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2010-2011

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• ANDRIY ZAYARNYUK



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Confronting the Past: Ukraine and Its History
A Festschrift in Honour of John-Paul Himka

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
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
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Preface

Those who have met John-Paul Himka in different periods of his life will have dissimilar impressions of his interests and beliefs. They might know him as a social historian of nineteenth-century Galicia, a specialist on Eastern Christian icons, or an authority on the Holocaust in Ukraine. They could also have met John-Paul as a Ukrainian Catholic priest in training, a Marxist who championed democracy and socialism in an independent Ukraine, a Ukrainian Orthodox Church parishioner in Edmonton, a proud Ukrainian Canadian, or a stern critic of historical mythologies widespread in the Ukrainian diaspora and in Ukraine. Finally, those who have known him longest are likely to call him John or Jack rather than John-Paul, Ivan, or Ivan-Pavlo. Yet, for all these changes over time, everybody who has encountered John-Paul Himka more than once over the years would agree that he has remained the same person—a man of principles guided by his conscience. He always was and remains a rock of support for his friends and students, but also a colleague ready to take a stand on the issues of academic integrity and a Ukrainian Canadian putting moral principles before perceived communal interests.

Born and raised in a working-class neighbourhood of Detroit, John-Paul was aware early on of his hyphenated ethnic identity as a Ukrainian American. In large part this happened because he was raised by his paternal grandmother, who emigrated from eastern Galicia to the United States in 1909. Yet his conscious interest in things Ukrainian dates from a later period, for he did not learn Ukrainian as a child and one's ethnic identity was not yet something to be proud of as he was growing up. John-Paul's interest in the Byzantine past and Eastern Christian world dates back to his training at a seminary, which he did not finish, choosing instead to pursue the same subjects at the University of Michigan. It was in Ann Arbor, as the often told story goes, that he discovered that one can win a scholarship and thus "get paid to read books one likes." Although John-Paul's focus in his undergraduate years remained in the field of Byzantine and Orthodox Christian studies (he was working with Professor John Fine), this was the grain from which his interest in modern Eastern Europe in general and Ukraine in particular developed. It was also in Ann Arbor in the 1970s that John-Paul got involved in student activism and discovered socialism.

Thus his transition to a Ph.D. program in Eastern European history at the same university came with a natural change of topic. Now working under Professor Roman Szporluk, John-Paul focused on the development of Ukrainian and Polish socialism in late nineteenth-century Galicia, later the subject of his first monograph (1983). By the time it was published, he was already in Edmonton, working as a research associate at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) from 1977 and teaching part-time in the Department of History at the University of Alberta. Soon after the death in 1984 of his illustrious predecessor, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, in 1985 John-Paul became a tenure-track assistant professor of East European history at the University of Alberta. In 1988 he was promoted to associate professor, and in 1992 he became a

full professor in what is now the Department of History and Classics. However, John-Paul has kept close contacts with CIUS, publishing with them his next monograph, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (1988), and serving as co-editor of the history articles in vols. 3–5 (1993) of the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* and director of the Research Program on Religion and Culture at CIUS since 2008.

At the University of Alberta John-Paul has flourished as a scholar and teacher and emerged as an authority on modern Ukrainian history. He built up an impressive graduate program in East European history, which understandably has had a prominent Ukrainian component, and developed a number of popular new courses on topics in Marxism, military, contemporary, and Ukrainian history, and historical methodology. He has earned a reputation as a good citizen of his university, serving on a variety of committees and in his large department, where administrative decisions have often been difficult, as associate chair for graduate studies and, for a year, as acting chair. Along the way he has continued to publish actively.

John-Paul has confessed to his friends that when he has had to allocate time for various work-related tasks and choose one assignment over another, his priorities have been his graduate and undergraduate students. His own scholarship has come third. Nevertheless, his books and articles have continued to appear regularly. Particularly influential among specialists are the monographs *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia* (1999) and *Last Judgment Iconography in the Carpathians* (2009). Within the Ukrainian diaspora community, his (often controversial) articles and op-ed pieces on wartime collaboration as a lacuna of Ukrainian historical memory, on the political uses of the Holodomor, and on the Holocaust in Ukraine have perhaps resonated more strongly than his other publications. As always, John-Paul's intellectual interests remain diverse. He never focuses exclusively on one topic, commenting about Soviet Ukrainian dissidents and Ukrainian art when writing about nineteenth-century Galicia, and presenting papers about Ukrainian cinema and historical memory when researching the Holocaust in Ukraine.

This diversity is well reflected in the present Festschrift, which combines contributions from John-Paul's Canadian, American, and Ukrainian colleagues in the many fields he has worked in and at the University of Alberta's departments of History and Classics and Modern Languages and Cultural Studies, and six of his former graduate students—Mark Baker, Serge Cipko, Yoshie Mitsuyoshi, Colin Neufeldt, Serhy Yekelchuk, and Andriy Zayarnyuk—who went on to pursue careers as historians. Ukrainian history is a major uniting theme of the articles included in the Festschrift, but what truly reflects John-Paul's personality is the spirit of revisionism, the search for new perspectives, and the introduction of new material—all traits found, in varying combinations and to varying degrees, in the contributions to this volume.

Andrew Colin Gow, Roman Senkus, Serhy Yekelchuk

My Past and Identities*

John-Paul Himka

Detroit was booming when I was born there in 1949, and it attracted immigrants from all over the eastern half of America: from the Delta, the Appalachians, and the moribund little coaltowns of Pennsylvania. My father was part of the anthracite emigration, as was my mother. I grew up in an extended family in which Polish, Ukrainian, Slovak, and Italian were tossed about by the older generation, above the heads of the monkey-in-the-middle younger generation to which I belonged. It was after the war, most of the men had seen service, everyone was too busy being American to imagine that there was any point in teaching us young 'uns the old languages, which hardly any of them could read or write in any case. The food was a mixture of city chicken, hot dogs, ravioli, and *golqbkki* (or *holubtsi*, depending on who was doing the talking). The older they were, the more old-country they were. My father and mother were the babies of their families and among the most assimilated. Still, there was a constant buzz of ethnicity in the air, even if none of the family had heard the word back then.

There was also my grandmother. My birth mother had passed away when I was a baby, and some years were to go by before my father remarried. In the meantime, I was raised by my grandmother, who came to live with us. She had left the old country in 1909 but had never really gotten a handle on English. When she came to raise me, though, she made a choice that both of us later regretted: she would improve her English by raising me in that language. I later had to learn her native language, and we switched to that as our medium of communication. It would be an understatement to say that I loved my grandmother very, very much, and I spent much of my childhood trying to figure her out. Where did she come from? She said, "Lemberg, Austria," but it wasn't on the map. Eventually I found it in a historical atlas in my father's library and matched the location on a modern map: it was now "Lvov, Russia." By about age twelve I had many things figured out, including that Grandma was Ukrainian, but Grandma was going to be constantly setting puzzles for me to solve, even long after she passed away. Many of the things she told me just didn't make sense in terms of the Ukrainian history I subsequently read and was taught. Long before I could express it, I understood that there was an important distinction to be made between the national codification of Ukrainian history and the actual past that was experienced by people who are counted as part of the Ukrainian nation.

* This essay was originally published in *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 165–69. It is reprinted here (with minor corrections) with the permission of the University of Michigan Press.

The big jump in my consciousness came when I was fourteen. I wanted to become a priest and left home for a minor seminary, St. Basil's, in Stamford, Connecticut. I had been baptized in the Roman Catholic Church, attended a Roman Catholic School, sang in Latin in Our Lady of Sorrows boys' choir, served as an altar boy at a Roman Catholic summer camp, and heard Sunday mass at the local Roman Catholic parish. But the discoveries of the previous few years had revealed to me that, in spite of this Roman Catholic upbringing, I was nonetheless canonically a member of an Eastern rite and that if I wanted to be a priest, I needed a special dispensation to enter the Roman priesthood. But by then I was all keen to enter Grandma's exotic church, as I thought of it, and off I went to the Ukrainian-rite seminary.

I received an incredible education at that institution over the next five years, taught by remarkable men. My teacher of Latin had done his doctorate with Moses Hadas at Columbia and had written his thesis in Latin; my music teacher was probably the most prominent conductor of the Ukrainian diaspora; my Ukrainian teacher has recently been named to succeed to the metropolitan throne of Lviv, that is, to assume the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church worldwide. Most of the teachers had doctorates and great erudition in complicated fields like patristic anthropology. Quite a few had serious academic publications to their credit. Devoted to their church and nation, they lavished their knowledge on us ingrate boys instead of making proper careers. We made fun of them all the time, but they inspired us to learn. We played sports, but we also followed the example of our preceptors, each according to his talents: arranging the sacred choral music of our church, painting icons, writing the lives of the saints, studying the traditions of the other Eastern churches.

Aside from this formal education, I learned a great deal about Ukrainians, particularly two kinds of Ukrainians: those whose parents had come after World War II and who were themselves born abroad (in other words: DPs) and those whose grandparents had immigrated before World War I, as mine had. These two groups accounted for the overwhelming majority of the seminarians, and there was always tension between them. Most of the first-immigration kids came from Pennsylvania and from an environment that retained much more of its Ukrainian character than mine had. I fit in well with these guys, from whose number my closest friends were drawn. But I was also impressed by the postwar immigrants: completely fluent in Ukrainian, possessing a worked-out nationalist worldview, tough-minded. With time, I was to gravitate more strongly toward them and to assimilate more of their culture. After I left the seminary, I always sought the company of this postwar immigration and eventually married into it.

My vocation was no match for the spirit of the times. At the end of the 1960s I left the seminary and plunged into the radical culture and radical politics of the outside world. At the University of Michigan, where I continued my education, my life consisted of militant demonstrations against the war, against racism, and against capitalist exploitation, as well as of lectures and seminars.

Michigan was an excellent place to continue my interest in things Ukrainian and develop a deeper interest in all things East European. Once again I had remarkable teachers, and peers. I came under the tutelage of Roman Szporluk, now [1991–2007] the Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University. I also studied Balkan history with John Fine and Russian history with Horace Dewey.

Close friends of my Michigan years included Roman Solchanyk and Patrick Moore, now prominent analysts of Ukrainian and Balkan affairs respectively, as well as Robert Donia, the Bosnian specialist, and Marian Krzyzowski, longtime editor of *Studium Papers*. In these years I also met the scholars connected with the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute; later I was to spend time with them at their home institution, and some of them were to end up with me in Edmonton.

During this period I had to reconstruct my own Ukrainian identity. The religious underpinnings had been shuttered. Moreover, I needed a Ukrainian identity that could accommodate the extreme leftism that I now espoused. My grandmother and one of my teachers at the seminary had already left me with some clues that I followed until I came upon the rich traditions of the Ukrainian socialist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And Professor Szporluk guided me to the Ukrainian socialist thinkers that exercised the largest influence on me for many years thereafter: the father of Ukrainian radicalism, Mykhailo Drahomanov, and the Marxist historian and interpreter of *Capital* and the *Grundrisse*, Roman Rosdolsky. I eventually was to write my doctoral dissertation (and first book) on the history of the socialist movement in Galicia and translate one of Rosdolsky's books into English.

I was not the only one trying to reconcile a Ukrainian identity with the radical North American zeitgeist. I came across the journal *New Directions* from New York and, really much more exciting for me at the time, the journals coming out from the Ukrainian New Left in Toronto: *Meta* and *Diialoh*. Later I was to move to Canada and marry *Meta*'s co-editor.

Before that, however, in 1974–76 I embarked on my first trip to Eastern Europe, spending a year in Cracow, six months in Leningrad, and a month each in Lviv and Kyiv. It was my first encounter with the other Ukrainians, the ones who had not left for the West. In Cracow the Ukrainians were similar to the postwar Ukrainians I knew back home: well versed in Ukrainian lore, nationalist, religious, antisocialist. We got along well in spite of many differences of opinion. In Leningrad I encountered greater variety: displaced Galicians with the nationalist worldview; other displaced Ukrainians who, like the national poet Taras Shevchenko over a century earlier, found that the alienation they experienced in the northern Russian metropolis only led them to a deeper appreciation of their roots, although, unlike Shevchenko, they did not know as much about these roots; others yet who could still remember some words of the Ukrainian language but had basically melted into “the Soviet people.”

Ukraine itself offered me even more variety. On that first trip and on many other trips over the next twenty-some years, I engaged in close encounters with mighty and fledgling scholars, illiterate peasant women, enraged dissidents, simpatico and obnoxious Russians (whether one or the other, their days in authority were numbered), writers, artists, stamp collectors, crooks, saints, and *biznesmeny* on the make. Over the years I watched my friends rewrite their autobiographies, redefine their present and past selves, and reconstruct their identities (I should add: as I myself am perforce doing in this essay).

In 1977 I left the United States for Canada, where I was offered a contract position at the University of Alberta. Again, I was fortunate in the company I encountered. The professor of Ukrainian history was one of the great luminaries of the diaspora, Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky. We became close friends, even though he was a conservative and by this time I was an orthodox Marxist. Until his death in 1984, he continually gave me

things to read and engaged me in discussion and debate, turning our friendship and working relationship also into a seminar. In Edmonton I was able to join the editorial board of *Diialoh*, which had moved there from Toronto. We had a slogan that captured our politics perfectly: "For socialism and democracy in an independent Ukraine." (Most of us later settled for the partial fulfillment of our program that history offered.) We published a journal in Ukrainian and, spicier yet, set up a modest smuggling and intelligence network in Eastern Europe and Ukraine. In addition to the deeply conspiratorial *Diialoh*, we also established a left-wing Ukrainian cultural society, Hromada, which in turn gave birth to the Hromada Housing Co-operative, where some of the old stalwarts (myself included) still live. In the late seventies/early eighties life was intense, all cigarettes and public forums and layouts and debates. Key figures in the milieu included Bohdan Krawchenko, whom we nicknamed "Captain Ukraine" and who later became director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and still later an adviser to the independent Ukrainian government; Myrna Kostash, author of *All of Baba's Children* and later head of the Writers' Union of Canada; Halyna Freeland, founder of Common Woman Books and presently executive director of the Ukrainian Legal Foundation in Kyiv; and many, many others, not least of whom was my wife Chrystia Chomiak, an indefatigable activist in many progressive Ukrainian causes.

In the later 1980s things began to change, most dramatically on the international scene, but also in my personal life. Chrystia and I had children, and I also ended up in the position formerly occupied by Professor Rudnytsky, with all the responsibilities that entailed. I managed to finish my second book, on the impact of the Ukrainian national movement on the Galician countryside, the most consistently Marxist book in my oeuvre. I decided that as my third monograph I would write a study of the Greek Catholic church in its relationship to the nationality question. It took me about ten years to write that book, during which time I re-examined and re-evaluated many of the premises I had been working with hitherto. It has been a time extremely fertile in ideas and, especially, doubts, one fruit of which is the study of national identity published in this volume.**

** That is, John-Paul Himka's article "The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions," in *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, ed. Suny and Kennedy, 109-64.

John-Paul Himka: A Select Bibliography, 1971–2011

AMR = *American Historical Review*
CASS = *Canadian–American Slavic Studies*
CIUS = *Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies*
CSP = *Canadian Slavonic Papers*
HURI = *Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute*
HUS = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*
JUS = *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*
SR = *Slavic Review*
UTP = *University of Toronto Press*

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Compiled by Roman Senkus

References to History and Historical Fiction in the Mohylanian Trivium

Natalia Pylypiuk

Can there be, beside the things that satisfy our physical needs, gentle reader, something more fulfilling and pleasing to the human's inquisitive disposition than the reading of books and the knowledge of people's past actions and behaviour? Can there be a quicker cure for those in grief than the diligent and adequate application of the medicine that books provide?

*Samiilo Velychko (c. 1670–after 1728)*¹

Samiilo Velychko began writing his monumental *Discourse on the War between the Cossacks and the Poles* ... in 1720 and continued working on it until approximately 1725. The resulting text covers historical events from 1648 to the 1700s and draws on numerous sources, including *Wojna domowa z Kozaki i Tatary* ... (1681) by the Polish author Samuel Twardowski, Samuel Pufendorf's general history of Europe (1682), and various Polish chronicles, as well as Ukrainian incunabula and manuscripts. Velychko employs motifs drawn from Torquato Tasso's *Gerusalemme liberata* and makes reference to religious writers, such as Ioannykii Galiatovsky, Dymytrii Tuptalo, and Symeon Polotsky. His express goal is to write the first comprehensive history of Cossack Ukraine during and after the rebellion of 1648. Although he is critical of numerous historical sources, Velychko experiments with the reconstruction or stylization of documents, invents speeches, and introduces fictional narrators. Endowed with a high poetic quality, many of his prose narratives are genuinely moving portrayals of the devastation brought about by the wars. Often, to illustrate his points, Velychko even cites excerpts from the poetry by Oleksander Buchynsky-Yaskold, Lazar Baranovych, Varlaam Yasynsky, and Ioan Velychkovsky. Notwithstanding his love for these poets, he dismisses from the very beginning the possibility of writing history in verse. Most importantly, his "Foreword to the Reader" reveals the kind of negative disposition toward literary activity—in particular, toward the writing of poetry—that we encounter among many authors educated at the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium. To begin understanding the creative tension

¹ "Єжели может що быти любопытствующему нраву челоуѣческому, кромѣ тѣлеснихъ требованій, ласкавий чителнику, такъ угодное, и приятное, яко чтеніе книжное, и въѣденіе прежде бывшихъ дѣяній и поведеній людскихъ. Єжели в печалехъ сущимъ можетъ що акъ скорое подати лѣкарство, яко тотъ-же книжный с прилѣжаніемъ и внимаіемъ уживаемый медикаментъ." Cited with minor orthographic adjustment according to Samiilo Velychko, *Skazaniie o voini kozatskoi z Poliakami* ..., vol. 1 (Kyiv: Arkheohrafichna komisiiia VUAN, 1926), 2. In this article all emphases, unless noted otherwise, and all translations of Velychko are mine.

and contradictions in Velychko's own *Discourse*, I maintain that it is necessary to study the kind of literary training he might have received at his alma mater. With this purpose in mind, my article investigates in preliminary fashion the references to poetic invention, history, and historical fiction in Mohylanian manuals of poetics and rhetoric.

All seventeenth- and eighteenth-century manuals of poetics and rhetoric prepared at the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium and its affiliates are Neo-Latin texts intended for students enrolled in the intermediate level of the *trivium*. Many of them indicate somewhere in the title that they were composed for the benefit of Ukrainian youth (*Roxolana iuventute*, in Latin). Some of them contain, among sample texts, illustrations of panegyric verses honouring school and church dignitaries, Ukrainian and Russian military leaders, and even the Russian Empress Anne. However, not one is dedicated to a contemporary Ukrainian hetman or ruling monarch, be he Polish or Russian. Varying in scope of treatment, these manuscripts were not intended for publication by their respective authors. Some, such as Mytrofan Dovhalevsky's bipartite *Hortus poeticus* [...] (1736–37), survive in elaborate presentation copies, apparently made by the professor himself. Others have reached us in more than one redaction and represent, in fact, records kept by students under tutorial supervision. Inasmuch as the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium, like all European upper-track educational establishments, emphasized extensive drills, theme writing, and other exercises, it is safe to assume that not one manual includes a complete inventory of actual classroom activity.²

The poetics manuals encapsulate, albeit in attenuated fashion, the didactic theory of art that had been codified in the West during the literary polemics of the sixteenth century.³ In fact, I propose that they can be considered as a subcategory of the humanistic theory of style for the following four reasons. (1) They discuss poetry in terms of the essential rhetorical exercise, the affirmation of ethical values. Thus, although Ukrainian preceptors accept that poetry succeeds as a pedagogical tool because it imparts pleasure, they do not promote this goal over teaching and moving. (2) They classify figures and tropes according to semantic or grammatical criteria and focus on issues such as etymology, the length of syllables, morphology, and elementary syntax.⁴ (3) Motivated as they are by the objective of developing the communication skills of

² Of the 28 extant poetics manuals and 183 extant rhetoric manuals, only three complete texts and the introductory fragment of a fourth appeared in print in the twentieth century. However, the various studies by N. Petrov, H. Syvokin, R. Lužny, P. Lewin, V. Masliuk, and V. Lytvynov quote extensively from the other manuals. Their work has enabled my current discussion, which I offer as a tentative conceptualization of questions that need to be addressed in the future. For a description of the rhetoric manuals, see Ya. M. Stratii, V. D. Lytvynov and V. A. Andrushko, *Opisanie kursov filosofii i ritoriki professorov Kiev-Mogilianskoi akademii* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1982), 11–151.

³ For a summary of this polemic, see O. B. Hardison, Jr., *The Enduring Monument: A Study of the Idea of Praise in Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 43–67.

⁴ The sole exception is Teofan Prokopovych's *De arte poetica libri III* (1705), which consistently emphasizes the "emotive" power of stylistic ornament. It should be noted, however, that this manual appears to have been composed for a more mature audience, one already initiated into the mysteries of Latin.

the collegium's students, the manuals emphasize the study methods of *copia verborum* and the techniques of amplification. Thus implicitly they instill respect for the exhibition of art rather than its concealment. (4) Finally, the bulk of their illustrative material is drawn from Latin and Neo-Latin authors accepted in the curriculum of the European upper-track educational establishment. The Polish examples they cite are either: (a) translations, periphrases or analogs of classical models; (b) illustrations of imitation, amplification techniques, and so on, or (c) expressions of the ethical values (classical and Christian) that both the Humanists and humanistic teachers prized.⁵ Numerous as they are, these examples do not represent, by far, the full spectrum of contemporary Polish letters. Instead they are selections drawn strictly from published sources. The manuals do include Latin, Polish, and Slavonic verses written by the instructors themselves. These, however, also function as illustrations of the points expounded in a given lesson.

By all appearances, Ukrainian preceptors did not follow the standard critical practice of designating the genus and differentia of poetry, which was observed in West European treatises.⁶ This oversight might stem from the fact that in the *trivium* the study of poetics was subordinate to, and intimately linked with, the study of classical and sacred languages. Thus perhaps, the compilers of the manuals associated poetry—in the first place—with grammar⁷ and therefore felt relieved from the responsibility of identifying the place of poetry among other branches of human learning.

Mohylanian preceptors pursued the instruction of Latin and Slavonic, allowing the use of Polish and Ukrainian strictly as respective ancillary tools. In true humanistic fashion, they frequently emphasized the power of skilled expression. However, they never explicitly aligned the poetics course with the goal of reinstating Roman pre-eminence in art or protecting the ascendance of Polish poetry. What is more, they never proposed the need to develop a body of poetry in either the sacral language, Slavonic, or their native vernacular, Ukrainian. When in his defence of poetry, among the standard commonplaces, Prokopovych declares that poetry preserves for posterity the heroic virtues of distinguished individuals, he underscores poetry's usefulness—its capacity to depict models worthy of imitation. He does not, however, identify the "heroes" or "posterity" with any specific cultural group. He does so only in the rhetoric course, when describing the benefits that eloquence would bring to his own wartorn country.

Thus, in sharp contrast to the West European models that inspired them, Ukrainian preceptors do not conceive of poetry as a discrete manifestation of a historical and

⁵ See the summary provided in Ryszard Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska: Z dziejów związków kulturalnych polsko-wschodniosłowiańskich w XVII–XVIII w.* (Cracow: Jagiellonian University, 1966), 103–105.

⁶ The tradition of classifying poetics among the sciences is discussed in Bernard Weinberg, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 1–37.

⁷ A similar approach can be detected among Orthodox preceptors even before Mohyla's reforms gave priority to the study of Latin. Consider, for example, the fact that Meletii Smotrytsky's Slavonic grammar included a section on prosody, in which he attempted to make Slavonic conform to classical rules. His melancholy effort is not an isolated phenomenon, however. Edmund Spenser, George Harvey, Richard Stanyhurst, and Thomas Campion made similar attempts for the English language. See Hardison, *The Enduring Monument*, 7–10.

cultural continuum that can be claimed as their own. Moreover, they do not define it as a phenomenon that can be developed and perpetuated.⁸

References to history and/or historical material do appear in Mohylanian poetics manuals. Firstly, they surface implicitly in conjunction with the various defenses of poetic fiction that the preceptors articulated. One such defense is the standard exculpation of poets from the Platonic charge that they are liars. Consider, for example, the following statement in the *Liber artis poeticae* ... of 1637–38: “After all, the responsibility of the poet is to expound not so much what has taken place, but what could have taken place. If in this fashion his narration is not truthful, *this is not a sin*.”⁹ A similar argument appears in the 1696 manual *Lyra variis praeceptorum* [...]:

[... T]here is no need to inculcate the poet and also [his] poetry as unconscionable liars, on the grounds that he invents, because *the poet's invention is not a lie*, as we normally understand this word; and [the poet] does not speak contrary to reason as do liars; he depicts objects in accordance with reason.¹⁰

Eighteenth-century manuals also express such sentiments. For example, the 1735 manual *Cunabula erudita* ..., which was prepared in Chernihiv, states:

Just as a painter, when expressing [himself], devises an idea and *does not lie*, because he paints that which he has preconceived, *thus the writer of fiction or the poet*, making a subtle poetic point and creating something not real but verisimilar, *in truth does not lie*.¹¹

Similarly, in the well-known *Hortus Poeticus* ... of 1736–37, Dovhalevsky instructs his young charges that whatever they invent is not untrue, because—as poets—they create in accordance with the rules of logic:

The poet depicts something verisimilarly and sings about it in verse. It does not follow from this that the Cretan word for “invention”—untruth [ποίησις = fabrication] refers to the poet and poetry, as the simple people believe, because *what you, poets*,

⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the relationship of Mohylanian manuals vis-à-vis the humanistic and courtly theories of style, see my article “Kyivski poetyky i renesansni teorii mystetstva,” in *Yevropeiske vidrodzhennia ta ukrainska literatura XIV–XVIII st.*, ed. Oleksa Myshanych (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993), 75–109.

⁹ “Адже обов’язок поета викладати не стільки те, що відбулося, скільки те, що могло відбуватися. Якщо таким чином, його оповідь не є правдивою; то в цьому нема гріха” (Ukrainian trans. of the Latin original cited according to V. I. Krekoten, “Kyivska poetyka 1637 roku,” in *Literaturna spadshchyna Kyivskoi Rusi i ukrainska literatura XVI–XVIII st.*, ed. O. V. Myshanych [Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1981]), 129). The English trans. of this and of all subsequent Ukrainian or Russian renderings of Latin texts are mine.

¹⁰ “[H]а том основаніи, что поэт вымышляет нельзя обвинять его, а ровно и поэзію в безсовѣстной лжи, потому что *вымысел поэта не есть ложь*, как обыкновенно понимается это слово, и не противное разуму говорит он, как лжецы; но преимущественно изображает предметы, согласные с разумом.” (cited according to N. Petrov, “O slovesnykh naukakh i literaturnykh zaniatiakh v Kievskoi akademii ot nachala eia do preobrazovaniia v 1819 godu,” *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* 17 [1866]: 313).

¹¹ “*Sicut pictor exprimens excogitat ideam, non mentitur, quia id pingit, quod praeconcepit, itaque fictor seu poeta versificans acumen et fingens non verum, verisimile tamen, vero non mentitur*” (cited according to V. P. Masliuk, *Latynomovni poetyky i rytoryky XVII—pershoi polovyny XVIII st. ta ikh rol u rozvytku teorii literatury na Ukraini* [Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1983], 30). English trans. by Patrick Conway (University of Alberta).

invent is not untrue and does not contradict sound reason. The poet, says the Cretan [philosopher], always invents or creates something in accordance with the rules of logic.¹²

Recurring even more frequently in the Kyivan manuals are remarks that echo the compromise between the tradition sanctioning the use of history by poets and the critics loyal to Aristotle. Let us recall that Aristotle designated the poet as a maker of plots, or fictions, and considered fable to be the essence of poetry. In his opinion, it was Homer who had chiefly taught other poets the art of telling lies skilfully. Few critics were willing to defend poetic fiction per se. After all, zealous Christian authors had objected to pagan literature precisely because they did not consider the ability to lie effectively a virtue.

As a result of the compromise reached in the sixteenth century, poets were encouraged to select material from history in order to make their narratives credible. But they were also allowed to exercise invention when embellishing true episodes and creating new ones. Verisimilitude of invention became the pivotal criterion in poetry. Consider the following passage from *Liber artis poeticae* ... (1637–38): “If the [poet’s narration] is not verisimilar, in other words, if it depicts inadequately, if it tells about something that could not have taken place, then it loses the right to be called a [poetic] narrative, losing, as Cicero said, its appeal.”¹³ The *Tractatus tres de chria, periodis et epistolis* ... of 1687 makes a similar argument in reference to epic poetry while recommending that material be drawn from the historians: “The story of any extraordinary event one needs to take from the historians, describing any one’s life; and if their versions differ among themselves, the poet may imitate whomsoever he desires.”¹⁴ On the other hand, the manual *Helicon bivertex* ... of 1689 makes a parallel recommendation in reference to dramatic poetry: “Where I have said that part of the story was ‘true,’ it must be noted that there history must be understood through the story (*fabula*), which is indeed called a story, because more things were added to it than were actually true.”¹⁵

¹² “Поет зображує якусь річ правдоподібною й оспівує віршем. Та з цього не випливає, що критське слово ‘видумка’ – неправда стосується поета і поезії, як вважає простий народ, бо те, що ви поете видумуєте, не є неправдою і не суперечить здоровому глуздові. Поет, як каже критянин, завжди видумує або створює якусь річ згідно з правилами логіки” (Ukrainian trans. of Latin original cited according to Mytrofan Dovhalevsky, *Poetyka: Sad poetychnyi*, translated, edited, and annotated by V. P. Masliuk [Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 1973], 33–34).

¹³ “Якщо [оповідь поета] не правдоподібна, тобто якщо погано зображає, якщо оповідає про те, чого не могло бути, тоді вона втрачає право називатися [поетичною] оповіддю, гублячи як казав Ціцерон, привабливість” (cited according to Krekoten, “Kyivska poetyka 1637 roku,” 129).

¹⁴ “Разказ о каком либо знаменитом происшествии нужно брать из историков, описавших чью либо жизнь, и если они будут разногласны между собою то поэт может следовать кому хочет” (cited according to Petrov, “O slovesnykh naukakh,” 346).

¹⁵ “Advertendum est ubi dixi actum partem esse fabulae ibi per fabulam intelligenda est historia, quae ideo dicitur fabula, qui in illa plura adduntur, quam fuerint” (cited according to Paulina Łewin, “Nieznaną poetyka Kijowska z XVII wieku,” in *Z dziejów stosunków literackich polsko-ukraińskich*, ed. Stefan Kozak and Marian Jakóbiec [Wrocław and Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1974], 77, n. 34). Trans. Patrick Conway.

The manual *Lyra variis praeceptorum* ... of 1696 emphasizes that poetic creation is tantamount to verisimilar imitation, to the invention of something plausible: "To do something poetically is to imitate in a certain way the images of things ... through an invented fantasy of things and modes.... [It] does not put forth new and existing things, but *things that are verisimilar and capable of similitude to true and existing things ... things that are and things that are not but are capable of being.*"¹⁶

In his *De Arte Poetica Libri* ... III (1705) Teofan Prokopovych also emphasizes verisimilar imitation of human actions as the criterion of poetry. A composition in verse may not be considered poetry unless it conveys a fiction, an act of imitation. History, on the other hand, even when written in verses, does not have poetic license to create (invent) things that appear verisimilar:

The first thing that justifies all poetry is fiction [= invention] or imitation; if this is absent, however many verses shall have been composed, they will be nothing other than verses: They will certainly be called "poems" without justification. If you wish to call them "poems," you will call them a dead thing. *For imitation is the soul of poetry*, as is clear from the definition.... [T]he philosopher [Aristotle] sought to dispel the error of many who maintain that it suffices to compose verses to be a poet. *History, which is required by law to describe events that have actually transpired and the manner in which they have transpired, lacks the license to invent things that feign verisimilitude. For this reason, even if it is written down in verse, it will remain history and not poetry.* Through "fiction" or "imitation" one understands not only the context of stories [fabulae] but the whole reason for writing them, through which human actions, even if they are real, are nonetheless portrayed in a manner similar to what is real.¹⁷

Furthermore, as late as in 1746, in his *Praecepta de arte poetica* ..., Heorhii Konysky reiterates the idea that imitation is pivotal in the creation of poetry: "Fiction, or imitation, is the shape and soul of poetry, as it were."¹⁸

Following Plato's own lead, Renaissance defenders of poetry tended to emphasize hymns and praise of famous men. They pointed that epideictic prescriptions of praise relied on historical material. The topics of *effictio*, for example, included such facts as

¹⁶ "...[P]oëtica facere est imitari quodam modo simulacra rerum [...] per excogitativam rerum et modorum phantasiam [...] non profert res novas et existentes, *sed verisimiles et possibiles ad similitudinem rerum verarum et existentium ... res, quae sunt et quae non sunt, sed fieri possunt*" (cited according to Masliuk, *Latynomovni poetyky*, 26). Trans. Patrick Conway and Natalia Pylypiuk.

¹⁷ "Primum est, quod in omni poemate praecipuum sibi jus vendicat, fictio seu imitatio, quae si desideretur, quotquot fuerint versus compositi, nihil aliud quam versus erunt: poema certe immerito vocabuntur, aut si velis poema dicere, mortuum appellabis. *Imitatio enim est anima poeseos*, sicut ex definitione planum est. [...] Dicit hoc philosophus, ut refellat multorum errorem, qui solam versificationem putant sufficere ad poetam officium: *historia enim, cui lex imponitur & res vergestas & eo modo, quo gestae sunt, describere, caret licentia fingendi verisimilia*. Quapropter etiam versu descripta manebit historia non poema. *Per fictionem vero seu imitationem intellige non solum contextum fabularum, sed totam eam* [cas?—NP] *scribendi rationem, qua actiones humanas, tametsi verae sint, verisimiliter tamen effiguntur*" (Feofan Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, ed. I. P. Eremin [Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1961], 238–39). Trans. Patrick Conway and Natalia Pylypiuk.

¹⁸ "*Fictio seu imitatio est quasi forma et anima poeseos*" (cited according to Masliuk, *Latynomovni poetyky*, 28). Trans. Patrick Conway.

race, nation, family, and strength. *Notatio*, on the other hand, called for the narration of the person's famous deeds—*gesta*.¹⁹ This combination of poetry, history, and rhetoric significantly influenced the Renaissance concept of epic. It also blurred the boundaries between epic and the poetry of praise.²⁰

Such blurring of boundaries is perceptible in numerous panegyrics addressed to prominent Ukrainian figures.²¹ It should not surprise us, therefore, when we find it reflected in various Mohylanian poetics manuals. Consider, for example, that the anonymous *Lyra variis praeceptorum* ... of 1696 enumerates eight epideictic kinds as examples of epic poetry: *genethliaca* (i.e., birthday poems); *epithalamica* (i.e., wedding poems); *encomiastica* (i.e., poems formally expressing praise); *dirae* (i.e., poems expressing imprecation); *eucharistica* (i.e., poems expressing gratitude); *paramithetica* (i.e., poems expressing consolation or encouragement); *pathetica* (i.e., poems evoking pathos [?]); and the *epicedium* (i.e., funeral or bereavement poem).²² This very list reappears in Dovhalevsky's *Hortus poeticus* [...] (1736–37).²³

In some of the manuals epic is not directly associated with panegyric. However, besides mentioning and briefly excerpting Vergil, such manuals seldom give examples of epic poetry. When they do, they point to various Jesuit works, e.g., Jacob Biderman's *Herodias*, which is an imitation of Vergil; Papinius Statius's *Thebaide* and his *Achilleid*, an imitation of Aldus Manutius; Andreas Canon's *Fodinae Bochnenses, hypotyposis patientis Dei*, an imitation of Papinius Statius; and Albertus Ines's *Lechias, ducum principum, ac regum Poloniae, Ab usque Lecho deductorum, Elogia historico-politica, et panegyres lyricae. In quibus Compendiosa totius Historiae Poloniae Epitome exhibetur* [...], a panegyric that praises, among others, Anna Chodkiewicz, patron of the Jesuit college in Ostrih, and Jan Chodkiewicz's role in the war against Muscovy.²⁴ Interestingly, in his poetics manual Prokopovych recommends both

¹⁹ Hardison, Jr., *The Enduring Monument*, 48–49.

²⁰ Sixteenth-century humanists were guided by the desire to create a Christian poem that would equal the *Aeneid*. An important literary problem for them was the reconciliation of the aesthetic and moral aims of poetry and the interpretation of Aristotle and Horace. Thus, for example, when Girolamo Vida sets out to educate a poet who will write epic, it becomes clear that he understands epic as hymns and encomia, the two poetic types that Plato allowed in his *Republic*: "Of all the genres of song, none is so excellent (save songs of the gods) as that in which poets recount heroes' deeds [...] my first concern here will be teaching how one may tell the praises and deeds of the gods and the heroes descended from gods" (cited according to Ralph G. Williams, *The De Arte Poetica of Marco Girolamo Vida* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1976], 5); also cf. the discussion on 127.

²¹ Simon Pecalid's *De bello Ostrogiano ad Piantcos cum Nisoviis libri quattuor* (1600), which deals with Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky's victory over his own rebellious Cossacks, is a good example of epic narrative fused with panegyric. (A slightly abbreviated Ukrainian trans. of the Latin original is available at <litopys.org.ua/suspil/sus32.htm>.) On the other hand, Sofronii Pochasky's *Eucharisterion albo Vdiachnost* (1632), which combines the strategies of the *actio gratiarum* and the *epinicion*, frequently treats its addressee, Petro Mohyla, in heroic terms. For a facsimile reproduction, see *The Kiev Mohyla Academy: Commemorating the 350th Anniversary of Its Founding* (1632), vol. 8 (1984) of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*.

²² Masliuk, *Latynomovni poetyky*, 126.

²³ Dovhalevsky, *Poetyka*, 176–83.

²⁴ Petrov, "O slovesnykh naukakh," 349. *Lechias* is available as an e-book at <books.google.ca/books?id=4BgVAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=lechias>.

Torquato Tasso's *Gerusalemme Liberata* and John Barclay's *Argenis*,²⁵ whereas Lavrentii Horka singles out Actius Sannazario's *De partu virginis*.²⁶

The Ukrainian practice of having each preceptor prepare his own Neo-Latin manual ended in 1776, when the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium officially adopted Apollo Baibakov's printed Russian manual, *Pravyla piytycheskiiia o stikhotvorenii rossiiskom y latynskom*.²⁷ Introduced in Moscow two years earlier, this book, like the Mohylanian manuals before it, was a compilation drawn from various Neo-Latin sources, including Kyivan manuals.²⁸ By his own admission, in his section on Latin prosody Baibakov relied on Gerard I. Vossius's *Poeticarum Institutionum libri III* (Amsterdam, 1647).²⁹ Significantly, the book's first part is devoted to Russian versification and draws upon the theory of Vasilii Trediakovsky. Besides Russian translations of excerpts drawn from Vergil, its illustrative material includes Mikhail Lomonosov's poetry, Mikhail Kheraskov's *Vladimir vozrozhdennyi* and *Rossiiada*, as well as selections of Lomonosov's *Petriada*. It is worth recalling in this context that these poems also fuse the boundaries between epic and panegyric. Needless to say, the introduction of Baibakov's manual reoriented the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium's linguistic priorities and introduced Russian historical myths and a radically different cultural framework for the study of poetry.

Another element of the Renaissance didactic theory that surfaces in Kyiv manuals of poetics is connected with the refutation of the Platonic charge that poetry excites negative passions. Here emphasis on *actiones humanas* as the pre-eminent subject matter of poetry and its edificatory function plays an important role. Witness the following three examples: "Poetry is the art of portraying in verses *human actions* and explaining them to teach life" (*Fons castalius* ..., 1685);³⁰ "Poetry is the art of depicting *the deeds*

²⁵ Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, 293.

²⁶ Petrov, "O slovesnykh naukakh," 351.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 352.

²⁸ Indeed it would be difficult to argue that theoretical innovation was a goal any one instructor of poetics pursued in upper-track educational establishments. Kyivan professors made liberal recourse to the treatises of Girolamo Vida (pub. 1527), Julius Caesar Scaliger (pub. 1561), the Jesuit preceptors Jacobus Pontanus (pub. 1600) and Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski (written between 1619 and 1626), and numerous others. They frequently, if not always, acknowledged their sources. To dismiss their pedagogical efforts merely on the charge that they were derivative would undermine our understanding of a crucial period in the history of Ukrainian culture. Moreover, from the standpoint of Renaissance scholarship, such an indictment would be rather incongruous. We know that the very European authors from whom the Kyivans borrowed material for their lectures had not necessarily laboured under the obligation of developing original literary theory. As Charles Sears Baldwin explains: "The revival of classical Latin was promoted by manuals and discussions, and accompanied by still others directed to vernacular poetry. *Though none of these ranks as a poetic in the sense of a contribution to the theory of poetry*, not a few reveal or define habits of thought and taste, directions of study, literary ideals and methods. Thus their importance, far beyond their intrinsic values, is in their clues to literary preoccupations and trends, their indications for a Renaissance weather map" (*Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice: Classicism in the Rhetoric and Poetic of Italy, France, and England, 1400–1600* [Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959], 154).

²⁹ For a description of Baibakov's manual, see Paulina Lewin, *Wykłady poetyki w uczelniach Rosyjskich XI/III w. (1722–1774) a tradycje Polskie* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1972), 94–97.

³⁰ "Poësis est ars hominum actiones effigens easque ad vitam instituendam carminibus explicans" (cited in Masliuk, *Latynomovni poetyky*, 26).

of human beings in order to teach life [experiences]" (*Lyra variis praeceptorum ...*, 1696);³¹ and "[T]he nature of poetry corresponds to its own name, for it is the art of representing human actions and applying them to the customs of life in song" (Prokopovych, *De Arte Poetica Libri ... III*, 1705).³² The Ukrainian scholar Vitalii Masliuk does cite manuals where the subject matter of poetry is defined more broadly. He stresses, however, that the general tendency in most manuals is to give preference to *actiones humanas*.³³

Intimately related to the refutation of the charge that poetry incites negative passions is the argument that poets represent what ought to have happened rather than what actually happened. As the American scholar O. B. Hardison, Jr., explains, such licence constituted a justification for historical fiction:

In terms of the logical categories so frequently invoked by sixteenth-century critics, pure fiction is related to sophistic and consequently is falsehood made to seem like truth. On the other hand, to relate historical events in terms of what ought to be, is to describe them according to the probabilities of moral philosophy. For instance history teaches us that tyrants are sometimes successful, but moral philosophy teaches us that they ought to be failures. If the poet modifies history to make it accord with this principle, he cannot be accused of lying in the simple sense of the term. His narrative is related to dialectic rather than sophistic, and its deviations from history are instances where truth of particulars has been sacrificed for the higher truth of moral universals. For this reason humanistic critics regularly invoked the theory of idealization to justify poetic fictions.³⁴

Thus it should not surprise us when Ukrainian poetics frequently emphasize that the poet describes what ought to be, or could have been. For example, the manual *Liber artis poeticae ...* (1637–38) states: "[The] responsibility of the poet is to present ... what could have happened."³⁵ Similarly, the *Lyra variis praeceptorum ...* (1696) maintains that the poet describes things that could be.³⁶ Whereas Prokopovych in his *De Arte Poetica Libri ... III* (1705) explicates: "The poet, however, closely considers later actions in a particular hero, having left out those earlier ones; that is, he does not write the things that were done by a certain person, but *those that could or should have been done*."³⁷

Such idealization according to the probabilities of moral philosophy involved the creation of images, patterns, examples, or exemplary mirrors of virtue. It was ex-

³¹ "Поєзія є мистецтво передавати людські вчинки для життєвого повчання ..." (*Lyra variis praeceptorum ...*, cited according to the trans. in H. M. Syvokin, *Davni ukrainski poetyky* [Kharkiv: Kharkivskyi derzhavnyi universytet, 1960], 46).

³² "Nomini suo correspondet natura poeseos: est enim *ars effingendi humanas actiones, easque ad vitae institutionem carmine explicandi*" (Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, 237). Trans. by Patrick Conway.

³³ Masliuk, *Latynomovni poetyky*, 26–27.

³⁴ Hardison, *The Enduring Monument*, 57.

³⁵ "[O]бов'язок поета викладати ... те, що могло відбутися" (Krekoten, "Kyivska poetyka 1637 roku," 129).

³⁶ "[R]es, quae ... fieri possunt" (Masliuk, *Latynomovni poetyky*, 26).

³⁷ "Poeta autem neglectis illis prioribus posteriores in aliquo heroe actiones considerat, hoc est, non scribit, quae ab aliquo gesta sunt, sed *quae geri potuerunt, aut debuerunt*" (Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, 290). Trans. Patrick Conway.

pected that these would arouse in the audience both admiration and the desire to emulate. Prokopovych—when discussing the differences in method that distinguish the poet from the historian and the moral philosopher—states that the poet depicts general virtues (or vices) and attributes them to a single individual. The mirror thus created serves as an example: for philosophy, in general, considers matters taken in general rather than each taken separately, since, as the dialecticians say, knowledge is not given from particulars. Moreover, in this respect poetry diverges from philosophy, because the philosopher deals with general things generally and does not limit them with specificities. *It is true that the poet depicts general vices or virtues, but he does this as [if they were] the discrete actions of some person. The political philosopher teaches that a brave man ought to be of such quality, the poet sings that Ulysses, or Aeneas, was of such quality.* Poetry, therefore, both stands apart from philosophy and history and touches upon them in a certain way, as if with both arms. The poet describes the actions of specific people, as does the historian; but *the historian presents how these actions were done while the poet presents how they ought to have been done.* In the same way, the poet considers the general actions of a man, as does the philosopher. But *the philosopher considers these actions without ornamentation and without [creating an] example, while the poet attributes them to specific people.* There is a reason why the poet ought to handle matters in this way, because *it is not the intention of the poet, as it is of the historian, to hand down "things accomplished" to the memory of posterity, but to teach men of what quality they ought to be in a given situation, or even what sort of life they ought to live.* Political philosophers also do this; however, the poet displays his own civil doctrine [= political leanings] in the deeds of a certain hero, *as if in some mirror, and by praising him sets [the hero] forth as an example to others.*³⁸

Whatever the degree of idealization a given *exemplum* might present, verisimilitude remained a pivotal criterion in poetic invention. To be sure, there existed much confusion concerning the definition of this concept. But, as Hardison explains, it is more important to remember the objective of verisimilitude rather than the methods employed to attain it. Didactic critics unanimously agreed that the audience would be persuaded by the applicability of a moral lesson only if they actually believed that the events depicted were true.³⁹

³⁸ "[P]hilosophia enim cotelatur res in genere sumptas non singulas, cum de particularibus (ut dialectici loquuntur) non detur scientia; dissidet tamen hac in re & a philosophia poesis; nam philosophus generalia generaliter pertractat, nec ea adstringit singularitate. Poeta vero generalia quidem seu vitia, seu virtutis depingit, sed tamquam singulares alicuius personae actiones. Politicus philosophus docet talem debere esse virum fortem, poeta canit talem fuisse Ulyssem, talem Aeneam. Poesis igitur & distat a philosophia atque historia, & illas veluti duplici brachio quodammodo attingit. Scribit poeta res gestas certarum personarum, quod facit historicus; sed historicus, quomodo gestae sint, poeta quomodo geri debuerint, exponit. Item cotelatur poeta generales hominum actiones, sicut & philosophus; sed philosophus eas nudas & sine exemplo considerat, poeta certis personis attribuit. Causa est cur hoc modo res tractare debeat poeta; quia poetae intentum non est, sicut historici res gestas ad posteritatis memoriam transmittere, sed docere homines, quales hoc vel in illo vitae genere esse debeant, id quod faciunt etiam politici philosophi; poeta tamen civilem suam doctrinam, veluti in speculo quodam, in rebus gestis herois alicujus ostendit eumque laudando ceteris proponit pro exemplo" (Prokopovich. *Sochineniia*, 291). Trans. Patrick Conway and Natalia Pylypiuk.

³⁹ Hardison, *The Enduring Monument*, 59.

It is interesting to note in this context that *exemplum* was considered as a most effective device in rhetoric. In logic, however, where the main goal is formal proof rather than persuasion, it was viewed as a third-rate tool.⁴⁰ This difference between the goals and methods of the rhetoricians, on the one hand, and the logicians, on the other, may have contributed to the low prestige of poetry in the *quadrivium*, the upper sequence of courses in the humanistic school.

The defense of poetry from the charge that it is insufficiently philosophical does not appear frequently in Mohylanian manuals. When it does appear, it echoes the standard arguments concerning allegory and fable, and their ability to convey moral principles or useful doctrine. In some cases preceptors designate poets as the interpreters of God: "There is nothing nobler than poetry. After all, poets are the interpreters of the words and thoughts of God, whose essence they reveal, teaching people the divine services and reverence toward God; thanks to the poets, mortals learn all kinds of good things" (*Liber artis poeticae* ..., 1637–38).⁴¹ In his manual Prokopovych emphasizes that the earliest poetry was philosophical and relied on hieroglyphics and other symbols:

Therefore from the very evidence that it takes in hand, poetry acquires its great importance. In addition, philosophy, that great light of the human mind, was either born from or nourished by poetry. For those authors who have written about the various schools and different types of philosophers say that the very first, most ancient philosophy was poetic ... It was done after the custom of the Egyptians (who by all indications were the first to philosophize), for they wrap all the more divine conceptions in hieroglyphics and certain signs, subject to [their] likeness ...⁴²

Lavrentii Horka, on the other hand, distills the *exemplum* of *actiones humanas* to the point that it becomes an allegorical type. Consider the discussion concerning the depiction of the courageous ruler as a type that appears in his *Idea artis poëseos* ... (1707):

[W]hether the poet invents a topic or only its manner, he is singularly required to ... depict universal virtues ... for example, that heads [of state] intelligently govern the state, draft laws, decree rights, judge, give out awards, and so on. Such virtues are universal because they befit every head [of state]. But there also are individual virtues, such as, for example, when a head [of state] draws, sings, [or] plays the harp. However, this can befit him [merely] as a [private] individual; it does not befit [him] qua head [of state]. The poet, disregarding whatever contradicts the authority of a head [of state], will find in the famous hero only those deeds that speak of his leadership. In other words, [the poet] writes not what was actually accomplished, but what could have been accomplished. *If he wishes to praise a courageous military*

⁴⁰ Ibid., 53–54.

⁴¹ "Що шляхетніше, ніж поезія. Адже поети – тлумачі слів і помислів Бога. вони розкривають їхню суть, учать людей священнодіянню і богопоклонінню: завдяки поетам смертні навчаються всілякому добру" (cited according to Krekoten, "Kyivska poetyka 1637 roku," 126).

⁴² "Vel ex ipso igitur argumento, quod tractat, magna momenta pretii sui accepit poesis. Adde, quod ingens illud mentis humanae lumen philosophia aut nata aut enutrita a poesi est: qui enim de variis sectis & diverso genere philosophorum scripserunt auctores, primam eamque vetustissimam philosophiam dicunt esse poeticam ... Sive id ex more Aegyptiorum factum est (qui primi videntur coepisse philosophari) illi enim omnia diviniore sensa hieroglyphicis & signis quibusdam sub similitudine involvebant" (Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, 234).

*leader, he need not describe in detail how he actually waged war, but needs to invent the manner in which every courageous military leader ought to wage war and then attribute this to his hero.*⁴³

The fable and those allegories that were devoted to topics other than *actiones humanas* represented two kinds of writing that were not strictly regulated by the criterion of verisimilitude. Prokopovych, for example, while emphasizing that the fable had to be invented verisimilarly, allowed that it was not a truthful narrative. He also recommended it as a tool for the instruction of the uneducated.⁴⁴ In a similar vein, Mytrofan Dovhalevsky distinguished two distinct types of poetic invention. He maintained that verisimilitude assists the poet in avoiding the incorrect and naive portrayal of reality. But he also acknowledged that poetic invention in allegory is quite different, because it depends on imaginary rather than true verisimilitude. Unlike Prokopovych, however, he argued that the fable does not observe verisimilitude at all:

What are the virtues of poetic invention? ... [T]hat it be verisimilar ... so that things do not hurt our ears with their incorrect and naive depiction. For this reason the poet ought to invent things that could have probably happened....

Note the difference between invention and allegory. Allegory concerns all kinds of imaginary similarities, which invention entirely does not. Allegory attributes to inanimate objects the qualities of animate [beings], whereas invention ascribes to people real deeds, intentions....

Remember: the fable and invention, taken not in their narrow but in their wider sense, are one and the same thing, but there is one [significant] difference between them. Poetic invention has a certain dose of reality, and this thing, upon which it is grounded like on a foundation, is also seemingly real. The fable does not have this.⁴⁵

⁴³ "[В]ымышляет ли поэт самый предмет, или же только способ его, он должен единственно стараться о том ... чтобы указывать общія добродѣтели ... напр. что начальники благоразумно управляютъ государством, начертываютъ законы, постановляютъ права, судятъ, раздаютъ награды и проч. Эти добродѣтели суть общія, потому что идутъ всякому начальнику, но есть и частныя, как напр., если начальник рисует, поет, играет на арфѣ – и это не идет начальнику, как начальнику, но может идти как частному человѣку ... Но поэт, пренебрегши тѣм, что противорѣчитъ авторитету начальника, наблюдаетъ в известном героѣ только начальническія дѣйствія, т.е. пишет не о том что сдѣлано, а о том что могло быть сдѣлано. Если он желаетъ воспитать харабраго полководца, то он не должен курьезно разказывать о том – каким образом он вел войны, а должен наблюдать, каким образом каждый храбрый полководец должен вести войны, и этот тип приписывать своему герою ..." (cited according to Petrov, "O slovesnykh naukakh," 318).

⁴⁴ Prokopovich, *Sochineniia*, 266.

⁴⁵ "Які достоїнства поетичної видумки? ... щоб вона була правдоподібною. [...] щоб речі не вражали наш слух їх неправильним та наївним зображенням. Тому поет повинен видумувати речі, які ... могли б правдоподібно траплятись ...

Зверни увагу на відмінність між видумкою та алегорією. Алегорія дбає про всякого роду уявну подібність, якої зовсім не має видумка. Алегорія приписує неживим предметам властивості живих, а видумка приписує особам начебто справжні вчинки, наміри ...

Запам'ятай: байка і видумка, взята не у вузькому, а в широкому розумінні, – це одне й те саме, однак існує між ними теж відмінність. Постична видумка має певну міру правдивості, і ця річ, на якій вона ґрунтується як на фундаменті, є теж наче правдивою. Байка цього ж немає" (Dovhalevsky, *Poetyka*, 184).

The preceding analysis suggests that Mohylanian authors viewed poetry as a tool serving intramural concerns that oscillated between communication skills, moral upbringing, and mental development.

More extensive and detailed than other Mohylanian manuals, Prokopovych's *De arte poetica libri III* (1705) is, by all indications, the only one to defend poetry as a conduit for historical memory. In fact, its arguments concerning epic narrative carefully prepare the ground for a discussion about the style and composition of historical works, which appears in his next manual, *De arte rhetorica libri X* (1706).⁴⁶ The latter is also more ambitious in scope and, like the poetics, might have been composed for an audience further advanced in the study of Latin.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, it vehemently upholds the teleological conviction of all Kyivan preceptors—inherited from Cicero via the humanistic educational establishment—that rhetoric is a most useful tool in a civilized society.

In his manual of rhetoric Prokopovych devotes twelve chapters of book six to history and epistolography, featuring elements not encountered in other manuals. If we are to trust Prokopovych's account in the initial chapter, professors of rhetoric in Kyiv did not expend much effort teaching how to write history and letters. He begins his lessons by citing Cicero's *De oratore* (II: 9, 36) to define history as a "witness of the times, the light of truth, memory of the past, life's teacher, [and] a herald of antiquity," whom the orator immortalizes with his eloquence.⁴⁸ Prokopovych also indicates that the goal of history is to be useful. It can teach what we ought to do and ought not to do through the examples of others, as if they were our own experiences.⁴⁹ Agreeing with Lucian of Samosata, he maintains that the usefulness of history derives from its truthfulness. Thus, while Prokopovych agrees that history—like poetry—needs to be appealing, he considers this virtue merely an ornament rather than the end of historical writing.

In the second chapter of book six, Prokopovych discusses the things an author must avoid when writing history. Once again, his ideas are openly drawn from Lucian: The three virtues of history are brevity, clarity, and probability ("*brevitas, claritas et probabilitas*"). The historical narrative may not be ignorant, enraptured and passionate, or frivolous ("*tres potissimum scopuli vitandi sunt: inscitia et affectus aut libido,*

⁴⁶ See the Ukrainian trans. in Feofan Prokopovych, *Filosofski tvory v trokh tomakh: Pereklad z latynskoi*, vol. 1, comp. Myroslav Rohovych and Valeriia Nychyk (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1979). This ed. excludes bk. 9, which is dedicated to sacred eloquence. Also see the complete Latin original in Feofan Prokopovic[h], *De arte rhetorica libri X*, ed., with commentaries, by Renate Lachmann (Köln: Böhlau, 1982).

⁴⁷ For a hypothesis concerning the special audience of Prokopovych's manuals in 1705–1706, see my article "Kyivski poetyky i renesansni teorii mystetstva," 97.

⁴⁸ Cited according to the Ukrainian trans. in Prokopovych, *Filosofski tvory v trokh tomakh*, 1: 33. The text borrowed [cited?] from Cicero is not in Lachmann's Latin edition of Prokopovic[h], *De arte rhetorica libri X*, 343. Therefore it might be useful to consider Cicero's original text: "*Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis, qua voce alia nisi oratoris immortalitati commendatur?*" (cited according to M. Tulli Ciceronis, *De oratore ad quintum fratrem, liber secundus* <thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/oratore2.shtml>).

⁴⁹ "*Historiae finis est prodesse vel utilitas, ut scilicet alicuius exemplis veluti proprijis experimentis, quod aut avgendum, aut fugiendum sit, intelligamus*" (Prokopovic[h], *De arte rhetorica libri X*, 343).

scribentis et levitas”). To avoid the first vice, the historian must be skeptical of all accounts, even those by participants in an event. Trust should be accorded only to those who are deserving. When describing something that happened long ago, the historian needs to find the most authoritative narratives and imitate the most serious authors. Prokopovych also recommends learning about the time and place of historical events from the writings of geographers, chronologists, and other authors. When dealing with more recent events, he advises visiting the places where they transpired.⁵⁰

Historians should not seek to win over readers by showing that they are inflamed with love or anger. They should not be blinded by hatred or envy, nor should they take sides with any one camp. When “going to battle,” let them stand in the middle, recommends Prokopovych, acting like witnesses, not participants in the dispute. Always standing on the side of truth, they should not give preference even to friends or their own passions. Citing Lucian again, Prokopovych complains that most historians neglect the description of events and engage in the praise of their own emperors and military leaders—extolling them to the heavens while immeasurably deprecating those of others. Thus historians forget that an immense, solid wall—rather than a narrow isthmus—distinguishes and separates history from the encomium (“*Nescij historiam non Angusto Isthmo, Sermago in tegerrimo muro, distinctam et divisam ab encomio.*”)⁵¹

Citing Lucian, Prokopovych recommends that history be written for posterity. He advises to write not for the sake of eliciting praise from contemporaries, but in order to obtain deserved acknowledgement from subsequent generations. It is better to be recognized in the future as a truly free human whose narrative merits the trust of readers. Prokopovych indicates that this does not exclude the possibility of praising or dispraising at the appropriate moment and in a balanced manner. But this needs to be done with an eye on the future—that is, on one’s descendants. He further explains that praise or dispraise must flow from the truthful exposition of events.

Frivolity surfaces when historians depict a real event in a manner that it appears unbelievable. Even more odious, according to Prokopovych, is the practice of depicting something that has never transpired. Such historians mock the subject matter itself and all of humanity. But in the end they fool only themselves, because they are easily discovered and deplored.⁵²

The third chapter of book six addresses, among others, the problems that arise when—in the absence of written records—legends shape the historical imagination or when anger or envy lead the historian to misrepresent the facts. Prokopovych recommends avoiding a difficult style and topics that have little relevance in the historical account. He condemns casting aspersions on the courage of others but does admit that this might be necessary when portraying the true character of an individual. In the case of contradictory pieces of information of equal reliability, Prokopovych recommends dismissing them both or selecting what appears to be the more reliable source. The fourth chapter concerns fictions in Latin writings about the saints and their miracles. Here Prokopovych critiques many of the inventions in Roman Catholic narratives, stating that even God would not be capable of similar creations. He indicates that some such narratives are really based on superstition or

⁵⁰ Ibid, 345–46; and Prokopovych, *Filosofski tvory*, 1: 339.

⁵¹ Prokopovic[h], *De arte rhetorica libri X*, 346–47; and Prokopovych, *Filosofski tvory*, 1: 339–40.

⁵² Prokopovic[h], *De arte rhetorica libri X*, 348–49; and Prokopovych, *Filosofski tvory*, 1: 340–41.

stem from lack of faith. The fifth chapter addresses the things historians ought to mention or pass over in silence. Recalling Cicero's dictum that the historian dare not tell an untruth and needs the courage to speak the truth, Prokopovych argues that historians should not devote attention to details of quotidian life. For example, during a march from one place to another a military leader might stop in a village to eat some chicken or drink some beer. But such facts or the manner in which the leader walks—no matter how true—are completely irrelevant to the history of a war and should not be depicted. In sum, Prokopovych gives pre-eminence to "weighty" historical matters.⁵³ He dismisses the kinds of details, including descriptions of landscape, clothing, and customs, that would be appropriate in a novelistic account.

In the sixth and final chapter dedicated to historical writing, Prokopovych, citing Lucian once more, describes the ideal historian: he is intelligent and eloquent, well versed in military matters, understands the strategy and vocabulary of war. He collects previously dispersed material and first organizes it into a draft. A completed work of history consists of three parts: an exordium (introduction), the narration, and an epilogue. The first and last are brief. The narration reveals the history, which itself consists of many narratives. In his exordium the historian does not actively cultivate the positive disposition of his readers (*"benevolentia non est captanda"*), lest they think he is guided by emotions. It suffices to elicit their inquisitiveness and attention. The history's title should accomplish the former. Attention will be garnered when the historian demonstrates how long and difficult was the war. It is important to mention one's motives for writing the history, Prokopovych advises, and to speak about the magnitude of the events and ensuing difficulties. Events need to be narrated in their natural, chronological order. When many events take place simultaneously, it makes sense to begin with the most important one. Then one can proceed to the circumstances leading to it. The description of the battle must show the manner in which each side fought and how long it resisted. If a soldier does something unworthy, he needs to be identified by name. It is counterproductive to describe battle scenes one after the other. Instead, other matters should be described in between to introduce variety in the narrative. The conclusion may briefly speak about the life of an [important] man, describing his character. If the history shows the downfall of a state or empire, some sorrow may be expressed. Alternately, the historian may talk about the vicissitudes of fortune. Toward the end he might lament over the vanquished, or he might refrain from any epilogues. At the very end, the historian should emphasize that all along he cared more about veracity than elegance and beg the reader's forgiveness for any unwitting lapses.

Relying on Lucian, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Quintillian, Prokopovych advises that the style of the historical narrative must avoid poetical excesses. The reader needs to discern that the narrative was engendered by the historical event rather than by artistic concerns. Prokopovych does, however, recommend a polished and elegant style, the use of humble metaphors, and a tempered, easy-flowing rhythm. The historian's speeches may consist of everything found in the speech of an orator, but they must be shorter, better prepared, and with less wordy amplification. Finally, Prokopovych teaches that to succeed in this type of writing one must diligently and constantly read the writings of the best historians.⁵⁴

⁵³ Prokopovic[h], *De arte rhetorica libri X*, 349–57; and Prokopovych, *Filosofski tvory*, 1: 342–48.

⁵⁴ Prokopovic[h], *De arte rhetorica libri X*, 358–63; and Prokopovych, *Filosofski tvory*, 1: 348–53.

Prokopovych's lessons about historical writing share the same ethical concerns we find in the poetics manuals. The reading of history can and should bring pleasure, but historians must inculcate values above all. In this they do not differ from the poets. According to Prokopovych, history—like poetry—serves as a vast repository of examples of human behaviour to be imitated or censured. However, unlike poets, historians—at least in Prokopovych's eyes—may not verisimilarly invent exempla (i.e., ideal types). It thus appears that, while poetics preceptors entertained the possibility of historical fiction, Prokopovych the teacher of rhetoric altogether dismissed the idea.

It is well known that within the overall structure of the average *trivium* sequence in humanistic schools, the study of poetics did not necessarily nurture respect toward independent literary activity. The legacy of Mohylanian professors responsible for the quadrivial curriculum has not been studied from a pedagogical perspective. Consequently we do not know their formulations on the topic. But indirect evidence that more mature students were not encouraged to engage in the literary game, in general, and the writing of poetry or history, in particular, can be gleaned from the remarkable oeuvre of the poet Ioann Velychkovsky (1630s?–1701?), the poet and philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda (1722–94), and the aforementioned Samiilo Velychko.

Inasmuch as my main goal here has been to cast some light on the references to history and historical fiction in the Mohylanian trivium, to substantiate my claim I will cite only from Velychko's *Discourse* ...⁵⁵ In his brief "Foreword to the Reader," which explains both his motivation and method, the author from the very outset vehemently rejects panegyricizing and poetry in historical writing, because it is appropriate only for the uninitiated:

[H]aving avoided [all] panegyric and poetic refuse, which is fitting only for school boys acquiring knowledge, I focused strictly on the war (like a blind man holding on to a fence) and expounded the events, changing things in a few places only when Twardowski's versified sense posed difficulties. However, I did not change the truthfulness of history and of military deeds.⁵⁶

As we can see from this passage, Velychko—unlike the preceptors of poetics at his alma mater—is not at all concerned with verisimilar exempla. Instead he discusses the historical veracity of his account about the Cossack wars, just as Prokopovych recommends in his rhetoric.

Most importantly, Velychko also emphasizes the need to preserve for posterity memory of the valiant deeds of his (and the readers') ancestors, whose knightly cour-

⁵⁵ For a discussion of Velychkovsky's veiled critique of the negative attitudes toward poetic activity nurtured at his alma mater, see my article "Poetry as Milk: A Seventeenth-Century Metaphor and its Pedagogical Context," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17, nos. 1–2 (1992): 189–203. For a discussion of Hryhorii Skovoroda's rejection of panegyric amplification, see my article "Praise in Skovoroda's Garden," In *Nel Modo degli Slavi: Incontri e dialoghi tra culture: Studi in onore di Giovanna Brogi Bercoff*, vol. 2: 469–79, ed. Maria Di Salvo, Giovanna Moracci, and Giovanna Siedina (Firenze: Firenze University Press, 2008).

⁵⁶ "[O]минувши непотребства панагиричніє и поєтицкіє, учасимся тилко отроком видїтию належасїє, самое тоїю военное (як слїпий держачися плоту) виводилем дїйствиє и любо для трудности вїршовой сєнс Твардовского в нїкотрих мїсцєх перемїнялем истории єднак и дїйствия военного істности не перемїнилием" (Velychko "Skazaniie o voini kozatskoi z poliakami," 4).

age and heroism in the past remain unexplained and concealed by their own indolent scribes (“*Наших же сармато-козацких предков ... давних времен и вѣков бывшіе рыцарскіе отваги и богатырскіе дѣянія, видѣх без описанія и объясненія чрез їх власних писаров оставленніе, и всегдашного забвенія нѣжчемним лѣности их плащем увидѣх покритіе.*”)⁵⁷ Thus, rather than deprecating the courage of those who fought against the Cossacks, Velychko merely seeks to balance the historical record by elevating those whom history has neglected and forgotten.

As if following Prokopovych's precepts, Velychko indicates in the foreword that he opted to conduct his narration in a simple style and the Cossack language (“*вивести простим стилем и нарѣчіем козацким*”). Noting the contradictions in, and doubting the truthfulness of, the sources he consulted (“*помененнии преречоних дѣяній описателѣ в своих не истинствуют писаніях*”), Velychko concludes that there might be some lapses in his own account (“*с ними не истинствую и аз*”), for which he begs the reader's forgiveness.⁵⁸

Although Velychko was critical of the poetic exercises conducted in the trivium, he—like many other alumni of the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium—was their direct beneficiary. In fact, the marvellous inventions of his monumental work, which still await the detailed analysis of literary scholars, reveal his training at every step.⁵⁹ I propose that his narrative may be regarded as a conscious experiment with various types of prose genres, including historical fiction. For now suffice it to say that Velychko's love of reading and desire to know about human actions and behaviour (in his own words, “*вѣденіе ... дѣяній и поведений людских*”), as well as his ability to access the chronicles and historical works of “foreign peoples” (“*лѣтописная и гисторическая іностранних народов писанія и дѣянія*”),⁶⁰ were initially nurtured at his alma mater, where—with the help of poetry—he studied Latin, Polish, and Slavonic, among other languages. This initial upbringing gave him the tools to describe for posterity the deeds of native heroes, thus redressing the absence of Ukrainian illustrative material from Mohylanian manuals of poetics and rhetoric.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁵⁹ For the first sustained attempt to view Velychko's *Discourse* as a work of historical fiction, see Bohdan Nebesio, “Skilky prozy mozhe buty v kozatskomu litopysi?” *Slovo i chas*, 1993, no. 9: 22–30.

⁶⁰ Velychko, “Skazaniie o voini kozatskoi z poliakami,” 2.



Reconstructive Forgery: The Hadiach Agreement (1658) in the *History of the Rus'*

Serhii Plokhyy

Few events in Ukrainian and Polish history have provoked as many what-ifs as the agreement concluded between the Cossack hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and representatives of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth near the city of Hadiach in the autumn of 1658. Long before the rise of virtual and counterfactual history, historians in Poland and Ukraine defied the maxim of positivist historiography—that history has no subjunctive mood—and plunged into speculation on how differently the history of both countries would have turned out if, instead of fighting prolonged and exhausting wars, Poland-Lithuania and the Hetmanate had reunited in a new and reformed Commonwealth. Would this have stopped the decline of Poland, the ruin of Ukraine, Ottoman interventions, and the rise of Muscovy as the dominant force in the region?

The Union of Hadiach, as the agreement became known in historiography, had the potential to influence all these processes. It envisioned the creation of a tripartite Commonwealth—the Kingdom of Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and a Principality of Rus', with the Cossack hetman as its official head. The union was the culmination of the activities of moderate forces among the Polish and Ukrainian elites and the embodiment of the hopes and dreams of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian and Belarussian) nobility of the first half of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the compromise that the union embodied was rejected by mainstream forces on both sides. The Commonwealth Diet ratified the text of the treaty with a number of important omissions, but even in that form it was viewed with suspicion and rejected by the Polish nobiliary elites, which could not reconcile themselves to the prospect of Orthodox Cossacks enjoying equal rights with Catholic nobles. On the Ukrainian side, the Cossack rank and file rejected a treaty that proposed to give all rights in the new Principality of Rus' to a limited number of representatives of the Ukrainian nobiliary and Cossack elites at the expense of the Cossack masses and rebel peasantry, which would have to submit once again to the noble landlords' jurisdiction and control.¹

¹ On the Union of Hadiach, see Vasyl Herasymchuk, "Vyhovshchyna i hadiatskyi traktat," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 87 (1909): 5–36, 88 (1909): 23–50, and 89 (1909): 46–91; Mykola Stadnyk, "Hadiatska uniia," *Zapysky Ukrainskoho naukovooho tovarystva v Kyevi* 7 (1910): 65–85 and 8 (1911): 5–39; Wacław Lipiński [Viacheslav Lypynsky], *Z dziejów Ukrainy: Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Włodzimierza Antonowicza, Paulina Świąćckiego i Tadeusza Ryłskiego*, wydana staraniem dr. J. Jurkiewicza, Fr. Wolskiej, Ludw. Siedleckiego i Wacława Lipińskiego (Kyiv and Cracow, 1912), 588–617; Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 10 (New York: Knyhospilka, 1958), 288–359; Władysław Tomkiewicz, *Uгода hadziacka* (Warsaw: Instytut Badań Spraw Narodowościowych, 1937); Stanisław Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz: W 300-lecie Ugody Hadziackiej* (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1960); Andrzej Kamiński, "The Cossack Experiment in

Since its inception in the early nineteenth century, modern Ukrainian historiography has been largely positive in its assessment of the Union of Hadiach and its authors' actions and intentions. This applies particularly to the views of twentieth-century Ukrainian historians not subject to Soviet control. After the fall of the USSR and the collapse of Soviet historiography, whose practitioners condemned Vyhovskyy as a "traitor to the Ukrainian people" and cited the Hadiach Agreement as proof of that treason, positive assessments not only of Vyhovskyy but also of the Union of Hadiach made their way into historical writing. One of the deans of contemporary Ukrainian historiography, Natalia Yakovenko, sees the Hadiach Agreement as "a striking monument of the political and legal thought of its time, which, had it been realized, would indeed have had a chance of laying firm foundations for the future of the Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian-Ukrainian community and renewing the Commonwealth by establishing new forms of coexistence for its peoples. This in turn would have guaranteed the protection of what had already been achieved—recognition of the right to freedom of the individual, property, and political expression."² The revival of interest in the agreement has been influenced, *inter alia*, by the increasing of Polish historiography, which has traditionally been friendly to the Union of Hadiach. For many Polish historians, the union has remained a symbol of Poland's civilizing mission in the East, religious tolerance, and ability to solve nationality problems within the context of a multiethnic state.³

This article examines the origins of the positive image of the Union of Hadiach in modern Ukrainian historiography, trying to understand how that image was created and the meaning it conveyed during the first decades of the Ukrainian cultural revival. At the centre of this discussion is the *History of the Rus' (Istoriia Rusov)*—a historical pamphlet that captivated the imagination of the Ukrainian elites of the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, when the Ukrainian national project took shape. If one were to seek the single most important work of Ukrainian nineteenth-century historiography, the *History of the Rus'* would certainly stand out. It also comes to mind as

Szlachta Democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: The Hadiach (Hadziacz) Union," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (June 1977): 178–97. here 195–97; Janusz Kaczmarszyk, "Hadziacz 1658: Kolejna ugoda czy nowa unia," *Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainistyczne* 2 (1994): 35–42; Antoni Mironowicz, *Prawosławie i unia za panowania Jana Kazimierza* (Białystok: Orthdruk, 1997), 149–89; and Tatiana Yakovleva, *Hetmanshchyna v druhii polovyny 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittia: Prychyny ta pochatok Ruiny* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1998), 305–23.

² See Natalia Yakovenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv: Heneza, 1997), 212. Cf. *idem*, *Narys istorii serednovichnoi ta rannomodernoï Ukrainy*, 2nd ed. (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005), 373–74.

³ See Andrzej Kamiński, *Historia Rzeczypospolitej wielu narodów, 1505–1795: Obywatele, ich państwa, społeczeństwo, kultura* (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2000), 134–35. For a survey of the ideas that informed traditional Polish historiography, see Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 10: 354–55. On the approaches dominant in modern Polish historiography, see A. B. Pernal, "The Union of Hadiach (1658) in the Light of Modern Polish Historiography," in *Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine, 988–1988, 177–92*, ed. Oleh W. Gerus and Alexander Baran (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada, 1989).

the work that contributed most to the popularization of a positive image of the Union of Hadiach in modern Ukraine.⁴

The author of the *History of the Rus'* took the dry narrative inherited from the Cossack chronicles and filled it with heroes and their deeds. Readers brought up on the ideas of the Enlightenment and the works of the early Romantics found the kind of storytelling they craved in the pages of the *History of the Rus'*. Even so, its historiographic canvas and some of its important ideas harked back to past chronicles. That was certainly true of the work's protagonist—the Rus' nation, which had its origins in the writings of the seventeenth-century Ruthenian chroniclers. To be sure, the author of the *History of the Rus'* picked and chose from the historiographic tradition: for example, he insisted on the exclusive use of the Rus' name for his country and people while rejecting the term “Ukraine,” which had been just as current in the seventeenth century and was becoming increasingly popular in the eighteenth.⁵

Facts and ideas borrowed from previous authors had to fit the author's paradigm: if there were not enough facts, they could easily be invented in the manner of James Macpherson and his *Ossian*. Like Macpherson's Ossianic poetry and the historical forgeries of Václav Hanka, the *History of the Rus'* came into existence at a time of cultural upheaval and growing interest in the preservation of local heritage. All these mystifications were responses to a longing for (invariably glorious) local tradition, which was considered lost beyond recovery by any other means. The Ukrainian antiquarians of the first decades of the nineteenth century, like their Scottish and Bohemian counterparts, hoped for a miracle, a recovery of a national Homer, and a sort of miracle did indeed take place. It came in the form of “reconstructive forgeries”—freshly created literary and historical texts that recovered parts of the otherwise lost national narrative. The “signatures” of Ossian in Scotland and Konysky in Ukraine gave these works an authority and appeal they would otherwise have lacked.⁶

⁴ See *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii: Sochinenie Georgiia Koniskago, arkhiepiskopa Belorusskago* (Moscow, 1846; repr.: Kyiv: Dzvyn, 1991). The *History of the Rus'* was a mystification attributed to the Hetmanate-born Orthodox archbishop of Belarus Heorhii Konysky; his authorship was not challenged until the second half of the nineteenth century. There is an extensive scholarly literature on the *History*. For a survey, see Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Narysy z istorii ukrainskoi istoriografii epokhy natsionalnoho vidrodzhennia (druha polovyna XVIII–seredyna XIX st.)* (Kharkiv: Osnova, 1996), 101–15; and idem, “*Istoriia rusiv u suchasnykh intepretatsiakh*,” in *Synopsis: Essays in Honour of Zenon E. Kohut*, 275–94, ed. Serhii Plokhly and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005) = *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, nos. 1–2 (2004).

⁵ On the concepts of fatherland and nation in the *History of the Rus'*, see Frank E. Sysyn, “The Persistence of the Little Russian Fatherland in the Russian Empire: The Evidence from the *History of the Rus'* or of Little Russia (*Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*),” in *Imperienvergleich: Beispiele und Ansätze aus osteuropäischer Perspektive. Festschrift für Andreas Kappeler*, 39–49, ed. Guido Hausmann and Angela Rustemeyer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009). On the use of the terms “Rus” and “Ukraine” in the *History of the Rus'*, see my article “Ukraine or Little Russia? Revisiting the Early Nineteenth-Century Debate,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 48, nos. 3–4 (September–December 2006): 335–53.

⁶ On historical and literary mystifications in Eastern Europe, see Nick Groom, *The Forger's Shadow: How Forgery Changed the Course of Literature* (London: Picador, 2002); Margaret

The anonymous author's interpretation of the Hadiach myth gives a fairly good idea of what the new generation of Ukrainian elites expected from the history of their land and of the way in which the author tried to meet those expectations. One of the challenges that that myth encountered in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the growing anti-Polish sentiment in Ukraine and the Russian Empire at large. That new mood was fully reflected in the *History of the Rus'*, making it one of the most anti-Polish historical works ever produced in modern Ukraine. Judging by the introduction to the *History*, one of its major tasks was to debunk the "tales" of Polish and Lithuanian authors and their followers in Ukraine. The anonymous author set out to prove that Ukraine had been settled by the Rus' princes, not by the Polish kings; that Little Russia had fought numerous battles with Poland for its liberation, joined the Russian state of its own free will, and deserved recognition for its martial deeds.⁷ Could the Hadiach myth really fit this historiographic paradigm?

Apparently it could, though not without certain difficulties and transformations. The Union of Hadiach emerges from the pages of the *History of the Rus'* in a version most unexpected for anyone familiar with its actual history and the texts of the agreement. Indeed, the anonymous author offers the most counterfactual account of the union ever written. First of all, we learn from the *History* that although the treaty was based on the Hadiach articles, it was not negotiated at Hadiach at all, but in the town of Zaslav (a.k.a. Zaslavl). Second, its principal Ukrainian initiator was not Yuri Nemyrych or Ivan Vyhovsky, but Yuri Khmelnytsky, who allegedly lost his hetmancy for agreeing to the union's conditions. The text of the agreement presented in the *History of the Rus'* finds little corroboration either in contemporary versions of the treaty or in the variant summarized by the Polish historian Samuel Twardowski and later used by the Cossack historians Samiilo Velychko and the author of the Hryhorii Hrabianka Chronicle.

According to the *History*, the treaty was mainly concerned with the rights and prerogatives of the Rus' nation, not with the hetman or the Cossack state—the two subjects that took centre stage in the account of the agreement in the Hrabianka Chronicle. The Rus' nation of the *History of the Rus'* came from the same Sarmatian stock as the Polish nation and occupied the principalities, or palatinates, of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Siversk, and Volodymyr. It was equal to the Polish and Lithuanian nations under the king's rule. Its leader was the Cossack hetman, who assumed supreme command in wartime and held the title of prince of Rus' or Sarmatia. The hetman was the commander in chief of a forty-thousand-strong army and had the right to recruit additional troops from volunteers and Zaporozhian Cossacks. He also supervised the regional governors or palatines, conducted elections to the General Council, and was in charge of the defense and internal security of the Rus' land. That land participated in wars conducted by the

Russett, *Fictions and Fakes: Forging Romantic Authenticity, 1760–1845* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); K. K. Ruthven, *Faking Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Susan Stewart, *Crimes of Writing: Problems in the Containment of Representation* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994). On literary mystifications in Russia and Ukraine, see George G. Grabowicz, "National Poets and National Mystifications," in *Literární mystifikace, etnické mýty a jejich úloha při formování národního vědomí: Sborník příspěvků z mezinárodní konference konané ve dnech 20.–21.10.2001, 7–24*, ed. Blanka Rašticová = *Studie Slováckého muzea: Uherské Hradiště* 6 (2001).

⁷ See *Istoriia Rusov*, 4.

Polish Crown only by express agreement. The right to elect the hetman and the palatines belonged exclusively to the local Cossack elite ("knights"); foreigners were excluded. The treaty guaranteed the equality of all representatives of the Rus' knightly estate and nation with their Polish counterparts, and the equality of the "Rus' Catholic, or Greek, religion" with the "Polish or Roman Catholic" one.⁸

What should one make of this account of the Union of Hadiach? It certainly tells more about the anonymous author's views than about the agreement. Still, in order to reconstruct those views, one must be able to separate what the author borrowed from his sources from what he contributed himself. Thus the first step in recovering the "value added" component of a given narrative should be the identification of the sources the author used. A detailed study of those sources remains a task for the future. However, research by previous generations of scholars about the *History of the Rus'* indicates its close relation to two eighteenth-century Ukrainian texts—the *Short Chronicle of Little Russia*, published in St. Petersburg in 1777 by Vasyl Ruban, a native of the Hetmanate,⁹ and the *Chronicle of Little Russia*, published in French as the second volume of Jean-Benoît Scherer's *Annales de la Petite-Russie* in Paris in 1778.¹⁰ Both monuments actually represent different versions of the same basic text, the *Brief Description of Little Russia*, by far the most popular chronicle in eighteenth-century Ukraine.¹¹

While the author of the *History of the Rus'* made use of the *Short Chronicle of Little Russia* for his coverage of the eighteenth century, he appears to have drawn on Scherer's *Annales de la Petite-Russie* for his account of the Union of Hadiach. Scherer's version of the Hadiach story begins with the Polish mission that came to Vyhovsky to confirm his title of hetman and enact the agreement he had negotiated earlier, together with Yurii Khmelnytsky, at Hadiach. Scherer lists the conditions of the treaty, which included recognition of the hetman's authority over Ukraine as a whole,

⁸ Ibid., 143–45. On the treatment of the Union of Hadiach in the Cossack chronicles of the first decades of the eighteenth century, see my article "Hadjač 1658: The Origins of a Myth," in *Nel Mondo degli Slavi: Incontri e dialoghi tra culture. Studi in onore di Giovanna Brogi Bercoff*, vol. 1: 449–58, ed. Mario Di Salvo, Giovanna Moracci, and Giovanna Siedina (Firenze: Firenze University Press, 2008).

⁹ See *Kratkaia letopis Malyia Rossii s 1506 po 1776 god* (St. Petersburg, 1777). On the parallels between the *Short Chronicle* and the *History of the Rus'*, see Mykhailo Vozniak, *Psevdo-Korinskyi i Psevdo-Poletyka* ("Istoriia Rusov" v literatury i nauky) (Lviv and Kyiv: Ukrainka Mohyliansko-Mazepynska akademii nauk, 1939), 135–59.

¹⁰ See Jean-Benoît Scherer, *Annales de la Petite-Russie*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1778); Ukrainian trans.: *Litopys Malorosii, abo Istoriia kozakiv-zaporozhtsiv ta kozakiv Ukrainy abo Malorosii*, trans. Viktor Koptilov (Kyiv: Ukrainnyi pysmennyk, 1994), on-line at <litopys.org.ua>. On the parallels between Scherer's version of the *Brief Description* and the *History of the Rus'*, see Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Z istorychnoi fabulistyky kintsia XVIII v.," repr. in *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, nos. 110–15 (1991–92): 125–29; Oleksander Ohloblyn, "'Annales de la Petite-Russie' Sherera i 'Istoriia Rusov,'" *Naukovyi zbirnyk Ukrainskoho vilnoho universytetu* 5 (1948): 87–94; and Ivan Dzura, "Vplyv 'Litopysu Malorosii' Zhana Benua Sherera v 'Istoriu Rusiv,'" *Problemy istorii Ukrainy XIX–pochatku XX st.*, 2003, no. 6: 412–25.

¹¹ One of the eighteenth-century Ukrainian historians who used the text of the *Short Chronicle* as a source on the Union of Hadiach was Oleksander Rigelman, who wrote his historical chronicle of Ukraine in the 1780s. See his *Litopysna opovid pro Malu Rosiiu ta ii narod i kozakiv uzakali* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1994), 276–77.

the election of the hetman and senators by the Cossacks from among their own candidates, and the right of the Cossack Host to remain neutral in wars conducted by the Poles. Scherer also considered the agreement to have resulted from a Polish plot. He wrote that although Vyhovsky accepted the agreement, many Cossacks were more skeptical in their assessment of Polish intentions, suspecting that the Poles would renege on their promises. Thus it was Vyhovsky, not the entire host, who was blamed for entering into an agreement with the deceitful Poles.¹²

The author of the *History of the Rus'* was generally much more positive in his assessment of the Union of Hadiach than Scherer. He did not interpret it as a Polish ploy, noting only that it was rejected by the Cossack Host, provoked accusations against Yurii Khmelnytsky, and cost him the hetmancy. With reference to the conditions of the union, the anonymous author wrote: "But when they were announced, representatives of the officers and rank-and-file Cossacks, having learned of a change of such importance and so shameful to all, immediately abandoned the hetman, heaping abuse on him, cursing his base behaviour and villainous intentions, and returned to the town of Chyhyryn."¹³ These were harsh words of condemnation, but the author of the *History of the Rus'* gave no indication that he shared the sentiment he described. Like all Ukrainian chroniclers before him, he preferred to blame Ivan Vyhovsky for the union while sheltering Yurii Khmelnytsky from direct criticism. According to the *History of the Rus'*, the younger Khmelnytsky was rejected by the Cossack Host but found support among the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who were unhappy with the union with Russia largely because they were routinely insulted by Russian soldiers during joint military campaigns.

In this conflict between the Zaporozhians and the Muscovites, the anonymous author sided with the former. "Those [Muscovite] soldiers," he wrote, "then still in gray topcoats and bast shoes, unshaven and bearded, that is, in their full peasant aspect, nevertheless had an incomprehensible arrogance or some kind of vile habit of giving contemptuous names to all peoples, such as *poliachishki*, *nemchurki*, *tatarishki* [derogatory names for Poles, Germans and Tatars], and so on. According to this strange habit, they called the Cossacks forelocks and topknots, and sometimes brainless topknots, and this sent the Cossacks into frenzies of rage; they often quarreled and fought with the soldiers, and finally the Cossacks became irreconcilably hostile and breathed a constant aversion to them." It is hard to escape the impression that by telling this story, which depicts the Cossacks as victims of culturally inferior but arrogant Muscovite soldiers, the author of the *History of the Rus'* was not only trying to exonerate Yurii Khmelnytsky but also to justify his union with Poland.¹⁴

Scherer is partly responsible for the major confusion the author of the *History of the Rus'* created in his account of the Union of Hadiach. In an apparent effort to make sense of the complex history of the removal of Yurii Khmelnytsky from the hetmancy and the ascension of Ivan Vyhovsky to that office, the author seized on the reference in the chronicle used by Scherer to Khmelnytsky as one of the negotiators of the Hadiach Agreement. It seems that the author was unsure whether it was Bohdan Khmelnytsky or his son Yurii who negotiated the deal. Thus the author mentioned Bohdan

¹² See Scherer, *Annales de la Petite-Russie*, vol. 2.

¹³ *Istoriia Rusov*, 144.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 145.

Khmelnysky as the negotiator of the Hadiach articles but presented that information as not entirely reliable: it was divulged to the younger Khmelnysky by the Poles. In the *History of the Rus'* Yurii Khmelnysky figures as the main promoter and victim of the union, which he accepted on the basis of the Hadiach Articles at the Congress of Zaslav. There the articles were guaranteed not only by representatives of Poland but also of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires—a “true” international congress, not unlike those the European powers conducted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The participation of representatives of the great powers certainly lends prestige and international legitimacy to the agreement in this account, but why did the “congress” take place in Zaslav? There may never be an answer to this question, but from the viewpoint of the author of the *History of the Rus'* it probably made sense to “organize” a congress featuring representatives of the Cossacks, Poles, Habsburgs, and Ottomans in a town that he mentioned repeatedly as a Ukrainian-Polish-Ottoman border point. Besides, Zaslav was designated as the capital of a new imperial viceregency immediately after the Second Partition of Poland in 1793.¹⁵

The anonymous author of the *History of the Rus'* was clearly an admirer of the Hadiach Articles. He returned to them again and again in his text, writing about Yurii Khmelnysky's second election to the hetmancy, his appointment as prince of Sarmatia by the Ottomans, and the election of Mykhailo Khanenko as hetman.¹⁶ Each time he referred to the Hadiach or Zaslav Articles, he mentioned that they had been approved and guaranteed by representatives of the great powers. It was easy for the author of the *History of the Rus'* to endorse the agreement, given that not only the Zaslav Congress but also most of the Hadiach text was of his own creation. Most of the text of the Hadiach Agreement as it appears in the *History of the Rus'* came from a source that had nothing to do with the 1658 union. This was the text of the Zboriv Agreement of 1649, which appears about a hundred pages before the account of the Union of Hadiach. That text, in turn, had little to do with the actual text of the agreement, but neither was it a product of the anonymous author's pure imagination.

Why would someone create a forgery by recycling a document cited earlier in the same work? It would appear that the anonymous author thought of himself as a careful researcher of historical fact, not a literary criminal. His sources claimed that the Hadiach Articles had originally been proposed by Bohdan Khmelnysky. In fact, Hrabianka, who may have been known to the author through other versions of his abridged chronicle, stated that these were Khmelnysky's “well-known” articles. The only well-known articles of the old hetman to which the author seems to have had access were the ones negotiated at Zboriv. He presented a long and elaborate history of the negotiation of the Pereiaslav Agreement, but summarized its text in a few relatively short sentences. Thus he used an apocryphal text of the Zboriv Agreement in his possession to reconstruct the text of the Hadiach Articles. In his view, the latter could not be less advantageous to the Cossacks than their precursor, the Treaty of Zboriv. A comparison of the texts of the Zboriv Agreement and the Union of Hadiach, as presented in the *History of the Rus'*, leaves little doubt that if the latter text was a creation of the author of the *History*, the former (or at least parts of it) had

¹⁵ See *Istoriia Rusov*, 129–30, 143–44; and “Iziaslav (Zaslav),” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

¹⁶ *Istoriia Rusov*, 150, 157, 170.

a different author. The text of the Zboriv Agreement is full of Ukrainisms, many of which the author of the *History of the Rus'* corrected in his reconstruction of the Hadiach Articles. For example, a passage from the text of the Zboriv Agreement, "From now on the Ruthenian nation is and shall remain independent of all but itself and its government," was rendered in the text of the Union of Hadiach as "Let the Ruthenian nation and its land ... remain free, depending on themselves and their government."¹⁷ Each of the texts has its share of Ukrainian linguistic influences, but the most obvious ones, like "From now on ... is and shall remain independent of all but itself," are to be found only in the text of the Zboriv Agreement. The anonymous author of the *History of the Rus'* clearly had a much better command of Russian than the authors of some of his sources.

The author of the *History of the Rus'* was evidently prepared to improve not only the language of his sources but also their content. He began his version of the Hadiach Agreement not with a reference to the abolition of the church union, as did Hrabianka and his editors and continuators, but with a chapter affirming that the Rus' nation was free, that it was joining other "Polish nations" as equals, and that all earlier conflicts between them should be forgiven and forgotten. In essence, the first clause of the new Hadiach Agreement, with its emphasis on the Rus' nation, was little more than a conflation of the first two clauses of the alleged Zboriv Agreement. It declared the anonymous author's primary interest in the history of the Rus' nation and his readiness to interpret major events of the Cossack past as episodes of that history. The author borrowed from the alleged text of the Zboriv Agreement, transferring to his text of the Union of Hadiach provisions that stipulated the independence of the Rus' government; the supreme authority of the hetman, elected exclusively by his own Cossack Host without the involvement of foreigners; the numerical strength of the Cossack Host (forty thousand, plus an unlimited number of volunteers); and, finally, the Rus' nation's right to defend its homeland and to choose whether to participate in the Commonwealth's wars or remain neutral. The provision on the equality of the Orthodox and Catholic churches may have come from the apocryphal text of the Zboriv Agreement or from any of the accounts of the Hadiach Agreement that the author had in his possession.

The author also made some additions to the apocryphal text of the Zboriv Agreement and dropped some of its provisions, turning his version of the Hadiach Articles into a document inspired by, but still very different in its political message from, the text of the agreement. Interesting in this regard is the author's definition of the territory claimed by the Rus' nation. If in the case of the Zboriv Agreement the Rus' nation's western boundary was defined by the Horyn River (a historically correct border of the Hetmanate), in the case of the Hadiach Agreement the territory claimed by the Rus' nation included the "principalities or palatinates" of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Siversk, and Volodymyr(-Volynskyi). The author was clearly a patriot of the Siversk land. Although there was a medieval Novhorod-Siverskyi principality and, for a brief period, an eighteenth-century governorship of Novhorod-Siverskyi, no palatinate of Siversk ever existed. More important in retrospect is that the author claimed for his Rus' nation all the Ukrainian lands attached to the Russian Empire as a result of the partitions of Poland, including Volhynia.

¹⁷ Ibid., 94, 143.

In political terms, the major departure from the apocryphal text of the Zboriv Agreement was the anonymous author's emphasis on the powers of the hetman and the rights of the nobility ("knights"). He declared that in wartime the hetman could become an autocratic ("samovlastnyi") prince of Rus' and Sarmatia, a title apparently based on the one Yurii Khmelnytsky used in the 1660s. The author of the *History of the Rus'* referred to it in relation to Khmelnytsky's installation as ruler of Ukraine by the Ottomans, allegedly on the basis of the Hadiach Articles. He considered the provision about the hetman's absolute powers to be one of the most important articles and made reference to it in his account of the installation of Mykhailo Khanenko as hetman—again, allegedly, on the basis of the Hadiach Articles. According to the author's variant of the articles, the hetman supervised the activities of the elected palatines and was in charge of elections to the General Diet—an institution not mentioned in the text of the alleged Zboriv Agreement. The anonymous author replaced the agreement's provisions stipulating the election of the hetman and the government by the Cossack officers and the whole host, or even the population at large, with references to election by the nobility ("knights") alone.¹⁸

The major omission concerned the provision for the abolition of the church union. Although that provision appeared in all the sources on the Union of Hadiach available to the anonymous author—the two versions of the *Brief Description of Little Russia* and the apocryphal text of the Zboriv Agreement—it was dropped in his account of the Hadiach Agreement. Did the author—who, as students of the *History of the Rus'* have shown, was influenced by Enlightenment ideas—prefer toleration to violence in the sphere of church-state relations, or was he trying to accommodate new members of the Rus' nation, which now included largely Uniate Volhynia? None of these assumptions helps explain the strong anti-Uniate statements elsewhere in the *History of the Rus'*. Did the author simply forget to "adjust" the anti-Uniate tone of his sources to fit his own enlightened views on the subject? We lack answers to these questions and must leave them open for now. It seems quite obvious, however, that the author dropped all references to the church union not because he gained access to the version of the Treaty of Hadiach approved by the Polish Diet in 1659, which indeed did not stipulate the liquidation of the Uniate Church, but for ideological reasons. While the author was quite limited in his selection of historical sources, there were almost no bounds on his imagination and ability to create texts reflecting the ideas, tastes, and preferences of his own era.¹⁹

A careful reader of the *History of the Rus'* might conclude that the Rus' nation emerged from the Hadiach Agreement with a larger territory than the one provided by the Treaty of Zboriv, with a much more powerful hetman who could act as an independent prince in wartime and a much stronger elite that deprived the Cossack Host of the right to elect its hetman and local governors. The numerical strength of the Cossack Host remained the same, as did the status of the Rus' nation in the Commonwealth. The only negative feature of the agreement in this account, it would seem, was its association with Ivan Vyhovsky. The anonymous author continued the well-established tradition of Cossack historical writing that distanced the good agreement from the evil Vyhovsky. He added another negative feature, referring to

¹⁸ Ibid., 143–44, 157, 170.

¹⁹ Cf. the texts of the Zboriv and Hadiach agreements in *ibid.*, 94–95, 143–44.

Vyhovsky as an ethnic Pole (“*prirodnyi poliak*”)—in a world of rising nationalism, this served to explain Vyhovsky’s treasonous actions better than earlier references to his Polish schooling and sympathies.²⁰

The image of the Hetmanate that emerges from the text of the Hadiach Articles as presented by the author of the *History of the Rus'* may be distant from mid-seventeenth-century realities, but it was fairly close to what prevailed—or, at least, to what the Cossack officers wanted—in the mid-eighteenth century. Strong rule by the hetman; the political dominance of the Cossack elites; the establishment of a local Diet—all these were features of the reform program for the Hetmanate advanced by the last hetman, Kyrylo Rozumovsky. This was the image remembered and cherished by the Ukrainian nobility at the turn of the nineteenth century.²¹ The anonymous author ascribed special importance to the Rus' nation, depicted as equal to other nations, its rights not only recognized by the Polish Crown but also guaranteed by the major European powers. This was a nation that tolerated other major religions in the spirit of the Enlightenment, and whose own religion was tolerated in return. It was a nation of which the reader could be proud, and the author of the *History of the Rus'* could also be well satisfied, knowing that the goal declared in the introduction to the work—to render due homage to the glorious deeds of the Rus' nation and its leaders—was well served by his account of the Hadiach Agreement.²²

The introduction proposed that such homage could best be rendered by narrating the numerous battles of the Rus' nation against the Poles, but the anonymous author’s treatment of the Union of Hadiach proved that agreements concluded with the Poles, presented in an appropriate light, could do just as well. Indeed, the author of the *History of the Rus'*—the most anti-Polish work in Ukrainian historiography—managed to appropriate even the myth of Hadiach for his purpose. While the author clearly located his Rus' nation within the Russian imperial historical space, he needed the Polish “other” to fully define his people within that space. His account of the Cossack wars with Poland was meant to emphasize the importance of the Rus' nation for the empire, while the Cossack treaties with the Polish kings—evidence of the seriousness with which the Cossacks were treated in the Commonwealth—gave the Rus' nation a claim to special status in the imperial setting. Both elements promoted national pride among the Ukrainian elites, thereby contributing to the process of nation building in modern Ukraine. Myths like that of Hadiach were indispensable to the success of the national project. The author’s treatment of the Hadiach myth in the *History of the Rus'* shows him adapting it to the requirements of a national narrative—a new genre of historical writing establishing itself in a world characterized by the rise of exclusive national identities.

The *History of the Rus'* played an important role in the development of Ukrainian historiography, serving as a bridge between eighteenth-century Cossack historical

²⁰ See *ibid.*, 143.

²¹ On Rozumovsky’s attempted reforms in the Hetmanate, see Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988), 86–94.

²² See *Istoriia Rusov*, iii–iv.

writing and modern Ukrainian historiography of the nineteenth century. Its impact on Taras Shevchenko and his generation of Ukrainian nation builders has been well documented. It is safe to say that the *History of the Rus'* was one of the most influential historiographic texts of the Ukrainian cultural revival.²³ When the first modern history of Ukraine by Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamensky (1822) was criticized for being little more than a history of one Russian province, Ukrainian authors turned to the *History of the Rus'* in search of the authentic flavour of Ukrainian history.²⁴ Mykola Markevych, the author of the multi-volume *History of Little Russia* (1842–43), used the *History of the Rus'* not only for patriotic inspiration but also as a historical source, never doubting the authenticity of its data.²⁵ Along with Bantysh-Kamensky's narrative, Markevych's *History* remained the only synthesis of the Ukrainian past available in the Russian Empire until the publication of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Survey History of the Ukrainian People* (1904).²⁶ Thus its influence on the formation of Ukrainian historical and national identity can hardly be exaggerated.

For better or worse, like Shevchenko's poetry, Markevych's *History* disseminated not only the ideas but also the confusions created by the anonymous author of the *History of the Rus'*. The history of the Union of Hadiach was one of the primary beneficiaries and victims of that process. If Bantysh-Kamensky preferred to ignore the account of the Hadiach/Zaslav Agreement in the *History of the Rus'*,²⁷ Markevych was at pains to reconcile the text of the Hadiach Articles that he found there with the text that he knew from the so-called Froliv Chronicle. Nor could Markevych find corroboration of the anonymous author's claim that the Union of Hadiach had been concluded by Yurii Khmelnytsky, as opposed to Ivan Vyhovsky. Ultimately Markevych printed both texts of the Hadiach Treaty available to him. The first text, taken verbatim from the *History of the Rus'*, he called the Zaslav Articles. He referred to the second, taken from the Froliv Chronicle, as the Hadiach Articles. Both treaties were allegedly negotiated by Vyhovsky, whom Markevych, following the author of the *History of the Rus'*, called a Pole. "The ambitious, money-grubbing Vyhovsky, foreign by birth to Little Russia, indifferent to the welfare of a people to which he was not related, did not fail to betray Ukraine, which had done him a great favour," wrote Markevych, adding a dose of mid-nineteenth-century populism to the anonymous author's nationalism.²⁸

²³ On the influence of the *History of the Rus'* on Ukrainian literary and cultural figures, see Vozniak, *Psevido-Konysky i Psevido-Poletyka*, 5–60.

²⁴ See my *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (University of Toronto Press, 2005), 153–55.

²⁵ See Nikolai Markevich, *Istoriia Malorossii*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1842–43); and Mykola Markevych, *Istoriia Malorosii* (Kyiv: In iure, 2003). Markevych referred to Heorhii Konysky as the author of the *History of the Rus'*—a belief shared by everyone familiar with it until the second half of the nineteenth century.

²⁶ Mikhail Grushevsky, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskago naroda* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia polza, 1904).

²⁷ Bantysh-Kamensky used a copy of the Hadiach Articles from the archive of the College of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. See his *Istoriia Maloi Rosii ot vodvorentia slavian v sei strane do unichtozheniia getmanstva* (Kyiv: Chas, 1993), 225–26.

²⁸ Markevich, *Istoriia Malorosii*, 250. The "Zaslav Articles" introduced into historiography by the author of the *History of the Rus'* and further popularized by Markevych were considered authentic

Continuing a long-established tradition in Ukrainian historical writing, Markevych distanced Vyhovsky from the treaties (now two) the latter had negotiated. Indeed, Markevych was the first author to praise them openly for the benefits they offered the Cossacks. Commenting on the Hadiach Articles, which he took from a source other than the *History of the Rus'*, Markevych wrote: "And what would Little Russia be in reality if the Hadiach Articles could actually have been fulfilled at some point? We have our own troops, our own academies, schools, printshops, our own government, our own currency, our own faith; the hetman distributes awards, confers noble status, and acts as commander in chief even of the Polish armies in Ukraine. We have the right to make an alliance with the Crimea but not with Muscovy; we have our own trade; our own navigation; we are even entitled to maintain neutrality in wars between the Kingdom of Poland and other states—this is no longer a protectorate; it is an independent power; a separate state within a state."²⁹

This was the most positive assessment that a mid-nineteenth-century Ukrainian historian could give of any treaty of the past. It certainly expressed the feelings of generations of Cossack chroniclers before him, who had so faithfully copied the conditions of the Union of Hadiach into their works but were never able to express openly the reasons why they cherished that document so much. Markevych was not entirely free of self-censorship in this regard. To explain why the union was rejected by the Cossack Host and never implemented, he stated that the promises the Poles gave were insincere and meant to deceive the Cossacks. Commenting on the "Zaslavl Articles" taken from the *History of the Rus'*, Markevych added a national dimension as well: "In those articles we see one of two things: either senselessness or treason. They conform neither to common sense nor to politics; nevertheless, they conformed to the characters of the two nations whose rivalry would remain unresolved even today had it not been for Khmelnytsky. One was the pursuer, the other the pursued; one boundlessly proud, the other grateful but self-regarding; one giving promises that could not be fulfilled, the other having lost his former credulity. Their disunion was irrevocable, their friendship, beyond recovery."³⁰ Through his interpretation of the Hadiach Agreement, Markevych contributed to the "nationalization" of Ukrainian history. He also prepared the ground for the interpretation of the Union of Hadiach as a treaty that guaranteed Ukraine full autonomy, if not outright independence—a view shared to one degree or another by most Ukrainian historians and political thinkers of the twentieth century.


There is something fascinating about unfinished lives, unfulfilled promises, and unrealized agreements. People want to know how history would have turned out if those incomplete projects had come to fruition. The Union of Hadiach is no exception to that rule, and it still attracts the attention of historians of Eastern Europe. Today some of them regard the union as a monument to shattered dreams of the peaceful coexistence of two nations that missed their chance to achieve an understanding and paid a high price for their failure. Others see in it a failed attempt of one nation to re-establish control over the other. Whatever the current interpretations, the

by some historians as late as the 1880s. One of them was Nikolai I. Pavlishchev, the author of *Polskaia anarkhiia pri Yane Kazimire i voina za Ukrainu*, 3 vols., 2d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1887).

²⁹ Markevich, *Istoriia Malorosii*, 260.

³⁰ Ibid., 251.

myth of Hadiach seems alive and well three and a half centuries after the event. It no longer addresses the needs, interests, and fears of royal houses or social estates, but it serves the interests of nations. It seems that myths never die: they only reappear in new guises.



Is Gogol's 1842 Version of *Taras Bulba* Really "Russified"?

Oleh S. Ihnytskyj

The established orthodoxy of Gogol scholarship holds that the 1842 redaction of *Taras Bulba* is "Russified," i.e., an expression of Russian nationalism and, by extension, a sign of Gogol's retreat from Ukrainian patriotism, which was symbolized by the original 1835 *Mirgorod* edition of the tale. This view reinforces the notion that Gogol is an exclusively Russian writer because he transferred his national loyalties. My paper, an abridged version of a longer work (minus several examples), challenges this interpretation as well as the uses to which *Taras Bulba* is put in shaping Gogol's "national" persona. Analysis centres on the meaning and inter-relationship of several key words (*Ukraina, russkaia zemlia, russkii, svoi tsar*) that serve as the mainstay of the Russocentric exegesis.

According to Soviet scholars, *Taras Bulba* represents the distinctive qualities of the "Russian soul" and "Russian feeling" (*russkoi dushi, russkogo chuvstva*).¹ Donald Fanger claims the rewritten novel shifted "the patriotic burden from Ukrainian to proto-Russian" and that "the [earlier] patriotic Ukrainian emphases [were] changed to Russian ..."² Geoffrey Hosking characterized "the Cossacks of the Ukrainian frontier" as "a romantic portrait of the alternative [N.B.] Russian ethnos."³ Meanwhile Simon Karlinsky observed that "Russian governments—from that of Nicholas I to the present-day Soviet one—value it for its insistence on the eternal unity of the Russian and Ukrainian people under Russian rule and its implicit opposition to any Ukrainian separatist tendencies."⁴

Karlinsky calls the tale "one of the most ultra-nationalistic works in all literature," which portrays "Cossacks as staunch defenders of Orthodoxy and passionate Russian patriots" (p. 79). Judith Deutsch Kornblatt promoted the thesis that Gogol "does not present the Cossacks in contrast to Russians, but as though they themselves *are* the Russians."⁵ And Saera Yoon says "the earlier Ukrainian story [1835] [is transformed]

¹ N. V. Gogol, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 2 ([Moscow]: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1937), 725–726. This edition is henceforth abbreviated PSS. It is available on-line at <<http://febweb.ru/febupd/gogol/default.asp?febupd/gogol/texts/ps0/ps0.html>>. My quotations are taken from there.

² Donald Fanger, *The Creation of Nikolai Gogol* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979), 97–98; 192–93. Emphases added.

³ Geoffrey A. Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917* (London: Fontana Press, 1998), 297.

⁴ Simon Karlinsky, *The Sexual Labyrinth of Nikolai Gogol* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 77.

⁵ Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, *The Cossack Hero in Russian Literature* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992) 45. Emphasis in the original.

into an epic-historical novel ... that promotes Russian virtues in the face of an encroaching Western civilization [Poland]." Yoon describes the Cossacks of the Mirgorod redaction as "separate and disinterested in Russia," but the Cossacks of 1842 "completely internalize a form of the Russian identity. They... adopted the patriotically charged epithet 'Russian' to describe themselves." For Yoon this becomes evidence of "Gogol's transformed ideological position."⁶

The most sophisticated expression of the Russification idea—and the one on which I will focus here—belongs to Edyta Bojanowska. In her excellent book she states that Gogol's "only fiction that glorifies Russian nationalism remains the 1842 redaction"⁷ of *Taras Bulba*.

Gogol greatly expanded the *Mirgorod* version of *Taras Bulba* and changed its national profile.... The 1835 version celebrated the Cossacks as freedom-loving Ukrainians fighting for the preservation of their religion and customs that had come under assault from Catholic Poland. The word "Ukraine" (*Ukraina*) appears frequently (PSS 2, 283, 285, 299, 310, 311, 327, 344, 349); the concepts of a "nation" (*natsiia*) or a "Cossack nation" are also mentioned (PSS 2, 348, 349). The Ukraine of the 1835 *Taras* is contiguous with the Ukraine of Gogol's historical writings whose echoes resound in the narrative: an entity that was a *nation* by virtue of its cultural specificity and unique historical experience. *This changes in 1842*. Though in the least reworked passages *some* references to Ukraine remain, Gogol's overall *strategy* is to *eliminate* them and to identify the *place of action* as "Russia" ("eastern Russia" or "the original Russia"; PSS 2, 64, 46, 78) and the protagonists' *national identity* as "Russian" or "southern Russian" (PSS 2, 41, 46, 47, 48, 65, 124, 133, 138–140). The Cossacks' "physiognomy" remains unique, yet this *no longer signals their national separateness*. Gogol now presents this uniqueness as a peculiar stamp, a flourish that the Cossacks *impart* to a *general Russian nature*. The Cossacks come to express *Russianness*, which the text bounds, as I mentioned, to Orthodoxy and East Slavic *ethnic ties* that have historically *united* the Muscovites, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians. Their heirs all form a nation of "brothers" (PSS 2: 65) ...⁸

Bojanowska believes that Gogol renounces "his earlier [Ukrainian] autonomist leanings" (256). In place of pitting "Ukraine against Russia and accentuat[ing] national differences" (371), he embraces a nationalistic Russian ideology, based on the amalgamation of "East Slavic Orthodox domains into a 'greater' Russian nation" (304).

Bojanowska's emphatic "Russian" interpretation loses some of its edge in light of certain ambiguities, which she admits exist. For example, there is not "a single ethnically Russian character in" *Taras Bulba* (256)—an obvious problem for the "amalgamation" thesis. She draws attention to the odd fact that Gogol chose to glorify

⁶ Saera Yoon, "Transformation of a Ukrainian Cossack into a Russian Warrior: Gogol's 1842 *Taras Bulba*," *The Slavic and East European Journal*, 49, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 431, 432.

⁷ Edyta M. Bojanowska, *Nikolai Gogol: Between Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 255. "PSS" is also Bojanowska's abbreviation for Gogol's *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (cf. n. 1 above); the number "2" indicates vol. 2. Owing to length constraints, I shall not comment on some of the arguments she raises. For my review of her book, see "The Nationalism of Nikolai Gogol: Betwixt and Between?" *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 49, nos. 3–4 (September–December 2007): 349–68.

⁸ Bojanowska, *Nikolai Gogol*, 266 (emphases added). See also 256–57.

"Russian nationalism" by embedding it "in a theme from Ukrainian history, the topic on which his Ukrainian nationalism had run at its highest" (255). She recognizes uncertainties in Gogol's use of *russkii* ("this [word] can in fact be read to mean Ukrainian" [304]) as well as the meaning of *tsar*, saying that "troubling incongruities" arise in "the [Russian] nationalistic message" of the novel's "grand conclusion" (304). But despite these misgivings, she remains true to the "Russified" reading, persuaded that *Taras Bulba* is about an "idea of Russia" (i.e., a "greater" Russia) and that Gogol's goal is to tie "Ukraine's national potential to Russia" (371).

This paper makes a case for a diametrically opposite interpretation. It treats the novel's incongruities—i.e., Gogol's apparent inability or unwillingness to espouse forthrightly the Russian nationalist position attributed to him, as well as scholarship's reliance on overly vague definitions of "Russian" (proto-Russian, alternative Russian, Orthodox East Slav)—as aporias that invite a reassessment of the standardized reading. I propose that *Taras Bulba* is really about an *idea of Ukraine*, whose origins Gogol establishes in Kyivan Rus'—which, *for him*, is not "Russia." The novel does not depict two nations—Ukrainians and Great Russians—brought together into a "greater" Russia through the intermediacy of a Russian tsar. It is an account of Ukraine *alone* as a Cossack-Rus' state on the cusp of a political rebirth. As an alternative to the view that Rus' and Cossack Ukraine must exclude each other—"In the 1842 edition the Cossacks no longer celebrate their Ukrainian uniqueness but rather their loyalty to the concept of Rus' (Bojanowska, 256)—I show that Gogol treats them as *complementary* societies that together form a historically "greater" Ukraine, which he names *Ukraina or rus-skaia zemlia*.

In this sense *Taras Bulba* has a lot in common with what Bojanowska called Gogol's "fairly risky direction of ... historical thinking about Ukraine" (127) during the 1830s. Whereas Bojanowska, like most scholars, construes the array of terminology in the novel (e.g., *Ukraina, russkaia zemlia, iuzhnaia pervobytnaia Rossiia*) as ideological vacillation in favour of Russian nationalism, I deal with this as ordinary practice, completely in line with nineteenth-century historical writing—an innocuous and unavoidable way of identifying Ukraine and East Slavdom.⁹ If one is to glean Gogol's political and patriotic views from the revised novel, then the focus should not be on verbal shifters like *Rossiia* and *russkii*, whose meaning is relative and entirely dependent on context, but on the modifiers "north/south" to which Gogol consistently turns as markers, respectively, of Russian and Ukrainian nationality. The novel is ideologically homogenous because it rigorously invokes only Ukrainian territories to the exclusion of Great Russian areas in the empire. With respect to national difference, I also take the absence of Great Russians as significant

⁹ I cannot develop this idea in detail here for lack of space, but, as an example, compare the usage of *Rossiia* and *russkii* in Mykhailo Maksymovych's writings. See M. O. Maksymovych, *Vybrani tvory z istorii Kyivskoi Rusi, Kyieva i Ukrainy*, ed. P. H. Markov (Kyiv: Vyshcha shchkola, 2004). Like Maksymovych (cf. 48–49), Gogol adheres to the scholarly terminology of his day, in which *Rossia* is frequently used to mean East Slavdom, while Ukraine and Russia are differentiated with the adjectives "southern" and "northern." These terminological tendencies are evident in Gogol's "Vzgliad na sostavlenie Malorossii" (1832 [?], pub. 1835), where the first references to Ukraine as "south *Rossiia*" is followed by this statement: "Эта земля, получившая после название Украины" (PSS 8: 45). As Bojanowska aptly notes: "Since history writing featured too many hot buttons, Gogol resorted to geography to make his point" (*Nikolai Gogol*, 132).

and reject giving them a virtual presence through the mechanism of defining words like *ruskii* and *tsar* in the "Great Russian" manner, for which the novel makes no allowance. I will prove that Gogol's "imagining" of the Cossack nation has nothing in common with an all-inclusive Russia. I conclude that interpretations of *Taras Bulba* are guided too much by ethnocentric Russian cultural and political perspectives and too little by the Ukrainian.

"Ukraina" and "Russkaia zemlia"

Bojanowska's Russification thesis has a quantitative aspect. The purportedly fewer uses of the word *Ukraina* lead to a qualitative deduction about the "national profile" of the novel. She says that in the 1835 version "the word 'Ukraine' (*Ukraina*) appears frequently," but in the 1842 edition, "in the least reworked passages," only "some references to Ukraine remain." She claims that the "overall strategy is to eliminate" the word *Ukraina* and "to identify the place of action as 'Russia' ('eastern Russia' or 'the original Russia')¹⁰ [...] and the protagonists' national identity as 'Russian' or 'southern Russian'" (266; my emphases). But does Gogol's text support these statements and conclusions? We can answer the question by looking at the frequency with which *Ukraina* appears in both redactions.

Table 1

| Word Form | Frequency | Version | Word Form | Frequency | Version |
|-----------|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| Украина | 2 | 1835 | Украина | 1 | 1842 |
| Украине | 2 | 1835 | Украине | 8 | 1842 |
| Украину | 3 | 1835 | Украину | 2 | 1842 |
| Украины | 2 | 1835 | Украины | 2 | 1842 |

Table 1 shows that the 1835 edition has nine occurrences of the word; the 1842 version has thirteen.¹¹ Hence the word *Ukraina* does not simply "remain" but becomes more frequent. This means there was no "strategy" to "eliminate" the word—but, quite possibly, to increase it. Ideological interpretations of the novel need to contend with this fact. In any event, a key mainstay of the "Russification" thesis is simply wrong.

Four out of nine instances of *Ukraina* from the 1835 *Taras Bulba* were carried over into 1842 (table 2 shows them in italic). Nine out thirteen uses of the word in the 1842 redaction are entirely new. Table 2 (a list of all twenty-two uses of the word) reveals that Gogol sometimes made minor changes to capitalization (lines 7–8) but felt no obligation to alter the adjacent *Ukraina*. Line 5 illustrates that he inserted *po vsei Ukraine* into a phrase that did not have it in 1835.¹² Lines 16–17 show that the distinction between Muscovy and Ukraine survives into the second edition. If Gogol's strategy was to "unify" two countries, then all the preceding editorial decisions were clearly counterproductive.

¹⁰ Gogol actually writes "the southern original Russia [*Rosstia*]."

¹¹ See PSS 2: 43, 44, 62, 77 (2x), 79, 106, 107, 124, 125, 147, 160, 165.

¹² The 1835 version reads: "И что ксендзы ездят из села в село в таратайках ..."

Table 2: All Occurrences of the Word "Ukraina" in Context: 1835 and 1842 Editions

| | |
|--|------|
| ... то мы поведаем, чтобы знала вся Украина, да и другие земли ... | 1835 |
| Кто сказал, что моя отчизна Украина? Кто дал мне ее в отчизны? | 1842 |
| ... спорным, нерешенным владением, к каким принадлежала тогда Украина. | 1835 |
| Украине не видать тоже храбрейшего из своих детей, взявшихся защищать ее. | 1842 |
| ... расскажу: и ксендзы ездят теперь по всей Украине в таратайках ... | 1842 |
| ... думах, уже не поющих более на Украине боролатыми старцами-слепцами | 1842 |
| ... не наши, что арендаторствуют на Украине! ей-богу, не наши! то совсем | 1835 |
| ... не наши, те, что арендаторствуют на Украине! Ей-богу, не наши! То совсем | 1842 |
| ... начались разыгрываться схватки и битвы на Украине за унию. | 1842 |
| Несмотря на свою печаль и сокрушение о случившихся на Украине несчастьях ... | 1835 |
| Вот какие дела водятся на Украине, панове! | 1842 |
| ... чтоб таких полковников было побольше на Украине! | 1842 |
| ... как сделали они уже с гетьманом и лучшими русскими витязями на Украине. | 1842 |
| ... зливается воля и козачество на всю Украину! | 1835 |
| ... зливается воля и козачество на всю Украину! | 1842 |
| ... полуазиатский угол Европы. Московию и Украину они почитали ... | 1835 |
| ... полуазиатский угол Европы: Московию и Украину они почитали ... | 1842 |
| ... сударственных магнатов, и очистить Украину от жидовства, унии | 1835 |
| ... войска показалось на границах Украины. Это уже не была какая-нибудь ... | 1835 |
| ... войска показалось на границах Украины. Это уже не была какая-нибудь ... | 1842 |
| Хоть неживого, а доведу тебя до Украины! | 1842 |
| ... эту военную школу тогдашней Украины, представит своим сотоварищам... | 1835 |

Bojanowska errs when she says that in eliminating the word *Ukraina* Gogol identified "the place of action as 'Russia.'" A glance at table 2 shows that the locative form *na Ukraine* increases from two in 1835 to eight in 1842—a total that does not include such expressions as *do Ukrainy* and *po vsei Ukraine*. In contrast, the word *Rossiiia* is used only twice in 1842 (once in 1835) and in both cases it is modified by an adjective ("southern original *Rossiiia*," "east *Rossiiia*" [location of the Sich]). This is done consciously to set Ukraine apart from *Rossiiia* as a whole, and to continue the differentiating practice evident in the distinction between *Moskoviia* and *Ukraina*. Significantly, it was only in 1842 that Gogol adds the phrase *iuzhnaia pervobytnaia Rossiiia* (replacing line 3 in table 2) to denote Ukrainian lands, thereby implicitly demoting the unmentioned "northern" *Rossiiia* (a.k.a. *Moskoviia*) to separate and "un-original" status. Gogol's *Rossiiia*, clearly, emerges not as one "greater" single Russian nation, but a binational East Slavic territory, where original political statehood (*Rossiianness*, if you will) belongs to Ukraine. Gogol essentially reiterates his early 1830s view of Ukrainians, whom he described as the "original [NB], indigenous

inhabitants of *south Rossiia*," a *society* speaking a language with a "pure Slavic southern physiognomy" very close to the *Rus'ian*¹³ language of that time:

Большая часть этого общества [i.e., the Cossacks] состояла однако ж из *первобытных, коренных обитателей южной России*. Доказательство — в языке, который, несмотря на принятие множества татарских и польских слов, имел всегда *чисто славянскую южную физиономию, приближавшую его к тогдашнему русскому* ... (PSS 8: 47)¹⁴

It is meaningful that *Taras Bulba* constructs *Rossiia* in terms of difference and gives Ukraine political primacy. As in his "Glance at the Making of Little Russia," Gogol associates Ukraine with southern Rus' instead of establishing connections with the Muscovite "north."

The reason "Russia" may appear to be the "place of action" is because the phrase *rusaskaia zemlia* appears eleven times in 1842—yet not once in 1835. Nevertheless, even at that frequency the phrase is used *less* often than *Ukraine* and never replaces any occurrence of *Ukraine* in the 1835 edition. This raises a question: can *rusaskaia zemlia* legitimately be read as "Russian land" or "Russia," as is the norm among scholars and translators?¹⁵ Doubts are warranted, because, in revising the novel, Gogol introduced an analogy between the Cossacks and Rus'—*not* Muscovy or the Great Russians. In other words, he made Ukrainians *Rus'ians* (not *Russians*).¹⁶ Moreover, he is known to have insisted on a categorical difference between southern and northern Rus'.¹⁷ Consequently the rough parity in the use of *Ukraine* and *rusaskaia zemlia* more readily suggests a synonymic bond between them rather than an allusion to "Russia," be it Muscovy or *Rossiia* as a whole. The place of action in *Taras Bulba* bears variable names, but it always refers to the same southern, non-Russian space. A few examples will reinforce the point.

The 1842 edition has several equivalents for *Ukraine* besides *rusaskaia zemlia*: *Getmanshchina*, *Zaporozhe*, *Sech*, or *Sich*. All are common, overwhelming the two geographically modified uses of *Rossiia* and leaving no doubt as to where events unfold. Take the speech of the "faithful comrade":

¹³ Bojanowska is wrong to translate this as "Russian" (cf. *Nikolai Gogol*, 141). Gogol clearly has in mind a southern redaction of Church Slavonic.

¹⁴ All emphases in this and subsequent quotations from PSS in this article are mine unless noted otherwise.

¹⁵ Bojanowska redefines "Russian" (putting it in quotation marks) to mean "a supratemporal cultural community of Orthodox East Slavs" (*Nikolai Gogol*, 256), which includes the Great Russians.

¹⁶ The use of *rusaskaia zemlia* for Rus' is attested in Gogol. Cf. the following historical note: "Князья часто в критические минуты говорили, напоминали о том, что *Русь* гибнет, а враги радуются. На сейме, собранном Мономахом, явно сказано: да будет *земля русская* общим для нас отечеством" (PSS 9: 62).

¹⁷ "И вот *южная Россия* ... совершенно отделилась от *северной*. Всякая связь между ими разорвалась; составились два *государства*, называвшиеся одинаким именем — *Русью* ... Но уже сношений между ими не было. *Другие законы, другие обычаи, другая цель, другие связи, другие подвиги составили на время два совершенно различные характера*" ("Vzgliad na sostavleniie Malorossii," PSS 8: 44–45). Cf. Bojanowska, *Nikolai Gogol*, 143–55.

Хоть неживого, да довезу тебя! ... Пусть же хоть и будет орел высмывать из твоего лоба очи, да пусть же степовой *наш* орел, а не *ляшский*, не тот, что прилетает из польской земли. Хоть неживого, а довезу тебя *до Украины!* (PSS 2: 147; *my emphases*)

Так говорил верный товарищ. Скакал без отдыху дни и ночи и привез его, бесчувственного, в самую *Запорожскую Сечь*. (PSS 2: 147)

The congruence of Ukraine and the Sich is indisputable. Interesting also is the mention of the "Polish land," which illustrates the opposition that Gogol establishes between Ukraine and Poland, an antithesis that is completely absent when he uses *Ukraina* and *rusaskaia zemlia*. Most scholars would argue that *polskaia zemlia* is to "Poland" what *rusaskaia zemlia* is to "Russia," but that clearly is not supported by Gogol's practice. He embeds *rusaskaia zemlia* in a wholly Ukrainian environment, without a hint of Russianness. Consider the following passages, which occur within the span of three pages (PSS 2: 77, 78, 79). To save space, I have removed all intervening text that is irrelevant to this argument:

"А вы разве ничего не слышали о том, что делается на *Гетьманищине?* [...] (PSS 2: 76)

"Слушайте!. еще не то расскажу: и ксендзы ездят теперь *по всей Украине* в таратайках ... Вот какие дела водятся на *Украине*, панове! А вы тут сидите на *Запорожье* да гуляете [...]" (PSS 2: 77)

"Как! чтобы жида держали на аренде христианские церкви! ... Как! чтобы попустить такие мучения на *русской земле* от проклятых недоверков! чтобы вот так поступали с *полковниками и гетьманом!* Да не будет же сего, не будет!" (PSS 2: 78)

"Как можно, чтобы мы думали про *запорожцев* что-нибудь нехорошее! Те совсем не наши, те, что арендаторствуют на *Украине!* Ей-богу, не наши! То совсем не жида: то черт знает что." (PSS 2: 79)

Bearing in mind the emphasized words, it is perfectly obvious that events are not taking place in Russia and do not portray "a supratemporal cultural community of Orthodox East Slavs" despite the appearance of *rusaskaia zemlia*. The Hetmanate, the Zaporizhzhia, *Ukraina*, and *rusaskaia zemlia* are all one and the same unified and contiguous space. This is the land of the Cossacks, the Zaporozhians and the hetmans. And, as the novel will make clear, it is also the land of their Rus' fathers and grandfathers.¹⁸ Chapter twelve of the 1842 edition corroborates the linkage between the Cossacks, *Ukraina*, and *rusaskaia zemlia*:

Отыскался след Тарасов. Сто двадцать тысяч *козацкого войска* показалось на границах *Украины* ... поднялась вся *нация*, ибо переполнилось терпение *народа* ... (PSS 2: 165)

Нечего описывать всех битв, где показали себя *козаки*, ни всего постепенного хода кампании: все это внесено в *летописные* страницы. Известно, какова в *русской земле* война ... (PSS 2: 166)

¹⁸ Bulba states: "Хочется мне вам сказать, панове, что такое есть *наше* товарищество. Вы слышали от *отцов и дедов*, в какой чести у всех была *земля наша*: и грекам дала знать себя, и с Царьграда брала червонцы, и города были пышные, и храмы, и князья, князья *русского рода*, свои князья, а не католические недоверки" (PSS 2: 133).

The repeated close collocation of *Ukraina* and *rusaskaia zemlia* creates, in effect, a reciprocal definition. The second of the two paragraphs above, with its reference to chronicles, also explains why Gogol (and Bulba [cf. note 17]) characterizes the Ukrainian land by the adjective *ruskii*: this is a replication of the chronicle tradition. In case the reader missed the first cue, the next paragraph reiterates this: *V letopisnykh stranitsakh izobrazheno podrobno* (PSS 2: 167). *Ruskii*, in effect, is an elevated, archaic reference to Ukraine, a word made relevant by the invocation of chronicles and Rus' (but not Russia).

Particularly troublesome for the thesis that *Taras Bulba* has a "changed ... national profile" (Bojanowska, 266) are the new instances of *Ukraina* that appear in the 1842 edition and have no equivalence in the 1835 version. As mentioned, there are nine such cases. Perhaps the most startling introduction of the word comes from the lips of Andrii. In 1835 Gogol had him renouncing his father, brother, mother, and fatherland. In 1842, instead of a vague fatherland, Andrii betrays Ukraine by name: "*Kto skazal, chto moia otchizna Ukraina?*" In this way Andrii's treason is made exclusively Ukrainian, suggesting, by extension, that it is this land (not *Rossia*) that demands his primary loyalty.¹⁹ Three paragraphs later the 1842 edition invokes *Ukraina* again when Andrii kisses his Polish *tsaritsa* and his former Cossack self "dies." At this point Gogol emphasizes that Andrii's betrayal leaves Ukraine defenseless, because, she, a mother figure, is abandoned by one of her bravest children:

И погиб козак! Пропал для всего козацкого рыцарства! Не видать ему больше ни Запорожся, ни отцовских хуторов своих, ни церкви [Б]ожьей! Украине не видать тоже храбрейшего из своих детей, взявшихся защищать ее." (PSS 2: 106)

Bojanowska takes the view that in the 1842 redaction the Cossacks are less of a *nation*, that the unity of East Slavs through Orthodoxy becomes more important than their "national separateness." She notes two instances of the word "*natsiia*" in the 1835 version but cites no examples for 1842, creating the impression that Gogol might have downgraded "Ukraine" from its earlier "national" status. This is a flawed presentation, because the idea of nationhood is strongly highlighted in 1842. The Cossacks (their numbers increase from 30,000 to 120,000) are not just a "little group or detachment" pursuing selfish goals, but members of an "entire nation," elements of a long-suffering "people." They fight to redress more than the injuries to their religion, which is referred to as the "faith of their *ancestors*" (not a formulation found in 1835). In particular, this *natsiia* stands up for its rights, mores, and customs. Compare the 1842 and 1835 texts:

¹⁹ Bojanowska (p. 297) refers to this moment in *Nikolai Gogol* but does not acknowledge that Gogol added the word "Ukraine" to dramatize the national moment in the novel.

1842 Version

Напрасно король и многие рыцари, просветленные умом и душой, представляли, что подобная жестокость наказаний может только разжечь мщение *козацкой нации*. (PSS 2: 164)

Отыскался след Тарасов. Сто двадцать тысяч *козацкого* войска показалося на границах *Украины*. Это уже не была какая-нибудь *малая часть или отряд*, выступивший на добычу или на угон за татарами. Нет, поднялась *вся нация*, ибо переполнилось терпение *народа*, - поднялась отмстить за посмеяние прав своих, за позорное унижение своих нравов,²⁰ за оскорбление веры предков и святого обычая, за посярмление церквей, за бесчинства чужеземных панов, за угнетенье, за унию, за позорное владычество жидовства на христианской земле - за все, что копило и сугубило с давних времен суровую ненависть *козаков*. (PSS 2: 165)

1835 Version

Он очень хорошо видел, что подобная жестокость наказаний может только разжечь мщение *козачьей нации*. Но король не мог сделать ничего против дерзкой воли государственных магнатов ... (PSS 2: 348)

След Тарасов отыскался. Тридцать тысяч *козацкого* войска показалося на границах *Украины*. Это уже не был какой-нибудь *отряд*, выступавший для добычи или своей отдельной цели: *это было дело общее*. Это *целая нация*, которой терпение уже переполнилось, поднялась мстить за оскорбленные права свои, за униженную религию свою и *обычай*, за вероломные убийства гетманов своих и полковников, за *насилие* жидовских арендаторов и за все, в чем считал себя оскорбленным угнетенный *народ*. (PSS 2: 349)

As is obvious, Gogol corrected and expanded the later version, making it, among other things, more eloquent ("mshchenie *kozachei natsii*" is polished to "mshchenie *kozatskoi natsii*"). *Ukraina*, *natsiia*, *narod*, and the Cossacks make up a single semantic matrix, with the Cossack movement transforming itself into a national phenomenon. These sections disprove the view that "The Cossacks' 'physiognomy' remains unique, yet this no longer signals their national separateness" (emphasis added). Both national and religious themes remain in these passages, but the 1842 version clearly tips the scales in favour of national concerns. In parsing the word *natsiia*, Bojanowska at one point writes: "While *natsiia* ... unambiguously means 'a nation' and carries a political overtone, *narod* ... is more vague and politically innocuous, as it may mean 'a people' or 'a nation,' depending on the context" (139-40). If we go by her own definitions, *Taras Bulba* obviously politicizes Ukraine, treating it unambiguously as a nation.

This is an appropriate place to touch on a related claim. Bojanowska has the 1842 *Taras Bulba* emphasizing "ethnic ties," "historical unity," and support for "a nation

²⁰ In the print edition of PSS the underlined phrase above is gibberish: "за позорное своих унижение" (2: 165). My correction comes from N. V. Gogol, *Sobranie sochinenii v semi tomakh* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1967). Because of this error, Bojanowska (291) leaves out "svoikh нравов" (our mores) in her English translation. She also leaves out "Ukraina" and "ancestors."

of 'brothers'"—tendencies that allegedly chip away at the Cossacks' separateness and subsume them "in the larger category of the Russians" (268). This is part of the argument that Gogol changes "the protagonists' *national identity*" to "'Russian' or 'southern Russian'" (266). To bolster this idea Bojanowska relies twice (266, 268) on a passage in which the Ukrainian is called a "southern *rossiianin*."²¹ She elaborates:

Even the characteristic Ukrainian straight-face humor that Gogol had used elsewhere to set the Ukrainians *apart* from the *Russians* here becomes *attenuated* within a statement that *asserts the kinship* of the two *ethnicities* ("a sharp feature that even now distinguishes a southern Russian from his other brothers ..."). (268; emphasis added)

Again, I believe Bojanowska overstates the case to shore up the "Russification" thesis. Gogol's sentence emphasizes *difference* and *separateness*—not kinship and unity. He states: "the 'southern *rossiianin*' [i.e., the Ukrainian] is *different to this very day* [*otlichaetsia donyne*] from his 'other brothers' [*drugikh brat'ev*]," who, oddly, remain unspecified and without a geographic site. Surely, even when using "southern *rossiianin*," Gogol is establishing past and present *differences* for Ukrainians in *Rossia*, just as he did when he called Ukraine "the *southern* original *Rossia*" and Ukrainians her "original and indigenous inhabitants." The accent lies on the differentiating word "southern," not on the unifying concept *rossiianin*. Moreover, neither the word *Rossia* nor *rossiianin* foreground *ethnic* unity; they suggest civic or political commonalities. If Gogol's purpose was to underscore Slavic kinship and establish for the protagonists a "greater" Russian national identity, the words *russkii* (*yuzhnyi russkii*) or *Rus'* would have served him better. As it stands, in the only instance of the novel where a Great Russian brother *appears* to be invoked, the best Gogol can muster is a formula that *distinguishes* imperial subjects in the state rather than "amalgamating" them into an "all-Russian" nation. Ukraine as a part of *Rossia* is a contemporary fact for Gogol. However, the ideology of his novel is geared toward separating Ukraine and establishing its uniqueness.

"*Russkii*"

В русских избах проклятые кацапы везде поразводили тараканов. («Иван Федорович Шпонька и его тетушка»)

... шея его ... казалась необыкновенно длинною, как у тех гипсовых котенков ... которых носят на головах целыми десятками *русские иностранцы*. («Шинель»)

Не было ремесла, которого бы не знал *козак* ... пить и бражничать, как только может один *русский*. («Тарас Бульба»)

All English translations of *Taras Bulba* convey every instance of *russkii* as "Russian" and each occurrence of *russkaia zemlia* as "Russia" or the "Russian land." Most scholars adhere to these meanings as well. What such interpretations have in

²¹ "[Веселость это] ... резкая черта, которою *отличается* донине от других братьев своих южный *россиянин*" (PSS 2: 65).

common is the refusal to grant *russkii* a "Ukrainian" and/or "Rus'ian" status. The exception to this rule is Yurii Barabash:

The frequently used concepts in *Taras Bulba*—"Rus'," "*russkaia vera*," "*russkaia zemlia*," "*russkaia dusha*"—should not mislead us. For Gogol these [words] are synonyms of everything native [*rodnogo*] Ukrainian that has roots in Kyivan Rus', and under no circumstance in anything officially "all-Russian" and especially not in anything "Great Russian"... It is absolutely obvious that Taras in [his] famous speech about comradeship—when speaking about "*zemlia nasha*," about "*kniazia russkogo roda*"—has Kyivan Rus' in mind.²²

The word "*russkii*," of course, appears in many of Gogol's works and frequently does mean "Russian." It figures conspicuously in the opening of *Dead Souls*, where it clearly (but redundantly) identifies two Great Russian peasants. In *Taras Bulba*, naturally, the word cannot carry the same connotation because of the different cultural context. Gogol's entire literary career was based on differentiating Ukrainians and Great Russians (a fact brilliantly demonstrated by Bojanowska)—and *Taras Bulba* is no exception.

The 1835 edition uses *russkii* three times;²³ it also had a single instance of *vostochnaia Rossiia*, a reference to (south)eastern Ukraine where the Sich was located. In short, these words were not special measures taken in 1842 for purposes of Russification; they were part of Gogol's lexicon even during his so-called Ukrainian period.²⁴ True, the second edition uses *russkii* many more times (twenty-four to be exact) in a variety of combinations, among them eleven times in "*russkaia zemlia*." But if this word refers to Ukraine/Rus', it enhances the Ukrainian patriotism of the 1842 work rather than diminishes it. But what is the evidence that *russkii* means "Ukrainian"?

First, we should note that *Taras Bulba* is true to the diverse terminology of Gogol's time (and beyond) when conveying the meaning "Ukraine/Ukrainian."²⁵ The words *Ukraina/ukrainets* were in use, but the adjective *ukrainskii* was relatively rare both in

²² Yu. Barabash, *Pochva i sudba: Gogol i ukrainskaia literature. U istokov* (Moscow: Nasledie, 1995), 141. Bojanowska cites Barabash in *Nikolai Gogol*, 304.

²³ (1) "[*P*]русское духовенство"; (2) "толстая русская купчиха"; (3) "состоявший из польских и русских дворян."

²⁴ Speaking of the early period, "*russkaia zemlia*" appears in *Strashnaia mest* (1832) twice, as does the adjective "*russkii*." These words appear along with the expressions "*narod ukrainskii*," "*ukrainskii narod*," "*ukrainskii krai*," "*po Ukraine*," and "*v Ukraine*." These collocations simply underscore that the semantics of "*russkii*" was "Ukrainian" already in Gogol's early period and was not invented in *Taras Bulba* to "Russify" the novel.

²⁵ Zenon E. Kohut writes that "an important factor in Western nationbuilding was the elite's identification of a specific territory and people by a single name. In the Ukrainian case establishing such a name was particularly complex, because, as Mykola Kostomarov pointed out over a century ago, throughout history Ukrainians had used a multiplicity of names for self-identification. [The terms used most frequently were "Rus'," "Little Russia" (*Mala Rus'*, *Mala Rossiia*, *Malorossiia*), and "Ukraine" (*Ukraina*). "Rus'" was, of course, the most ancient name originating with the Kievan realm. It included the concept of "Rus'" territory, dynasty (the Rurikides), and church (the metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus')]" ("The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. 3–4 [December 1986]): 562, 564).

general usage and in Gogol's work;²⁶ Shevchenko, for example, never used it in his poetry.²⁷ The Ukrainian language was known either as *malorosiiskii yazyk* or *yuzhno-russkii yazyk*. There was a *Yuzhno-russkii sbornik* (Kharkiv, 1848) and a *Yuzhno-russkii almanakh* (Odesa, 1900). *Rus'ka khata* (Lviv and Chernivtsi) appeared as late as 1877. Taras Shevchenko published the *Bukvar yuzhnorusskii* (1861). Nikolai (Mykola) Kostomarov wrote about the "dve russkiiia narodnosti," one Ukrainian, the other Great Russian.²⁸ The Ukrainian land was called *Yuzhnaia Rossiia* or *Yuzhnaia Rus'* as well as *Malorossiiia*. For our purposes, the most interesting example comes from Gogol's chief historical source—*Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*—which uses *russkii* (with one "s") to designate its Ukrainian subject matter alongside the word *Ukraina*. Therefore the presence of *russkii* and *yuzhnyi rossiiianin* in *Taras Bulba* must be seen as a matter of standard practice. It cannot be construed as Gogol's furtive betrayal of Ukraine for Russia.²⁹

One of the most transparent uses of *russkii* to mean "Ukrainian" in the high style surfaces in the phrase "*russkimi vitiaziami na Ukraine*" (PSS 2: 124). Here both *russkii* and the noun *vitiaz* (knight) raise the tone. The national location is explicit ("*na Ukraine*"), and everything that precedes these three words refers to Ukrainian military men:

Ты хочешь, видно, чтоб мы не уважили первого, святого закона *товарищества*: оставили бы собратьев своих на то, чтобы с них с живых содрали кожу или, исчетвертовав на части *козацкое* их тело, развозили бы их по городам и селам, как сделали они уже с *гетьманом* и *лучшими русскими витязями на Украйне*. (PSS 2: 124)

To argue that Gogol is treating Ukrainians *as* Russian, or portraying "a general Russian nature" while referring to hetmans and Cossacks, is to strain credibility to the utmost.

²⁶ Gogol used the adjective "*ukrainskii*" in his article "O malorossiiskikh pesniakh" and in some of his tales.

²⁷ Cf. Oleh S. Ilnytskyj and George Hawrysch, *A Concordance to the Poetic Works of Taras Shevchenko*, vol. 3, 1901–1905 (New York and Toronto: Shevchenko Scientific Society in the U.S. and Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2001). Shevchenko used "*rus'ka zemlia*" in the poem "Z peredsvita do vechora" for Rus', and the word "*rusychi*" to denote its people.

²⁸ N. Kostomarov, "Dve russkiiia narodnosti," *Osnova* (St. Petersburg), no. 3 (1862): 33–80. The article opens with this statement: "... *Основа* поднимает знамя *русской* народности, не отличной от той русской, какой многими исключительно присвоено это название. О ее существовании не может быть сомненья, коль скоро она сама о себѣ заявляет. Итакъ те которые говорили: русская народность, и понимали подъ нею что-то *единственное* самосущее, ошибались; они должны были говорить: русскія народности. Оказывается, что русская народность не едина; ихъ двѣ, а кто знаетъ, можетъ быть ихъ откроется и болѣе, и тѣмъ не менѣе онѣ – русскія" <<http://litopys.org.ua/kostomar/kos38.htm>>. Here Kostomarov repeats what he had written much earlier, in 1843: "Но народность Малороссии есть особенная отличная от народности великороссийской" ("Обзор сочинений, pisannykh na malorossiiskom yazyke," in M. I. Kostomarov, *Tvory v dvokh tomakh*, vol 2 [Kyiv: Dnipro, 1967], 377).

²⁹ In one of Gogol's historical notes, Ukrainian (Kyivan) territories are designated as the "*russkii southwest*": "Влияние России на *юго-запад русскій* стало значительно меньше" (PSS 9: 65). See also n. 30 below.

There are other episodes in the novel proving that *russkii* can only mean "Ukrainian." Take the passage about Kyiv's high society in the 1842 version, which is virtually identical to the 1835 version:

Эта бурса составляла совершенно отдельный мир: в круг высший, состоявший из польских и русских дворян, они не допускались. Сам воевода Адам Кисель ... не вводил их в общество и приказывал держать их построжее. (PSS 2: 54)

The historical framework eliminates any possibility that Gogol might be speaking in one breath about Polish and Great Russian gentry. Moreover, there is proof that these *russkie* are indeed Ukrainians: in only a slightly different context Gogol labeled them *malorossiiane*. Here is a scene depicting Andrii's wanderings through Kyiv (preserved without changes in the 1842 version):

Иногда он [Андрий] забирался и в улицу аристократов, в нынешнем старом Киеве, где жили малороссийские и польские дворяне ... (PSS 2: 56)

As a digression, I draw attention to Gogol's historical notes, which contain jottings about King Władysław II Jagiełło's unification of Poland, *Malaia Rossiia*, and Lithuania. He records that three equal hetmans were established for each "*natsiia*": "Hetman koronnyi polskii; Hetman litovskii; Hetman *russkii*." The last, of course, is a reference to Ukraine/*Malaia Rossiia*.³⁰

Now that we have seen how "*russkii*" functions, we can turn to a paragraph in the first chapter of *Taras Bulba*, which features the word in the phrases "*russkaia priroda*" and "*russkaia sila*"—typically understood and translated as "Russian nature" and "Russian power." For many critics this is the ultimate proof of Gogol's Russian patriotism.

Бульба был упрям страшно. Это был один из тех характеров, которые могли возникнуть только в тяжелый XV век на полукочующем углу Европы, когда вся южная первобытная Россия, оставленная своими князьями, была опустошена, выжжена дотла неукротимыми набегами монгольских хищников; когда, лишившись дома и кровли, стал здесь отважен человек; когда на пожарищах, в виду грозных соседей и вечной опасности, селится он и привыкает глядеть им прямо в очи, разучившись знать, существует ли какая боязнь на свете; когда бранным пламенем объялся древле мирный славянский дух и завелось козачество — широкая, разгульная замашка русской природы, — и когда все поречья, перевозы, прибрежные пологие и удобные места усеялись козаками, которым и счету никто не ведал, и смелые товарищи их были вправе отвечать султану, пожелавшему знать о числе их: "Кто их знает! у нас их раскидано по всему степу: что байрак, то козак" (что маленький пригорок, там уж и козак). Это было, точно, необыкновенное явление русской силы: его вышибло из народной груди огниво бед. (PSS 2: 46)

Gogol's modern-day narrator describes here the revival of the Kyivan Rus' lands through the agency of the Cossacks, who, thanks to their courage, become the very embodiment of the former *Rus'ian* temperament and power (hence *russkaia priroda*,

³⁰ See "1386. Ягайлом соединяются Польша, Малая Россия и Литва" (PSS 9: 79). Another note has the following: "1342. Установление русского воеводства. Из северн[ой] части Галиции оно распространилось впоследствии до вершины Днепра" (PSS 9: 78). Here, again, we have a clear reference by Gogol to Ukraine using the word *russkii*.

rusaskaia sila). Observe that the Cossacks speak to the sultan in Ukrainian, which requires a parenthetical translation for Russophone readers. They are heirs to the original Slavic state, Kyivan Rus' (here "yuzhnaia pervobytnaia Rossiia"), which was abandoned by its princes ("ostavlennaiia svoimi kniaziami"). The ancient, peaceful Slavic spirit—tempered by the dangerous southern environment—reacquires the characteristics ("zamashka") of the *Rus'ian nature* in the form of Cossackdom ("kozachestvo"). Bojanowska, referring to this section, writes: "The warlike Cossacks now represent 'the broad, robust [*razgul'naia*] manifestation of the *Russian nature*'... [Gogol] now presents these saviors [of Europe] not in *opposition to the Russians* but as 'an extraordinary phenomenon of *Russian power*'" (268; emphases mine). In her reading the Cossacks and Russians are *two separate peoples*, with the former acquiring the features of the latter while surrendering their own. In other words, Bojanowska sees an integration of Ukrainians and Russians in line with the "amalgamation" ideology that purportedly governs the text. In actual fact, however, there is only *one* nation here ("kozaki/kozachestvo") that traces its lineage and temperament to Rus' princes through the adjective *ruskii*. This nation manifests in its current (Cossack) guise all the noble qualities of the "southern original" Rus' state. Bulba will make this absolutely clear at the end of his "comradeship" speech when he links the Cossacks—through the uninterrupted memory of their "fathers and grandfathers"—to Kyivan Rus' (cf. note 18).

Where Gogol portrays a single uninterrupted national history, Bojanowska sees "Cossacks [being] subsumed in the larger category of the Russians" and "Cossacks expressing 'Russianness'" (268). Through these phrases, she becomes a victim of her own mistranslation: *ruskii* as "*Russian*" instead of *Rus'ian*.³¹ However, Gogol's "larger category" (or nation) is not some expanded entity that consists of Little Russians and Great Russians. It is a fusion of Cossack Ukraine and Rus' ("*rusaskaia zemlia*"), both of which are congruent with the "southern original *Rossiia*." "*Rusaskaia priroda*" and "*rusaskaia sila*" are not mentions of Russia "proper" but southern attributes, i.e., manifestations of the Cossacks' Rus'ian heritage. The Cossacks appear, ("*vozniknut*"), rise ("*stal*"), are born ("*zavelos*"), and settle ("*selilsia*," "*uselialis*") on the very same territory that the Rus'ian princes vacated. The Cossacks come to manifest in the *present* the Rus'ian power of the *past*. None of this has anything to do with Great Russians, since they are not in the novel and, according to Gogol, as we saw above, do not share in the "southern original" heritage of Kyivan Rus'. *Taras Bulba* embodies an idea Gogol expressed in 1834 in the journal *Severnaia pchela*, when he was announcing his impending history of Little Russia: namely, that Ukraine acted for almost four centuries separately from Great Russia (cf. Bojanowska, 124–26).

"*Svoi tsar*"

Bulba's farewell remarks just before his death are key to the Russocentric reading:

³¹ Interestingly, when Bojanowska discusses one of Gogol's historical notes about Kyiv, she correctly (in my estimation) translates "*ruskii*" as "Russian" (with one "s"), namely, as referring to Rus', not Russia. The phrase in question is: "Влияние России на юго-запад русский стало значительно меньше," which Bojanowska translated as the "influence of Russia on the *Russian* southwest became significantly smaller" (*Nikolai Gogol*, 152; see also 128).

"Прощайте, товарищи! – кричал он им сверху. "Вспоминайте меня и будущей же весной прибывайте сюда вновь да хорошенько погуляйте! Что, взяли, чертовы ляхи? Думаете, есть что-нибудь на свете, чего бы побоялся козак? Постойте же, придет время, будет время, узнаете вы, что такое православная русская вера! Уже и теперь чуют дальние и близкие народы: подымается из русской земли свой царь, и не будет в мире силы, которая бы не покорилась ему!" (PSS 2: 172)

As Taras's body is engulfed in flames, the authorial voice adds:

А уже огонь подымался над костром, захватывал его ноги и разостлался пламенем по дереву... Да разве найдутся на свете такие огни, муки и такая сила, которая бы пересилила русскую силу! (PSS 2: 172)

These paragraphs purportedly contain evidence of Russian ultra-patriotism, defense of the Russian faith, and the unity of the Ukrainian and Russian people under Russian authority. George Grabowicz has written: "the Cossacks—as we see at the end of *Taras Bulba*—become a foreshadowing of imperial Russian Orthodox power."³² Myroslav Shkandrij extrapolates an even more specific meaning: "Ukrainian salvation depended on the coming to power of the Romanov dynasty in 1613."³³ Bojanowska views this scene as confirmation that Ukrainians will come "[u]nder the leadership of the mighty Great Russian tsar" (256).³⁴

Clearly, for those who read *Taras Bulba* as a Russian nationalist paean, the words *rusaskaia zemlia* and *tsar* are mutually reinforcing. *Tsar* seems to be *prima facie* evidence for treating *rusaskii* as "Great Russian." To defend a "Ukrainian" interpretation of *rusaskii*, one would need to decouple *tsar* from its "Great Russian" associations. *Taras Bulba* actually does this with the little word *svoi*, but most readers are conditioned to ignore it.

Taras predicts: "one's own [*svoi*] tsar will rise from the *rusaskaia zemlia*." First, we should note that this is hardly a declaration of "unity," "amalgamation," and other forms of Ukrainian subordination to the Great Russians. Moreover, the sentence cannot be referring to a "Russian land," because Gogol associates "*rusaskaia zemlia*" with southern Rus' of the Cossacks. Furthermore, (1) the Great Russians (to cite Yurii Barabash) already *had* a tsar when Taras utters his prophetic words and hence would not be anticipating his "rising" from the "Russian land" in the near future; and (b) for the Cossacks and Taras the Russian tsar would not be "*svoi*."³⁵ Surely, had he intended it, Gogol could have expressed unification with Russia more clearly, as did all contemporary histories. Some translators simply ignore "*svoi*" or replace it with the word "Russian" to uphold the "Russian" reading of the novel.³⁶ Scholars, in their turn,

³² George G. Grabowicz, "Three Perspectives on the Cossack Past: Gogol, Ševčenko, Kulis," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 2 (June 1981): 189.

³³ Myroslav Shkandrij, *Russia and Ukraine: Literature and the Discourse of Empire from Napoleonic to Postcolonial Times* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 107.

³⁴ Later Bojanowska adds: "Taras forecasts a broadened scope of the war, with the Russian tsar as its new participant" (Nikolai Gogol, 293).

³⁵ Barabash, *Pochva i sudba*, 141.

³⁶ Peter Constantine renders the sentence this way: "Word has already spread through every nation: A Russian Czar will spring forth from the Russian earth" (Nikolai Gogol, *Taras Bulba*, trans. Peter Constantine (New York: Modern Library, 2004), 141.

typically sidestep or rationalize away these difficulties, unwilling to state the most obvious: Taras is predicting that the Rus'ian land ("Ukraina-russkaia zemlia") will raise its own tsar. The novel is not a call to unity with Great Russians. Only Barabash acknowledges this forthrightly, saying that, given demonstrated Cossack self-reliance, it is more reasonable to assume that the reference to a tsar signals "the ancient dream of Ukrainian Cossackdom about *its own* statehood—the direct descendant of the state traditions of Kyivan Rus'.³⁷ Unlike the "Russian" interpretation, this Ukrainian one makes logical sense.

In fact, the obsession with linking "tsar" to Muscovy and a host of hypothetical Russians (proto-, alternative, or a supratemporal cultural community) deflects attention away from *Taras Bulba's* obvious concern with "its own" Ukrainian things (e.g., "*prava svoi, svoi nrawy, svoia tserkov, svoe dukhovenstvo, svoi kniazia*"; "*nash oreli, nasha zemlia*"). In his novel Gogol is especially interested in the problem of one's own native Ukrainian leadership, as Bovdiug's words attest:

А вот что скажет моя другая речь: большую правду сказал и Тарас-полковник, — дай [Б]оже ему побольше веку и чтоб таких полковников было побольше на Украине! (PSS 2: 125)

Taras is described earlier (PSS 2: 48) in these words: "*Taras byl odin iz chisl korennnykh, starykh polkovnikov.*" As we saw already, Gogol accentuates the fact that Rus' was "abandoned by her own princes" ("*iuzhnaia pervobytnaia Rossiia, ostavlen-naia svoimi kniaziami*"). In his comradeship speech, Taras mentions that the Rus'ian land ("*zemlia nasha*") had at one time its own rulers ("*byli kniazia, kniazia russkogo roda, svoi kniazia, a ne katolicheskie nedoverki*"). In this context, it is understandable why Bulba would anticipate an indigenous (*svoi*) leader rising again from the Rus'ian land. In place of the Catholic heretics, Ukraine will have its own ruler, as in the days of yore.³⁸ It is also telling that as the Cossacks sail off at the end of the novel, they "spoke about *their own otaman*" ("*govorili pro svoego atamana*"). Through the use of the word *russkii*, everything points to a pride in native leadership and history, not to an interest in a simulated unification with Great Russians.

Although the meaning of "*svoi tsar*" is now clear, we still need to ask why Gogol chose to designate the ruler of Rus'-Ukraine by this particular word instead of, say, *polkovnik* or *hetman*. A number of explanations suggest themselves. Taras may have wanted to endow the Ukrainian leader with status equivalent to the Muscovite tsar, the better to frighten the Poles. Gogol may have chosen the word for the benefit of Great Russian readers to help them appreciate the calibre of leadership the Cossacks will

³⁷ Barabash, *Pochva i sudba*, 141. Bojanowska cites his words and concedes that "Barabash has valid reasons to regard the mention of the Russian [sic] land's rising tsar as ambiguous" because she continues, "instead of using 'rossiiskii' to describe the 'Russian' land, which would unambiguously mean (Great) Russian, Gogol opts for *russkii*, [which] can in fact be read to mean Ukrainian, since 'Rus,' from which this adjective comes, was also an old designation for Ukrainian lands" (*Nikolai Gogol*, 304).

³⁸ In Taras's farewell speech (quoted at the beginning of this section), the addressee ("*uznaete vy*") can be plausibly understood to be the Poles. This means that at that at the end of the novel Gogol continues to maintain the opposition between Orthodox Ukrainians and Catholic Poles, threatening the latter with a Ukrainian tsar rather than Russian unity. The Russians may very well be one of the "*blizkie narody*" about to witness Ukraine's plight.

have. More dangerously, it hints at possible political parity between Ukraine and Muscovy, recalling Gogol's words in "A Glance at the Making of Little Russia" about the two being separate states ("gosudarstva"). The word may simply be a stylistic flourish, i.e., an attempt to maintain the exalted tone of the conclusion—quite similar to another moment in the novel when Andrii turns to the Polish girl and exclaims, rather incongruously for a Ukrainian, "Tsaritsa!" But the most probable explanation is that Gogol simply borrowed "tsar" from his historical source, *Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*, where the word figures as a title for the princes of Kyivan Rus' (Volodymyr the Great³⁹ and Volodymyr Monomakh⁴⁰) and is even associated with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.⁴¹ Thus there are two "tsars" in Kyivan Rus'. And since in Taras's mind (and, more importantly, Gogol's) the Cossacks and Rus' are one, the sudden evocation of a "tsar" is most appropriate. The Rus'ian *kniazi* will return to Ukraine under the historical name *tsar*. In general, the difference between *Istoriia Rusov*'s "tsar ruskii" (Monomakh's sobriquet) and *Taras Bulba*'s "podymaetsia iz russkoi zemli svoi tsar" is negligible.

Gogol's decision to follow *Istoriia Rusov*'s terminology is not surprising. However, it is quite amazing that he chose *not* to borrow the history's most conspicuous argument, namely, that Little and Great *Rossii* are one. He avoids *Istoriia Rusov*'s repeated description of Ukrainians and Russians as people "of the same faith and tribe" ("edinovernyi i edinoplemennyy"), choosing instead to emphasize difference and political self-sufficiency.⁴² Gogol's other important source, Bantysh-Kamensky's *Istoriia Maloi Rossii*,⁴³ is also focused sharply on the Ukrainian-Russian unity theme. In both histories Russians are given a clear presence. They have none in *Taras Bulba*. The absence of Great Russians speaks volumes about Gogol's ideological orientation and goes counter to his 1834 plan of writing a history of Ukraine that would demonstrate not only its "original character" but eventual unification with *Rossii*.⁴⁴ Bantysh-Kamensky's history (cf. the full title) solidly focused on Ukraine *after* unification with Russia, and its "original status" is a postscript. In Gogol's case the

³⁹ G. Koniskii, *Istoriia Rusov, ili Maloi Rossii* (Moscow, 1846). The reference to Volodymyr (Vladimir) as *tsar* reads: "И сей Владимиръ ... соединивъ всѣ другія Славянскія Княжества ... былъ одинъ надъ ними Самодержцемъ и назывался Великимъ Княземъ Рускимъ и Царикомъ надъ всѣми Князьями ..." (<<http://litopys.org.ua/istrus/istrus02.htm>>).

⁴⁰ "Владимиръ Второй, названный Мономахомъ по дѣду его съ матерней стороны Императору Греческому, Константину Мономаху, по которому и онъ признанъ отъ Греческой Имперіи Царемъ Рускимъ и получилъ на то дѣдовскую корону, со всѣми другими Царскими пераліями" (*Istoriia Rusov* <<http://litopys.org.ua/istrus/istrus02.htm>>).

⁴¹ *Istoriia Rusov* draws a parallel between Hetman Khmelnytsky (described as "leader of the Rusy") and Caesar by quoting a poem that accompanied the Hetman's posthumous portrait. See <<http://litopys.org.ua/istrus/istrus09.htm>>.

⁴² In his article "A Glance at the Making of Little Russia," published in Uvarov's *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnago prosveshcheniia*, Gogol did use phrases reminiscent of *Istoriia Rusov*: "Какое ужасно-ничтожное время представляет для России XIII век! Сотни мелких государств *единоверных, одноплеменных, одноязычных, означенных одним общим характером* и которых, казалось, против воли соединяло родство" (PSS 8: 40).

⁴³ *Istoriia Maloi Rossii so vremen prisоединeniia onoi k Rossiiskomu Gosudarstvu pri tsare Aleksee Mikhaloviche, s kratkim obozreniem pervobytnago sostoiianiia sего kraia* (Moscow, 1822).

⁴⁴ "Obiavlenie ob izdanii istorii Malorossii" (PSS 9: 76).

priorities are reversed. He, obviously, was more interested in embracing the "original state of Little *Rossiiia*" than making a clear-cut case for unification.

Conclusions

I have tried to demonstrate that Gogol's terminology has an internal logic and works as a well-defined signifying system, which always points to Ukrainian reality and the history on its territory, including Rus'. The prevailing wisdom, in contrast, holds that *Taras Bulba* transmogrifies two nations into a single "Russian" one. I believe this traditional position is completely untenable under closer examination. *Taras Bulba* is about *one* nation (the Ukrainians) depicted through the prism of *two* historical periods (Cossack and Kyivan Rus') and *three* terminological traditions (*Ukraina – russkaia zemlia – yuzhnaia Rossiia*). The inconsistency of Gogol's terminology is not a sign that he shifted "the patriotic burden from Ukrainian to Russian," but simply a sign of the times, when there was no single designation for Ukraine. Gogol's stubborn insistence on a difference between Ukrainians and Great Russians between the empire's south and north, is the true lesson of *Taras Bulba*. It turns out that rather than backing away from his Ukrainophile positions of the 1830s, as most critics maintain, Gogol actually reinforced them in the 1842 redaction by establishing roots for the Ukrainians in Rus'. This was an ideological gesture that directly challenged Great Russian self-representations and official imperial historiography. At the end of the novel it is not unity with Russia that Gogol extols, but the impending restoration of a mighty native leadership in a historically greater and independent Rus'-Ukraine.

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The Feminine Ideal and the Critique of Gentry Sentimentalism in Taras Shevchenko's "Khudozhnik"

Myroslav Shkandrij

The overture ended, the curtain shuddered and lifted. Everyone, including myself, gazed at the curtain. The ballet began. Up to the cachucha everything went well, the public behaved like any well-mannered public. With the first clash of castanettes a shudder and trembling was felt by all. Applause ran through the hall quietly like rumblings of distant thunder, then louder and louder, and, when the cachucha ended, the thunder broke out. The well-mannered public, my sinful self included, lost control of itself and roared at the top of its voice: some shouted bravo, others da capo, and some simply groaned and worked their hands and feet. After the first fit I glanced at Karl the Great, and saw sweat pouring from the poor man; he was working his hands and feet as hard as possible and shouting as loudly as he could: "Da capo!" Guber was doing the same. I took a breath and imitated my teacher. Gradually the hurricane began to pass, and the enchantress who had been called back ten times fluttered on the stage again and, after several most gracious curtseys, was gone. Karl the Great rose, wiped the perspiration from his brow, and, turning to Guber, said: "Let's go back stage. Introduce me to her." "Let's go," said Guber enthusiastically. Behind the curtains swarmed a crowd of her admirers, consisting mainly of venerable bald heads, spectacles, and binoculars. We joined the throng, making our way not without some difficulty to its centre. And, heavens, what a spectacle we saw there! The enchantress who had flitted light as a zephyr was lying on a couch with her mouth open, her nostrils dilated like those of an Arabian steed, and down her face perspiration mixed with powder and rouge ran like muddy streams in springtime. "Revolt-ing!" said Karl the Great and turned around. I followed him, while poor old Guber, who had just finished a compliment that fitted the occasion and uttered Briullov's name, turned to see that the latter had disappeared. I do not know how he extricated himself from his predicament.¹

Shevchenko's story "Khudozhnik" is set around 1839 in Karl Briullov's circle, a milieu that worshipped literature and the arts. An elevated, almost ecstatic tone is adopted by young people when they discuss aesthetics: a great painting brings visitors from all of Europe; a view of the sunrise from a bridge in St. Petersburg is sought out by artists; and great performances on stage are greeted with unbridled enthusiasm. An important aspect of this reverence for beauty is the cult of women, who are idealized as goddesses and the sources of inspiration. The true artist

¹ Taras Shevchenko, "Khudozhnik," in his *Povne zibrannia tvoriv u shesty tomakh*, vol. 4 (Kyiv: Akademiia nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, 1963), 152–53.

dedicates himself to a woman who can stir him to great feelings. His devotion to refined pursuits elevates him above the mass, with its mercantile interests and unrefined tastes, and insulates him from the surrounding barbarism of social life. In the quoted passage the greatest artist of his day, Briullov, who is at the height of his fame after completing the great painting *Last Day of Pompei* (1833), attends the ballet with his friends and is swept away by the performance of the incomparable Maria Taglioni, the foremost ballerina of the Romantic age. Why, however, when the woman is seen close up, is the artist revolted? How is it that the aesthetic effect produced by her dancing is instantly shattered? This essay argues that the passage and the entire story can be read as a challenge by the emerging new "realism" to the Romantic tastes and sentimental gentry manners of the 1830s. A new focus on the close up and the corporeal destroys carefully elaborated illusions, which depend on distancing ugly details. The puncturing of sentimental illusions is most evident in the collapse of the masculine image of woman. This occurs repeatedly in the story: Briullov becomes aware shortly after marriage that his image of his fiancée is completely false; the young artist and chief protagonist is shocked to learn that his adored young protégée Pasha, whom he considers a "vestal virgin," has been made pregnant by a brutish, detested sailor; the artist's friend Shternberg is heartbroken when the woman he adores marries a rival for money; and the aging narrator describes his disillusionment with a woman he had once idolized.

Shevchenko wrote this story, which has strong autobiographical elements, seventeen years after the events described, following the death of Nicholas I, the tsar who had sentenced him to exile with an added ban on writing or practising art. The story is a retrospective meditation on his youthful years in St. Petersburg and an attempt by Shevchenko to come to an understanding of his fate. The narrative is constructed out of a clash between two different cultural codes in the imperial capital during a time when strong contrasts were contributing to an intense intellectual life. Shevchenko perhaps as much as anyone, embodied the confrontation and mingling of heterogeneous cultural layers in the cauldron of the capital's life. Bought out of serfdom in 1839 by the Briullov circle, he had become immersed in the life of St. Petersburg's artistic elite. The ultimate outsider, the serf, was allowed to pass as an insider. The young Shevchenko was acutely aware of the elite's failure to understand, or often to even notice, the suffering the socio-political system had caused.

In 1856, as he looked back on these years, the aging writer wrote nine short stories in Russian that reassess his early infatuation with the ideals of the Romantic age: "Naimichka" (The Servant Girl, 1844), *Varnak* (The Escaped Convict, 1845), *Kniazinina* (The Princess, 1853), "Muzykant" (The Musician, 1855), "Neschastnyi" (The Wretch, 1855), "Kapitansha" (The Captain's Wife, 1855), "Khudozhnik" (The Artist, 1856), "Progulka s udovolstviem i ne bez morali" (A Pleasant Trip Not without Moral, 1858), and "Bliznetsy" (Twins, 1859). Although the first two are given an earlier dating, Mykola Zerov has expressed the view that they were also produced in the mid-1850s and that Shevchenko dated them to precede his 1847 arrest so as to avoid trouble in case of their confiscation in a police raid.² During his exile he had been subjected to searches that revealed his non-compliance with the injunction against writing or practicing art. It is therefore likely that he wrote all of the stories after the

² Mykola Zerov, *Tvory v dvokh tomakh*, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1990), 175–76.

new tsar, Alexander II, came to the throne in 1855. At this time Shevchenko hoped to share in the amnesty that had been granted to many prisoners. The stories often deal with Ukrainian themes and are interspersed with Ukrainian words and conversations.

"Khudozhnik" is the best of them. It is built on a collision of the Romanticism and sentimental manners of the 1830s on the one hand, with an emerging ironic, deflating realism concerned with prosaic details of everyday life on the other. Both codes are present in the work, and readers experience a jolting shock when they suddenly have to switch from the first to the second. Yurii Lotman has described literature as creating

a model of the extra-systemic out of its own inherently systemic material. In order to appear "accidental," an element in a work of art must belong to at least two systems and must be located at their intersection. That element which is systemic from the point of view of one structure will appear "accidental" when viewed from the vantage point of another. The capacity of a textual element to enter into several contextual structures and to take on different meaning in each context is one of the most profound properties of the artistic text.³

The interaction of two codes is the mechanism that operates throughout the story. It allows for a binary reading: both a nostalgic review of artistic life in the capital and a subversive critique of this life by the Ukrainian outsider.

The debt to Romanticism and sentimental manners is acknowledged primarily through the references to Friedrich Schiller, whose writings were an important influence in the 1830s. The German writer had lamented the fragmentation of the modern artist and contrasted this cultural condition to that of ancient Greece. The naive creators of the ancient world, he felt, possessed a unity with nature, which allowed them to produce harmonious works, something that the modern artist, in whom nature and reason clash, cannot accomplish. Noble natures are therefore obliged to transform the world through aesthetic education in order to restore wholeness, spontaneity, and unity. Only then will the individual cease to be a fragment incapable of dealing with the world's universal and varied concerns. In Shevchenko's story Briullov and his circle recognize the young artist's noble nature and great talent, rescue him from serfdom, welcome him into their circle, and provide him with the required aesthetic education. The young artist offers the same kind of education to his beloved Pasha.

The results, however, are tragic. The second code-system with its hard realities intrudes to destroy the dream of reforming the world through beauty. The implication is that social and economic conditions cannot be ignored. They are vastly different for the elite, which pursues the aesthetic ideal while ignoring worldly needs, while the lives of impoverished artists and of the population at large are ruled by brute necessity. Schiller had already indicated the distance between the ideal and its actual possession and was "unable to reconcile the labouring and the contemplative classes, to provide for all men the sort of activity that would be compatible with contemplation."⁴ Shevchenko's story presents the aesthetic ideal (aesthetic sensibility,

³ Yurii Lotman, *The Structure of the Artistic Text* (Ann Arbor: Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan), 59-60.

⁴ Philip J. Kain, *Schiller, Hegel, and Marx: State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982), 23.

gentility, woman worship, the cult of love, detachment from worldly cares), and then—particularly in its story's second half—questions whether such an attitude can be maintained in straitened circumstances. In the final pages the Ukrainian writer suggests that the ideal might itself be misguided.

Briullov's circle contains philanthropic and sensitive men who are appalled by the "barbarism" of serfdom and try to rescue talented serfs by buying their freedom. The serf-owning society acts as a reproach to the privileged artists, whose lives consist of fine dining, entertainment, and devotion to self-improvement. At one point Briullov forces the young artist to skip class and then humiliates him for doing so. By bringing about the young man's irresponsible behaviour and then criticizing it, he appears to be making the point that the well-heeled can follow their whims and ignore classes but the struggling student cannot. At another point in the story the reader is told that, "like a true socialist," the great artist refused offers of a covered table and a private room at Madam Jurgens's restaurant. The unmistakable irony here suggests that the privileged can profess egalitarianism while continuing to live in a world far removed from that of the recently emancipated youth. More significantly, these episodes indicate a fundamental incoherence in the Romantic-sentimental code: one can only pursue an aesthetic education and mock the labours of this world if one has achieved complete social and economic independence. Uncomfortable in high society, in the end the young artist admits that he prefers the more intimate company of fellow artists, which includes his soulmate Shternberg, the Pole Demski, and the quiet Germans Yoakhim (Joachim, Jokisch) and Fitstum (Fitztum). He is also drawn to the Schmidt family, which comes closest to representing his ideal of domestic happiness.

The young artist, even while enjoying the friendship of Briullov and other leading lights of St. Petersburg, lives among half-starving artists and low-life characters. He therefore witnesses the clash of Romantic-sentimental ideals with ugly realities at every level—social, political, artistic, and domestic. Marriage and family happiness become the test of these ideals. The story describes life in several family units and shows that domestic harmony can sooner be found within the lower middle class than in high society. It also indicates the capacity of the least privileged for deep feelings and artistic achievements. Grace, art, and beauty are to be found even among ordinary people. During a trip to Rome a friend of the young artist witnesses common folk dancing the *cachucha*. The performance is described as "elegant and passionate, the way it is among the folk themselves, and not tidied up and painted the way we see it on stage."⁵ The gentry, in short, is taught to admire an artificial and mannered elegance and is blind to the spontaneous and uninhibited life of the common people.

The story's first half retells Shevchenko's life in St. Petersburg in the years 1837–43 and contains portraits of the individuals he knew. It has often been examined in the light of the author's biography. Another biographical approach has focused on the writer's disillusionment with women, especially with Agata Uskova, whom he met in exile in 1854 and who is described in the diary that he kept at the time.⁶ There is no reason to doubt biographical influences, and the background detail is certainly

⁵ Shevchenko, "Khudozhnik," 225.

⁶ M[ykhailo] Rudnytsky, "Povist 'Khudozhnyk'," in Taras Shevchenko, *Povne vydannia tvoriv* vol. 6 (Chicago: Vydavnytstvo Mykoly Denysiuka, 1959), 311–23.

richly evocative of the period: the story can serve as a guide to what artists were studying and reading, the operas and plays they attended, and the works of art they discussed. But there are obvious departures from biographical fact. The young hero's age in 1837 is given as "fourteen or fifteen," whereas Shevchenko would then have been twenty-three. The primary narrator, who is based on the Ukrainian artist Soshenko, did not apparently first meet with Shevchenko in the Summer Garden as described. This (now, for many, iconic) moment from Shevchenko's biography is apparently a fictionalization of their first encounter, one that appears to have been borrowed from the life of his friend and fellow artist David Shternberg.⁷ Moreover, the young artist presents himself as a non-Ukrainian: in a letter to the narrator (who is identified as a Ukrainian) he uses the terms "your" native land and "your" countrymen. The story's second half is entirely invented. Consequently the text is more properly viewed as a work of fiction. Its meaning is to be found in the youth's disappointment, not with particular women, but with the cultural code of St. Petersburg's artistic set of the late 1830s. The plot works to seduce readers with a picture of the milieu's attractions and then to shock them into an awareness of underlying falsehoods. This is achieved, as in the passage quoted at the beginning of this essay, by sudden shifts in perspective and focus.

Mykola Zerov has identified three periods of Ukrainian Romanticism: the Khar'kiv (mid-1830s to 1843), the Kyiv (early 1840s to 1847), and the St. Petersburg (1855–63).⁸ If this periodization is accepted, Shevchenko's story can be seen as the third period conducting an examination of the first. The atmosphere of St. Petersburg in Shevchenko's youth was dominated by certain Romantic themes. Characters, images, and plots from classical literature were used as guides to conduct and were set as subjects to be painted by all students in the St. Petersburg Academy of Art, which Shevchenko attended. Contemporaries were, for example, familiar with Cato the Younger's suicide in 46 BC, caused by his witnessing the fall of the Roman republic, and with Plato's discussion of immortality in *Phaedon*. In the opening to *Pan Tadeusz* (1834), Adam Mickiewicz has the hero's eyes fall upon a painting of a patriotic Pole who committed suicide in 1780 after the partitioning of Poland, and he informs the reader that both Cato's story and *Phaedon* are illustrated in the painting. The intelligentsia of the 1830s in both Russia and Ukraine had been nourished on Schiller's dramas, in which young men pledge to dedicate their lives to fighting tyranny and to sacrificing themselves for the good of humankind. The Marquis of Posa from Schiller's *Don Carlos* became a household name and an example of integrity in human conduct. This character counsels his prince to avoid egoistic, personal passions, to open his heart to the whole world, and to pity the unhappy fate of his subjects in Flanders. He argues that humankind needs to be roused to a sense of its own innate worth. As he prepares to die, he thinks of the prince: "O bid him realise the dream, / The glowing vision which our friendship painted, / Of a new—perfect realm!"⁹

⁷ Anatolii Tataryn, "'Mii iskrennyi druzhe ...' Do 130-richchia z dnia smerti Ivana Soshenka," *Obrazotvorche mystetstvo*, 2006, no. 2: 22–25.

⁸ Zerov, *Tvory*, 2: 76.

⁹ Friedrich Schiller, *The Works of Friedrich Schiller: Piccolomini, Wallenstein, Don Carlos, Mary Stuart*, ed. Nathan Haskell Dole (Boston: Wyman-Fogg, 1901), 219.

In his memoirs *Byloe i dumy* (My Past and Thoughts, 1861) Herzen describes how in 1827 he would retire to the woods to read Plutarch and Schiller, imagining that he was in the Bohemian forests that are the setting for some of the German writer's works. The young Herzen thought of Schiller's dramatic heroes as "living men" and dreamed of speaking to his sovereign, as does the marquis, about the way the empire oppresses its people, and of then being sent off to the mines or executed. The first two parts of these memoirs appeared in 1854 and 1856. They were immediately successful with the reading public, and Shevchenko most likely read them. Part 1, which was published in *Poliarnaia zvezda* in 1856 and describes Herzen's life before his arrest, shows nostalgia for the impractical idealism of youth and appears to have influenced Shevchenko's story.

The Romantics of the 1830s took an intense interest in the inner life, particularly in the friendship of "soulmates." They sought out spiritual "brothers" or "sisters" with whom they could merge their souls and for whom they could sacrifice themselves. The ideal was a life spent in an atmosphere of love and veneration. Personalities who could inspire such sentiments were adored. A kind of hothouse atmosphere, dominated by the cult of friendship and femininity, tender feelings, and refined beauty, could be found in artistic groups and on gentry estates. In Shevchenko's story love between soulmates pervades the artist's relationship with Shternberg, Yoakhim, and Demski. Love also unites the young artist with the upright and sensitive souls of the older generation, such as Briullov, who is a great inspiring personality surrounded by acolytes.

However, by the 1840s, under the influence of Hegelian logic, a philosophy that emphasized the real was becoming fashionable. The pursuit of all-embracing love was surrendered to a more clear-eyed view of humanity's weaknesses and immoral behaviour. As Romantic disillusionment set in, the rarified emotions of the 1830s along with the literature and art they encouraged, were viewed as divorced from the experiences of the broader society. To make this point, forms of vulgarity and ugliness that sentimentalism had ignored began to find their way into literature. In his poetry of the 1840s Shevchenko broke taboos by writing about serfdom, rape, incest, child abuse, and national oppression. In "Khudozhnik," after recreating the elevated atmosphere of the late 1830s, the author deliberately distances himself from it: the artist's great friendships are broken by death (Demski) and separation (Shternberg, Yoakhim); his love for the young girl Pasha is shown to be a misguided form of self-sacrifice, not a meeting of minds; and even Briullov is shown to be misguided. At one point he is associated with the frightening image of Saturn devouring his child.¹⁰ Because the greatest Russian artist of his day refuses to look reality squarely in the eye, he fails to see the frivolous nature of his own fiancée. His refusal to paint Pushkin's wife because she is "squint-eyed" confirms that he prefers the beautiful illusion and refuses to admit imperfections or deal adequately with the disappointments that come from a squaring up to reality.

An interesting aspect of "Khudozhnik" is the strong focus on emotions, which includes frequent weeping, especially in the presence of art, and the love of women. Shternberg warns the young artist about his infatuation with fifteen-year-old Pasha:

¹⁰ Alexander Herzen, *My Past and Thoughts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 64-65. Originally published in Russian in his *Byloe i dumy* (1861).

¹¹ Shevchenko, "Khudozhnik," 227.

a woman is a sacred and inviolable thing, and at the same time she is so seductive that no power of will can withstand that seduction except for the feeling of the loftiest, evangelical love. It alone can protect her from shame and us from lifelong reproach. Arm yourself with that beautiful sentiment like a knight with an iron shield, and advance boldly on the foe.¹²

This attitude, which recalls the times of courtly romances, is countered by the more practical advice the story's primary narrator (the older artist Soshenko) offers. He represents the steady realism of an older man. Looking back on his own life, he says: "now that imagination and common sense have reached a balance, when one does not look at the future through a rainbow prism, but clearly, involuntarily one thinks of the proverb 'a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.'" ¹³ In his view true artists are guided by noble, altruistic motives and are capable of extraordinary acts beyond the capacity of most people, but unfortunately their natures are "amazingly indiscriminate in questions of love." They set up "idols" of unworthy subjects and become "victims of their beloved idol—beauty." The beauty of women in particular "acts upon them all-destructively [*vseokrushitelno*]. There can be no other way. This is the muddy, all-poisoning [*vseotravliaushchii*] source of all that is beautiful and great in life."¹⁴ The problem, according to the narrator, is that men have made idols out of women. By focusing exclusively on external attractiveness, they themselves have contributed to developing women into egotistical, vain creatures.

A number of Shevchenko's stories from this time deal with the issue of educating peasant girls. In *Varnak* the main character, who is seventeen, decides to help a poor mother bring up her young daughter of ten, whom he later hopes to marry: "I imagined all the happiness, all the delight of my future family life."¹⁵ He is devastated when the lord takes the girl and makes her his lover. As a result the hero becomes an outlaw. In "Muzykant" a neighbouring gentry woman educates her daughters in isolation from high society. The two girls benefit from being raised in the warm, unpretentious atmosphere of a Ukrainian country home while their mother devotes herself to balls and receptions in the imperial capital. When one of the girls is later taken into the household of a landowner who keeps a harem, her character makes a dramatic change for the worse.

As Tolstoy was to do in the 1880s, Shevchenko in the 1850s expressed profound distaste for what was considered at the time to be appropriate female education, and dismay at the roles for which young women were being trained. In another story, "Progulka s udovolstviem i ne bez morali" (1858), he writes: "It is widely accepted that if a woman is stunningly beautiful, it means she is good, and clever, and educated, and endowed with angelic rather than human characteristics. However, the more beautiful a woman is in reality, the more she resembles a beautiful but soulless doll."¹⁶

According to the writer, because of their exclusive concern with appearances these women lack both intellectual interests (they do not read or take an interest in socio-

¹² Ibid., 201–202.

¹³ Ibid., 173.

¹⁴ Ibid., 233–34.

¹⁵ Shevchenko, "Varnak," in his *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, 3:156.

¹⁶ Shevchenko, "Progulka z udovolstviem i ne bez morali," in his *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, 4: 266.

political issues) and moral values (they are snobbish and insensitive toward others). Moreover it is clear, especially from Shevchenko's focus on harems, that he blames the situation largely on the dissolute and corrupting power of male landowners.

The education of women was an important theme in the literature of the day. From the mid-1850s the idea of gender equality and therefore the need to develop similar principles of education for young men and women became an article of faith for "democratic pedagogy."¹⁷ According to Lotman, the standards in elite schools such as the Smolny Institute were depressingly low: "Girls left the institute with no idea of real life. They thought that outside the wall of the institute an endless holiday, a palace ball, awaited them."¹⁸ The situation was little better in home schooling or the pensions, which were mostly run by French émigrés who had escaped the revolution. Girls were expected to learn polite conversation in one or two foreign languages, dancing, etiquette, and some drawing, singing, musicianship, and elementary history, geography, and grammar. Their education ended as soon as they were introduced to society.¹⁹

In "Khudozhnik" the narrator makes it clear that he favours reforming women's education. However, he also indicts the young artist's blindness to his pupil's real character and interests. The would-be educator sees Pasha as a vestal virgin and even paints a portrait of her as such. In reality she is not what her educator imagines her to be. This is a challenge to the premises of Romanticism and sentimentalism: the feminine mystique is shown to be an illusion, and aesthetic education alone cannot help Pasha or save the artist from self-destruction. His death, after all, is in part the result of his own delusions. His marriage to the pregnant Pasha might be a noble gesture but it prevents him as a married man from continuing his education in the art academy and leads directly to his mental collapse and death.

Briullov's female ideal suffers a similar crushing disillusionment. The first time occurs in the meeting with the enchanting dancer. It is the image of female grace and beauty that he admires, while contact with the real woman appalls him. This initial episode prefigures his disappointment in marriage to a woman who values looks and frippery. Like Pasha, she aims to please men by her attractive appearance and expects rewards for this alone. All the episodes of male-female contact follow a similar pattern. They begin with an infatuation, during which the woman is seen as pure and marvellous, capable of inspiring the artist, and satisfying the male craving for an ideal, and are followed by a collapse of this image and a rejection of the woman. In Shternberg's case it is the male who suffers rejection. Broken-hearted, he continues to pine for his lost love. Moreover, the wider male society outside the high-minded Briullov circle is portrayed as prone to a low form of carousing, coarseness, and lust.

The switching between the two codes is facilitated by shifts in the narrative voice from the primary narrator (Soshenko) to the young artist (who writes several letters and then to the cynical Mikhailov (two letters). These different perspectives on the young artist's life produce an estrangement from Romanticism and sentimentalism. The strongest and most convincing criticism of the young artist's character and life

¹⁷ Yurii Lotman, "Zhenskoe obrazovanie v XVIII–nachale XIX veka," in his *Besedy o russkoi kul'ture: Byt i traditsii russkogo dvorianstva (XVIII–nachalo XIX veka)* (St. Petersburg: Iskusstvo SPB, 1994), 77.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 87.

occurs in the final pages and is presented in the voice of experience—that of the older artist and primary narrator, who passes judgement on the young man's bohemian existence, spontaneous enthusiasms, uncritical attitude toward his surroundings, quickness in drawing close to people, and unguarded nature. But the primary narrator also expresses disapproval of St. Petersburg generally, especially of its vain *beau monde*. He prefers the calm life of the countryside, where communion with nature teaches deeper lessons—a reflection of the Romantic turn toward the local, rooted, and native. It might be recalled that in the third book of Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz*, when the Count states that Italian scenery and the portrayal of the ideal should be the landscape artist's goal, the hero chides him for failing to recognize the beauty of his own native land. The Count then meets a young girl whom he elevates to the status of goddess or nymph, only to feel immediate disillusionment when he realizes that she might be nothing more than a simple peasant girl. The point is that the focus on an abstract image of beauty drawn from classical sources prevents appreciation of other forms closer to home.

Shevchenko's story is therefore much more than a recreation of the author's youth. It is a commentary on the artistic atmosphere of an age. It looks back at the past in a tone similar to Herzen's memoirs. The Russian writer described the European civic activists who had been displaced to the Russian empire in the 1830s as lost in an artificial life of "sensual pleasure" and "unbearable egoism."²⁰ However, at the same time he gave this idealistic generation credit for championing progressive ideals, among which are the emancipation of women and more naturalness in sexual relations:

On the one hand came the emancipation of woman, the call to her to join in common labour, the giving of her destiny into her own hands, alliance with her as with an equal.

On the other hand the justification, the redemption of the flesh, *rehabilitation de la chair*!

Grand words, involving a whole world of new relations between human beings; a world of health, a world of spirit, a world of beauty, a world of natural morality, and therefore of moral purity. Many scoffed at the emancipated woman and at the recognition of the rights of the flesh, giving to those words a filthy and vulgar meaning; our monastically depraved imagination fears the flesh, fears woman.²¹

Shevchenko's attitude is also close to Herzen's with respect to the cult of art in the 1830s. For all its impracticality, it is still seen as preferable to the outright contempt for idealism among contemporaries. Herzen made this point in his memoirs when he wrote that the Schiller period had in the 1850s given way to an inferior Paul de Kock period—one characterized by a wasting of human drives and energies in mercantile affairs.²²

The story also captures the apocalyptic tone that has often been attached to descriptions of the imperial capital. Buckler has written of St. Petersburg's fondness for aligning itself with the famous ruined cities of world civilization—Babylon, Sodom and Gomorrah, Carthage, Troy, and Pompei: "The poetics of disaster figures through-

²⁰ Herzen, *My Past and Thoughts*, 66.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 114–15.

²² *Ibid.*, 110.

out Petersburg cultural history in the apocalyptic presentiments that skulk like an evil twin alongside the city's imperial posturing."²³ This sense of impending doom, captured in Briullov's great painting, haunts Shevchenko's story, indeed much of the poet's work. In "Khudozhnik" the recurring symbol of Saturn eating his child acts as a reminder of disturbing undercurrents. The image can be related to the idea of the regime destroying its citizens. But it can also be seen in metaphysical terms, as Chronos devouring time or as harsh reality consuming the talented but vulnerable. Much of Shevchenko's work reveals a yearning for a nurturing and protective environment, one that would provide selfless love. The young artist in the story searches for it unsuccessfully in the capital while being pursued by the threatening image of Saturn. The god's symbolic image might suggest the tsar or the monarchy, but it might also indicate the first stage in human evolution. As such, Saturn represents the threat of civilization's collapse, of a return to primordial chaos. It is a reminder of an inchoate and destructive universe hidden beneath the surface of polite society, of primitive passions that might rise to destroy the refinements of the human spirit. Romantic artists saw themselves as doing the work of God by developing the higher, spiritual forms of life. The lurking destructive impulse that is associated with the fall into chaos and the work of Lucifer threatens to pervert this drive for the ideal.

Seen in these terms, the story asks whether the human race is to sink into an ugly Saturnalia or to strive for the perfection that the Creator wishes it to achieve. The ugly statues, and that of Saturn in particular, indicate that humanity might be degenerating. This atmosphere of metaphysical unease dominates the story and is Shevchenko's tribute to the ambivalent St. Petersburg myth that was being elaborated in the first half of the nineteenth century. But the Ukrainian writer constructs the myth somewhat differently from most Russian authors. Petersburg, according to Toporov, was frequently described as soulless, official, regimented, unnaturally regular, abstract, uncomfortable, and un-Russian, in contrast to Moscow, which was seen as spiritual, domestic and intimate, patriarchal, comfortable, natural, and Russian.²⁴ In Shevchenko's myth of St. Petersburg the city contains both positive and negative characteristics; the juxtaposition occurs more along class and national lines. Soulless, official, regimented, abstract, and uncomfortable Petersburg tends to be the realm of the rich, conservative, politically powerful, and reactionary, while the spiritual, domestic and intimate, comfortable, and natural tends to be associated either with rural life beyond the city or with the urban middle and lower classes, the artistic bohemia and often with non-Russians (Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians). Up to a point the class-national divide separates patriarchal forces from those that favour women's emancipation, and serf owners from abolitionists, although it is clear that victimizers and victims are to be found throughout imperial society.

In psychological terms the depiction of the young artist's psychological breakdown, like the disastrous love affairs among his friends, can be analyzed as displacements of the libido onto ideal images that are deceptive lures and fantasies created by an unnatural society. The sudden and traumatic collapse of illusions suggests

²³ Julie A. Buckler, *Mapping St. Petersburg: Imperial Text and Cityscape* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 229.

²⁴ V. N. Toporov, *Mif, ritual, simbol, obraz: Issledovaniia v oblasti mifopoeticheskogo. Izbrannoe* (Moscow: Izdatelskaia gruppa "Progress" and "Kultura," 1995), 268.

fundamental fragility in this symbolic order and in civilization as a whole. Those who are unable or unwilling to recognize the harsh realities that lie just beneath the surface of the literary-artistic symbolic order are doomed to irrelevance or destruction. The reader is also left with a pervasive feeling that the whole edifice of cultural life hangs in a fragile balance. This is a Schellingian view: the philosopher was a dominant intellectual influence in the imperial capital in the 1830s. The fate of Shevchenko's young artist therefore illustrates a metaphysical point: reality itself is a precarious balance of antagonistic forces in constant danger of destabilization. The threat of a sudden eruption, such as that of Vesuvius in Briullov's painting, hangs over individual lives and over the delicate ecological balance that we call civilization. The threat of a cataclysm is ever present.



“Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions” Reconsidered

Yaroslav Hrytsak

Among the many works John-Paul Himka has written about Habsburg-ruled Galicia, his article “Icarian Flights in Almost Every Direction” stands out as the most imaginative.¹ It is the most comprehensive attempt at bringing studies of Galicia’s Ukrainians (Ruthenians) in line with recent theories of nationalism. It also symbolizes a radical departure from the conventional scheme of nation building as a unilinear process, and it suggests a more nuanced approach to various options and unrealized possibilities. Last but not least, the article is a good example of how a complicated topic can be presented in a lucid and, to a large extent, witty manner. I have constantly included this article on the reading lists of courses I have taught both in Ukraine and abroad, and it has been unremittingly popular among students. The article was published in an influential collection on the role of intellectuals in the articulation of nations.

It is exactly because of its outstanding quality that this article deserves further reconsideration. After all, a good theory is defined not only by the number of facts it covers and explains, but also by the number of discussions it provokes ... almost in all directions.

The word “almost” in the article’s title suggests that the number of options for the evolution of Galician Ruthenian identity was unlimited. It is true that when one looks through relevant sources, one may come upon quite unexpected options. For example, there is a murky reference to a local Ruthenian belief of the early nineteenth century that St. Paul’s letters to the Galatians were actually addressed to the Galicians.² The equation of Habsburg-ruled Galicia and biblical Galilee can be found in historical sources on more than one occasion. Some Polish and Ukrainian intellectuals in the Russian Empire used it in a deprecating way to underline Galicia’s backwardness and provincialism.³ But no one was considering “Galilean” identity seriously, and thus the repertoire of identity options was not boundless.

However, there were serious discussions about a separate, multi-ethnic “Galician” identity that, according to Habsburg plans, was to emerge in Galicia in a result of bringing civilization to that backward land. The primary targets of this project were the

¹ John-Paul Himka, “The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus’: Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions,” in *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, 109–64, ed. Ronald G. Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). Prof. Kennedy once said to me that he considers Himka’s article the best contribution in that book.

² Ewaryst Andrzej hr. Kuropatnicki, *Geografia albo dokładne opisanie królestw [sic] Galicyi i Lodomeryi* (Lviv, 1858), 1.

³ See Ewa Wiegandt, *Austria Felix, czyli o micie Galicji w polskiej prozie współczesnej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, 1998), 5–12.

local Polish nobles, whom Vienna considered uncivilized and rebellious. Thus Klemens von Metternich, in a letter to Emperor Francis I in 1814, wrote that the long-term goal of Habsburg policy should be to encourage Polish nobles to become Germans. But he was against the accelerated implementation of that policy: "The tendency [of our policy] must primarily go not towards making Poles into Germans all at once, but above all first making them true Galicians—thereby halting them from perceiving themselves as Poles"⁴. It is not quite clear, however, whether this community was conceived of as a national or a supranational one, and further investigations need to be conducted to identify the intentions and perception of this experiment.⁵ One may risk a generalization that its character depended on its perception: while in Vienna's plans it was a non-ethnic civilizational project, Polish patriots treated it an artificial nation that was being created in order to block their own national aspirations.⁶ In any case, the experiment fared rather poorly. By the 1850s and 1860s some literati did think of themselves first and foremost as "Galicians" and rejected any clear-cut ethno-national self-identification. But their number was rather small, and with the growing nationalization of the political and cultural scene they became almost extinct.⁷

Even if we to include this Galician identity in the repertoire of national identities that Galician Ruthenians could choose from, it does not dramatically increase the number of possible choices. It seems that John-Paul Himka pushed his constructivist approach too far by stating that national identification might evolve in almost all directions. Even if we drop "almost" as a metaphoric embellishment, the very idea that the Galician Ruthenians faced that many choices sounds like an exaggeration. I have never come across any hint that the Ruthenians identified themselves with the Chinese, the Finns, or the Portuguese. Their choice was rather limited, as it was in the similar cases of the Balkan ethnic groups,⁸ the Czechs (Bohemians),⁹ the Crimean Tatars,¹⁰ and the Ukrainians under Russian rule,¹¹ to give a few examples.

⁴ Arthur Haas, *Metternich, Reorganization and Nationality: A Story of Foresight and Frustration in the Rebuilding of the Austrian Empire* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1963), 167–69, as quoted in Hugh Lane, "The Galician Nobility and the Border with the Congress Kingdom before[.] during[.] and after the November Uprising," in *Die galizische Grenze, 1772–1867: Kommunikat oder Isolation?* 159, ed. Christoph Augustinowicz and Andreas Kappeler (Berlin: LIT, 2007).

⁵ In that respect, Larry Wolff's *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford University Press, 2010) offers very important insights.

⁶ See, e.g., the complaints of the Polish noble and Catholic writer Maurycy Dzieduszycki (1813–77) that the Habsburgs wanted "to create some kind of non-historical Galicians" (quoted in Zbigniew Fras, *Galicja* [Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1999], 89).

⁷ Kazimierz Chłędowski, *Pamiętniki*, [r. 1], *Galicja 1843–1880*, ed., with an intro. and notes, by Antoni Knot (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1951), 41, 200; and W. F., "Z okazji odbytego wiecu rabinów żydowskich i 'cudotwórców,'" *Przegląd Społeczny* (Lviv), 1887, no. 1: 76–80.

⁸ See Paschalis M. Kitromilides, "'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans," in *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, 23–66, ed. Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (Athens: Sage-Eliaamep, 1990).

⁹ See Jiří Kořálka, "Tschechische Nationsbildung und national Identität im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Nationalismen in Europa: West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich*, 306–21, ed. Uhlrike von Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001).

¹⁰ See Hakan Kırımli, *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905–1916)* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 301–33.

While the list of identities cannot be dramatically extended, some of them should be reconsidered in the light of recent studies. John-Paul Himka found it hard to find traces of a hypothetical Ruthenian identity encompassing the former Rzeczpospolita's Eastern Christians (now the Ukrainians and Belarusians).¹² However, such a concept was actually featured in the first grammar of the Ruthenian language in the 1820s and, as Michael Moser has shown recently, in the Galician Polish revolutionaries' Ruthenian writings.¹³ There are some interesting findings concerning the "*Natione Polonus, Gente Ruthenus*" identity. David Althoen has shown that this concept could be safely considered an "invented tradition" and that the usual references to the sixteenth-century political writer Stanisław Orzechowski (1513–66) as the alleged originator of this concept are groundless. This identity was coined much later, during the Revolution of 1848, and it was then that a more distant origin was ascribed to it.¹⁴

These new findings bear little relation to the main arguments of Himka's "Icarian Flights." There are, however, two exceptions: Anna Veronika Wendland, who in her monograph about the Galician Russophiles¹⁵ calls for a serious reconsideration of Himka's interpretation of the relations between the Ukrainian and all-Russian identities—Himka tends to treat them as "two very distinct and mutually exclusive constructions"¹⁶—and Paul R. Magocsi, who earlier suggested that these identities were complementary and became separate only at the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁷ Wendland basically supports Magocsi's thesis. She shows that most Russophiles did not want to accept an exclusive national identity; many of them, especially rank-and-file ones, co-operated with Ukrainophiles; some of them even changed their identity as a results; and in the end only a small group adopted a Russian orientation. The Russophiles' imagined motherland—Rus'—was an ambiguous and vague concept that could be interpreted as either Ukraine or as Russia, depending on the context. For the Russophiles, however, "Russia" sooner meant the ideal of Holy Rus', with its symbolic centres in Kyiv and Moscow, than the modern Russian empire corrupted by the West. More often than not, they were not eager to define their conception of Rus'

¹¹ See Leon Wasilewski, *Drogi Porozumienia: Wybór pism* (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2001), 66–70.

¹² Himka, "The Construction of Nationality," 152.

¹³ Mikhael Moser [Michael Moser], *Prychynky do istorii ukrainskoi movy*, ed. Serhii Vakulenko (Kharkiv: Kharkivske istoryko-filoholichne tovarystvo, 2008), 337–38, 567, 587n.

¹⁴ David Althoen, "That Noble Quest: From True Nobility to Enlightened Society in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1550–1830." (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2000); and idem, "*Natione Polonus* and the *Narod Szlachecki*: Two Myths of National Identity and Noble Solidarity," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 52, no. 4 (2003): 475–508.

¹⁵ Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001).

¹⁶ Himka, "The Construction of Nationality," 112.

¹⁷ Paul R. Magocsi, "Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism: A New Conceptual Framework For Analyzing National Ideologies in Late-Nineteenth-Century Eastern Galicia", in *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists, Kiev 1983*, vol. 2: 305–24, ed. Paul Debreczeny (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1983); repr. in his *Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 99–118.

clearly, and even when they did they did not think such a definition should imply Ukrainian or Russian irredentism.

Unlike Magocsi, Wendland considers Russophilism to have been a stage in the evolution of the Ukrainian national movement and argues that the victory of the Ukrainian orientation among Galicia's Ruthenians was prepared by the Russophiles' cultural work in the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s. She even suggests taking a further step—namely, treating the Russophiles as the conservative wing within the Ukrainian camp. According to Wendland they played a role similar to that of the so-called *malorossy* (Little Russians) in the Russian Empire: both were recruited from among the lower gentry (in the Galician case, from among the Greek Catholic clergy, which was a quasi-gentry); both combined their *Landpatriotismus* with a loyalty to a ruling house; and both displayed conservative attitudes. If one is to stick to the metaphor Himka has suggested, then the Russophiles were not the equivalent of Icarus—rather they resembled Icarus's father, the skilful and proficient Daedalus, who made his son's wings.

Icarian Flights?

Most contentious is the final part of Himka's article, in which he ponders why some constructions failed and the Ukrainian project succeeded. It is an exemplary exercise in counterfactual history: Himka carefully weighs various factors in a "what if?" way, eliminating those he considers less important and underlining those that, in his opinion, played a crucial role in the final (Ukrainian) solution of the Galician Ruthenians' identity crisis. Since, as he believes, Polish identity had little chance of winning over the hearts and minds of Galician Ruthenians and the Rusyn and Ruthenian identities were of a purely hypothetical character, he focusses on the rivalry between the Ukrainian and Russian identities. In a nutshell, his point can be presented as follows: it was the Habsburgian repression of the Russophile movement in the early 1880s that sealed the Russophiles' fate and brought about their failure. Vienna saw this movement—rightly or wrongly—as Russian irredentism and could not tolerate it in the atmosphere of the growing Austrian-Russian tensions portending war. "The result was the creation of a climate in which Russophilism found it difficult to flourish.... Ultimately, I think, the crucial factor in the victory of Ukrainophilism in Galician Rus' was the Austrian state," Himka writes.¹⁸ Conversely if the Russophile movement had been left on its own, it would have most probably won over the Ukrainophiles. If this had happened, then Galicia would have become another Russian land, and consequently the map of Central and Eastern Europe would look quite different today.

This line of argument calls for counterarguments. If the Russophiles' failure can be attributed to state repression, then why did the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire—which faced similar, if not worse, repression as an "Austrian Polish/German intrigue"—succeed? If an explanation lies in the fact that Ukrainian patriots from the Russian Empire moved the centre of their activity to Austrian-ruled Western Ukraine and managed to create their own "Galician Piedmont" there, why then did the similar efforts of the Galician Russophile émigrés in the Russian Empire

¹⁸ Himka, "The Construction of Nationality," 129, 145.

produce poor results? After all, the Galician Ukrainian socialists of the 1870s and 1880s suffered no less repression under the Habsburgs than the Russophiles did, but, unlike the Russophiles, they nonetheless found ways to flourish in 1890s.

Arguments and counterarguments of that kind are of somewhat limited value. As Tony Judt wrote, the trouble with counterfactual history is that "[i]t takes the last move in a sequence [of historical events], correctly observes that it might have been different, and then deduces either that all the other moves could also be different, or else they don't count."¹⁹ Therefore I suggest a different approach: to confront the texts that articulated the alternative national identities with their social perception. So far historians of Habsburg Galicia have focussed on what has been written and by whom, but they rarely analyze who read what was written.²⁰ This is rather odd: after all, reading is the most crucial factor in the imagining of a nation. To put it another way, "nations are book-reading tribes."²¹

Consequently let us turn to data, which I came across while working on my biography of Ivan Franko, regarding literary production in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires in the early 1880s—the period Himka sees as crucial for the rivalry between the Ukrainophile and Russophile orientations. They were painstakingly compiled by a Polish bibliographer in Lviv who was concerned about the prospects of Polish nationalism vis-à-vis other national movements in the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German empires.²² Therefore he organized his analysis according to ethno-linguistic groups, and the main criterion was the number of periodicals per capita. These statistics (in the table below) reveal that the Poles were doing relatively well in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. Although in the German Empire their situation was rather alarming, it was a far cry from the modest production of the Habsburg-ruled Ruthenians, who had the fewest of publications in their own language. Franko's joke that before 1840s it would only take a few wheelbarrows to gather all Ruthenian publications in one place testifies to the paucity of Ruthenian literary production.²³ Between the 1840s and the 1880s the situation changed dramatically. With the liberal imperial reforms of the 1860s and the introduction of autonomy for Galicia (1867), a vibrant public space emerged, with numerous newspapers and journals among other venues for publication. By that time Franko had become a dominant figure in Ruthenian/Ukrainian cultural production and one of the most productive and widely read Ukrainian authors in both the Habsburg and the Russian Empire. But his reading public never exceeded 1,000–1,500 persons at best—the maximum number of subscribers that Ruthenian (both Russophile and Ukrainophile) periodicals could boast (usually there were fewer than 1,000). This

⁹ Tony Judt, *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin, 2009), 190.

¹⁰ John-Paul Himka's *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1988) is a rare exception.


¹¹ Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

¹² See Korneli Heck, "Bibliografia Polska z r. 1881 w porównaniu z czeską, węgierską i rosyjską," *Przewodnik naukowy i literacki: Dodatek miesięczny do «Gazety Lwowskiej»*, 1882, no. 10: 1096.

¹³ Ivan Franko, "Metod i zadacha istorii literatury," in his *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'iatdesiaty tomakh*, vol. 41, *Literaturno-krytychni pratsi (1890–1910)*, ed. P. Y. Kolesnyk (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1984), 21.

number was a drop in the bucket, if one compares it with, say, the 185,000 Ruthenian students in Galicia in the 1880s or, for that matter, with the Polish press, which at that time had three to six times as many titles as the Ruthenian press and a print run that was seven to eight times greater.²⁴

Periodicals per capita, 1881



Given these modest statistics, the Galician Ruthenians' nation-building effort appear more like crawling than "Icarian flights." We may split hairs over the issue of which national orientation was more or less successful,²⁵ but we do so at the risk of

²⁴ Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Prorok u svoii vitchyzni: Franko i yoho spilnota* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2006), 369-75.

²⁵ In Himka's words, "The highest Icarian flight was that of the Russophiles: flights of Rusynism and "Ruthenianism" were not undertaken; [and] the flight of the Ukrainophiles proved not to be Icarian at all" ("The Construction of Nationality," 153).

ailing to see the forest for the trees—namely, that that success was rather dubious and in no way absolute. At the time the Ukrainians ("Little Russians") of the Russian Empire had no journals whatsoever: this illustrates vividly the fact that the Ukrainian movement there was arrested in its development. But the empire's ethnic Russians, whose cultural production was never suppressed, did not fare much better. They might have had a great national literature, but its distribution was very modest, to say the least. Indeed, the empire's Swedes, Germans, and Finns fared much better in that regard. Even when periodicals in Russian were freely allowed in Galicia, they would hardly help to create a "Russian" nation there,—and the local Russophiles' literary production was also insufficient for that purpose.

I do not have such statistics for a later period. However, data regarding literacy during the years 1897–1910/26 seem to confirm a similar tendency: the Ruthenians in the Hapsburg Empire and the Little Russians in the Russian Empire were among the less literate ethnic groups in Europe, and the Russians did not fare much better. Data regarding literary production and literacy in those empires cluster together rather neatly according to religious affiliation: the most literate communities were the Protestants and the Jews; the Roman Catholics stood somewhere in the middle; while the Eastern Christians (the Armenians, Georgians, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, and Ukrainians) lagged far behind, outstripped only by the Muslims.

Applying Benedict Anderson's theory, one may conclude that until the very beginning of the twentieth century the Eastern Christians in the Habsburg and Russian empires remained pre-national and largely illiterate "sacred societies" rather than modern national "imagined communities." To a large extent these statistics confirm Arno Mayer's earlier conclusion about the persistence of the old regime throughout Europe until the very beginning of the First World War,²⁷ with an important qualification that Eastern Europe and the Eastern Christians were among the most persistent "sacred societies."

In that context, John Armstrong's scheme of nation building in that historical region deserves special attention. In his opinion, the national identities of local ethnic and religious groups were largely indistinguishable. Most of them spoke a mutually comprehensible patois, had a diffuse historical memory of their common descent, and a more acute sense of religious distinction than those who did not belong to their denomination (i.e., the Western Christians, Armenians, Jews, and Muslims). Only gradually, under the centrifugal influences of large cultural centres such as Kyiv, Lviv, and Vilnius did distinctive national identities emerge.²⁸ At first glance, there is nothing specifically "regional" about this scheme: it could be applied elsewhere. Armstrong himself suggests the Mediterranean world of Romance languages as a close parallel. Another comparison that comes to mind is the large German-speaking area of Central Europe, even though, as some philologists suggest, the German dialects' differences

²⁶ Hrytsak, *Prorok u svoii vitchyzni*, 544.

²⁷ Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

²⁸ See John A. Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, 129–30, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992).

were much more pronounced than was the case among the numerous Slavic dialects in Eastern Europe.²⁹

What was specific was that in the latter region, owing to the mixing of Eastern Christianity with local political traditions,³⁰ pre-modern identities and intellectual practices proved to be extremely persistent. They were symbolized by the perseverance of "Rus'," a vague notion of the Eastern Christian community characterized by its use of Church Slavonic, whose cultural achievements were rather poor by Western standards. Under these circumstances, local nation builders had no choice but to deconstruct this community, rejecting some of its elements (like Church Slavonic) and modernizing others. By the end of the nineteenth century Lviv was one of the most crucial centres where such deconstruction was occurring. Judging by the intensity of its cultural production in the 1880s, it compared favourably with St. Petersburg and Warsaw, leaving Moscow, Kyiv, Vilnius, and other cities that had a large share of Eastern Christians far behind.³¹

Regarding the formula by which this deconstruction was undertaken in Lviv Wendland's monograph provides some important insights. In her opinion, controversies between the Galician Russophiles and Galician Ukrainophiles can be rendered as opposition(s): as Orthodox Ruthenian (Rus') civilization vs. "European" Ukraine conservative vs. democratic, old ways of defining the culture of Rus' vs. new way (e.g., the etymologic vs. the phonetic system of writing). Or, as a leading Galician Russophile put it, "Ukrainian identity [*ukrainizm*] is the result of a new trend in the spiritual life of Europe that grew slowly, starting from the second half of the eighteenth century, from west to east until it reached Russia and made a revolution in the worldviews of the educated classes of the Russian people. In the field of science it gave birth to empiricism, in belles lettres, to realism, and in political and social relations, to the idea of personal liberty and equality of all people."³²

My claim is that before 1914 nowhere else was the concept of Rus' as radically unmade as it was in Habsburg-ruled Galicia. This unmaking occurred as that crown land underwent a dramatic transformation from a provincial corner of the largely cosmopolitan German cultural space to a leading centre of the national(izing) Polish space as a result of its new autonomous status (from 1867). As I tried to show in my biography of Franko, Ukrainian national identity was strongly affected by this transformation. It became more sophisticated and articulate on the one hand, and more exclusive on the other. In the final result it was more attuned to modern culture and mass politics, and that largely determined its victory by the turn of the twentieth century.

²⁹ G[eorge] Y. Shevelov, "Language," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 3: 36 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

³⁰ On these topics see George Schoepflin, "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe," *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 55–90; and Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996).

³¹ Korneli Heck, "Bibliografia polska z r. 1881 w porównaniu z czeską, węgierską i rosyjską," *Przewodnik naukowy i literacki: Dodatek miesięczny do «Gazety Lwowskiej»*, 1882, no 10: 1096.

³² F[ylyp] S[vystun], *Chim est dlia nas Shevchenko? Krytychne rozsuzhdenie* (Lviv: Yzdanstvo redaktsii "Novoho Proloma," 1885), 24.

However, the victory was not absolute: the Russophile movement was still relatively strong. The Russophiles' fate was finally sealed by the First World War, when, because their ideology and symbols were deeply entrenched in conservative thinking, they lost their legitimacy and appeal with the demise of the old regime.

Conclusions

John-Paul Himka conceived his article as an attempt "to explore the utility and the limitations of the new thinking [i.e., since the 1980s] on nationalism." While he succeeded brilliantly with the first part ("utility"), he did not do so in the second part ("limitations"). When Himka was working on his article, modernist theories of nationalism were still going strong. But, as frequently happens, at the height of its might the modernist paradigm showed some signs of its subsequent decline. Since the 1990s there has emerged a new, fierce, and, I would say, reasonably well substantiated attack on what is now called "modernist orthodoxy." These new critics do not necessarily reject what is the strongest part of modernist theories of nationalism—namely, the emphasis on the social construction of nationality and national cultures. Instead they focus on the role of other factors that have not been taken sufficiently into account, such as religion, wars, and the international context.³³

It is against this new background that I believe the Galician case should be tested. It would, however, be unfair to blame John-Paul Himka for his failure to show the "limitations" of modernist theories. All of us who were raised to view things from a Marxist perspective can easily agree with Lenin's dictum that persons should be judged not by what they have not done, but by what they have achieved. It is hard to imagine that the currently flourishing state of nineteenth-century Galician Ukrainian studies could have occurred without John-Paul Himka's innovative and substantial scholarly contributions of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Since the 2000s his focus has shifted elsewhere. But all of us who continue working on the history of Habsburg-ruled Galicia cherish the hope that he may one day return to our fold.

³³ See Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); "Subjecthood That Happens To Be Called Citizenship," or Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime on Its Own Terms: Interview with Peter Ahlins," *Ab Imperio*, 2006, no. 4: 39–58; and Wilfried Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective," *Current Sociology* 51, nos. 3–4 (May–July 2003): 265–86.



The Greek Catholic Rustic Gentry and the Ukrainian National Movement in Habsburg-Ruled Galicia

Andriy Zayarnyuk

This article discusses the national allegiances of the Byzantine-rite Galician petty gentry during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century. Noble status set this social group apart from other Ruthenian inhabitants of nineteenth-century Galicia. Both contemporaries and later scholars saw the Galician Ruthenians as a typical “non-historic,” or “plebeian,” nation consisting of “priests and peasants.” However, the petty gentry did not fit into this picture. Throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries both the Polish and the Ukrainian national communities claimed that the Galician Greek Catholic petty gentry was theirs. The petty gentry’s position in between these two communities helped attract public attention, but at the same time it determined the partisan character of the study of this question. For non-partisan scholars, a major limitation was the acceptance of a framework that emphasized sociological differences between “historic” and “non-historic” nations in determining the character of the nation-building process: the petty gentry did not fit well into either of these “ideal types.”

The Ukrainian descendants of petty-gentry families were for some time their only students. They tended to stress the importance of the petty gentry in the history of the Ukrainian nation, viewing the latter as a community stretching over many centuries. After the Soviet interlude, during which the Ukrainian petty gentry were lionized only in diaspora publications,¹ a renewed interest in that gentry arose in western Ukraine in the 1990s.² Even well-known historians succumbed to the temptation to overestimate the impact of this unusual social group. In his scheme of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national awakening, the late Harvard historian Omeljan Pritsak, who was a descendant of the petty gentry on his mother’s side,³ claimed that the Eastern-rite gentry that dominated in Galicia’s organized Ukrainian life uninter-

In Soviet Ukraine researching this subject was taboo for ideological reasons. Meanwhile the editors and authors of post-war émigré Ukrainian publications about the regions where the Galician petty gentry once lived compactly were preoccupied with the latter. Articles about individual members of the gentry in the Boiko region can be found in almost every issue of *Litopys Boikivshchyny* (Philadelphia, 1969–89).

Panegyric articles about the petty gentry appeared in *Litopys Boikivshchyny* after the Boikivshchyna History and Ethnography Museum in Sambir, Lviv Oblast, revived that publication, and in numerous local miscellanies and new books, e.g., Ivan Volchko-Kulchytsky, *Istoriia sela Kulchytsi rodu Draho-Sasiv* (Drohobych: Vidrodzhennia, 1995).

Hryhorii Demian, *Talanty Boikivshchyny* (Lviv: Kameniar, 1991), 292.

ruptedly for several centuries also played a key role in Ukraine's nineteenth-century national awakening.⁴

Since their emergence, these Ukrainian narratives have been contested by structurally very similar Polish ones. However, unlike their Ukrainian counterparts, Polish historians have tended to attribute Polish identity to Galicia's Greek Catholic petty gentry. In the absence of direct evidence, such an identity was inferred from some actions by members of the gentry, for example, their participation in the Polish uprisings of the nineteenth century.⁵ For Polish historians, the ultimate proof of the gentry's Polishness was their sharp dissociation from their peasant neighbours. For the most part, both Polish and Ukrainian historians have sought to essentialize the gentry's identity, despite the volatility of the gentry's national allegiances.

Armed with Ernst Gellner's theory of nationalism, John-Paul Himka was the first scholar to discuss the Galician petty gentry's national affiliation in the context of the formation of a nation that did not previously exist. His thesis was that although the petty gentry was Ukrainian according to the two most important ethnographic criteria—religious affiliation and language—the heritage of the feudal era turned them into an ally of the Polish nobility and an enemy of the overwhelmingly peasant Ukrainian national movement. Although Himka's analysis ends with the 1880s, he believes "that with the passage of time, as one moved away from the feudal era and as the Ukrainian movement grew more differentiated, the petty gentry also found a place in the movement."⁶

This article re-examines Himka's arguments and pays closer attention to the years before and after the 1880s. Following Himka's methodology, it explores the relationships between the petty gentry and the national movement, not the petty gentry's identity per se. This choice is based on the assumption that national identity is a historical phenomenon sustained by the purposeful effort of social institutions, groups, and individuals, which inevitably change over time. Accordingly, the only meaningful way to establish the "identity" of a group is to trace the relationship between the group and nationalized or nationalizing agents' efforts and representation. This paper will deal only with the period in which such agents can be identified.

The term "petty gentry" is a confusing one. In the context of the nineteenth century its usage is a misapplication of the social reality of the Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth to the new social order created during Habsburg rule. This paper will discuss only the so-called "rustic gentry"—the petty gentry that owned "rustical" (peasant) and not "dominical" (demesne) land. These gentry folk either lived in their own villages or, more commonly, shared villages with their peasant neighbours. Other kinds of petty gentry (i.e., impoverished dominical, service, employed by the state or the church, or leasing and purchasing dominical estates) are not con-

⁴ Omeljan Pritsak, "Prolegomena to the National Awakening of the Ukrainians during the Nineteenth Century," in *Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, 109, ed. Roland Sussex and J. C. Eade (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1983).

⁵ Krzysztof Ślusarek, "Szlachta zagrodowa w Galicji, 1772–1939: Stan i przeobrażenia warstwy pod zaborem austriackim i w okresie niepodległości," in *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, vol. 2. *Spółczesność i gospodarka*, 120, ed. Jerzy Chłopecki and Helena Madurowicz-Urbańska (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1995).

⁶ John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 212–13, 214.

idered, even though in most cases their ancestry can be traced to the rustic gentry. The majority of the Galician Greek Catholic rustic gentry in the first half of the nineteenth century lived in the Habsburg administrative territory called Sambir circle" (German: *Kreis*).

From the point of view of the late eighteenth-century Habsburg state, the rustic gentry was not much different from the peasants. State governance of the countryside relied on the manors (*dominia*) and not on those claiming noble blood. Rustic gentry communities frequently had a history of conflicts with the *dominia* not unlike the conflicts that peasant communities had.⁷ The rustic petty gentry did not have to perform corvée labour and allegedly had a greater number of literate people, but their written and customary culture was very much like that of the peasants.⁸ In the 1840s a peasant impostor born in a state-owned village could present himself as a member of the petty gentry in another district of the same circle without arousing suspicion.⁹ The rustic gentry maintained their distinctiveness from the local peasants, but marriages between their members, although not frequent, were not considered abnormal.¹⁰

When the national movement was making its first inroads into the villages of Sambir circle, the petty gentry reacted much as the peasants did. Individuals from both groups took part in the Polish nationalist conspiracies of 1846. Although the rustic gentry's involvement was proportionately somewhat higher,¹¹ nonetheless the majority of both the rustic gentry and the peasants did not take part. In 1848 representatives of both groups participated in the activities of the Ruthenian Council that was formed in the mountainous area of Sambir circle. The council was chaired by a peasant but included a number of rustic gentry from several villages, and once again members of the rustic gentry were proportionately more involved than the peasants.¹² In the circle's lowlands both the rustic gentry and peasants abstained from taking part in the Ruthenian Council.¹³

In the 1860s, with the return to the constitutional system and with the granting of freedom of the press and of association, the issue of the rustic gentry's national affiliation was raised in public debates for the first time. During the 1860s the num-

Antoni Schneider, *Encyklopedya do krajoznawstwa Galicyi po względem historycznym, statystycznym, topograficznym, orograficznym, handlowym, przemysłowym, sfragistycznym ...*, vol. 1, pt. 7: 288, 289 (Lviv: Drukarnia J. Dobrzańskiego, 1874); Ivan Franko, "Zapysky ruskoho selianyna z pochatku XIX v.," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* 115 (1913): 157.

Franko, "Zapysky ruskoho selianyna," 155–66; Zofja Strzetelska-Grynbergowa, *Staromieskie ziemie i ludność* (Lviv, 1899), 330, 545–50.

The case of Onufer Stebelsky is described in my monograph *Idiomy emansypatsii: «Vyzvolni» roieky i halytske selo v seredyni XIX stolittia* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2007).

⁷ Narrative testimony can be found in Mykhailo Zubrytsky's autobiography, preserved in the Manuscript Division of the Lviv National Scientific Library (hereafter VR LNNB), fond (hereafter) 206, *sprava* (hereafter spr.) 922, *papka* (file, hereafter p.) 27, *arkush* (folio, hereafter a.) 3. Marriages between members of the rustic gentry and peasants were recorded already at the end of the eighteenth century: see, e.g., the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv (hereafter TsDIAL), f. 201, *opys* (hereafter op.) 4a, spr. 635.

⁸ See my *Idiomy emansypatsii*, passim.

⁹ TsDIAL, f. 180, op. 1, spr. 4, a. 51.

¹⁰ TsDIAL, f. 180, op. 1, spr. 4, a. 184.

ber of Ruthenian deputies in the Diet was higher than it was in following decades. As a rule, circle and, later, county (German: *Bezirk*) administrations were manned by Austrian bureaucrats and had not yet been taken over by the Polish nobility. In the 1860s the villagers of Sambir circle were represented in the Diet by a Ruthenian whose election may have been backed by the administration. Already in 1861 the newspaper of the Polish "democrats" (the mostly urban-based opponents of the party of large landowners) published a rebuke directed at Ruthenian politicians that was allegedly written by Ruthenian petty gentry from a particular village.¹⁴ The Ruthenian side replied that most rustic gentry supported the movement.¹⁵ A number of rustic gentry were involved in the Polish uprising of 1863, but there were peasant volunteers as well. The fate of these participants in the uprising's aftermath was equally unenviable, and Ivan Franko claimed that it contributed to the decline of pro-Polish attitudes among the rustic gentry.¹⁶

The elections of 1870 were the first ones in Sambir county to be manipulated in favour of the Polish candidate after the Polish landowning nobility made a deal with Vienna to secure the crownland's autonomy and their own political dominance there. These elections give us a glimpse into the rustic gentry's behaviour in the new conditions that were shaping the confrontation between the two national camps. In the small landowners' curia in the Stryi Sambir-Sambir electoral district, a Polish candidate, Michał Popiel, ran against the Ruthenian Yuliiian Lavrivsky, who had represented the district's villagers in the Diet in the 1860s. Both candidates were from the petty gentry and both of them had connections to the area. But Popiel's was stronger—he was born and grew up in one of the local gentry villages. Since the elections were held in two stages, much depended on the profile of the one or two delegates village communities (*Gemeinde*) sent to vote in the county centre. Some mixed (peasant and gentry) villages and the purely gentry village of Silets, sent Greek Catholic priests, who voted for the Ruthenian candidate. The rustic gentry's delegates voted for Popiel, with the exception of one from the village of Berezhnysia.¹⁷

In the 1870s the rigging of elections in favour of Polish candidates by the administrative authorities of the newly autonomous crownland became a commonly accepted practice. The number of Ruthenian deputies shrank, and peasant deputies disappeared from the Diet. At first, reports to the Ruthenian patriotic press from the Sambir area complained about "selfish peasants guided by outside influence."¹⁸ But once the populist trend in Ruthenian politics gained momentum, blame was laid on the leaders—local educated patriots—and later on the rustic gentry. In 1877 the area's rustic gentry, with the exception of the Silets and Kulchytsi communities, was described as "decisively hostile towards the Ruthenian cause."¹⁹ Nonetheless neighbouring mountainous Turka county (part of Sambir circle before the administrative reform), which was equally densely populated by members of the rustic gentry, continued electing Ruthenian candidates throughout the 1870s. In this case

¹⁴ Mykhail Kropyva, "Iz Ozymyny, blyz Horodyshcha kolo Sambora," *Slovo*, 1861, no. 10.

¹⁵ "Iz Sambora," *Slovo*, 1861, no. 10.

¹⁶ Ivan Franko, "Dobvaniuk," in his *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'iatdesiaty tomakh* vol. 16, *Povisti opovidannia (1882–1887)*, 207–208, ed. O. Ye. Zasenka (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1978), 207–208.

¹⁷ TsDIAL, f. 165, op. 1, spr. 299.

¹⁸ [A voter,] "Iz Sambora," *Slovo*, 1874, no. 43.

¹⁹ "Iz Sambora," *Slovo*, 1877, No. 41.

however, the Ruthenian press did not single out the gentry among other Ruthenian voters.²⁰ Evidently it was not some distinct group identity but other factors, such as candidates' personalities and the strength of patriotic networks in the county's villages, that determined the rustic gentry's electoral behaviour.

In the 1880s the pattern of blaming the rustic gentry for the Ruthenian movement's electoral failures continued. Contributors from Sambir county to the Ruthenian press praised the peasants and described the petty gentry as "a totally different type of people, not like our Ruthenian one."²¹ The petty gentry was allegedly motivated by venality and sold its votes for the best price. For Himka's analysis of the situation in which the petty gentry found itself in the 1880s, the accusatorial writings of Ivan Mykhas, a peasant activist from the Sambir county, served as an important source. Mykhas claimed that the petty gentry "does not consider peasants to be God's creatures and fraternizes with the Poles,"²² and that it conspired with the local Jews against the peasants.²³ Mykhas also complained that the petty gentry "in some places oppresses peasants and considers them to be something as base as cattle."²⁴ During the 1880s the Ruthenian movement's discourse about the petty gentry became so radical that in 1889 a Ruthenian newspaper for the first time identified the petty gentry as Polish: "there are ... many Poles, especially the so-called petty gentry."²⁵

The first attempts to explain the petty gentry's apparent alienation from the Ukrainian national movement were also made in the 1880s. Ivan Franko pointed to the rustic gentry's relative economic decline vis-à-vis the peasants after the abolition of *robot* in 1848.²⁶ Mykhas made the same claim at the time.²⁷ Describing the petty gentry's self-awareness as based on their fresh memories of their privileged position under the feudal order, Himka developed this line of argumentation into an elaborated scholarly interpretation.

Such an interpretation is, however, based on the assumption that the petty gentry was to blame for the poor relationships between its members and the Ruthenian national movement. It ignores the earlier contacts between the rustic gentry and the movement and the fact that the antagonism between the petty gentry and the peasants came under public scrutiny only in the 1880s. These two facts seem to indicate that the Ukrainian national movement played a much greater role in the abatement of these relationships, especially if we take into account the fact that during this decade the movement reoriented itself towards the peasants. Only then did the old particularistic conflicts between the peasants and the petty gentry start to matter for the movement. The rustic gentry, in its turn, might have been dismayed by the movement's pro-peasant rhetoric and the advances it started making towards the peasants in the 1880s. Peasant activists entering politics and public discussion during this decade brought with them their own animosity towards the petty gentry.

²⁰ "Ot Sambora," *Slovo*, 1879, no. 71.

²¹ "Iz Sambora," *Slovo*, 1885, no. 54.

²² Ivan z nad Dnistra [Ivan Mykhas], "Pysmo z Sambirshchyny," *Batktivshchyna*, 1884, no. 48.

²³ Idem, "Pysmo z Sambirshchyny," *Batktivshchyna*, 1886, no. 3.

²⁴ Idem, "Pysmo z Sambirshchyny," *Batktivshchyna*, 1886, no. 45.

²⁵ *Batktivshchyna*, 1889, no. 35.

²⁶ Ivan Franko, "Prychynok do piznannia ekonomychnoho pobytu nashoho selskoho dukhovenstva pershii chetvertyni seho stolittia," *Dilo*, 1884, no. 109.

²⁷ Ivan z nad Dnistra, "Pysmo z Sambirshchyny," *Batktivshchyna*, 1884, no. 48.

The irony of this situation was that the only rural Ukrainian reading club active in Sambir county in 1884 was located in the petty gentry village of Stupnytsia.²⁸ The gentry village of Silets had been voting for Ruthenian candidates since at least 1861 and in the 1880s its mayor, who was also from the local petty gentry, became the village's leading Ruthenian patriot, replacing the priest.²⁹ In the 1880s the village of Kulchytsi voted for Ruthenian candidates as well. Already during that decade some members of the rustic gentry from Luka and Dorozhiv had become members of the Prosvita popular-enlightenment society.³⁰ The same year that the peasant Mykhas founded a reading club in his native Morozovychi, reading clubs were also founded in the petty gentry villages of Berezhnytsia and Kulchytsi.³¹ Some petty gentry from these villages became activists of the Ukrainian movement on the county level.³²

By 1895 there were seven village Prosvita reading clubs in Sambir county. Three of them were in petty gentry villages shows how engaged the petty gentry was in the Ukrainian national movement.³³ But there are also different statistics regarding the petty gentry. Out of thirty-seven petty gentry votes in the 1895 elections, the Ruthenian candidate received only four, whereas he received twenty-one out of fifty-two votes from Ruthenian peasants.³⁴ However, if we take into account that many of those "peasant" voters were priests, the difference between peasant and petty gentry voting patterns almost disappears. Both petty gentry and peasant delegates were equally tempted by bribes they were offered during the voting, and representatives of both sides were deceived and terrorized by paid agents and hooligans. A teacher from Sambir claimed that during the pre-election campaign in 1897 "many from the gentry, even mayors, and zealous adherents of the national-populists, and we can count on them."³⁵

Even Mykhas revealed that the petty gentry's allegiances were ambiguous: "The petty gentry is against the committee, saying that peasants took it over, and [the petty gentry] would like to play the role of both Poles and Ruthenians, oppositionists and opportunists, to be on the people's and county list. And, in general, the petty gentry keeps with the gentlemen."³⁶

In the 1880s the Ruthenian movement could not afford to alienate its newly discovered peasant constituency: after all, peasant activists and peasant organizations would become its backbone. At the same time the movement sought a solution that would also accommodate the petty gentry. Hryhorii Tsehlynsky's 1887 comedy *The Petty Gentry* presents such a solution, albeit in a fictionalized form.³⁷ The author, like many other leading Ruthenian intellectuals in Galicia, was himself the child of rustic gentry. The plot of his play revolves around the community council elections in a village where both gentry and peasants live and compete with each other in politics and in love. Good judgement helps to overcome old prejudices, and at the play's end

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ I. S., "Z Sambirshchyny," *Dilo*, 1890, no. 30.

³⁰ TsDIAL, f. 348, op. 1, spr. 4892, a. 1-6.

³¹ VR LNNB, f. 167, op. 2, spr. 291, a. 15.

³² TsDIAL, f. 348, op. 1, spr. 4892, a. 21.

³³ Visti Prosvitni," *Chytalnia*, 1895, no. 23.

³⁴ Tovarysh narodnyi [Ivan Mykhas], "Z Sambirshchyny pyshut nam," *Dilo*, 1895, no. 217.

³⁵ VR LNNB, f. 11, spr. 626, p. 59, a. 32.

³⁶ [Ivan Mykhas], "Z Sambora (Kandydatsy do rady povitovoi)," *Batktivshchyna*, 1896, no. 13.

³⁷ Hryhorii Tsehlynsky, *Shliakhta khodachkova: Komedii v IV diiakh* (Lviv, 1887, 2d ed. 1911).

better community government, consisting of both petty gentry and peasant members, is elected and champions the interests of the entire village. Conjugal love and marriage also unites male peasants and female petty gentry.

The implicit message of Tsehlynsky's play is that the petty gentry and peasants have the same interests, but local Jewish middlemen incite antagonism between them and exploit both groups for their own profit. The sameness of the peasants and the petty gentry is emphasized. Like the peasants, the petty gentry preserved their Ruthenian language and religion, while the higher nobility forsook them in order to obtain material and social privileges.

Efforts in Sambir county's mixed villages to implement the solution Tsehlynsky offers in his fictional account also date from the end of the nineteenth century. Local patriotic Ukrainian village priests, who were typically of petty gentry origin, opposed the gentry's particularism. They fought against those local customs that were reminiscent of the gentry's privileged status and estranged the gentry from the peasants.³⁸

Numerous incidents at the turn of the twentieth century prove that, for the movement's leaders, the danger of alienating the peasants outweighed the prospects of winning over the petty gentry. In the 1908 Diet elections, Andrii Chaikovsky, by then a well-known writer of popular fiction who hailed from the rustic gentry, ran as a candidate of the Ukrainian National Democrats (at the time the largest Ukrainian political party in Galicia) in the Sambir electoral district.³⁹ The local petty gentry allegedly supported his candidacy.⁴⁰ But Ivan Mykhas, the well-known peasant activist in the area and a member of the Radical Party, also decided to run in the elections. For the sake of uniting the Ukrainian vote, Chaikovsky withdrew in favour of Mykhas.⁴¹

Within the Ukrainian political spectrum, the clerical and conservative right wing was especially interested in the petty gentry as potential supporters. The representative of this group in Sambir believed that the comparison between the attitudes and abilities of the petty gentry and the peasants showed the former in a more favourable light.⁴² Already in 1905 he suggested inventing "some kind of organization for them." Some of the petty gentry in the villages allegedly supported this plan.⁴³ Local secular Ukrainian patriots of petty gentry origin who were active in the Prosvita society also supported this initiative. They believed that only a petty gentry organization could win over members of the petty gentry who had strong particularist sentiments. There was also a fear that the Russophiles could exploit tensions if they tried to mobilize the gentry against the peasants.⁴⁴

Mykhailo Zubrytsky, an ethnographer, Ukrainian patriot, and parish priest in the village of Ishanets, believed that "our influential people should be watchful about this and by all means erase these differences [between the petty gentry and the peasants]." In 1895 he abolished the custom whereby the gentry had their baskets of Easter food blessed inside the village church while the peasants had to wait for the blessing outside in the cemetery. See VR LNNB, f. 206, spr. 922, p. 7, a. 27.

Svoboda, 1908, no. 6.

Svoboda, 1908, nos. 6–7.

Svoboda, 1908, no. 10.

VR LNNB, f. 11, spr. 628/59, a. 14.

VR LNNB, f. 11, 626/p. 59, a. 83.

Ivan Fylypchak, "'Tovarystvo ruskoï shliakhty v Halychyni,'" *Ukrainskyi Beskyd*, 1939, no. 28:

Eventually a petty gentry organization was founded in Galicia in 1907—the Association of Ruthenian Gentry (*Tovarystvo ruskoi shliakhty*). Its creation was initiated by Petro Pohoretsky, the parish priest in the petty-gentry village of Bilyna Velyka and himself a member of the gentry. The association's local founders consulted the writer Chaikovsky, who drafted the association's statutes. He also warned Pohoretsky that the National Democrats might possibly be negatively disposed: "Politics would rather allow for [the founding of] 100 peasant societies than one for the [petty] gentry."⁴⁵ To forestall a negative reaction, Chaikovsky suggested submitting an article to the leading Galician Ukrainian daily, *Dilo*, demonstrating the benefits of such an association for the entire national community.⁴⁶

The National Democrats' executive committee, the National Chancery, did not show any particular enmity towards the enterprise. Although the committee refused to share its list of its "trusted men" in the counties, it nonetheless supplied the association with information about the counties where petty gentry were concentrated.⁴⁷ Symptomatically, it was not Pohoretsky who approached the National Chancery, but another local activist who was a priest of peasant origin.

The educated members of Galician Ukrainian society were told that the major goal of the Association of Ruthenian Gentry was to impel the petty gentry to join the national movement. With the creation of the association, the gentry had an opportunity to meet and interact without "encountering rebukes and ridicule from our peasants."⁴⁸ The association's statute emphasized its apolitical nature: "The association's goal is education, enlightenment, and the raising of the well-being of the Ruthenian gentry in Galicia, excluding all political matters." At the same time, at the association's first general meeting Pohoretsky appealed to the petty gentry's ego and explained that the goal was "to elevate them again to a leading position in Ruthenian society, to the position they once occupied in ancient times."⁴⁹

Sambir, Staryi Sambir, and Turka counties were the association's strongholds.⁵⁰ In petty gentry villages the association tried opening "gentry casinos" as alternatives to the village "reading clubs." The first such casino was established in 1909 in the village of Chaikovychi.⁵¹ That year the association had 242 members and its general meeting was attended by the county leader of the Ukrainian National Democrats. He left the meeting convinced that the association's leaders were striving to work for the benefit of the entire Galician Ukrainian community, and not simply to satisfy gentry whims.⁵²

It is difficult to judge what impact the association had on the petty gentry's national allegiances. By 1909, out of five villages with a petty gentry majority in Staryi Sambir county, four adhered to the Ukrainian national movement, and only one was dominated by Russophiles.⁵³ However, the leader of county's Ukrainian National Democrats—rural parish priest named Ivan Yavorsky—and not the Association of Ruthenian Gentry

⁴⁵ State Archive of Lviv Oblast (hereafter LODA), f. 1245, op. 2, spr. 18, a. 6–7.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ LODA, f. 1245, op. 2, spr. 18, a. 8.

⁴⁸ "Deshcho pro 'Tovarystvo ruskoi shliakhty v Halychyni,'" *Osnova*, 1908, no. 6.

⁴⁹ Fylypchak, "'Tovarystvo ruskoi shliakhty v Halychyni,'" *Ukrainskyi Beskyd*, 1939, no. 29: 2.

⁵⁰ Ibid., nos. 30: 2 and 31: 2.

⁵¹ LODA, f. 1245, op. 2, spr. 24.

⁵² Fylypchak, "'Tovarystvo ruskoi shliakhty v Halychyni,'" *Ukrainskyi Beskyd*, 1939, no. 31: 2.

⁵³ LODA, f. 1245, op. 2, spr. 24.

should be credited with the Ukrainian movement's success there. In addition, it was reported that in mixed villages where the gentry did not constitute a majority, they were merging with the peasants and become virtually indistinguishable from them. The movement was clearly reaping the fruits of the strategy Tsehlynsky advocated and local patriotic priests implemented.

In the immediate area of Pohoretsky's activity, his efforts provoked peasant resentment. There were complaints about the "gentry casinos" and separate gentry reading clubs, and local peasant correspondents branded Pohoretsky as one who obstructed the villagers' enlightenment.⁵⁴ What is more, Pohoretsky was officially investigated by ecclesiastical authorities. Some parishioners claimed he had been appointed to the parish by bribing local petty gentry.⁵⁵ And peasants complained that he had charged them excessive fees for performing religious rites.⁵⁶ The peasant community of Bilynka Mala, which belonged to Pohoretsky's parish, complained that he had favoured the petty gentry at the expense of the peasants.⁵⁷ Rev. Andrii Detsko, the local dean and a priest of peasant origin in the petty gentry village of Luka, investigated these complaints and concluded that they were justified.⁵⁸ There were also charges that Pohoretsky had engaged in land speculation and usury and had otherwise abused his office.⁵⁹

In 1909 Pohoretsky withdrew from being actively involved in the Association of Ruthenian Gentry.⁶⁰ Dmytro Hordynsky, the parish priest of Kulchytsi, whose political preferences were similar to Pohoretsky's, became the new chairman. In 1910 the association reported that its membership had increased to four hundred. At the same time, however, mass meetings of the association were taking place only in villages that had a long history of involvement with the Ukrainian movement—tupnytsia, Silets, Horodyshche, and Chaikovychi.⁶¹

In 1911 the Russophiles, who had been losing out to the Ukrainophiles in the contest for the loyalty of the Galician Ruthenians, tried to exploit the rustic gentry's particularism and patchy history of relations with the Ukrainian movement. The Russophile candidate in that year's elections in Sambir county, Ivan Volchko Kulchytsky, was a member of the local petty gentry in the village of Kulchytsi. Another Volchko Kulchytsky, apparently a relative of the candidate, even proclaimed during an election rally in Kulchytsi that "now we have recovered our sight and shall not allow the bastards to trick us with Ukraine.... You should know that from now on we do not give a damn for Ukraine and have returned to the historical road. From now on we are Russians."⁶² The mayor of Chapeli, who was from the petty gentry, allegedly supported this Russophile candidate as well.⁶³ But in other places tensions between

⁵⁴ *Narodne slovo*, 1909, no. 168; "Z Sambirshchyny," *Dilo*, 1909, no. 25.

⁵⁵ State Archive in Przemyśl, Archive of the Greek-Catholic Bishopric (hereafter APP, ABGK), *sygnatura* 4273.

⁵⁶ APP, ABGK, *sygnatura* 4047.

⁵⁷ APP ABGK, *sygnatura* 4277.

⁵⁸ APP, ABGK, *sygnatura* 4048.

⁵⁹ APP, ABGK, *sygnatura* 5810.

⁶⁰ Fylypchak, "'Tovarystvo ruskoi shliakhty v Halychyni,'" *Ukrainskyi Beskyd*, 1939, no. 32: 2.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 1939, no. 33: 2.

⁶² *Golos naroda*, 1911, no. 17.

⁶³ *Golos naroda*, 1911, nos. 18, 19, 21, and 22.

the peasants and the petty gentry turned the latter against the Russophiles. In Luka, where local peasants had been under the influence of a Russophile parish priest for several decades, the petty gentry was decisively anti-Russophile.⁶⁴ Even though Ivan Volchko Kulchytsky was paired with the Russophile peasant activist Stefan Pelekhaty as his substitute, he suffered a devastating defeat, receiving only 334 votes in the county while the Ukrainian candidate—a rural priest—received 12,052.⁶⁵

While the formation of the Association of Ruthenian Gentry signalled that there was now room in the Ukrainian movement for the petty gentry's particularist sentiments, the movement had not given up the strategy that it had formulated in the 1880s. But the gentry found the peasant-oriented economic and professional associations that penetrated the villages beneficial, because their main occupations, economic position, and economic interests were identical to those of the peasants. Cells of the Ukrainian economic associations and co-operatives mushroomed in Sambir county, especially around 1910.⁶⁶ The winner of the 1911 parliamentary elections, the parish priest Stefan Onyshkevych, was a leading member of the Silskyi Hospodarskyi society, which had been conceived as a trade-unionlike organization for the Galician Ukrainian peasantry. In 1914 circles of that society were founded even in Bilyn Velyka and Ortynychy, two strongholds of the Association of Ruthenian Gentry.⁶⁷ A. Tsehlynsky had envisioned in the 1880s, the petty gentry and the peasants came together in one organization to defend the Ukrainian villagers' interests. It was no accident that the second edition of his play was printed in 1911. By 1912 the only petty gentry village in the Sambir county still voting for the Polish candidate was Rosokhy.⁶⁸ In 1913 the petty gentry of Kulchytsi, Luka, Hordynia, and Bilyna were reported as showing a remarkable unanimity in voting for the Ukrainian candidate.⁶⁹

While conservatives and activists of the Association of Ruthenian Gentry emphasized its contribution to the petty gentry's conversion to the national cause, the association's role should not be overestimated. The new national co-operative and farming associations and new representations of national history were at least equally as important.

In May 1913 fewer than fifty members of the Association of Ruthenian Gentry took part in its general meeting.⁷¹ Members constantly complained about the ridicule the association suffered from agencies and activists of the national movement. In 1914 the celebration of Taras Shevchenko's centennial in Lviv turned into a manifestation of the strength and spread of organized Ukrainian society in Galicia. The association planned to dispatch a detachment of petty gentry cavalrymen to participate in the Ukrainian parade but the idea was never implemented, partly because of the negative attitude of some Ukrainian leaders, who perceived the association as "backward" and "anachronistic."⁷²

⁶⁴ "Luka," *Golos naroda*, 1912, no. 8.

⁶⁵ "Rezultaty druhykh vyboriv," *Golos naroda*, 1911, no. 30.

⁶⁶ *Hospodarska chasopys*, 1913, no. 6.

⁶⁷ *Hospodarska chasopys*, 1913, no. 24.

⁶⁸ *Dilo*, 1912, no. 227.

⁶⁹ "Po vyborakh," *Dilo*, 1913, no. 146.

⁷⁰ "Dopys z Sambirshchyny," *Ruslan*, 1913, no. 11.

⁷¹ Fylypchak, "Tovarystvo ruskoï shliakhty v Halychyni," *Ukrainskyi Beskyd*, 1939, no. 33: 2.

⁷² *Ibid.*, no. 34: 2.

A visible demonstration of the petty gentry's return to the nation's bosom was staged in Sambir county in 1912 during the commemoration of the early seventeenth-century Cossack hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny in his native village of Kulchytsi by both the petty gentry and peasantry.⁷³ Sahaidachny was celebrated as a symbol of the petty gentry's involvement in the Ukrainian national past, and the Cossacks were represented not as merely peasant runaways but as noble defenders of the nation. The gentry's participation in heroic Cossack feats was incorporated into Ukrainian academic history at approximately the same time.⁷⁴

Ivan Fylypchak, an enthusiastic historian of the region and writer who had described the nationalization of the local rustic gentry in the early twentieth century in one of his semi-documentary novels, emphasized the role of historical narratives in this process. His novel also ended in 1912, the year when the petty gentry became unquestionably Ukrainian. As one of his characters proclaims, "there shall be no gentry and no peasants from now on, only noble Ukrainian citizens."⁷⁵

When the interwar Polish state launched an action to "reclaim" the rustic gentry for the Polish nation, Ukrainian patriots turned once again to the Cossack past to counter the Polish narratives. Andrii Chaikovsky wrote a novel about Hetman Sahaidachny,⁷⁶ while Ivan Fylypchak took up the figure of Yurii Kulchytsky, another native of Kulchytsi and the legendary saviour of Vienna during the famous siege of 1683.⁷⁷ But these and other interwar developments deserve a separate study.

This article has demonstrated that by 1914 gentry villages were institutionally absorbed by organized structures of the Ukrainian national movement, that the majority of the rustic gentry were voting for Ukrainian candidates, and that the gentry's particular pride and ambitions had found a rich source of nourishment in the new Ukrainian historical narrative.

As for the history of relations between the petty gentry and the Ukrainian national movement, representatives of the petty gentry became involved in the movement from its inception. Identification with a national group was missing among the majority of gentry folk in the second half of the nineteenth century, but it was also missing among the peasantry. The "problematic" character of the petty gentry's identity was not unusual. What was unusual, however, was the attention this question received from the movement and the discursive and institutional solutions with which the movement

⁷³ "Vichevyi rukh," *Dilo*, 1912, no. 125.

⁷⁴ See Wacław Lipiński, *Szlachta na Ukrainie: Udział jej w życiu narodu ukraińskiego na tle jego dziejów* (Kyiv and Cracow: Leon Idzikowski, 1909); and idem, ed., *Z dziejów Ukrainy: Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Włodzimierza Antonowicza, Paulina Święcickiego i Tadeusza Ryłskiego, wydana staraniem Józefa Jurkiewicza* [et.al.] (Kyiv and Cracow: D. E. Friedlein, 1912). The latter includes an excerpt from the monumental *History of Ukraine-Rus'* that Mykhailo Hrushevsky was still writing at the time.

⁷⁵ Ivan Fylypchak, *Bratnia liubov kripsha vid kamimnykh stin: Povist z zhyttia zahonovoi shliakhty pochatku XX viku* (Sambir: Filiia tovarystva "Prosvita" v Sambori, 1937), esp. 117, 224.

⁷⁶ The first part of Chaikovsky's *Sahaidachny* was published in 1918. After significant revisions, the second edition appeared in 1927. Polish authorities destroyed the entire print run of the second part published in 1929. The complete edition of all three extant parts appeared seventy years later: *Sahaidachny: istorychnyi roman u trokh knykhakh* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1989).

⁷⁷ Ivan Fylypchak, *Kulchytsky: Heroi Vidnia. Istorychna povist z pryvodu iuvileiu, 1683–1933* (Kulchytsi Shliakhotski and Sambir: Tovarystvo "Boikivshchyna," 1933).

experimented, all of which may be explained by its movement's pro-peasant profile which had formed in the 1880s. There was no single moment when the petty gentry suddenly became Ukrainian. The movement, working through its institutions and representations, generated a framework in which public choices and manifestations regarding one's national identity became much less volatile and more conforming.

The story of the Greek Catholic rustic gentry's relations with the Polish movement still has to be written. Only preliminary hypotheses can be offered as to why this gentry ended up being Ukrainian and not Polish: the influence and constant presence of Greek Catholic priests, who were frequently Ruthenian patriots; the weakness of Polish organizations in the countryside, where economically useful Polish associations were even more "peasant" than the Ukrainian ones; and the centrality of the petty gentry in the new narrative of Ukrainian history and its marginality in the Polish one.

Між українофільством і панславізмом: До історії змін національної ідентичності галицько-руських діячів у 60-х роках XIX ст. (спроба полібіографічного дослідження)

Остан Середа

У третій чверті XIX ст., внаслідок розвитку громадського життя в Галичині перед освічених галицьких русинів, проявилися ряд національно-політичних та ультраруських течій: староруська, полонофільська, русофільська та українофільська-народовецька¹. Якщо полонофіли вважали, що русини мають залишитися частиною польської нації як у культурному, так і в політичному плані, то старорусини заперечували концепцію історичної єдності поляків та українців і, головним чином, орієнтувалися на книжну церковну культуру. Об'єднані постулатом “ми – не поляки”, останні включали і представників вищої церковної ієрархії (т. зв. “святоюрців”), і прогабсбурзьких лоялістів, і прибічників подальшої інтеграції в російську культуру, і врешті прихильників ідеї національної єдності з наддніпрянськими українцями. У 1850-х рр. з староруського угруповання чіткіше виокремилися русофіли, що вважали Галицьку Русь частиною австро-польського культурного простору. Спочатку культурницьке русофільство поєднувалося з політичним австрофільством, але після 1866 р. Відверто проявилася і русофільство політичне. Натомість ранні народовці (т. зв. “молода Русь”), представлені на початках здебільшого студентством, орієнтувалися на сучасну українську культуру, що формувалася тоді на Наддніпрянщині.

Дотепер в ряді студій простежено, як в політичній атмосфері “конституційних експериментів” у підавстрійській Галичині визріли основні засади як наро-

Дві відмінні класифікації національних течій у Галичині, запропоновані в різний час історіографами, а саме: американськими вченими Павлом-Робертом Магочієм та Іваном-Павлом Химкою. Протягом останніх десятиліть знайшли відображення у працях істориків в Україні. Див.: Paul L. Magocsi, «Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism: A New Conceptual Framework for Analyzing National Ideologies in Late Nineteenth Century Eastern Galicia», зб. *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists* (Kiev, September 1983), т. 2, *Literature, Poetics, History*. 305–23. . у упор. Paul Debreczeny (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1983); John-Paul Himka, *The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions*, зб. *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, 109–64, у упор. Ronald Grigor Suny і Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Мар'ян Мудрий, «Національно-політичні орієнтації в українському суспільстві Галичини австрійського періоду у світлі сучасної історіографії», *Вісник Львівського університету: Серія історична*, вип. 7, ч. 1 (2002): 465–500.

довецького, так і русофільського руху². Однак менше відомо про взаємодію цих середовищ, зокрема переходи окремих діячів з одного табору в інший. У зв'язку з цим цікаво перенести фокус дослідження з вивчення колективних ідентичностей більших груп національних діячів на індивідуальні випадки, щоб прояснити як персональні мотиви окремих осіб, так і ширші політичний та культурний контексти. Це, зокрема, дозволило б уникнути помилки, притаманно багатьом студіям з історії української суспільної думки – а саме, трактування тих чи інших поглядів діячів, що начебто “представляли” певну течію, як автоматично репрезентативних для неї, без врахування багатоманітності їхнього індивідуального сприйняття та можливої еволюції поглядів, а також внутрішніх розходжень у кожному з вищевказаних угруповань. У цій статті я спробую прослідкувати індивідуальні траєкторії трансформації національної ідентичності трьох представників народовецького руху 1860-х рр. – Володимира Стебельського, Ксенофонта Климковича і Корнила Устияновича, що хиталися між українофільською та панславистською опціями, а також деяких їхніх сучасників.

Дослідники українського руху, вивчаючи інтелектуальні контакти українофільських діячів двох імперій, часто розглядали їх як процес передачі головних засад національної думки з Наддніпрянщини на західню периферію українських земель. Насправді ранні народовці не були лише пасивними реципієнтами ідей з-над Дніпра. Іван-Павло Химка влучно зауважив, що “українська ідея” істотно трансформувалася, потрапивши до Галичини: “було щось інакше у тому, як галичани розуміли українську національність: як справді щось абсолютне, відмінне від російської національності, виключене з неї, у той час як українофільство у Росії не було таким радикально двочленным”³. І справді, виходячи подібно до кирило-методіївських братчиків, з демократичних слов'янофільських засад⁴, ранні народовці змінили уявлення про українську національну місію, посиливши антиросійські наголоси.

² Олена Аркуша та Мар'ян Мудрий. «Русофільство в Галичині в середині XIX – на початку XX ст.: Генеза, етапи розвитку, світогляд», *Вісник Львівського університету. Серія історична*, вип. 34 (1999): 231–68; Остап Серед, «Національна свідомість і політична програма ранніх народовців у Східній Галичині (1861–1867)», там само, 199–214; Anja Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915* (Відень: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000), 141–92; Олексій Сухий, *Від русофільства до москвофільства: Російський чинник громадській думці та суспільно-політичному житті галицьких українців у XIX ст.* (Львів: Львівський національний університет ім. Івана Франка, 2003). В дослідженнях останнього часу звертається увага й на те, що як реакція на ріст руського руху в галицькому громадському житті, стає помітним угруповання т.зв. “gente Rutheni natione Poloni”, яке пропагувало подвійну (польсько-руську) ідентичність. Див.: Мар'ян Мудрий, «Ідея польсько-української унії та “русини польської нації” в етнополітичному дискурсі Галичини 1859–1869 років», *Вісник Львівського університету. Серія історична*, вип. 39–40 (2005): 83–148.

³ John-Paul Himka, «The Ukrainian Idea in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century», *Kritika Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 329.

⁴ Про співвідношення слов'янської та національної ідей у ранньо-народовецьких публіцистичних див. Федір Стеблій, «Слов'янська ідея в інтерпретації української публіцистики в Галичині 60–80-х рр. XIX ст. (За матеріалами народовецької преси)», в зб. *Друг*

Отже, новочасну українську ідею загалом доречніше розглядати не як неминну константу, раз й назавжди проголошену корифеями українського відродження, яку діячам меншого калібру залишалося лише поширити серед мас населення, а як змінну концепцію, постійно відновлювану і доповнювану в тогочасних дискурсах. Важливо також врахувати особливості раннього етапу формування національних проєктів, що співпадає з епохою романтичного націоналізму: відсутність канонізованих уявлень про національну культуру та ідентичність, несформованість національного культурного канону як такого, а відси – наявність широкого “вікна можливостей” для індивідуальних інтерпретацій. У такій ситуації значення політичного контексту, взаємодії з іншими політичними акторами, інтелектуальних (зокрема, літературних) впливів, а навіть особистих інтересів чільних діячів було вагомішим для національного самовизначення, ніж, скажімо, наприкінці XIX ст., коли національна культура та ідентичність уже здобули в півавстрійській Галичині інституційну основу.

Зокрема, в тогочасному листуванні та пізніших спогадах галицько-руські діячі, пояснюючи джерела та чинники української ідентифікації чи відмови від неї, часто вказували на вплив художньої літератури. Мабуть у цьому випадку możemy говорити про “літературно-зумовлений” націоналізм, оскільки національно-політичні ідеали часто співпадали з поетичними. Така літературна зумовленість національної ідентифікації не була чимось унікальним. Так, польський історик Генрик Верещицький вказував, що польська романтична література в атмосфері 1830-х рр. навіртала на польськість синів австрійських бюрократів. Вибір національної ідентичності в їхньому колі нерідко залежав і впливу відповідно польської або ж німецької романтичної літератури⁵. Романтичні концепції особливої всесвітньої місії кожного народу відповідало поняття національної ідеї як принципу самостійного існування. Польський вчений Анджей Валицький слушно зауважив, що мислення романтичними категоріями національного місіонерства могло розвинути перебільшену уяву про виняткову роль власного народу, як також і привести до повної зневіри у сенс його окремого існування⁶. Зміни національної ідентифікації сприймалися і пояснювалися як наслідок боротьби національних ідей, які обирали або ж змінювали на переможливіші.

Багато авторів вказували на те, що до появи народовецького руху в Галичині особливо спричинилося поширення української художньої та історичної літератури з Наддніпрянщини⁷. Дослідник народовецького руху Віктор Петричівич зауважив, що поезії Тараса Шевченка, переписані та завчені напам'ять молодими народовцями, істотно змінили їхній словник та принесли у Галичину

Міжнародний конгрес україністів (Львів, 22–28 серпня 1993 р.): Доповіді і повідомлення. Історія, част. 1 (Львів, 1994), 199–208.

Henryk Wereszycki, «The Poles as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor», *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, част. 2 (1967): 295.

Andrzej Walicki, «Polska, Rosja i Stany Zjednoczone w koncepcjach Adama Gurowskiego», в його кн. *Міędzy filozofią, religią i polityką: Studia o myśli polskiejepoki romantyzmu* (Варшава: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983), 157.

Ярослав Гординський, *До історії культурного й політичного життя в Галичині у 60-тих р. XIX ст.* (Львів: Наукове товариство ім. Шевченка, 1917), 40–43; Кирило Студинський, *До історії взаємин Галичини з Україною в рр. 1860–1873», Україна*, 1928, кн. 2: 6–24.

цілий ряд нових понять і термінів: “переписка громадян [членів народовецьких гуртків] переповнена словами і цілими рядками вибраними з «Кобзаря», деякі з них приймалися як сталі терміни і звороти в студентській мові.... Многі ученики учились на память «Кобзаря», щоби придбати собі знане української мови, щоби з него присвоїти собі *coriam verborum* [багатство слів].... Слова: правда, воля, слово і завіт Тараса найчастійше являють ся в привітах, і ними молодіж найбільше захоплювалась”⁸. Чимало народовців згодом стверджували, що саме під впливом поезій Тараса Шевченка та творів інших наддніпрянців вони усвідомили себе частиною української нації. Для декого нова національна самоідентифікація визначалася народницьким соціальним світоглядом українських авторів, відповідно до якого культура простого народу мала стати основою для розвитку високої культури, і саме народ розглядався основною дійовою особою історії. Проте найбільше захоплення викликали романтичні твори про козацьке минуле, внаслідок чого Шевченків поетичний простір з Дніпром степами і могилами ставав національним простором і галицьких русинів українців. Як вказують студії Григорія Грабовича, поезії Т. Шевченка, як також і раніші твори польських романтиків-“козакофілів” на козацьку тематику, були чимось більшим, ніж художньою розробкою історичної теми. Вони писалися як “свята правда” про козацьку минувшину, надавали козацтву універсальної ваги, поєднуючи минуле і сучасне, вияснюючи навколишню реальність. Як кожна мітична структура, міт козацтва міг ставати основою для самоідентифікації читачів, викликати зміну цінностей і поведінки⁹. І справді, радикальний переворот у свідомості сприймався багатьма народовцями як здобуття нової ідентичності – вступаючи до громад, вони часто змінювали свої імена на такі що звучали на козацький лад¹⁰.

Один із найемоційніших ранніх народовців, вїйт самбірської гімназійної громади Володимир Стебельський (1847–91), вступивши до народовецької громади, також прийняв козацьке ім’я – “Богдан Гайдабура”. Так само, як більшість представників його покоління, він провів дитинство у польськомовному середовищі. На думку матері-польки, Володимирові “побаламутив голову Самбір, точніше навчання у Самбірській гімназії на початку 1860-х рр.”¹¹ Там появилася одна з найраніших народовецьких громад, що налічувала близько півтора десятка гімназистів¹². Вже у січні 1863 р. з нею листувалися на сторін

⁸ Віктор Петрикевич, *Історія культу Шевченка серед гімназійної молодіжи* (Пермишль: З друкарні греко-католицької Капітули, 1914), xxxii, xxxiv, xl. Тут і далі правопозначених текстів частково осучаснених.

⁹ George G. Grabowicz, «The History and Myth of the Cossack Ukraine in Polish and Russian Romantic Literature» (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1975), 183; idem, «Three Perspectives of the Cossack Past: Gogol, Ševčenko, Kuliš», *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5, № 2 (1981): 171–94.

¹⁰ Про діяльність перших народовецьких громад у Галичині в 1860-х рр., див. мою розвідку «Громади ранніх народовців у Східній Галичині (60-і роки XIX століття)», *Україна: Культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність* (Львів), вип. 9 (2001): Ювілейна збірка на пошану Феодосія Стеблія, 378–92.

¹¹ Більшість біографічних даних про Стебельського почерпнуті зі студії Юліяна Чаківського, *Володимир Стебельський: Життєпис і характеристика* (Львів, 1905).

¹² Про народовецьку громаду у Самборі див. мою розвідку «Громади ранніх народовців» 382.

ах преси львівські народовці¹³. Війтом громади став Стебельський. Досить овно збереглося його листування з провідником громадівського руху Данилом анячкевичем за 1863–66 рр., сповнене майже інтимних зізнань про пошук ласного “я” і ставлення до української культури та ідеї. На основі цих листів львівський історик Юліан Чайківський на початку XX ст. написав цікаву розідку про ідейно-національні хитання Стебельського. На жаль, дослідник поясював їх виключно особистими прикметами – “м’яккістю, гнучкістю та подативістю” – його натури, “нерозумінням і незнанням” творів Т. Шевченка, поверховістю” українофільських почувань тощо¹⁴. (Оскільки йшлося про пояди зовсім молодого юнака, не дивно, що у поле аналізу вченого потрапили нацькі емоційні переживання, мрії та розчарування.) Але Чайківський не вернув уваги на загальні тенденції формування національної ідентичности іяців того часу. Насправді випадок Стебельського розкриває особливості саралізації національної ідеї ранніми народовцями.

У листах Стебельський зізнався, що “ще не поняв повно і досконало велиого духа України. Бо й як? Прочитавши лиш кілька книжок Українських ільш не було”, – але нам видається, що це були типові для галицької молоді очуття національних “неофітів”. Він постійно наголошував на тому, що лише едавно пізнав глибину “української ідеї.” Перед тим він головним чином пеймався “мглавими теоріями німецької школи”, “снами метафізичними імців”, що навіювали “грубо містичні мрії”, зокрема творами Канта і Фіхте, а кож романтичними поезіями Байрона і Шіллера, образами Французької еволюції доби Робсп’єра, Дантона і Марата. (Тут слід зауважити, що твори анта, Фіхте та французьких філософів мали особливе значення для формування деї колективної свободи та народнього суверенітету, а отже, як відзначав ританський дослідник Антоні Смит, були своєрідною предтечею доктрини зропейського націоналізму¹⁵).

Під впливом українських книг – творів Шевченка, Г. Квітки-Основ’яненка, арка Вовчка, томів “Основи” – Стебельський відцурався попередньої “сфери зого духа”; а враження від Стороженкових оповідань витіснили переживання, викликані творами Байрона і Шіллера (сам самбірський народовецький йт не раз наголошував на тому, що задля України зрікся попередніх ідеалів: Україно моя! Велика славна подоптана Україно! Для тебе покинув я цілий лискучий світ, покинув ідеали сповиті гарячим духом, а хоч часами лиха мара ринесе душу мою передню ... я терплю, я борюсь для тебе, для Твого обра!”¹⁶).

Безпосереднім вчителем і радником Стебельського був провідник громадівського руху Д. Тянячкевич. Звіряючись йому з своїх вражень від “пізнання країни”, Стебельський вдавався до мови новонаверненого, протиставляючи деальну Україну” навколишнім невтішним обставинам: “Обняв я мою святу країну цілим жаром свого духа. окружив мученицьку її голову вінцем невяну-

Вечерниця, 1863, ч. 2 (10 січня): 16.

Чайківський, Володимир Стебельський.

Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), 94.

Львівська національна наукова бібліотека ім. В. Стефаника (далі – ЛННБ), відділ кописів, ф. 11, од. зб. 3789, арк. 1–13в.

чої слави; за святу мою Україну присяг я на тіні Тараса на могили козацькі і на ті мої До[в]бушеві гори – терпіти і співати!"; "недоволен світом, недоволен собою, я живу лиш в моїй ідеальній Україні, я живу лиш в Тобі, ясний мій Вчителю!"¹⁷ Натомість життя русинів у Самборі нагадувало "мерзенну непонятну картину".

У цій дуалістичній системі Стебельський бачив себе, цілком в дусі типових для XIX ст. романтичних уявлень, у ролі проповідника нового одкровення, відкинутого бездушним оточенням. "Старші одцурались святої нашої ідеї. Старші – а є їх громада – суть горячими агитаторами Московщини. Говори з яким попом, а він, учитель малоруського люду, стане ти поганити святі наші думки, стане говорити про «єдинство нераздельной Россіи»"; "я говорив побратимам за святую правду, говорив, кричав – як Іван на пуші – побратими обсміяли! Братіку! я говорив дівчині за правдиву поезію життя – вона не поняла! Серце моє! Я говорив родині про мої ідеали – вони загулюкали, заголомшили!"¹⁸ – скаржився він Тянячкевичу.

Конфлікт молодих народовців з навколишнім середовищем існував не лише в уяві Стебельського. Старші галицько-руські діячі, яких у Самборі очолював Михайло Качковський, занепокоєні політичною та культурною радикалізацією молоді (сприйняттям шевченківського наряду в літературі як вищого від власної галицько-руської традиції, використанням фонетичного правопису в народовецькому часописі "Мета", звинуваченнями на адресу "старої Руси" у прихованому москвофільстві) змінили своє прихильно-нейтральне ставлення до українофільства на негативне. Русофільсько-народовецьке розмежування серед руських освічених кіл у Галичині особливо поглибилося у зв'язку з польським Січнеvim повстанням 1863 р. Серед старорусинів та русофілів спочатку зросло побоювання щодо можливих територіально-політичних змін на користь поляків, а після поразки повстання поширилося захоплення Росією. З другого боку польський виступ актуалізував серед народовців питання боротьби за незалежність проти царизму. Львівські народовці налагодили контакти з польськими українськими "хлопоманами", а згодом і з польським Національним урядом. Однак уже сам факт контактів народовців з польськими колами, чутки про які поширювалися у Галичині, дискредитував українофілів в очах староруських русофільських кіл.

Істотне значення мало також поширення на теренах Габсбурзької монархії російської літератури та панславістських ідей. Зокрема, Слов'янське благодійне товариство, засноване в Москві у 1858 р., від середини 1860-х рр. зосередилося на співпраці з інтелігенцією слов'янських народів монархії Габсбургів та на боротьбі з польським рухом. В утвердженні проросійських настроїв визначальну роль відводилася впливові російської художньої літератури. У сферу діяльності товариства потрапили і галицькі русини. Вже від 1863 р. воно стало спонсорувати постачання російських книг у Галичину¹⁹.

¹⁷ Там само, ф. 1, од. зб. 560, арк. 40зв., 71зв.

¹⁸ Там само, арк. 52, 71зв.

¹⁹ Детальніше про різні канали фінансового та інтелектуального впливу російських панславістів на слов'янських діячів у Габсбурзькій монархії, зокрема на галицьких русинів 1860-х рр. див. мою розвідку «Епізод з історії поширення російських панславістських ідей».

Таким чином, ідилічний період гармонійного співжиття “молодої” і “старої” уся завершився у Самборі, й в цілому в Галичині, коло 1863 р. Ще у 1862 р. перший музично-декламаційний вечір, на якому декламувалися поезії Шевченка, також і Стебельського, відбувся за участю гімназійних професорів та урядовців помешканні Качковського. Але спроба самбірських громадівців провести декламаційний вечір на шевченківські роковини у 1864 р. наштотхнула на ідверту протидію та осуд того ж Качковського²⁰. На думку самбірських наодовців, саме він подав скаргу на “громадян” до намісництва, звідки до батька Стебельського, податкового урядника, надійшов лист з застереженням щодо оведінки сина. Батько заборонив Володимирові брати участь у будь-якій україофільській діяльності²¹.

Однак навряд чи ці непорозуміння могли відвернути Стебельського від країньської ідеї, за яку він деклярував готовність страждати (“готов й терпіти за вятую справу, за велику українську ідею” – писав він до інших самбірських ромадян саме у цей момент). Скоріше глибинне невдоволення викликало те, що ро нього забули та недооцінили, використовуючи для другорядних справ, наодовецькі провідники. Серед них поширювалися чутки про те, що Стебельський брав гроші від Качковського, що ображало молодого юнака. Розчарування недавніх наодовецьких товаришах виявилось сильнішим за віру в “святую країньську ідею”, і Стебельський врешті відрікся свого наставника – Д. Танячевича. В останньому листі з 1866 р. він усе ще деклярував вірність своїм “думам, ідеям та марам”²², але того ж року, вступивши у Львівський університет, рийняв пропозицію Богдана Дідицького, редактора львівської газети “Слово” та ітелектуального лідера “старої Руси”, стати редактором проросійського асопису “Боян.” Протягом 1867 р. цей часопис змагався з наодовецькою Правдою” за право бути головним органом галицько-руської молоді. Думки та очування Стебельського того часу концентрувалися навколо типових панслаістських концептів – ролі і значення слов’янської цивілізації та “інтриг” поляків. Ільше того, Стебельський швидко опинився у центрі публічного конфлікту з антелеймоном Кулішем²³.

На цьому ідейні пошуки Стебельського не завершилися. Протягом 1870-х рр. ін був активним діячем у русофільських студентських колах, публікував свої зори у львівському “Друзі”, й певний час був провідним поетом цього сереовища. У віршах з 1872–74 рр. він намагався поєднати патріотичні почуття

абсбурзькій монархії (1868 рік)», *Вісник Львівського університету: Серія історична*, вип. 7, ч. 2 (2002): 106–18.

ЛННБ, відділ рукописів, ф. 11, од. зб. 3789, арк. 33зв.

Там само, арк. 100, 100зв.

“О тямку за мене я не прошу, а теперь освідчаю желанне бути забутим. Не так обмежені лузда в мене, щоб не пізнати, куди річі йдуть. А що я те на устах, що в серци – кажу вам о-просту причину сеї вашої наглої химери. Ви думаете, що я перешуєний [Б.] Дідицьким то вашій теорії оже люде тростинами) і ставъ Кацапом. Думайте собі гаразд – на те ви льки вже видумали, а я собі проживатиму тихо, смирно, в собі заритий, с своїми мислями, еями, тай з марами своїми – вірний до скону їм!” (там само, арк. 116–16зв.).

Олесь Федорук, «Українсько-польські відносини у перцепції Пантелеймона Куліша (контекст галицького суспільно-літературного процесу 60-х рр. XIX ст.)», *Україна одерна*, ч. 8 (2003): 101–104.

одночасно до Галицької Руси, України і Росії²⁴, а у дописах до львівського “Слова” розмірковував у гамлетівському стилі – бути чи не бути “питання України”?²⁵ Як встановив Ю. Чайківський, після 1873 р. Стебельський вже не декларував себе русофілом: натомість з 1880-х рр. він вважав себе польським демократом та приятелем галицьких народовців. Переїхавши у 1886 р. до Варшави, наприкінці життя він брав участь у польському літературному русі²⁶.

Цікаво, що й національно-політичні переконання чільних галицьких русофілів, що у 1866 р. перетягнули Стебельського на свій бік, теж помітно мінялися впродовж тих років. Як правило, у ранній молодості (перед 1848 р.) чимало з них були під впливом польської культури та політичних ідей, а впродовж 1850–60-х рр. хиталися між українофільською та проросійською орієнтаціями. Перехід на панславистські позиції чільних діячів галицько-руського відродження диктувався побоюванням перед небезпекою польонізації. Перебуваючи на перехресті польських та російських національно-культурних впливів, українські діячі, зокрема галицькі, як правило, реагували зростання проросійських настроїв у період загострення польсько-українських конфліктів навпаки²⁷. Тому істотне зміцнення позицій польських кіл у другій половині 1860-х років, що внаслідок реформ в імперії Габсбургів здобули панівні політичні позиції у Галичині, зробило привабливішими російські панславистські ідеї та посилювало надії на втручання Російської імперії в польсько-руський конфлікт у Галичині, а також на створення у майбутньому великої слов'янської держави під проводом Росії²⁸.

Так політична ситуаційність стає фактором, що визначає національну ідентифікацію автора програмних заяв русофільського руху о. Івана Наумовича у 1860-х рр. Впродовж цього десятиліття він – принаймні у публічних деклараціях – постійно ставив свої дії, що могли б привести до конфесійної та національної конверсії у православного “великороса”, в залежність від вчинків опонентів польських кіл. З цього огляду цікаво порівняти риторику о. Наумовича, використану в статті “Погляд в будучність” (8 серпня 1866 року), що стала історичним маніфестом галицького русофільства, з іншими його публікаціями цього періоду. У цій відомій програмній статті о. Наумович аргументував потребу відвертись зізнатися у спорідненості з росіянами необхідністю захистити Галицьку Русь від загрози спольщення, позбутися залежності від політичного контексту і впливу польських політиків в Галичині²⁹. Раніше того ж року він пояснював власну зміну

²⁴ Ярослав Грицак, *Пророк у своїй вітчизні: Франко та його спільнота (1856–1886)* (Київ: «Критика», 2006), 123–24.

²⁵ *Слово*, 1871, ч.1 (14 січня): 1–2.

²⁶ Чайківський, *Володимир Стебельський*, 41.

²⁷ Ярослав Ісаєвич, «Українське національно-культурне відродження в ХІХ ст.: Передумови, контекст, значення», *Шашкевичіана* (Львів і Вінніпег), вип. 3 (2000): 18.

²⁸ Один із ранніх народовців, Теофіл Скобельський, так передавав міркування свого батька 1864 р.: “ми Русини не можемо нині сами утримати, є бо нас лишень 15 мільйонів, а ні панство з 15 мільйонами нічо не значит, ба й не даремно Ляхи убиваютьця о Polskę w stary granicach, є бо їх лишень 7 1/2 мільйона, а це панство à la Lichtenstein, отже нам треба федерації Славянської під покровом Москви” (ЛННБ, Відділ рукописів, фонд 1, од. зб. 56 арк. 92зв).

²⁹ Один іменем многих [І. Наумович], «Дописи. От Львова (Погляд в будучність)», *Слово*, 1866, ч. 59 (8 серпня [27 липня]): 1–2. Ця стаття найдокладніше проаналізована в кн. Іван

тавлення до національної ідеї мінливістю політичної ситуації в Галичині. За його словами, “малоруський діалект” міг би стати книжною мовою, бо “народ, отрий числить 15 міліонів осіб ... міг би витворити собі, при сприятливих обставинах, питому, від великоруської незалежну, літературу.” Зважаючи на поширеність на Наддніпрянщині великоруської мови, о. Наумович вважав, що малорусчина” могла формуватися лише в Галичині за сприяння поляків. Відмова ж польських депутатів Галицького сейму надати фінансову субсидію уському театрові начебто переконала його в тому, що для малорусів єдиним врятунок від польонізації – прилучення до високосвіченої, книжної, багатой осійської літератури³⁰. Як бачимо, переходи з одної національної спільноти в іншу пояснювались наявністю або відсутністю віри в її спроможність озвизуватися самостійно, а також безпосередньою політичною сусідніх сторін.

Неоднозначною у першій половині 60-х рр. XIX ст. була й позиція редактора “Слова” Б. Дідицького³¹. Відомо, що народовці винуватили його в свідомому москвощенні” галицько-руської мови, зокрема у поемах “Конюший” та “Отець гнатій” та в редактованих ним “Зорі Галицькій” та “Слові.” Сам. Дідицький годо м зізнавався, що вищевказані художні твори були написані під впливом М. Лермонтова та М. Гоголя з метою “всеможливого єднання малоруської бесіди з великоруською”³². З другого боку, парадоксальним чином, на початку 1860-х рр. Дідицький належав до активних поширювачів творів Т. Шевченка в Галичині та на Закарпатті, вміщував у “Слові” Шевченкові поезії та дописи про нього, та регулярно відвідував православні панахиди в річниці смерті поета³³. За редакції Дідицького “Слово” за перші п’ять років свого існування (1861–65 рр.) опублікувало декілька декларацій, в яких було відмежовувано українців-малоросіян від росіян-великоросів. Кирило Студинський вважав, що “в душі Дідицького відчувалася в літах 1861–65 велика переміна. Із колишнього ‘об’єдинителя’ вистав новий чоловік, прихильний до українства та його розвитку”³⁴. Щоправда, у спогадах, написаних наприкінці життя, Дідицький приписував Т. Шевченкові та Маркові Вовчок намір створення такої літератури і культури, яка була б зрозуміла як українцям, так і росіянам, і становила їхнє спільне надбання³⁵. Він вважав, що твори українських письменників найефективніше відчували галичан від польської манери наголошування слів та віршування, а отже

Павла Химки (John-Paul Himka), *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867–1900* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 23–28.

Стаття повністю цитується в кн. Осипа А. Мончаловського *Життя и деятельность Івана Наумовича* (Львів: Політичне общество «Русская Рада», 1899), 65–67.

Про попередні трансформації його ідентичності, що відобразилися у прийнятті імені Богдан”, див.: Ярослав Грицак, «Руслан, Богдан і МIRON: три приклади конструювання ідентичності серед галицьких русино-українців», *Україна модерна*, ч. 8 (2003): 32–36.

“[В]сеозможного єдинення малорусской бесѣды съ великорусскою” (Богдан Дѣдицкий, *Воежитѣвѣвыи записки*, част. I [Львів, 1908], 33).

Іван Верхратський, «З перших літ народовців (1861–1866)», *Записки Наукового Товариства ім. Шевченка* 122 (1915): 82–83; Студинський, «До історії взаємин Галичини з країною», 16–23.

Студинський, «До історії взаємин Галичини з Україною», 23.

Дѣдицкий, *Своежитѣвѣвыи записки*, 45.

сприяли поширенню російського силабічного ладу (його він називав “чоловічим” і протиставляв “жіночому” – польському). Таким чином, і І. Котляревський і Т. Шевченко, на його думку, були “поневольними” перемитниками літературних багатств, створених “на Русі”³⁶. Таку панрусську спробу трактування української (“малоруської”) спадщини та культури можна насправді побачити в історичних працях та газетних публікаціях Дідицького кінця 1860-х рр. (зокрема, в його “Народній історії Руси”, опублікованій в трьох частинах у 1868–70 рр.³⁷). Однак можливо, зміни ідентичності Дідицького доречніше розглядати не як коливання між чітко окресленими українським та панрусським проєктами, а радше як постійне намагання переосмислити їхній зміст та визначити межі того, що їм об’єднувало.

Перехід на засади російського панславізму, зумовлений зміною балканських політичних сил в Габсбурзькій імперії та розчаруванням у політичних та культурних перспективах українського руху, став помітною тенденцією серед галицько-руських діячів того часу. Особливо шокуючою була зміна поглядів Ксенофонта Климковича (1835–81), автора основних програмних статей на родовецького спрямування, опублікованих в редактованому ним часописі “Мета” (1863–65)³⁸. Саме Климкович відіграв істотну роль у формуванні галицького варіанту української національної ідеї. Ідеї австрійського федералізму, висловлених на сторінках “Мети” у 1865 р., розширили попередню вимогу старорусинів щодо поділу Галичини за етнічним принципом і накреслили шлях утворення окремої української політичної одиниці в межах майбутньої “австрійської федерації”. Місія Австрії полягала у протистоянні російським панславістським впливам. Щоб стати альтернативним до Росії центром слов’янського життя, вона повинна була перетворитися у федерацію центральних європейських (як слов’янських, так і неслов’янських) народів, до складу якої перспективі мали увійти як окреме політичне утворення всі українські землі. Натомість створення федерації слов’ян на основі Російської імперії видавалося народовецьким публіцистам безперспективним, оскільки у ній не було б можливості забезпечити рівноправності націй. На думку Климковича, зовнішня політика Росії була скерована на захоплення Галичини та русифікацію усіх слов’ян, а отже політична місія українців полягала у боротьбі проти російських спроб підкорити та асимілювати слов’янські народи³⁹.

³⁶ Там само, с. 31. Ще у середині 1880-х рр. Филип Свистун стверджував, що русофіли мали б розумно скористатися популярністю поезій Т. Шевченка задля зближення з російською культурою: “украинизм же не отдаляет нас от великорусского міра; он противно приближает нас к духовной жизни Великой Руси” ([Ф. Свистун], *Чим єсть для нас Шевченко? Критичное розсужденіє* [Львів, 1885], 20).

³⁷ У цій популярній праці, що була по суті першим синтетичним викладом української історії в Галичині, Дідицький приділив найбільшу увагу козацькій добі. Заключна частина загалом була присвячена “могутньому гетьману російської України” Богданові Хмельницькому. Головний історичний подвиг гетьмана автор вбачав у прагненні об’єднати роз’єднані частини Руси.

³⁸ Про роль Климковича в українському суспільно-культурному житті Галичини, особливі його мовні погляди, див. Philipp Hofeneder, «Ksenofont Klymkovych und die zweite ukrainische Erneuerungsbewegung», *Studia Slavica* 54, № 1 (червень 2009): 77–97.

³⁹ Серєда. «Національна свідомість і політична програма раннях народовців», 199–214.

Після того, як у 1865 р. через фінансові проблеми “Мета” перестала виходити, Климович вимушено виїхав зі Львова на село. Весною 1867 р. він одружився й одразу після того переїхав у Відень⁴⁰, де несподівано став другим співредактором панславистського російськомовного часопису “Славянская Заря” (головним редактором був відомий русофільський журналіст Йосип Лівчак). Видання часопису було одним із наслідків Слов’янського з’їзду 1867 р. у Москві, зокрема зустрічі Лівчака з російським міністром освіти Д. А. Толстим. На ній було обговорено видання часопису для поширення російської мови серед слов’ян в абсбурзькій імперії. На думку міністра він мав стати дієвим засобом боротьби зокрема і проти галицьких українфільів. З фондів російського Міністерства народної освіти та з бюджету Царства Польського Лівчак отримав значні суми (1 000 гульденів і 1 000 рублів) на нове видання⁴¹. У програмі нового часопису бґрунтувалася потреба об’єднання габсбурзьких слов’ян російською мовою для досягнення спільних політичних завдань. Таким завданням було створення кремої від Росії “західно-слов’янської” держави під проводом династії абсбурґів⁴².

А вже у другому числі “Славянской Зари” з’явилась друком стаття Климовича під промовистим заголовком “Слѣдует ли быть малорусскому вопросу?” автор задекларував бажання, щоб “столь близки другъ другу племена славянкіе, соединились посредствомъ одного литературного органа и составили бы одну великую культурную націю.” У дусі російських панславистських засад знову для об’єднання габсбурзьких слов’ян він вбачав у російській літературній мові. Ті ж слов’яни, що свідомо прагнули подальшого роздроблення слов’янства (зокрема й українські діячі), на думку автора, лише шкодили власним інтересам⁴³.

Сучасники Климовича висловлювали переконання, що при зміні його поглядів першочергову роль зіграли матеріальні чинники, а в душі він зберігав вірність своїм попереднім ідеалам, “нѣгде не спроневьривъ ся своѣй народнѣй деи”⁴⁴. По суті підтверджуючи цю тезу, Анатоль Вахнянин, зокрема, згодом гадував про “тайні сходи́ни” українфільської молоді у Відні з Климовичем у 1867 р., на яких той “розкрив дійсні наміри Лівчака – recte Раєвського”⁴⁵.

Однак, мабуть, не слід і абсолютизувати значення російських фінансових убу́сидій. Звернення за підтримкою до російських панславистів було викликане

В. Гр. К., «Бл. п. Ксенофонт Климович (Шкіц біографічний)», *Зоря*, 1881, ч. 24 (27 грудня): 299–300.

Mieczysław Tanty, *Panślawizm, Carat, Polacy* (Варшава: Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970), 117; Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien*, 433.

Середа, «Епізод з історії поширення російських панславистських ідей», 111–14.

К. Г. Климович, «Слѣдует ли быть малорусскому вопросу?», *Славянская заря*, 1867, №. (13 [1] серпня), ас. 37–43.

Корнило Н. Устиянович, *М. Ф. Раєвскій и російській панславизмъ: Споминки зъ не-ожитого и передуманого* (Львів, 1884), 39. Про матеріальну допомогу о. М. Ф. Раєвського Климовичеві та видання “Слов’янської зорі” див. мою розвідку «Епізод з історії поширення російських панславистських ідей», 111–14.

Н. Вахнянин, «Спомини про заснованє “Січі”», в зб. «Січ»: *Альманах в память 40-ихъ годовъ основанія товариства “Січ” у Відні*, зібрали і видали Зенон Кузеля і Микола Байківський (Львів, 1908), 9–10.

розчаруванням у політичних перспективах австрославізму після укладення австро-угорського компромісу. На нашу думку, мають рацію ті дослідники, які шукають джерела панросійських тенденцій не в рублевих субсидіях, а радше інтелектуальних контактах, ідейному кліматі та політичному контексті тієї епохи. Климкович не був єдиним знайомим українофілом, що взяв участь у виданні “Славянської Зари.” Перше число вмістило лист Миколи Костомарова, який намагався інтерпретувати її програму на свій лад. Після невдалого замаху Каракозова на імператора Александра II в 1866 р. Костомаров панічно боявся репресій, тож не дивно, що він погодився написати до російського журналу “Відні”. Однак у ньому він критикував традиційний російський панславізм, підтримував ідею створення окремої слов’янської держави на захід від Росії. Новий панславістський проєкт міг приваблювати і Климковича можливістю тісної співпраці з іншими слов’янськими діячами в Габсбурзькій монархії та зміни дуалістичної системи, яка не влаштовувала практично жодне угруповання серед галицьких русинів.

Однак панславістський епізод в діяльності Климковича потривав лише до завершення видання “Славянської Зари” у травні 1868 р. Восени того року він повернувся в Галичину, а весною 1869 р. відновив контакти з галицькими народолюбцями, намагаючись повернутися до своїх давніших однодумців⁴⁶, і згодом брав активну участь у виданні народовецької газети “Основа” (1870–72). Але Климковичу вже не вдалося повернутися на позицію провідного народовецького публіциста, а його образ відступника від української ідеї, нехай тимчасового, набув своєрідного трагічно-лиховісного відтінку в очах сучасників. Пантелеймон Куліш називав його в 1868 р. “падшим ангелом”, а Іван Франко згодом зауважив, що на ньому назавжди залишилося “тавро відступника від своїх принципів”⁴⁷.

Однак не усі траєкторії розвитку ідентичності у Галичині в 1860-х рр. вели до русофільства чи панславізму. Деякі були скеровані й в протилежному напрямі – до українофільства. Син відомого галицького українського поета Корнило Устиянович (1839–1903), сам – знайомий художник та письменник, пройшов цілий ряд етапів переходу від панславістської до української ідентичності, докладно описаних в його спогадах “М. Ф. Раєвській и російській панславизмъ” (1884). Ця еволюція є особливо цікавою ще й тим, що одночасно хоч і не синхронно, з ним хитався між різними концепціями власної “русскости” і його славнозвісний батько, приятель діячів “Руської трійці” та представник генерації руських патріотів 1848 р. – о. Микола Устиянович (1811–85).

Пошук о. Устияновича свого місця у спектрі національно-культурних орієнтацій тривав, по суті, до смерті. У роки шкільної юності він був учасником

⁴⁶ Анатоль Вахнянин, *Листи до Пантелеймона Куліша (1869 р.)* (Львів: К. Студинський, 1908), 95. Але повернення Климковича до народолюбів не пройшло гладко, оскільки ті довго не могли пробачити йому зраду. “Щоб ми Климковича або Стебельського прийняли у наше громадо – хорони насъ Боже!” – зарікався той же А. Вахнянин ще у січні 1869 р. Однак вже у лютому, обдумуючи плани заснування у Львові народовецької політичної газети, він змушений був визнати, що “у нас крімъ Климковича – maleum necessarium – не має такої [людей]; що жъ діяти ... Вінъ одинъ повівъ би діло те добре” (там само, 31, 41).

⁴⁷ Пантелеймон Куліш, *Листи до М. Д. Білозерського*, упор. Олесь Федорук (Львів і Нью-Йорк: М. П. Коць, 1997), 163; Іван Франко, «Українські народовці і радикали», в його *Зібранні творів у 50 томах*, т. 28 (Київ: Наукова думка 1980), 199–200.

ольських конспіративних угруповань, наприкінці 1830-х рр.; розчарувавшись щирості намірів польських революціонерів, він належав до кола “Руської рійниці”; а в час “Весни народів” він промовляв на Соборі руських учених у Львові (31 жовтня 1849 р.) про воскресіння “руської землі”, розташованої омід Вислоком, Доном і Бескидом, як серця “святої словянщини”⁴⁸. Натомість же у 1850-х рр. о. Устиянович всупереч старорусинам підтримував проекти азбучної” реформи 1859 р. (що було рівнозначним польонофільству), хоч на початку 1860-х років перейшов до русофілів. У своїй автобіографії причини станньої трансформації він пояснював по-різному: переконаністю у порідненості російської та руської книжних мов (що нібито з’явилася у нього де 1849 р.) та антируськими заявами польського політика Александра Дуніна-орковського у Сеймі в 1866 р. (можливо, йшлося про два етапи русофільства – ультурницький та політичний). Наприкінці життя, проживаючи на Буковині, Устиянович наблизився до народовців, але усе ж він залишався типовим уським “патріотом старої дати”, що, за влучним висловом Ярослава ординського, тішився кожним руським словом, не вникаючи у те, яке воно – авньо-книжне, українське чи російське. У вірші, написаному наприкінці тиття, він радив молодим людям обох напрямів (народовецького і усофільського) об’єднатися і спільно вклонитися як могилі Тараса на Україні, як і “златоверхій Москві”⁴⁹.

У своїх спогадах Корнило Устиянович не приховує того, що, навіть будучи алицько-руським патріотом у другому поколінні, він зазнав у дитинстві та юності значного впливу польської культури. У домі батька до 1860 р. розмовною овою переважно була польська, читалися здебільшого польські літературні ови, хоч о. М. Устиянович й намагався виховувати свою родину “в руськім атріотичном дусі”⁵⁰. Мабуть такі під впливом домашнього виховання К. стиянович, спільно з сином Маркіяна Шашкевича – Володимиром, спробував у 857/1858 навчальному році переконати своїх товаришів з львівської гімназії почати між собою говорити по руськи”, щоправда безуспішно. До того ж русь-ий патріотизм невеликого гуртка молоді був досить амбівалентним: хтось з його левів згодом виїхав до Росії, ще хтось зацікавився не народньою, а книжною овою⁵¹. Проте на початку 1860-х рр. просто почуватися русином було вже амало: тогочасне суспільне життя вимагало ясної національної ідеї і програми а майбутнє⁵². Потреба чіткої версії власної ідентичности відобразилися у апитанні 19-літнього Корнила, скерованому до батька у 1858 р.: “Скажіть мені, ату, що ми властиво є? Ми мислимо по німецьки, говоримо по польськи, а ишемо як? – по російськи!”⁵³

Цит. за кн. *Письменники Західної України 30–50-х років XIX ст.*, упор. І. Пільгук (Київ: Дніпро», 1965), 413–17.

Ярослав Гординський, «До біографії й характеристики Миколи Устияновича», *Записки адукового Товариства ім. Шевченка* 104 (1911): 83–122.

М. Ф. Устиянович, М. Ф. Раєвській и російській панславизм, 8.

К. Устиянович, «Руська мова серед молодіжі гімн. в 50-их роках», *Житє і слово* (Львів), 395, кн. 3: 468.

“[Я] був ще Русином – тільки без ясної ідеї, без надії на будуще и без програми” стиянович, М. Ф. Раєвській и російській панславизм, 15).

Там само, 11.

Згодом, з перспективи двадцяти років, Устиянович розглядав формування своєї ідентичності як процес боротьби ідей, почерпнутих головним чином літературних творів та інтелектуальних бесід – “ширша, висша, яснійша ідеї пожерла меншу, недоцвившу; я запалився до панрусизму ... я був готов їти хоти би і на хрест за свою ідею” (прикметно, що щодо національної ідеї засто совувались терміни з церковно-релігійної сфери). На його переконання, ідеї закоріненої в серці, можна було зректися лише під натиском “кращої, яснійшої спасеннішої ідеї”, а не якогось іншого, наприклад, матеріяльного, чинника.

Молодому К. Устияновичу найпереконливішими у першій половині 1860-років видавалися ідеї панрусизму та панславизму. І хоча він вважав, що зародок панславизму виніс з дому, політичні та культурні концепції, що сформував його ідентичність у першій половині 1860-х рр., він перейняв від кількох чільних громадсько-політичних діячів свого часу, а також під впливом отриманих від них творів Лермонтова, Пушкіна, Гоголя і Хом’якова⁵⁴. Устиянович відкидав значення фінансових субсидій для ширення панрусизму серед галичан, принаймні у цю добу⁵⁵. У 1858–63 рр., навчаючись у Відні, він не був поінформований про ранній народовецький рух, натомість належав до провідного осередку російського панславизму в Габсбурзькій монархії – віденського гуртка отця М. Ф. Раєвського. Згодом він так описав його у своїх спогадах: “що неділя було і що четверга, сходилися в його мешканню знакомі йому діячі славянські, а з ними і молодіж, що пробувала у Відні. Они толкували і спорили своїх народних ділах, а привітний, симпатичний і освічений господар прислухувався пишно всьому, лагодив спори і познакомлював всіх з Росцією і з передовими славянофілами, як Хомяков, Аксаков, Самарин, Погодин і інші. Хто там попав, почувся відразу членом великої славянської родини, а побачивши там часто всіх – не виключаючи і Поляків – під одною стріхою мусіло затулити за чимсь, чого може й ніколи не було, а забажати того, що Бог знає, чи коли й буде, – то єсть осущення ідеї всеславянства”⁵⁶.

Відданість Устияновича “ідеям Хомякова” підважував лише “голос Тараса Шевченка”. Досвід спілкування з ранніми народовцями привів до того, що ідеї панрусизму поступово поступалися у його свідомості “народній малоруській ідеї”. Однак цей процес затягнувся принаймні на десять років. Наприкінці 1860-х років Устиянович усе ще мав “поділене серце” між “юрцями” (тобто “святоюрцями”-старорусинами) та “українофілами”⁵⁷.

У той час він думав подібно до староруських консервативних кіл (й, зокрема, свого батька): “хто нам заручить, що за 100 літ буде? Наше діло ратувати руськість. Чи она буде московська, чи українська – аби руска”⁵⁸. Слов’янофілство давало займало чільне місце в його “ієрархії лояльностей.” Однак переосмислювалося

⁵⁴ “Відозвав ся до мене з поезій Хомякова такий патріотичний огняний дух всеславянський, кипіла в нім так горяча любов до всіх народів Слави ... віяло з них таким чарівним блиском, що они сталися відразу моїм євангелієм, а Хомяков ідеалом патріота, пророком всеславянства” (там само, 16).

⁵⁵ Там само, 19.

⁵⁶ Там само, 5–6.

⁵⁷ Там само, 39.

⁵⁸ Там само, 34.

місце Росії у слов'янському світі. Під час поїздки до Російській імперії Устиянович почав зауважувати "російський деспотизм", погорду росіян щодо інших слов'ян, і він став думати про загрозу, яку несе панрусизм до їхньої вободи. Як і народовці, Устиянович прийшов до віри у те, що існування окремого українського народу, як протидії до деспотизму росіян, є запорукою вободи майбутньої слов'янської федерації. Лектура творів Т. Шевченка, П. Гуліша, І. Нечуя-Левицького, Марка Вовчка та інших українських письменників привела до того, що він врешті "зненавидів ідею змосковщення нашого народа".

Перелом, внаслідок якого він "з москвофіля став ся горячим Українцем-народовцем", сам Устиянович відносив приблизно на кінець 1860-х рр. Восьмого рудня 1868 р. він узяв участь в установчих зборах народовецького товариства "Просвіта", на яких його було навіть обрано до виділу⁵⁹. Характерний спомин про цей епізод залишив Тит Ревакович: "Корнила Устияновича, котрий перед тим говорив: "Що то за мова? – Триста слів?" – Заревич і Ревакович пів жартом атягнули попід руки на салю, і він записав ся в члени "Просьвіти"... Потому був айщирійшим Українцем і опанувавши нашу мову так, як крім Франка ніхто у нас, сам переконався про її безмежне багатство"⁶⁰. А уже на початку 1870-х років Устиянович успішно виступав як декляматор на народовецьких шевченківських вечорах⁶¹. Як відомо, розквіт його творчої діяльності припав уже на пізніший період (80–90-і роки ХІХ ст.). Прикметно, що в очах сучасників він залишався скравим представником попередньої епохи, одним з "останніх могікан нашого романтизму"⁶².

Прикладів переосмислення своєї національної приналежності учасниками народовецького руху можна навести значно більше. Формування та подальші зміни національної ідентичності у перехідний період політичних трансформацій 60–70-х рр. ХІХ ст. були зумовлені як інтелектуальними впливами (зокрема, літературними художніми творами), так і політикою "сусідніх" угруповань (польського, російського панславівського). Саме в той час у підавстрійській Галичині значно посилюлися інтелектуальні та фінансові впливи як наддніпрянських українських діячів, так і російських панславівських кіл. Наприкінці десятиліття сутотно зміцніли позиції польських кіл, що внаслідок реформ в імперії Габсбургів добули панівні політичні позиції у Галичині.

Звісно, переходи з одного табору в інший тривали й надалі. Проте від 1880-х р. вони відіграють менш помітну роль у громадському житті, стаючи радше виявом змін з правила⁶³. На нашу думку, перехідним рубежем у формуванні но-

⁵⁹ «Справозданне з перших загальних зборів товариства "Просвіта" (Львів 26 Падоліста)», *Правда*, 1868, ч. 44: 28.

⁶⁰ О. Назарук і О. Охримович, «Хроніка руху української академічної молодіжї у Львові (На підставі споминів Тита Реваковича)», у зб. «Січ»: *Альманах*, 395.

⁶¹ Похвальні відгуки про деклямації К. Устияновича див. в газ. *Правда*, 1870, ч. 3: 144–45; і ж. *Основа*, 1871, ч. 28 (21 квітня): 218.

⁶² Богдан Лепкий, «Іван Франко», в зб. *Спогади про Івана Франка*, упор. М. І. Гнатюк (Львів: «Каменяр», 1997), 239.

⁶³ Історик Богдан Янишин відзначає, що у цей період "майже повністю припинилися політичні (а в тогочасних відносинах – і національні) міграції з одного табору в інший, що було значною мірою характерним для політичного життя галицьких українців у попередні десятиліття" (його ж «Народовці на рубежі 70–80-х рр. ХІХ ст.: Творення нової моделі політичної культури», *Український історичний журнал*, 2001, № 6: 93).

вочасних національних ідентичностей став процес формування національних інституцій, під якими (відповідно до конструктивістської теорії Петера Бергера Томаса Лукманна) можемо розуміти й різного роду громадські товариства, взагалі будь-які сталі суспільно-культурні практики, співучасть у яких свідчил про приналежність до певної нації⁶⁴. Наприклад, щорічне проведення “Шевченківських вечерниць” стає узвичаєною практикою громадського життя Львова, а тоді й менших міст Галичини у 70-х рр. XIX ст. Також важливо, що у 1860–70-х рр. зазнає докорінних змін система шкільної освіти, яка ще на початку 60-х рр. XIX ст. сприймалася як така, що приглушувала у школярів національні почуття⁶⁵. Наприкінці десятиліття вона й надалі формує лояльних підданих імперії, але інкорпорує чимало національних елементів. Відтоді молоді галицькі українці вивчають на гімназійній лаві українські літературні твори та відомості про історію та географію України як частину обов’язкової шкільної програми. Зокрема, у гімназійні “руські читанки” (хрестоматії) за редакцією Олексія Таронського (1868) та особливо Олександра Барвінського і Омеляна Партицького (1871) були включені твори Т. Шевченка та інших наддніпрянських письменників XIX ст.⁶⁶ Також у 1870-х рр. у шкільних бібліотеках появились українські художні книги. З другої половини цього десятиліття учні галицьких гімназій почали писати іспити з літератури на теми, пов’язані з творчістю Т. Шевченка⁶⁷. Безумовно, важливе значення мало й те, що у першій половині 1870-х рр. Товариство “Просвіта” зайнялося виданням українських підручників для початкових шкіл (за цей час було видано 22 підручники загальним тиражем понад 1 тисячу примірників). Згодом ці функції перейняли Товариство ім. Шевченка та “Руське Педагогічне Товариство”⁶⁸. Отже, перше покоління галицько-українських діячів, яке систематично вивчало твори Т. Шевченка на гімназійній лаві, з’явилося власне наприкінці 1870-х рр.

Вироблення та посилення інституційних рамок співпадало з кодифікацією різних версій національної культури (створенням відповідних словників та граматик, “заповненням” новими творами усіх літературних жанрів, вироблення власних “національних” стилів тощо). Для поколінь, що сприймали національну культуру вже як “дану об’єктивну реальність”, національний світ, перефразовуючи Бергера і Лукманна, “здобуває сталість у свідомості; він стає реальним щораз потужніший спосіб і вже більше не може так просто змінюватися”⁶⁹. Засвоєння національних канонів культури в ранньому віці за допомогою ре

⁶⁴ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).

⁶⁵ Анатоль Вахнянин, згадуючи про навчання в гімназії у 1850-х роках, зазначав: “про історію Руси ми не мали ні найменшого поняття. В школі не згадувано про Русь, а історичного підручника не було ніякого.... Ми називали себе Русинами, обиджалися, коли б нас хтось звав Поляками, але поза тим були ми національним зером” (його ж *Спомини*, 23).


⁶⁶ Див. *Руска читанка для вищої гімназії*, составлена А.Торонськимъ, т. 3, част. 1 (Львів, 1868); *Руска читанка для вищої гімназії*, уложив А. Барвінський, част. 2–3 (Львів, 1871); *Руска читанка для нижніх клас середніх шкіл*, част. 2, уложив О. Партицький, (Львів, 1871).

⁶⁷ В. Петрикевич. *Історія культу Шевченка*. Іх.

⁶⁸ А. Середяк. «Діяльність товариства “Просвіта” в 1868–1914 рр.», в кн. *Нарис історії “Просвіти”* (Львів: «Просвіта», 1993), 25.

⁶⁹ Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 55–56.

ярних практик шкільної освіти, а також постійна участь у цілій системі національних інституцій вели до того, що змінні й часто ситуаційні національні ідентифікації поступово набували характеру стійких ідентичностей.



Bukovyna: A Border Region with a Fluctuating Identity

Anatoliy Kruglashov

Debates about issues of national and regional identity have recently occupied a central place in the work of historians, political scientists, and sociologists. On the one hand, the growing interest in these issues and their pre-eminent position in contemporary academic discourse testify to their topical nature; on the other, this trend signifies a certain methodological lethargy in the theoretical and categorical apparatus used to research past and present ethno-national and ethno-political processes. Such investigations have gained prominence in the context of the social and political transformations underway in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, they are a necessary component of the sustainable development of the nascent national states and democratic regimes that have risen on the new terrain. Ethno-political stability may be the final determinant of these societies' transformation into well-balanced and efficient democracies. However, the path of democratization has proven to be longer and more difficult than the advocates and masterminds of totalitarianism's collapse initially expected.

Relations among Ukraine's leading ethnic communities have drawn justified attention from scholars in that country and from their foreign colleagues, as well as from policy-makers and ordinary citizens.¹ The stability of the ethno-political situation within the country and decision-makers' well-elaborated measures aimed at promoting inter-ethnic harmony guarantee the advancement of democracy and serve as an important stimulus and prerequisite for the formation of a civil society in this post-Communist country. At the same time, the situation in this sphere of political relations is a litmus test for the alignment of the nation's political direction with the strategic goal of integration with European structures, as proclaimed by Ukrainian policy-makers and supported by a significant number of Ukrainian citizens. The European democratic standard of tolerance as the basic model for developing the Ukrainian political nation requires respect for the inter-ethnic dialogue that occurred over the last few centuries, as well as the scrupulous study of modern tendencies in this area. It is imperative to implement timely countermeasures against potential sources of inter-ethnic tension and, in the worst case, conflict between the country's

¹ See, for instance, V[iktor]. O. Kotyhorenko, *Etnichni protyrichchia i konflikty v suchasnyy Ukraini: Politolohichnyi kontsept* (Kyiv: Svitohliad, 2004); Raul Chilachava, ed., *Mizhnatsionalni vidnosyny i natsionalni menshyny v Ukraini: Stan i perspektivy* (Kyiv: Holovna spetsializovana redaktsiia literatury movamy natsionalnykh menshyn, 2004); Vladimir Kulik [Volodymyr Kulyk], "Natsionalizm v Ukraine: 1986 – 1996 roky," in *Natsionalizm v pozne- i postkommunisticheskoi Evrope*, 101–26, ed. Egbert Yan [Jahn] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010); and Ihor Burkut, *Rusynstvo: istoriia i suchasnist* (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2009).

leading ethnic communities. At the same time, Ukraine faces not only internal but also growing external challenges to its ethno-political stability as well as threats to its territorial integrity and statehood.

These challenges demand serious attention, particularly in the multi-ethnic region of Ukraine, that is, where ethnic Ukrainians have traditionally lived side by side with other ethnic groups. Chernivtsi Oblast is a case in point. Ukraine's smallest oblast, it is comprised of parts of two historical regions—Bukovyna and Bessarabia. These territories have never been ethnically homogeneous, though Ukrainians have long inhabited them, and they have "enjoyed" a historical destiny typical of East European lands—multiple changes in their territorial-administrative status. In the twentieth century alone Bukovyna and Bessarabia have been part of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, the Kingdom of Romania, and the Soviet Union. Their colonial status was reflected in the mentality of the local population. Bukovynians were repeatedly urged, if not forced, to change their political identity, civic allegiance, and attitude toward the dominant cultures.

Consequently Bukovyna has always been a very interesting example of an ever-changing value system whose identity has gradually developed into a mutable but relatively stable hierarchy. Its hierarchical structure has been comprised of the following components: ethno-cultural, social, religious, and others characterizing the region's inhabitants. As a result, over the last few centuries local self-perceptions and self-representations have engendered a regional identity and even the phenomenon of so-called Bukovynism.

In this article I offer a general picture of the multi-ethnic environment in Chernivtsi Oblast, summarize the historical experience of its formation, and focus on outstanding problems regarding the region's past that have been raised by contemporary scholars. First and foremost by historians and political scientists. The results of sociological surveys that academic staff of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Chernivtsi National University carried out in 2002–2003 and 2004 form the basis of my assessment of the oblast's current ethno-political situation, the identities of its inhabitants, and the region's identity.

The Bukovynian Phenomenon: The Origin of "Golden Age" Myths

Despite Bukovyna's unexpected historical turns, its inhabitants' experiences have led to rather stable traditions of ad hoc multiculturalism marked by a prevalent attitude of respect for the languages and customs of their compatriots with other ethnic roots, as well by an ability to sustain more than tolerant inter-ethnic relations in present-day Chernivtsi Oblast. It is noteworthy that such relations have been distinguished by a high degree of stability. Although the tensions and conflicts that occurred in the past between Bukovyna's largest ethnic communities should not be ignored, it is important to underline that these conflicts were, as a rule, more often than not artificially instigated by policy-makers and not by the local population. The period of Austrian rule in Bukovyna (1774–1918) should be acknowledged as the one that contributed most to the culture of ethnic and religious tolerance among the region's residents. Discussion of inter-ethnic relations there in the past is necessarily speculative, because historians have mostly ignored the ethnic dimension or, at best,

given only superficial accounts of it.² Archeological findings have produced similarly scanty results.³ Therefore our imagined journey into the tradition of Bukovynian multiculturalism and tolerance should begin at the time when this former periphery of the Ottoman Empire became part of the Habsburg Empire.

There is no need for a consensus of opinion regarding the Austrian period of the region's history. It suffices to say that during this period Bukovyna experienced significant progress in its economic, social, and cultural life.⁴ From the mid-nineteenth century, the city of Chernivtsi (German: Czernowitz) underwent a rapid development in its urban culture and communications network, which increasingly connected the region with central and western Europe⁵. On the whole, however, Chernivtsi, and Bukovyna in general, modernized and industrialized gradually, if not slowly. The establishment of Chernivtsi University in 1875 and later of a large theatre building heralded the city's further development, and this autonomous crownland capital gradually became a regional academic and cultural centre.⁶ The opening of various ethnic—Romanian, Polish, Jewish, German, and Ukrainian (the *narodnii dim*)—community halls in Chernivtsi emphasized the growing role and prestigious status of the city's ethnic communities.

These local achievements of the Habsburg era, which still impress, were offset by negative developments. Bukovyna was one of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's most impoverished and economically underdeveloped provinces and a cultural backwater, and this influenced relations between the local ethnic communities. The two largest ethnic groups in the Duchy of Bukovyna—the Ukrainians and the Romanians—constituted a pre-industrial, agrarian, patriarchal society whose social structure was truncated. However, the local Romanians were more advanced because they had a landed aristocracy consisting primarily of the descendants of medieval Moldavian boyars. This social stratum controlled Bukovyna's rich and influential Orthodox patriarchy with its see in Chernivtsi. The status and activities of the Romanian community there were greatly supported by the neighbouring Romanian kingdom, which cherished the dream of incorporating Bukovyna.

² See, for instance, Pavlo V. Mykhailyna, "Vysvitlennia istorii Pivnichnoi Bukovyny na korinkakh sloviano-moldavskykh litopysiv," *Arkhivy Ukrainy*, 1969, no. 4: 81–84; idem, "Vidomosti z istorii Pivnichnoi Bukovyny XV–pershoi polovyny XVII st. v moldavskykh litopysakh," in *Mynule i suchasne Pivnichnoi Bukovyny*, vyp. 1: 13–18, ed. I. I. Kompaniiets (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1972); V. M. Kurylo, *Pivnichna Bukovyna, ii mynule i suchasne* (Uzhhorod: Karpaty, 1969); and B. O. Tymoshchuk, *Pivnichna Bukovyna – zemlia slovianska* (Uzhhorod: Karpaty, 1969).

³ See Kurylo, *Pivnichna Bukovyna*; and Tymoshchuk, *Pivnichna Bukovyna*.

⁴ See M[ykhailo]. V. Nykyforak, *Derzhavnyi lad i pravo na Bukovyni v 1774–1918 rr.* (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2000).

⁵ For a detailed discussion, see my article "Chernivtsi: (Ne)porozuminnia mizh spadshchynoiu ta padkoiemtsiamy," in *Chernivtsi v konteksti urbanistychnykh protsesiv Tsentralnoi ta Skhidnoi Evropi*, 5–34, ed. Michael Dippelreiter and Serhii Osachuk (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2008).

⁶ See V. Bilyk et al, *Vitannia z Chernivtsiv* (Chernivtsi: Prut, 1994); S. S. Kostyshyn et al, eds., *Chernivetskyi universytet, 1875–1995: Storinky istorii* (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 1995), 5–72; and Tamara Marusyk, "Teatralne i muzyчне zhyttia Pivnichnoi Bukovyny (druha polovyna XIX–poch. XX st.)," in *Z istorichnoho mynuloho Bukovyny*, 137–47 (Chernivtsi: Chernivetskyi derzhavnyi universytet, 1996).

However, Bukovyna's two most numerous ethnic communities did not dominate the region's political and administrative structures, and even less so its financial and commercial life. The local imperial bureaucracy consisted mostly of ethnic Germans,⁷ but members of the rather small but active and well-educated local Polish community also occupied many administrative positions and served as mayors and members of the crownland's diet.⁸

During the second half of the nineteenth century the gradual advancements in local (particularly municipal) self-government and the liberal constitutional reforms in the Habsburg Empire introduced Bukovyna's inhabitants to the traditions of European liberal political culture, while competing for parliamentary representation and access to other elected and appointed positions necessitated reaching consensual decision among candidates representing various ethnic groups and social strata. These circumstances contributed to forging the regional elite's typically "Bukovynian" political qualities and a regional identity. The elite highly valued and even cultivated the art of political compromise through constant dialogue and co-operation instead of confrontation. Potential ethnic conflicts and divergent political or social interests were moderated by overlapping religious identities. For instance, most of the Romanians and Ukrainians who contested the official status of indigenous ethnic group and the collective rights associated with it were members of the Orthodox Church, while most of the region's ethnic Germans and Jews belonged to the German-speaking cultural community.⁹ The list of overlapping identities of the region's ethnic groups could be extended. Consequently Bukovynians were distinguished by their conspicuous regional identity while remaining loyal to the ruling imperial dynasty and cultivating a feeling of personal allegiance to the ruling monarch. These stabilizing factors dampened the escalation of ethnic confrontations, as did the influence of German "high" culture which played an integrative role and not merely dominated in the region.

At the turn of the twentieth century all of central Europe witnessed the rapid nationalization (nation building) within its various local ethnic communities, a rise in national awareness, and the development of discrete and, at times, bellicose national identities. But these tendencies did not essentially transform the patterns of co-operation among Bukovyna's ethnic groups. The region's residents often saw themselves as Bukovynians first, and only then as Ukrainians, Romanians, Jews, and so on. While they might be treated as archaic, these phenomena were unique at that time for the Danubian empire, which constantly sought a balance between the requests and demands of its ethnic groups and regional elites. The absence of a dominant ethnic group ensured ethno-political stability in Bukovyna, while the two numerically dominant groups—the Ukrainians and the Romanians—remained mostly outside the main site of

⁷ See Serhii Osachuk, *Nimtsi Bukovyny: Istoriia tovaryskoho rukhu (druha polovyna XIX pochatok XX st.)* (Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2002), 12–17.

⁸ See V. Strutynsky and Andrii Horuk, "Kulturno-prosvitnytska diialnist Bukovynskoi polonii druhii polovyni XIX–na pochatku XX st.," *Naukovyi visnyk Chernivets'koho universytetu: Istoriia politychni nauky, mizhnarodni vidnosyny*, 2002, 341–50; and Andrii Horuk, *Natsionalno-kulturni rukh poliakiv na Bukovyni (druha polovyna XIX st. – 1914)* (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005), 49–53.

⁹ See Alfred Ablaitinher [Ableitinger], *Natsionalni superechky na Bukovyni do 1914 roku: Yik spetsyfyka u konfliktakh natsionalnosti i Tsislaitanii. Mini-kosmos Bukovyny. Kulturni zdobutky rehionu* (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2006), 112.

inter-ethnic tensions in eastern Europe—the urban environment—or were marginalized there. Therefore ethno-political mobilization and conflictual situations were rather improbable; and owing to their unanimous Austrian state patriotism and personal loyalty to the emperor the political elites of the various ethnic communities did not play the role of “mobilizers”. The region’s ethnic-community leaders perceived the empire’s central authorities as a desirable and most powerful ally as well as a welcomed mediator in conflict situations. They appealed to their co-nationals mostly to confirm the importance of their position of loyal servants of the monarch and the empire.

The social roles that the leading ethnic communities played rarely resulted in clashes of interest or direct confrontation between the Ukrainians and the Romanians, the Germans and the Jews, and so on. However, this did not mean that fully peaceful coexistence characterized the region. “Clouds” of conflict were sometimes visible, but they did not gather over this territory overtly and did not lead to popular unrest and ethnic calamities. It is also noteworthy that the central authorities in Vienna and the local authorities in Chernivtsi highly valued the internal stability of this border region, which could at any time become a battlefield between competing imperial rulers (this indeed happened during the First World War).¹⁰ These tendencies provided Austrian policy-makers with ample opportunities for learning lessons about political manoeuvring and ethno-political diplomacy via conducting negotiations with representatives of the region’s diverse ethnic groups and religious communities. Such negotiations touched upon a wide spectrum of problems, unanimous solutions to which were hardly ever achieved. A commonly known fact is testimony to the socio-linguistic tendencies of those days: both average Bukovynians and local policy-makers could freely communicate in four or five major regional languages—German, Ukrainian, Romanian, Polish, and Yiddish. Such historical “invariables” of relative peace and the slow development of an “East Tirol” helped to create a Bukovynian myth of a friendly, peaceful, hospitable, multicultural, somewhat patriarchal and peripheral land that was relatively problem-free from the standpoint of the imperial authorities.

The cultivation of traditions of inter-ethnic balancing, the relative parity of interests in their regional hierarchy, and the local culture of communication and compromise embodied in the regional Bukovynian identity of the Habsburg era were jettisoned soon after this region and Bessarabia (which had developed under the quite different political, administrative, and socio-cultural conditions of tsarist rule since 1812) were annexed by Romania in 1918.¹¹ This “great reunion,” which remains not only a Romanian national holiday but also a national ideal for a sizeable part of Romanian society, became first a drama and then a tragedy for the national minorities of the region. Since then, for the first time in the history of the region as a separate territory, there emerged a dominant nation that considered itself hegemonic and behaved accordingly. The leaders of this nation perceived this territory exclusively as part of Romanian history, culture, and national traditions.¹² During the interwar period official

¹⁰ See V[olodymyr]. Fisanov, “Bukovynske i halytske pytannia u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh periodu Pershoi svitvoi viiny,” *Visnyk Tsentru Bukovynoznavstva: Seriia istorychna* (Chernivtsi), vyp. 1 (1993): 143–52.

¹¹ See *Khotynu – 1000 rokiv: Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoï konferentsii, prysviachenoi 1000-lettiu Khotyna*, ed. V. M. Botushansky (Chernivtsi, 2000).

¹² Igor [Ihor] Burkut, “Istoricheskie etapy formirovaniia bukovinskoï polietnichnosti,” in his *Politychni protsesy: Istoriia, myf, realnist (pohliad z rehionu)*, 74–81 (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2005).

Bucharest perceived and treated regional ethnic communities at the very least as a suspicious and potentially dangerous factor of instability in poor and politically unstable Romania.

The Romanian authorities' elimination of the institutions and traditions of the Habsburg era was not limited to the liquidation of Bukovynian autonomy. From the early 1920s on efforts directed at the Romanianization of non-Romanians increased, which in turn increased dissatisfaction in almost all regional communities. Ion Nistor, the leading Romanian historian of the time and a later statesman, succinctly formulated the position of the new rulers: he claimed that the "reunion" of Bukovyna with Romania left no space for *homo bucovinensis*, but only for *civis Romaniae*.¹³ Inter-ethnic tensions increased considerably during and after the 1930s. Ethno-cultural contradictions were complemented—and aggravated—by discord over agricultural issues, control over local finance, and competition in the scarce labour market. Ethnic Romanians constantly demanded and received the more prestigious positions in the public service with the support of the national government. Campaigns directed at imposing Romanian traditions upon the local Ukrainian population were conducted with the consent of the central authorities, and Ukrainians reluctant to refuse their origin were discriminated against in a number of ways. Discriminatory measures also targeted the Jewish minority, which Romanian financiers and entrepreneurs viewed as a powerful and dangerous competitor.

Similarly, other regional communities could hardly boast of evident achievement in the interwar period. And yet, the main source of ethno-national instability in the region was the tensions between the Romanians and the Ukrainians, which constantly increased owing to the activities of both pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist guerrilla movements. In any case, these groupings represented a threat to Romania, and therefore local Ukrainians suffered from numerous constraints and repressive measures. It is worth noting that in their Romanianization efforts in Bukovyna both the central and local authorities successfully divided and conquered by neutralizing the usual anti-discriminatory solidarity of other ethnic groups. As a result, the region's local Romanians and Ukrainians supported official Romanian anti-Semitism to a certain degree, as did the indigenous Germans, who were increasingly influenced by Nazi ideology. Meanwhile anti-Ukrainian sentiments spread not only among Romanian chauvinists.

This has led me to conclude the regional pattern of the elite and mass culture and ethnic relations in the Habsburg era as neither absolutely solid nor self-sufficient. This culture—sometimes defined in the literature as the phenomenon of "Bukovynism" and a vivid example of a specific regional identity—was not capable of resisting the radical nationalism and chauvinism that spread throughout Europe in the interwar years.¹⁴ The competition for resources, better developmental prospects, land, capital, education, and spiritual influences all affected society in the previous period as well. The difference was that now politicians, bureaucrats, official Bucharest, and its local representatives fanned and cultivated these contradictions.

¹³ Cited in Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 49.

¹⁴ See Ihor Burkut, "Bukovyna u planakh Velykoi Rumunii," in *Bukovyna 1918–1940 na Zovnishni vplyvy ta vnutrishnii rozvytok*, 49–51, ed. Serhii Osachuk (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005).

After the Soviet invasion of northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia on 28 June 1940, those regions radically changed politically, economically, socially, and culturally. However, with the exception of official propaganda and punitive measures it is important yet very difficult to trace any kind of ethnic priority regarding the latter, the Soviet authorities did not manage to elaborate specific policy instruments with regard to regional ethnic communities. The very entry of the Red Army as stipulated by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is still a bone of contention among statesmen and historians in independent Ukraine and post-Ceausescu Romania who have tried to assess the events of 1940.¹⁵ (Their views are beyond the scope of this article.) It is noteworthy that the establishment of Soviet rule radically changed the ethnic and social situation in Bukovyna for the first time. The mass emigration of ethnic Germans ensued,¹⁶ as did the exodus of a sizeable number of members of the Bukovynian intelligentsia and representatives of the business elite, who were not pro-Soviet and were aware of realities in Stalin's Soviet Union. A previously unified region ceased to exist, and Chernivtsi Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR was formed in 1940. The remainder of this article will focus on this oblast.

The entry of the Romanian army into the territory of northern Bukovyna in 1941 negatively influenced the ethno-political situation there. The period of wartime Romanian occupation is, undoubtedly, the most dramatic page in the history of local ethnic relations: it was characterized by flagrantly chauvinist, terrorist policies, the instigation of civilian anti-Semitism with pogroms as its culmination, and later by acts of genocide against the Jewish population. The Ukrainian population of the region also suffered from repressive Romanian policies. The dictator Ion Antonescu and his entourage even envisioned measures for "cleansing" Bukovyna of ethnic Ukrainians.

It would be an overstatement to claim that the return of Soviet rule in 1944 brought desired peace and stability to the region's still multi-ethnic community. Local inhabitants who did not manage or did not want to leave their homeland with the retreating Romanian forces experienced the "peculiarities" of Stalin's regime—mass repressions, forced collectivization, violent campaigns against "bourgeois nationalism," and so on—to the utmost.¹⁷ It is noteworthy that the comprehensive and radical changes that occurred in the ethnic composition of Bukovyna during the first half of the twentieth century continued into the second half of the century. They resulted in irreparable deformations in regional identity and in the local population's perceptions of the "Other." As a consequence of the constant changes in the region's political status, the voluntary and forced migration of the population (as a side effect

For reflections about this event, see *28 chervnia 1940 roku: Pohliad cherez 60 rokiv. Materialy naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii, m. Chernivtsi, 29 chervnia 2000 roku*, ed. V. M. Botushansky (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2000).

V. Kholodnytsky, "Z istorii vzaemovidnosyn mizh radianskymy i nimetskymy predstavnykamy radiansko-nimetskii zmishanii komisii po evakuatsii bukovynskykh nimtsiv u Chernivtsiakh," *Naukovyi visnyk Chernivetskoho universytetu: Istorii, politychni nauky, mizhnarodni vidnosyny*, no. 123–24 (2002): 193–206.

Tamara Marusyk, *Zakhidnoukrainska humanitarna intelihentsiia: Realii zhyttia ta diialnosti* (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2002), 134, 141, 144–49; V. Kholodnytsky, "Z istorii pereselen i deportatsii na Bukovyni v 40-kh rokakh XX st.," in *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu*, vol. 8, 51–62, ed. Yuri Makar (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2001).

of those transformations) on the eve of the Second World War, and the evacuation of the overwhelming majority of Bukovynian Germans to the Third Reich in 1940.¹⁸

All ethnic communities inhabiting the region suffered tremendous social, demographic, and ethno-cultural losses as a result of the Holocaust (in the case of the Jews and Roma), exodus, mass repressions, and mass violence. Changes in the ethnic and sociocultural composition of the urban population were especially marked. It would not be an overstatement to claim that in the postwar period Bukovynian urban culture on the either side of the Soviet-Romanian border differed dramatically from the regional pattern of the pre-1918 era. In the post-Stalin period, local policies in the sphere of ethnic relations became more reserved and balanced. Soviet policy-makers were keen to show the advantages of "Lenin's national policy," "proletarian internationalism," and the "eternal friendship of nations" that had "blossomed" in the USSR. On the one hand, phony attention was paid to the Ukrainian population through the formal Ukrainianization of educational and cultural institutions. On the other hand, the activities of educational institutions and the mass media took into account, to some extent, the linguistic and cultural needs of local communities, including the Romanian and Moldovan community, mostly in the countryside. The aforementioned policies were aimed at demonstrating harmonious ethnic relations. However, there were actually many unresolved ethnic problems.¹⁹ For instance, policy measures were directed at the Russification of local cultures and education, especially in the region's capital Chernivtsi. Unfortunately these measures and their consequences have not yet been the focus of much attention by contemporary Ukrainian researchers. This lack of interest is rather surprising. It testifies indirectly to the insufficient critical and scholarly assessment of this very important component of the Soviet legacy, and it confirms the endurance of the Soviet theoretical heritage: both average citizens and decision-makers still revere this legacy, which is often perceived as an exemplary solution to ethnic challenges. However, this tendency is hardly deserving of admiration.

Some problematic aspects of the postwar years in Chernivtsi Oblast merit further attention. During that period numerous anti-Semitic campaigns were launched concurrently with the first mass exodus of the Jewish population, which was actively facilitated by Soviet authorities and the KGB. Persons of Jewish origin were banned from certain occupations and professions and were discriminated against during enrolment procedures at some departments of Chernivtsi State University. Regional authorities also persecuted, at times quite harshly, members of the Ukrainian and Romanian intelligentsia suspected of harbouring the slightest measure of "nationalist sentiment." From time to time acts of closed-door or public chastisement of those suspected of anti-Soviet "deviations" were initiated. Illustrative of the period was also the notorious practice of "ratio equalization," which in the minds of the Soviet *nomenklatura* was supposed to ensure equitable representation in government and elected Party and Soviet bodies and meet all of the social, ethnic, and even gender needs of the population.

¹⁸ See Serhii Osachuk, "Sotsialna dynamika i politychni oriientsatsii nimtsiv Bukovyny 1918–1940 rr.," in *Bukovyna 1918–1940 rr.: Zovnishni vplyvy ta vnutrishnii rozvytok*, 116–18, ed. Serhii Osachuk (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2006).

¹⁹ See Ihor Burkut, "Istorychni ta etnichni osoblyvosti rehionu," in *Kurs Ukrainy na intebratsii do Evropeiskoho Soiuzu: Rehionalni vymiry hromadskoi pidtrymky*, 16–17, ed. Anatoliy Kruglashov (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2002).

To claim that ethnic relations in the USSR were harmonized in this way would be misleading. The postwar Soviet period was far from being devoid of manifestations of ethnic intolerance, and the traditional ethnic structure that existed in Bukovyna during the first half of the twentieth century was considerably deformed as a result of demographic changes and in- and out-migration artificially stimulated by the Soviet regime. Also, the urbanization of agricultural areas did not occur without ethno-cultural tensions. Suffice it to mention the wide circulation, if not cultivation, of many far from innocent ethnic "jokes" about Jews and Moldovans that still remain current in the region.

Nonetheless, despite these negative tendencies the Soviet period was marked by certain stability in ethnic relations, even if this goal was achieved through forceful means. The gradual but continually increase in intermarriage rates during that period a vital indicator of ethnic tolerance.

The various problems that were overlooked and even concealed became evident with the advent of Perestroika. That period of reform was marked by new ethno-political changes in Chernivtsi Oblast particularly a powerful cultural revival within the oblast's various ethnic communities. This revival not only brought about elation but also presented new, as well as forgotten, challenges requiring the development of skills in public politics, dialogue, and democratic forms of co-operation between policy-makers and the ethnic communities, as well as between the associations and organizations representing the latter. However, the rapid and at times not at all positive changes in Ukrainian society exacerbated the sensitive nature of inter-ethnic relations. Not only have feelings of pride for one's nation and its past been manifested, but also previously suppressed ethnic phobias and even chauvinist attitudes when the desire to reclaim one's own rights is intermingled with the temptation to overlook similar claims on the part of other citizens.

Since 1991 ethnic relations in Chernivtsi Oblast have gained particular political significance. During the first years of post-Soviet independence, not only some decision-makers but also governing bodies in neighbouring Romania demanded that the current state borders with Ukraine be redrawn and laid claim to territories that were part of interwar Romania. As a result, relations between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Romanians in Chernivtsi Oblast deteriorated. Fortunately, however, despite attempts to establish a Romanian irredentist movement there, ethnic tensions in the oblast have not culminated in open confrontation. In addition, under the pressure of NATO and the European Union, Romanian decision-makers have tried to improve relations with Ukraine. Even though this process is still under way, this Romanian-Ukrainian détente has had a positive influence on ethnic relations in Chernivtsi oblast. During this difficult time, oblast authorities have tried to foster the revival of all of the oblast's ethnic communities and to respond favourably and respectfully to their needs, albeit haphazardly and irregularly.²⁰

Much is still left to be done in this regard, but Ukraine's legislative efforts and its aspirations to meet the Council of Europe's high standards have resulted in attempts to

See V. Kotik [Kotyk], "Natsionalnye menshinstva v ramkakh mezhdugosudarstvennykh otnoshenii Ukrainy, Respubliki Moldova i Rumynii," in *Ramochnaia konventsiiia o zashchite natsionalnykh menshinstv: Mekhanizmy realizatsii. Po materialam mezhdunarodnogo seminara, Ishineu, Komrat, Belts, 9-11 noiabria 1999 g.*, 116-27 (Chişinău, 2000).

solve the burning problems of ethnic politics through the application of fair legal procedures. Meanwhile both Romania and Moldova—and, more particularly, openly irredentist political forces in those countries calling for the revision of the current state borders—have been especially attentive to the ethno-political situation in Chernivtsi Oblast. Their influence has grown as a result of the ethno-demographic changes in the oblast. According to the published results of Ukraine's 2001 census, the oblast's Jewish population has almost entirely emigrated; there has been a downward trend in the number of residents who identified themselves as Russians before 1989; the ratio of ethnic Poles and ethnic Belarusians in the oblast has similarly diminished; while a sizeable percentage of those who previously declared themselves Moldovans have switched to identifying themselves as ethnic Romanians.²¹ Because of these considerable changes, the traditions of regional multiculturalism, which had been nurtured for centuries, and the peculiar informal system of checks and balances within the ethnic communities have been abandoned. This presents a certain challenge, if not a threat, to regional stability.

The problem of adopting Romanian identity by some part of the Moldovan population is not merely the result of successful propaganda regarding the twin notions of a united Romanian nation and *Romania Mare* among the local communities, although their influence cannot be denied. This trend may be explained by the improving social and economic conditions in Romania and as a side effect of that country becoming part of the EU in 2007 (it became a NATO member in 2004).²² Considering the unfortunate social and economic conditions in independent Ukraine, and particularly in Moldova, additional opportunities, such as obtaining a Romanian passport (even if this is obviously illegal according to Ukrainian legislation), have appealed to many Romanian-speaking residents of Chernivtsi Oblast. These and other measures that the neighbouring country has implemented towards its co-nationals in the oblast have raised questions to which adequate answers are yet to be found. These factors have exerted a negative influence on ethnic relations in the oblast and provoked oblast and even Ukraine's central authorities to adopt active measures aimed at preventing and resolving undesirable conflicts. Nevertheless, sporadic confrontations and an escalation of ethnic tensions are still evident. It is equally important to acknowledge northern Bukovyna's geopolitical peculiarity: now it is not only the Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan borderland, but also a Ukrainian region bordering on such powerful political structures as NATO and the EU. In addition, Chernivtsi Oblast has encountered various problems regarding its role and prospects within the framework of the Upper Proruroregion are problematic.²³

²¹ See V. Kaminska, ed., *Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia Chernivetskoï oblasti ta yoho movna oznaky* (za danyh Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2002 roku) (Chernivtsi: V. D. Liva, 2003), 4–8.

²² See Anatoliy Kruglashov, "Vid 'levropy natsii' do 'levropy rehioniv,'" *Polityka i chas*, 2003, no. 10: 69–78; and S. Mitriaeva, "Terytorialni pytannia ta etnicni chynnyky v protsesi druhykh khyvly rozshyrennia NATO: Rehionalnyi vymir" <www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/conf-march03/mitriaeva.htm>.

²³ See S. Gakman, "Stan mizhetnichnykh vzaiemyn na terytorii ievrorehionu 'Verkhniy Proruroregion': Dynamika, realii ta perspektyvy," in *Ievrorehiony: Potentsial mizhetnichnoi harmonizatsii. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats*, 180–90, ed. Anatoliy M. Kruglashov et al (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2004).

It is for these and other reasons that not only the achievements of ethnic dialogue and co-operation in the oblast should be highlighted, but also those latent, not easily observable challenges to amicable social and political life there. The latter pose a potential threat to the oblast's security and stability. If these dangers are continuously ignored and not addressed in an adequate and timely fashion, they may very soon become a scourge for Ukrainian policy-makers, and not only for them.

Biased, if Not Corrupt, Judges: A Reflection of Ethnic Relations in National Historiographies

Academic approaches to the history and modern condition of Bukovynian multi-ethnicity are an important instrument of forming well-balanced and efficient ethno-national policies at the oblast and national level. However, thorough analysis of the existing academic literature reveals numerous lacunae regarding the historical conditions for the formation of multi-ethnic tolerance in the oblast as well as challenges to its further positive development. Historical arguments aimed at tracing the roots of contemporary ethnic relations in the oblast do not always facilitate a better understanding of the processes underway, or the elaboration of effective national and regional policies.

Serious research of the phenomenon of this "Europe in miniature" or "East European Switzerland" reveals isolated archipelagos of scholarship and political journalism amidst an ocean of diverse national historiographies. One rarely encounters any commonalities therein. Thus, intellectuals have reproduced not one but several nationally oriented or at least ethnically coloured images of "Bukovyna," each of which is produced and consumed by different segments of the population. Some important tendencies are discernible in the ethno-national reconstruction of the region. The Ukrainian and Romanian historiographies of Bukovyna and, along with them, the histories of the various ethnic groups that have inhabited this region have played a crucial role in defining the intellectual climate and the formation of mass stereotypes and ethno-national myths, and have influenced the ideological positions of national leaders and decision-makers. Representatives of the two national historical schools have engaged in open "confrontations" and in tactical debates that, in their extreme form, have manifested themselves in radical and nationalist ways. Regarding the latter, on the Romanian side the latter position has been most vividly represented by the famous historian, professor, government minister, and rector of Chernivtsi University in interwar Romania, Ion Nistor (1876–1962)—the leading representative of the historiographic position that Bukovyna is a historical Romanian land and that its indigenous Ukrainians are immigrants or Slavicized Romanians.²⁴ Various interpretations of this "classical" model of the past can be found in monographs by contemporary Romanian researchers, who, even if they skirt the thesis that Bukovyna is exclusively Romanian, insist that the Romanians must have an exclusive status and special rights as the indigenous ethnos of Chernivtsi Oblast.²⁵

²⁴ Ion Nistor gradually developed this idea for his book *Românii și Rutenii în Bucovina: Studiu istoric și statistic* (Bucharest: Socec și B. Sfetea, 1915).

²⁵ A review of some of them is in O[leksandr]. Dobrzhansky, "Etnichniy sklad naselennia Bukovyny kintsia XVIII – pershoii polovyny XIX st. v suchasnyy istoriohrafii," in *Materialy IV*

Teachers in the oblast's Romanian-language schools similarly prefer the exclusivist approach to teaching the history of Bukovyna, based on the idea of the autochthonous character of the Romanian population. The inexhaustible well of Nistor's wisdom continues to be the source of political inspiration for the ideologues of the modern-day nationalist right wing in Romania, and first and foremost for the members of the nationalist-royalist party. The latter still cherish dreams about *Romania Mare* of 1918 which they would like to become reality in a new, united Europe(!).

The aggressive and sometimes arrogant stance on the part of the authors of this historiography and political tradition has engendered similar academic retorts from the Ukrainian side. Exemplary among them is Arkadii Zhukovsky's classic history of Bukovyna. He wrote this work in response to Ion Nistor and inverts the Romanian formula for writing the history of the region. In Zhukovsky's view, Ukrainian Bukovyna has continuously restrained Romanian aggressive tendencies toward Ukraine.²⁶

Zhukovsky's monograph is an important landmark of Ukrainian national historiography; it is highly polemical and critical of the prevailing views in mainstream Romanian historiography. In his book the reader may also find radical, partisan claims that reflect the intellectual and political climate of the 1930s and 1940s, during which the author's views and writing style were formed.

It is doubtful whether similar Romanian or Ukrainian monographs written at a time of aggressive ethnic confrontation and totalitarian and authoritarian experiments on European soil may serve as the starting point and theoretical basis for a tolerant and multicultural perception of Bukovyna's history. This can happen only if national leaders and often repugnant regimes view this history not only as a product but also—from a positive perspective—as the common achievement of many generations of the region's residents with various ethnic origins. The new generation of Ukrainian and Romanian historians are trying to find new forms and instruments of professional dialogue and compromise, and it has become ever more obvious that there is an urgent necessity for the elaboration of truly scholarly approaches to understanding the Ukrainian-Romanian past, with the focus on the "problem of Bessarabia and Bukovyna."²⁷

On the Ukrainian side, valuable research has been being pursued by such Chernivtsi scholars as Oleksandr Dobrzhansky, Ihor Burkut, Hanna Skoreiko, Serhii Osachuk, Serhii Hakman, Ihor Piddubny, Volodymyr Fisanov, and this author. Among Romanian researchers, the Suceava historians Ștefan Purici (a graduate of Chernivtsi Un-

Bukovynskoi istoriko-kraieznavchoii konferentsii, 367–73. ed. S. S. Kostyshyn et al (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2001).

²⁶ For Zhukovsky a burdensome and alienating factor in the history of Bukovyna was the influx of Romanian settlers, who displaced the indigenous Ukrainian population and persistently tried to denationalize and oppress them. The struggle between these two groups was the cornerstone of the region's history. See Arkadii Zhukovsky, *Istoriia Bukovyny* (Chernivtsi: Chas, 1994), 195.

²⁷ See, for example, V. Boiechko, "Pivnichna Bukovyna i Prydunavia – spokovnichnyi teren Ukrainy," *Polityka i chas*, 1992, no. 5: 47–51 and no. 6: 66–71; P. Symonenko, *Vichnozhvyi hylk Ukrainy: Pivnichna Bukovyna i pivdenna Besarabiia* (Kyiv, 1992); O[kšana]. M. Pavliuk, ed., *Bukovyna: Vyznachni postati 1774–1918 rr. Biografichniy dovidnyk* (Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2000); Nicolae Ciachir, *Din istoria Bucovinei, 1775–1914* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1993); and I. Luceac, *Familia Hurmuzaki: Iste ideal si realizare* (Chernivtsi: Editura Alexander Cel Bu, 2000).

ersity) and his colleague Florin Pintescu deserve particular mention.²⁸ Since 2001 four triennial international academic conferences titled "Ukraine-Romania-Moldova: Historical, Political, and Cultural Relations"—the first such conferences in the entire history of Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan relations—have become an important step in fostering understanding between scholars of these neighbouring countries. The first of these conferences, held in Chernivtsi, in May 2001, brought out the long-standing communication difficulties between the scholars. At the same time, however, it facilitated the articulation of desired joint academic co-operation aimed at overcoming the legacy of national romanticism, radical nationalism, and the many falsifications issued during the Communist period. In pursuit of this goal, it was recommended that joint groups be formed to elaborate common conceptions and textbooks on Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan relations, the history of their common region, the integration of Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, and post-communist processes in those countries.²⁹

In September 2004, on my initiative, the second such conference was held in Chernivtsi³⁰ to continue the dialogue begun in 2001. The third triennial conference, held in September 2007, showed that this meeting was becoming a permanent forum in a broad range of issues in Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan relations.³¹ The fourth conference, held in September 2010, proved the vitality of this forum. Unfortunately, except for some positive changes in terms of closer scholarly communication at conferences, seminars, and symposia, no other forms of collaboration have arisen.

One of the most serious drawbacks has been the failure to implement, let alone gain support for, joint research projects and publication of academic and educational literature at the regional, let alone international, level (e.g., joint projects involving scholars at Chernivtsi, Suceava, and Iași universities, considering that these universities have signed official agreements on mutual co-operation and partnership). But the greatest challenge is that these efforts have not attracted the attention and support of key decision makers in the three countries. Ukrainian, Romanian and Moldovan scholars have been reluctant to abandon their traditional, or rather inertial, methodological approaches to the complicated and, at times, conflictual "grey zones" of the ethno-political history of Chernivtsi Oblast and the heritage of the past. Overcoming the domination of these approaches is yet to be achieved even at the level of the corresponding conceptual frames. Left for the future is the task of compiling a Ukrainian

²⁸ See Ștefan Purici, "Trecutul Bucovinei în viziunea istoriografiei ucrainene contemporane (1991–2002)," *Codrul Cosminului* (Suceava), 2002–2003, no. 8–9: 43–52; Daniel Hrenciuc, "Integrarea polonezilor din Bucovina în Regatul României Mari (1918–1923): Un studiu de caz," in *Omăgiu istoricului Raimund Friedrich Kaindl*, 83–90, (Chernivtsi, 2005); idem, *Din istoria polonezilor în Bucovina (1774–2002)* (Suceava: Uniunea Polonezilor din România, 2002); Florin Pintescu, "Bucovina – zonă de convergență etnică și spirituală," *Revista română de studii culturale* (Suceava), 2000, no. 1: 9–16; George Ostavi Ost, "Etnic și economic în Bucovina," *Suceava: Anuarul Muzeului Județean al Bucovinei* (Suceava) 24–25 (1998–99): 215–78; and Traian Poncea, "Bucovina istorică: Evoluție geopolitică și demografică," *Foaie națională* (Bucharest), 2010, no. 4: 5–36.

²⁹ *Ukraina-Rumuniia-Moldova: Istorychni, politychni ta kulturni aspekty vzaiemyn v konteksti chasnykh ievropeiskyykh protsesiv* (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2002).

³⁰ Ibid., vol. 2 (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2006).

³¹ Ibid., vol. 3 (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2009).

textbook on the history of Romania and Moldova; nor have scholars obtained financial support for their initiative to found an academic centre on European and regional studies in Chernivtsi that, among other areas of research, would also deal with ethnopolitical processes in contemporary Romania and Moldova.

This does not mean that historians belonging to the minority ethnic communities in Chernivtsi oblast have ignored the processes of regional mythology. Scholars of Jewish origin have been particularly prolific in this respect, and there are obvious grounds for that: it is impossible to imagine the nineteenth- and twentieth-century history of Bukovyna and Bessarabia without the Jewish population, which sometimes dominated and was the most active and organized among the ethnic communities there. Therefore close attention to this community's past is well justified, and a number of serious monographs have been produced as a result. At the same time, however, Jewish interpretations of the regions' histories and ethnic relations there have left a certain impression regarding their ethnocentric and, partly, even nationally exclusive perspective.³²

In many accounts by Jewish scholars, the other ethnic communities, their activities and their co-operation are represented mostly as background to the Jewish community or as a threat to its existence. However, such particularities do not represent a direct threat to ethnic stability in Chernivtsi oblast. It is evident that contemporary migratory and demographic trends are increasingly marginalizing this segment of the ethnopolitical and cultural spectrum of opinion in the oblast: as previously underlined, the size of the Jewish population has speedily and irreversibly diminished. Moreover, the opinion that Bukovyna and the city of Chernivtsi lost an important, if not essential, part of its legacy with the wartime genocide of the Jewish community and emigration of the survivors can now be found within the local non-Jewish population as well.

The Polish historiography of ethnic relations in Bukovyna is also of undeniable value. Despite the seemingly negligible ratio of ethnic Poles in the region's ethnic structure, region, their high intellectual and social status has fostered a "Polish discourse" about the history of Bukovyna. Kazimierz Feleszko's contributions to this discourse have been the most outstanding ones.³³ Polish historians of Bukovyna have tried to present a well-balanced version of its ethnic history.³⁴ But the German-language and particularly the Austrian historiography of Bukovyna and ethnic relations on its terrain also merit special mention.³⁵

³² See Albert Lichtblau and Michael John, *Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz: Two Divergent Examples of Jewish Communities in the Far East of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy* (1996) <www.ibiblio.org/yiddish/Tshernovits/Lichtblau/lichtblau.html>.

³³ Kazimierz Feleszko, Jerzy Molas, and Włodzimierz Strutyński, eds., *Bukowina: Blaski i cienie "Europy w miniaturze."* (Warsaw: Energeia, 1995); Kazimierz Feleszko, ed., *Bukowina po stronach dialogu*—(Sejny: Pogranicze, 1999); and idem, "Bukovyna – miniatura lewopola. Lehendy, metody diisnist," in *Materiały III międzynarodowej historyko-krajoznawczej naukowej konferencji, prysviachen 120-richchiiu zasnivannia Chernivetskoho universytetu, 29 veresnia–1 zhovtnia 1995 roku*, ed. Anatoliy Kruglashov (Chernivtsi: Chernivetskyi derzhavnyi universytet, 1995), 179–87.

³⁴ See also Zbigniew Kowalski et al. eds., *Bukowina: Tradycje i współczesność* (Piła: Chernivtsi and Suceava: Dom Polski, 2006).

³⁵ See Mariana Hausleitner, *Die Rumanisierung der Bukowina: Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Grossrumaniens, 1918–1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001); Hanno Hofbauer and Viorel Roman, *Bukowina, Bessarabien, Moldawien: Vergessenes Land zwischen*

Here, it is possible to discern two different schools of research. The Austrian school's members mainly study the Habsburg period of Bukovyna's history and often depict it as its "golden age" (there are grounds for such a view). The other school is represented by German émigrés from Bukovyna who settled in Bavaria after the second World War II and founded the Institute of Bukovynian Studies in Augsburg.³⁶

Although the seriousness and academic value of the findings of the best interpreters of the histories of Bukovyna's and Bessarabia's various ethnic groups cannot be denied, it must be noted that their efforts have been methodologically diverse, ideologically biased, and, most importantly, limited by their authors' ethnicity and ethnically determined perceptions. By relying on received tradition, these authors have become hostages in the fortresses that they enthusiastically erected, and these fortresses which have often been "besieged" by representatives of other ethnic and religious groups. The problem is not that certain scholars are nationalist or chauvinist, but that their views have been propagated and circulated among other members of their ethnic communities both in the region and elsewhere.

Writing an integrated, common version of the region's past that would focus on ethnic relations is still on the agenda. It is evident that this would have to be an international project or, even better, various projects. Logistically and financially complicated as it may seem, Ukrainian researchers should play an important and initiating role in this regard. Surely this would be possible in close communication and partnership with their Romanian and Moldovan counterparts and with the active intellectual and financial participation of European and transatlantic institutions (in Canada and the United States, first of all). Implementation of this project might be a difficult task, but it is achievable.

Such important geopolitical processes as the enlargement of NATO and the EU and Ukraine's aspirations to become part of "Europe" require the sustained development of regional borderlands. Implementing related large-scale research projects would not only have academic value, but also useful socio-political applications.

Current Ethnic Relations in Chernivtsi Oblast

Sociological surveys of the ethno-political situation in Chernivtsi Oblast were conducted in 2002, 2003, and 2009 under my direction by the Department of Political Science and Public Administration (previously Political Science and Sociology) of Chernivtsi National University in co-operation with the Chernivtsi Regional Centre for the Professional Development of Public Servants of the Chernivtsi Oblast State Administration.³⁷ A total of one thousand respondents living in the oblast's eleven raions or in the oblast capital city were interviewed. They comprised a representative sample in terms of age, gender, educational background, and ethnicity.

Österreich, Russland und der Türkei (Vienna: Promedia, 1997); Emanuel Turczynski, *Geschichte der Bukowina in der Neuzeit: Zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte einer mitteleuropäisch geprägten Landschaft* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993); and Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, *Czernowitzer Geschichten: Über eine städtische Kultur in Mittel(Ost)Europa* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003).

See Johannes Hampel and Otfried Kotsian, *Das Bukowina-Institut in Augsburg*, 2d ed. Augsburg: Das Bukowina-Institut, 1994).

I thank the centre's director, Mykola Yarmysty, for his assistance in implementing the first part of the project.

The survey's results revealed that peaceful relations among the various nationalities in Chernivtsi Oblast have been maintained up to the present day. The overwhelming majority of the respondents (69.7 per cent in 2002, 70.5 per cent in 2003, and 80.27 per cent in 2009) defined their attitude to representatives of other ethnic groups as positive. A much smaller percentage (13.0 in 2002, 14.5 in 2003) was neutral in this regard, and only 4.5 per cent in 2002 and 5.9 per cent in 2003 was negative. In 2009 16 per cent stated that inter-ethnic relations in the oblast were strained, but only 3.72 per cent assessed them as conflictual (the evaluation scale had been somewhat changed at that time).

Altogether up to 5 per cent of the oblast's population had a negative attitude toward representatives of ethnic-minority groups. On one hand, this figure does not seem alarming. On the other hand, however, sociometric analysis reveals that this group of negatively inclined respondents is overwhelmingly represented by ethnic Romanian or Moldovan residents and members of other ethnic minorities, while the ratio of such attitudes among the oblast's Ukrainians and Russians is considerably lower. Moreover, in 2003 the ratio of the Romanian or Moldovan population who were negative toward other ethnic groups doubled from what it was a year earlier. By 2009 this percentage was 14.91 per cent of all Moldovan and 16.02 of all Romanian respondents. The Romanian or Moldovan population and representatives of other ethnic minorities have exhibited the highest degree of ethnic prejudice towards the Ukrainian, Russian, and Jewish communities. A general overview of the surveys conducted in 2002 and 2003 indicates that the ratios of negative attitudes in Chernivtsi Oblast were the following.

- Ukrainians: up to 3 per cent toward Moldovans and up to 2 per cent toward Russians;
- Russians: 14 per cent toward Jews and up to 3 per cent toward Ukrainians, Romanians, and Moldovans;
- Romanians: 7 per cent toward Ukrainians, 5 per cent toward Russians, and 8 per cent toward other nationalities;
- Moldovans: 10 per cent toward Ukrainians, 7 per cent toward Russians, and 13 per cent toward Jews and other minorities;
- Jews: almost 10 per cent each toward Romanians and Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians;
- Other nationalities: 7 per cent toward Romanians and Moldovans.

In 2009 an amended measurement scale provided the results enumerated in table 1.

Table 1. Attitudes toward Other Ethnic Groups

| | How would you accept representatives of the ethnic groups listed? | | | | | | | | |
|------------|---|------------|-------------------|------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | No. of respondents | Percentage | As family members | As friends | As neighbours | As co-workers | As residents of Ukraine | As visitors to Ukraine | Would not allow to enter Ukraine |
| Jews | 758 | 93.81 | 11.74 | 20.32 | 8.97 | 5.28 | 20.05 | 22.43 | 11.21 |
| Moldovans | 759 | 93.94 | 16.21 | 22.27 | 15.28 | 5.93 | 17.79 | 17.52 | 5.01 |
| Germans | 762 | 94.31 | 12.47 | 18.50 | 9.06 | 7.87 | 16.67 | 28.35 | 7.09 |
| Poles | 766 | 94.80 | 13.71 | 21.02 | 11.88 | 4.83 | 16.84 | 28.46 | 3.26 |
| Russians | 784 | 97.03 | 24.62 | 25.51 | 10.33 | 6.12 | 15.05 | 14.03 | 4.34 |
| Romanians | 757 | 93.69 | 19.82 | 20.34 | 15.46 | 3.04 | 16.38 | 18.63 | 6.34 |
| Ukrainians | 797 | 98.64 | 75.66 | 10.79 | 3.01 | 1.25 | 6.52 | 1.88 | 0.88 |
| Roma | 786 | 97.28 | 5.22 | 4.20 | 3.94 | 1.15 | 19.34 | 21.50 | 44.66 |

Despite a climate of generally friendly ethnic relations in Chernivtsi Oblast, there have been tensions between certain ethnic communities, in particular between the Romanians and Moldovans on one side and the Jewish and other minorities on the other.

Special attention should be paid to the ethno-social needs of individuals of other ethnic minorities (e.g., Belarusians, Germans, Georgians) who have not lived compactly in the oblast. Of the respondents in this category, 83.3 per cent stated they occasionally experience negative attitudes from persons of other nationalities, and 66.7 per cent believe they have limited opportunities to achieve their personal goals.

In 2009 the Department of Political Science and Public Administration conducted a study of the most general indices of ethnic tensions in the oblast and the well-being of its residents. The data are reflected in table 2.

Table 2. Ethnic Tensions

| How often have you experienced negative attitudes because of your ethnic background? | No. of respondents | Percentage |
|--|--------------------|------------|
| Quite often | 16 | 1.98 |
| Often | 25 | 3.09 |
| Seldom | 51 | 6.31 |
| Quite seldom | 97 | 12.00 |
| Never | 619 | 76.61 |

It is unfortunate that socio-cultural, informal conflicts lead among the manifestations of ethnic tension. This fact points to lacunae in educational, cultural and information policies, which would prevent such phenomena. It is also curious that in 2003, as compared to 2002 (data of 2009 are not applicable in the case), a greater number of respondents pointed to the interference of neighbouring countries in ethnic relations in the oblast. Obviously, one may observe signs of cultural segregation between the Romanian and Ukrainian community in the oblast. It is evident that such feedback reflects respondents' perception of a clear and present danger of deteriorating stability in the oblast due to hostile activity by external actors.

And yet, it is not the external but internal factors that play a crucial role in forming the ethno-political situation in the oblast. The analysis of variables that influence ethnic relations in the oblast revealed an overwhelming impact of socio-economic factors as compared to political ones. For instance, 43.8 per cent of the respondents suggested that ethnic relations depend on living standards; 23.1 per cent stated they depend on political and civic associations. Thus, the unsatisfactory pace of post-communist transformations and the contradictory nature of reforming efforts nurture both social and ethno-political tension in society. Interviewing also disclosed increasing negative tendencies. Inequitable redistribution of the common wealth in Ukraine is oftentimes explained by deteriorating attitude to residents of other nationalities.

Over the recent years, the tendency of loosening civic allegiance, and, concomitantly, rising emigration aspirations, which may be inferred from responses to the question about respondents' preferred citizenship, has been observed. The majority of the respondents would, under propitious conditions, opt for the citizenship of other countries: Europe, the former USSR, the United States, Canada, Australia, and so on. Such sentiments dominate among ethnic Ukrainians and Russians (see table 3).

Table 3. Distribution of citizenship preferences in 2002 and 2003, in per cent

| | | Ukraine | A European country | The former USSR | Elsewhere |
|------------|------|---------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------|
| Ukrainians | 2002 | 49.0 | 36.9 | 9.0 | 5.4 |
| | 2003 | 50.1 | 35.9 | 6.7 | 7.5 |
| Russians | 2002 | 29.2 | 33.7 | 27.0 | 10.1 |
| | 2003 | 34.0 | 34.0 | 30.2 | 1.9 |
| Romanians | 2002 | 21.7 | 63.9 | 10.8 | 3.6 |
| | 2003 | 40.7 | 41.6 | 11.9 | 6.2 |
| Moldovans | 2002 | 17.7 | 51.2 | 25.2 | 6.1 |
| | 2003 | 33.3 | 52.4 | 9.5 | 4.8 |
| Jews | 2002 | 29.2 | 50.0 | 4.2 | 16.7 |
| | 2003 | 80.0 | 20.0 | NA | NA |
| Other | 2002 | 33.3 | 33.3 | NA | 33.3 |
| | 2003 | 50.0 | 37.5 | 12.5 | NA |

In coming years the ethno-political situation in Chernivtsi Oblast may deteriorate because of land claims by states bordering on the oblast. Recent events on the Ukrainian-Romanian border have highlighted existing problems. The number of respondents who emphasized the urgency of revising the border doubled from 8.4 per cent in 2002 to 17.0 per cent in 2003. Despite governmental efforts on both sides to resolve issues, this position is ubiquitous among the oblast's Romanian and Moldovan population, suggesting that anti-state, unfriendly sentiments proliferate among part of that population. This attitude has been exacerbated by the circulation of ideas about the "historical justice" of the existing borders both internally and externally. Such surveys were not repeated in 2009. But this indicator needs to be revisited, because the number of ethnic Moldovans in the oblast opting for border revision had increased threefold, from 11.5 per cent in 2002 to 38.1 per cent in 2003, and 2.5 times among ethnic Romanians, from 7.2 per cent in 2002 to 17.7 per cent in 2003. At the same time the number of ethnic Ukrainians favouring political irredentism similarly increased, from 7.4 per cent in 2002 to 16.1 per cent in 2003.

Conclusion

The multi-ethnic phenomenon of Bukovyna remains important for research as a successful example of the regional model of ethnic relations well grounded in a culture of tolerance and co-operation between major ethnic groups. The regional model of ethnic coexistence had been established in the Austrian period as a result of both internal and external factors favourable and complementary to a culture of ethnic tolerance. The interwar period of Romanian rule in Bukovyna started the process by which the structure and value system the regional society and authorities had elaborated before 1914 began crumbling.

The Soviet regime suppressed ethnic tensions, but they had accumulated and were subsequently revealed at the end of Gorbachev's Perestroika. In Chernivtsi Oblast the post-Soviet independent Ukraine has had to face a dissolving traditionally multi-ethnic community that is becoming more ethnically and culturally homogeneous and structurally simpler than it was during previous historical periods. All of the stages in the region's history have contributed to shaping a specific type of regional identity

there, combining and integrating competing or overlapping ethnic, religious, and social cleavages and identities. This Bukovynian identity has become flexible and ambiguous, and its carriers have tended to avoid sharp and confrontational manifestations of their cultural distinctions.

Preliminary analysis of the ethno-political situation in the Chernivtsi oblast has not revealed any flagrant, direct threats to ethnic stability. However, there are a number of challenges that may provoke ethnic confrontation and demand our attention.

1. The negative, periodically intensive interference of certain political and non-governmental organizations in ethnic relations in the oblast.
2. Low living standards, which have prompted large-scale emigration and occasionally engendered negative and aggressive socio-political sentiments and ethnic intolerance.
3. Relations of the oblast's ethnic Romanian and Moldovan inhabitants with their Jewish, Russian, and Ukrainian neighbours have been characterized by mistrust, alienation, and even open hostility.
4. Representatives of other nationalities that are under-represented in the region have exhibited high levels of dissatisfaction with their ethno-cultural prospects and the authorities' efforts at addressing these needs have been inadequate.
5. Very low levels of civic consciousness, national allegiance, and Ukrainian political identity, that is, of the bases for consolidating the titular nation and other ethnic communities in support of a democratic Ukrainian state.
6. The conspicuous popularity of revisionist ideas, particularly among the oblast's Romanian and Moldovan population, that threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.
7. The dissemination of intolerant and prejudiced attitudes by the Romanian and Ukrainian mass media, highlighting issues in a provocative manner and exploiting ethnic stereotypes of the "other," thereby exacerbating ethnic tensions in the oblast.
8. A lack of resources for academic analysis and permanent monitoring of the evolving ethno-political situation, and in their stead a Pandora's box of incompetent speculations and the repetition of popular prejudices and negative stereotypes.

Orthodox Clergy and the Jews in Kyiv Eparchy, 1860–1900*

Heather J. Coleman

In a sermon he gave in the spring of 1881, the priest of the village of Nova Hrebliia in Kyiv county described his incomprehension upon hearing about the pogroms that had recently engulfed the Southwestern Land. How, he asked, could such behaviour be directed at the Jews, whom he described as “our long-standing cohabitants [*dav-ishikh sozhitelei*].”¹ “Cohabitants” is an interesting, and indeed appropriate, term to have chosen: Jews and Ukrainians occupied Kyiv province (gubernia) like room-mates, familiar yet apart. One has but to think of the literature of the day: in Sholom Aleichem’s *Tevye’s Daughters*, relations with the local priest appear at once familiar, cordial, and suspicious; likewise, Jews figure prominently, but not intimately, in the lives of the characters in Ivan Nechui-Levytsky’s novel about clergy in Kyiv eparchy, *Starosvitski batiushky ta matushky* (Old World Priests and Their Wives, 1883).²

Kyiv eparchy was a diverse environment in the late imperial period, both in ethnic and religious terms. It was a borderland, a “contact zone” between Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and Russians.³ Like other borderlands, it was a place where new identities were forged and contested. The historiography of the region has tended to focus on a series of solitudes—Jewish, Polish, Ukrainian—rather than the relationships between these groups. What studies there are of the relations between Jews and their neighbours have, not surprisingly, centred on two issues: violence and conversion.⁴ But there has been little attention to the meanings each group attributed

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Grigorii Shimansky, “Pouchenie k poselianam po sluchaiu volnenii i bezporiadkov v Yugo-zadnom kraie,” *Kievskii eparkhialnyiia vedomosti* (hereafter *KEV*), 1881, no. 22: 5.

Sholom Aleichem, *Tevye’s Daughters*, trans. Frances Butwin (New York: Crown, 1949), 99–103; Ivan Nechui-Levytsky, *Starosvitski batiushky ta matushky* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1973), 127.

In 1897, just under eighty-four per cent of the population of Kyiv province (identical to Kyiv eparchy) was Orthodox, twelve per cent was Jewish, and three per cent was Roman Catholic. See Centralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy v Kyevi (hereafter TsDAK), f. 442, op. 702, s. 348, ark. 2–3. Regarding the term “contact zone,” see Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992), 4.

See, for example, John D. Klier, “Christians and Jews and the ‘Dialogue of Violence’ in Late Imperial Russia,” in *Religious Violence between Christians and Jews: Medieval Roots, Modern Perspectives*, ed. Anna Sapir Abulafia (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002), 157–70; idem, “Popular

to its relationship with its neighbours, and especially to the place of Jews in Ukrainians' self-understanding. Yet both national and confessional identities are, in fact, interdependent. As Helmut Walser Smith and Chris Clark have argued with respect to imperial Germany, we need a history that reaches across the invisible boundaries that divide the various religious groups—in this case, primarily Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Catholics—and explore how they affected one another, how confessional identities “thrive on mutual misunderstandings, how impossible it is to make sense of one confessional affiliation without reference to the others by which, or against which, it defines itself.”⁵

This article explores one important facet of this interaction, the relationship between Jews and the Orthodox clergy in Kyiv eparchy, focusing on the period from the 1860s to the turn of the century. These years saw the emancipation of the peasantry, the Polish Insurrection, rapid social and economic change, the development of the Ukrainian movement, intensified Russification and de-Polonization, and the first of a series of waves of anti-Jewish violence.⁶ Against this turbulent background, this article tells a story of conflict, but also of exchange, of commonalities, even of shared experience. Church archives and journals offer frequent, but tantalizingly fragmentary, references to the Jews—both to social proximity and relations, and to the significance of the Jews' presence for the work of the church in what was known as the Southwestern Land—consisting of Kyiv, Podillia, and Volhynia provinces—of the Russian Empire. Although priests did write for a range of secular periodicals, this study draws most of its evidence from the Kyiv-based church press, especially but not exclusively the eparchial gazette, *Kievskii eparkhialnyi vedomosti* (hereafter *KEV*), which was an important venue for the development of the local clergy's identity. It catalogues how dealings between the Orthodox clergy and the Jews manifest themselves in these sources with a view to exploring less the actual nature of these relations than how Orthodox priests talked about their Jewish neighbours and understood their relationship with them. For the Kyivan clergy, Jews made up but one component of the broader challenge of ministering in a multi-ethnic and religiously

Politics' and the Jewish Question in the Russian Empire, 1881–2,” *Jewish Historical Studies* 33 (1992): 175–85; Mikhail Agursky, “Ukrainian-Jewish Inter-marriages in Rural Areas of the Ukraine in the Nineteenth Century,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9, no. 1–2 (June 1985): 139–44; idem., “Conversions of Jews to Christianity in Russia,” *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 20, nos. 2–3 (1990): 69–84; Viktoriya Khiterer, “The October 1905 Pogrom in Kiev,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 22, no. 2 (1992): 21–37; Chaeran Freeze, “When Chava Left Home: Gender, Conversion, and the Jewish Family in Tsarist Russia,” *Polin.*, vol. 18, *Jewish Women in Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2005), 153–88; and Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 2d ed. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990). A recent exception is Natan M. Meir, “Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians in Kiev: Intergroup Relations in Late Imperial Associational Life,” *Slavic Review* 65, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 475–501.

⁵ Helmut Walser Smith and Chris Clark, “The Fate of Nathan,” in *Protestants, Catholics and Jews in Germany 1800–1914*, 3, 6–7, ed. Helmut Walser Smith (Oxford: Berg, 2001).

⁶ See Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996); and Daniel Beauvois, “Les russes et la ‘dépolonisation’ religieuse de l’Ukraine rive droite (1863–1914),” *Revue des études slaves* 70, no. 2 (1998): 443–67.

heterogeneous community. As they chronicled their encounters with the Jews, they also constructed an image of themselves and their peasant parishioners as inherently Orthodox, pious, and victimized by both Jews and Poles. In so doing, they revealed a highly ethnicized understanding of moral reform and pastoral work and contributed to an emerging, and still highly variegated, local patriotic populist rhetoric about the oppression of the Orthodox population of the Southwestern Land and the need for ethnic and religious “self-defence.”

So, what did cohabitation involve? By their very nature, archival and press sources are generated by conflict or at least a break from day-to-day relations; getting at a relationship of “long-time cohabitants”, at peaceful interaction, represents a challenge. Yet we certainly glimpse such dealings. For instance, an obituary for Archpriest Mykhailo Dashkevych, the long-time pastor of the Church of the Assumption in the county centre of Berdychiv, described his funeral in the first days of 1861, noting that “Many Catholics and Jews in great numbers participated in the procession to the grave.” Indeed, the eulogist emphasized the Orthodox pastor’s warm relations with the Jewish community, which dominated Berdychiv’s population. “The Jews,” he explained, “also felt a particular respect both for his sincere qualities as well as his knowledge of the holy Hebrew language. Without a doubt his philanthropy played a role here too, for his giving hand never turned away even from poor Jews.” Apparently Dashkevych had finished first in Hebrew at seminary and had retained a lifelong scholarly interest in the language.⁷ And this intellectual interest seems to have been translated into a broader affinity with his Jewish neighbours.

Another aspect of peaceful relations was the ritualized greeting of important visiting Orthodox clerics. In one of many examples, the newly appointed Metropolitan Platon (Gorodetsky) of Kyiv devoted the summer of 1883 to touring the towns and villages of the eparchy. Strikingly often, the local Jewish community formally greeted Platon with bread and salt. For instance, in the village of Moshny, Cherkasy county, when Platon emerged from the church, “He was met with bread and salt by a Jewish deputation, which expressed to the Right Reverend feelings of deep respect and thankfulness, and through him to the clergy, in particular the local priest, Father Lev Kramarenko, for defending the Jews during the recent pogrom.” The report continued: “Jewish boys and girls, just like the Christian [children], also kissed the blessing hand of the metropolitan, even the adult Jews imitated them, and the metropolitan blessed them by laying his hand on their heads.” Overall, it noted, “The Jewish communes brought bread and salt in many places; a multitude of Jews attended meetings with the metropolitan not only around the church, but in the actual church buildings.”⁸

On one level, there can be no doubt that such displays constituted part of a Jewish community strategy to be left alone. It would certainly be in the interest of Jews to

⁷ “Nekrolog,” *KEV*, 1861, no. 1: 34–36.

⁸ *Zamietki i izviestia o puteshestviiakh Ego Vysokopreosviashchenstva, Vysokopreosviashcheniishago Platona, mitropolita Kievskago i Galitskago dlia obozrieniia eparkhii v miesiatsakh iunie, iulie i avgustie* (Kyiv: Tipografiia G. T. Korchak-Novitskago, 1883), 26–27; see also 24, 30, 34, 37, 54, 62. For another example of Jews physically entering parish churches, see the case of the priest from the town of Smila, Cherkasy county, who was accused in 1905 of holding meetings of Christians and Jews in the local church: TsDIAK, f. 442, op. 855, spr. 440, ch.2 (1906), ark. 57.

take advantage of large public gatherings of Orthodox to emphasize that the church condemned violent pogroms and also to remind the church hierarchy of their professed religious tolerance.⁹ And, of course, two could play this game: during an 1894 tour of the eparchy by Metropolitan Ioannikii (Rudnev), the rabbi of Bohuslav presented bread and salt and gave a long speech thanking the Orthodox clergy for preventing pogroms through their influence on the people; the visiting metropolitan responded by agreeing that the clergy could only disapprove of anti-Jewish violence, but added that the Jewish leadership too needed to supervise its own "dark masses" to ensure that they did not do anything to arouse popular dislike.¹⁰ These accounts also reflect mutual knowledge that is referred to elsewhere. For instance, one convert remembered her first stirrings of attraction to Christianity while observing Metropolitan Arsenii (Moskvin, served 1860–76) blessing the peasant boys and giving them small crosses during a visit to Mezhyrich, Kaniv county, where she lived.¹¹

Indeed, accounts of baptisms of Jews also reveal a world of exchange across the divide. For example, an 1882 local report from Uman county in *KEV* described the recent baptism of the son of a local Jewish liquor trader in the village of Nerubaika, Uman county. Proximity with Christian communities, argued the priest who wrote the article, worked in favour of conversions. "The closeness of Jewish children to the surrounding Christian population in villages, especially to the children, public use of the sign of the cross by the population, of short Christian prayers, the visible ceremony of burial of the dead, and other visible particularities of Christian liturgy inspire the impressionable childish mind to renounce family, kinsfolk, dead Judaism," he claimed.¹²

But, as Metropolitan Ioannikii implied in his response to the rabbi's speech, there were tensions in the relationship of Jews with the Orthodox clergy and their parishioners as well, of course. Familiarity did not necessarily breed understanding or friendship. As the priest Kypriian Petrushevsky wrote in a description of the town of Katerynopil, Zvenyhorodka county, for the provincial gazette: "Who among the inhabitants of our region does not know, if not in all their details, the religion, morals, habits, [and] folkways of the Jews—those energetic, trading individuals convulsively clashing with other people's interests at every step, wherever they go."¹³ Not surprisingly, the main issues of contention centred on economic relations, space issues, and religious concerns, (especially conversions). And these three components were often inextricably intertwined.

⁹ See also, for example, the 5 September 1887 letter of congratulations from the Kyiv Jewish community to Metropolitan Arsenii on the sixtieth anniversary of his ordination (no title, Russian National Library, shelf mark 18.253.2.387); and V. M. Skvortsov, *Boguslavskoe obshchestvo trezvosti i borba so shtundoiu* (Kyiv: Tipografiia G. T. Korchak-Novitskago, 1895), 69.

¹⁰ Skvortsov, *Boguslavskoe obshchestvo*, 70.

¹¹ "Poviestvovanie Marii Leshchinskoi o svoei zhizni i ob obrashchenii iz iudeistva v khristianstvo," *KEV*, 1879, no. 25: 6.

¹² Fr. Viktor Iliashevich, "Iz Umanskago uezda (Korrespond. Kiev. Ep. Vied.)," *KEV*, 1882, no. 6: 110.

¹³ Fr. Kiprian Petrushevsky, "Miestechko Ekaterinopol (Kalniboloto tozh)," *Kievskii gubernskii vedomosti*, 1859, no. 6: 41. The rest of the article was ambivalent and even positive in its evaluation and revealed considerable mutual knowledge. Petrushevsky had been inside the synagogue, and he also pointed out that the Jews lived a decent, but not rich, life.

The clergy's interest in social and moral reform and in temperance in particular generated the all-too-familiar, nasty language of Jewish immorality and exploitation. This was combined with a parallel construction of the local Ukrainian peasantry as an oppressed moral counterweight. In 1860 Father Lev Kramarenko (whom we met earlier) of Moshny wrote to the new Kyiv-based journal aimed at enlivening pastoral work by the clergy, *Rukovodstvo dlia selskikh pastyrei* (Guidance for Village Pastors), to report on priests' efforts to promote sobriety in the eparchy. The principal challenge, as he portrayed it, was the struggle against the Jewish tax-farmers who had been spreading rumours among the peasants that if the government did not receive the taxes it required from vodka sales, it would not give them their promised freedom. But their efforts were in vain, according to Father Lev: "the unremitting activity of parish priests and the awakening moral force of the peasants themselves triumphed over all their unscrupulous fables."¹⁴ Narratives of struggle against the "Jewish tavern" recurred regularly.¹⁵ So did complaints about the deleterious moral and economic influence of the Jews, focused on moneylending and the control of markets.

Clergy believed that a pastoral response to these challenges would involve building up oppressed Orthodox communities as much as calling on the government for restrictive legislation. The novelist Ivan Nechui-Levytsky, remembering the devotion of his father, a priest in Kyiv eparchy in the mid nineteenth century, to Ukraine and its people in the face of alleged Polish, Russian, and Jewish domination, noted that "In order to tear away trade from the Jews, he erected a building using brotherhood money [*na bratski hroshi*] and planned to set up community shops" before his premature death.¹⁶ A generation later, although the balance of power in the region had surely been altered, these themes continued. A correspondent of *KEV* from Berdychiv declared in 1879 that "Jews populate our small towns and villages like locusts" and that in years of tough harvests peasants were forced to borrow money from these "parasites." The solution, the author asserted, would be for priests to pay more attention to their parishioners and offer them material as well as moral support. Indeed, they should model themselves on Father Vyshny of Berdychiv county, who had persuaded his parishioners to use the money received for liquor licenses to set up a credit union.¹⁷ Another priest renewed the theme of the peasants' oppression and essential moral strength in an account of an alleged resolution to move the market days in Ruzhyn, Skvyra county, from Sunday to a weekday. His hand seemed evident

¹⁴ Lev Kramarenko, "Izviestie o razprostraneniі trezvosti v Kievskoi gubernii," *Rukovodstvo dlia selskikh pastyrei*, 1860, no. 1: 27. On the Jews, taverns, and Orthodox temperance campaigns (and their interference with tax revenues) in the Pale of Settlement, see W. Arthur McKee, "Taming the Green Serpent: Alcoholism, Autocracy, and Russian Society, 1881–1914" (Ph.D. diss., University of California Berkeley, 1997), 70–77, 298–99.

¹⁵ See, for example: S., "K voprosu ob umenshenii pianstva v narodie," *KEV*, 1881, no. 45 (11 November): 10; and Fr. A. Vasilevsky, "Evreiskaia rasplata vodkoiu (Kor. 'Kiev. Ep. Vied.')." *KEV*, 1881, no. 49: 9.

¹⁶ "Zhyttiepyś Ivana Levytskoho (Nechuia), napysannyi nym samym," in *Sami pro sebe: Avtobiografii vydatnykh ukrainsiv XIX-ho stolittia*, ed. Yurii Lutsky [George S. N. Luckyj] (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1989), 230.

¹⁷ Pravoslavny [pseud.], "Iz Berdicheva," *KEV*, 1879, no. 46: 8. See also Russky [pseud.], "K evreiskomu voprosu," *KEV*, 1883, no. 7: 154.

in the text of the resolution, which stated that Sunday were a “sad historical monument to the mockery and moral violence upon us of the former Polish landowners and their helpers the Jews, which [the markets] it has long been high time to destroy.”¹⁸

Yet portrayals of the Jews in these discussions of moral and community reform remained ambivalent. Whether it was the 1860s or the 1880s, priests praised the Jews’ exemplary devotion to their Sabbath and religious holidays. The Ruzhyn priest, writing in 1883, had opened his article by noting that the Jews “piously respect the Sabbath.” During an 1862 discussion in *KEV* of the perennial issue of Sunday markets, one article bemoaned the fact that “Christian trade here has been brought to such a decline that without the Jews there can be no market.” Yet it went on to wonder why the peasants were so respectful of Jewish holidays, which closed down the bazaars, and not their own.¹⁹ Another contributor reported having told his parishioners about the observance of Sunday rest in England, and pointed out “the nearby example of the Jews’ honouring of their holidays” as a model.²⁰

A broader intertwining of religious, economic, and space concerns also appears in the recurring complaints about the making and selling of Christian religious wares. In 1883 Archpriest Miron Akimovich of Bohuslav, Kaniv county, reported to the metropolitan that in his town there were “about fifty shops with groceries and in almost every shop the Jews have and sell wax candles.... Bohuslav’s Trinity Church stands right in the bazaar, and people coming to church bring candles that they have bought from the Jews, and through the sale of Jewish candles the church loses its only income.”²¹ Back in the mid-1860s priests in Kyiv had expressed a similar but more particular concern when they alleged that the influx of (illegal) Jews into the central parts of the city was squeezing out Orthodox inhabitants and thus reducing the incomes of priests in certain parishes.²² Yet some priests apparently did not necessarily regard selling objects of religious significance to Jews as sacrilege. Indeed, in the early 1880s the metropolitan complained in his annual report that priests were selling antique church items that were not being used for services, such as chalices, altar cloths, icons, or crosses, like “useless, half-rotten rubbish” to Jewish traders. These items then found their way to Jewish-owned antique shops in Kyiv.²³

Competition over space had both religious and practical dimensions. Reports could combine noise complaints with evocation of moral threat. Thus, in 1857 Father Myron Akimovych complained to the metropolitan that “on a high spot, in close proximity to the newly built stone St. Paraskeva Church in the town of Bohuslav, the Jews have begun ... to build for themselves a huge school and synagogue with the

¹⁸ Fr. V. Radetsky, “K istorii peremeny iarmarki v m. Ruzhinie s prazdnichnykh dnei na budni,” *KEV*, 1883, no. 6: 132.

¹⁹ “Vopros o yarmarkakh v voskresnye i prazdnichnye dni,” *KEV*, 1862, no. 11: 388. See also “Ob yarmarkakh. (Do silskikh parafii),” *Osnova*, no. 6 (June 1861): 74–75.

²⁰ “Izviestii: Mnenie naroda o iarmarkakh v voskresnye i prazdnichnye dni,” *KEV*, 1862, no. 17: 591.

²¹ Quoted in Volodymyr Pererva, *Pravoslavne Nadrossia u XIX stolitti* (Bila Tserkva: Oleksandr Pshonkivsky, 2004), 169.

²² “O chisle postupaushchikh v Kievskii universitet iz dukhovnykh seminarii,” *KEV*, 1866, no. 3: 122.

²³ Quoted in Pererva, *Pravoslavne Nadrossia*, 167.

permission of the steward. The Jews say their prayers so loudly that the echo is carried through the entire town; since the new synagogue is being built not even seventy *sazhni* [150 metres] from the church, will this not serve as a distraction and a temptation for the praying Christians[?]"²⁴ Yet in another case, in 1864, a local Orthodox dean did not seem as concerned about the moral aspect as about space. When complaining about a proposal to build a new Jewish prayer house in the town of Bilylivka, Berdychiv county, in addition to the synagogue and school, which he judged to be enough for the number of Jews in town, he said: "It does not threaten to undermine Orthodoxy, but it will threaten the Orthodox Trinity Church with the danger of fire, for the crowding of Jewish houses is amazing."²⁵

One aspect of relations between Orthodox clergy and the Jews that has received more scholarly attention is conversion. Certainly archival files and occasional press articles about the cases of individual Jewish converts make up a substantial part of available evidence on relationships between the two groups. On the whole, however, an examination of these reports confirms the findings of John Klier and Hans Rogger that mission to the Jews was a low priority for the Orthodox Church and its parish clergy.²⁶

Two main narratives dominated clergy's accounts of conversions of Jews. The first and positive one recounted the story of baptisms in order to show the inherent Orthodoxy and good will of the peasantry; the other, darker tale portrayed the converts and clergy as victims of Jewish fanaticism.

A good example of both of these themes is a parish priests's account of the baptism of a young Jewish woman in the village church of Perehoniivka, Vasytkiv county, in March 1869. Indeed, the priest who performed the sacrament noted that "this event deserves, in our view, a few words in the press, all the more because here we find aspects that characterize the attitude of our Orthodox population to such circumstances."²⁷ The convert had worked from a very young age as a servant. According to the priest, people were drawn to her fine character, intelligence, and good heart. She told him that since childhood she had sought "something higher and better than the Jewish life and religion." Villagers responded to her questions about Christian teachings and rituals as best they could. By the autumn of 1868 some of them began noticing that she seemed to be having a crisis of faith. Some peasants took this as an overt cue to encourage her to consider baptism; others made various wisecracks about how there was no point in witnessing to her since she would just

²⁴ TsDIAK, f. 127, op. 659, spr. 351, ark. 1. The consistory appealed to the governor general to have the synagogue construction stopped. The law stated that a synagogue could be built no closer than 100 *sazhni* (213 metres) from a church if the two buildings were on the same street, or fifty *sazhni* if they were on separate streets; see E. V. Vainshtein, *Dieistvuiushchee zakonodatelstvo o evreiaikh* (Kyiv, 1911), 332–33.

²⁵ TsDIAK, f. 127, op. 667, spr. 239, ark. 1. Another example is in TsDIAK, f. 127, op. 699, spr. 1016.

²⁶ John Klier, "State Policies and the Conversion of Jews in Imperial Russia," in *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, 92–112, ed. Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodorkovsky (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 33–35.

²⁷ Fr. Konstantin Volkov, "Prosvieshchenie sv. Kreshcheniem evreiskoi dievitsy," *KEV*, 1869, no. 11: 417.

remain a Jew. The combination strengthened her resolve, and she confided her decision to a young householder, who began "pulling his hair out about where to hide her from her Jewish family and then get her to Kyiv and so on." It took a respected elderly peasant to point out to the young man that he should inform the priest. When the priest heard of the situation, he ordered the woman brought to his house and promised to take care of the matter further. In the dead of night on 7 March, accompanied by four parishioners, she left her "native Jews" and came to his home.

"Now at this point there [began] a rather interesting disturbance among the Jews and a rather reassuring movement among our Orthodox population," the author continued. "Of course, everyone should know that ... if one of the Jews wants to accept Holy Baptism he must complete his intention in great secrecy from other Jews ... or else he will be subjected to considerable danger from the Jews' fanaticism and barbarity."²⁸ The following day, after they realized the young woman had disappeared, her family set up a search. According to the following account by the priest, it was only when a passing Jew saw her in his yard that they realized she might have converted. Word spread like wildfire among both Jews and Orthodox. Well over fifty peasants rushed to their pastor's house to protect him and the potential convert. "In this way," he wrote, "the sympathy of our Orthodox Christians, who stayed the whole night in groups around the lot, prevented any access to the Jews." The next day, the priest called one of the Jews to him and delivered a rather condescending speech in which he said that the girl's intention to convert was incontrovertible and that since the law was "on the side of the Orthodox," the Jews would only bring misfortune on themselves by objecting. This reprimand, the priest contended, had prevented the "harsh endeavours of which they [the Jews] are all too capable in such cases." Over the next days the girl remained in his home and the peasants stood guard as their pastor awaited permission from the metropolitan in Kyiv to baptize the girl. When she was at last baptized, many villagers crowded into the church and, on the spot, collected over thirty silver rubles to aid the new Christian.

The villagers are as much the focus of this account as the young convert, for it is they who brought her to the faith. As the priest proudly concluded, "I must not fail to mention here that to their credit, they [the peasants] were happy, glad, and interested in this event, [and] that according to their understanding they spoke out about the importance and high level of Christianity in comparison with other religions; how deeply and sincerely they declared their devotion to Orthodoxy, proving how pleasing to God is any soul who joins the Orthodox faith, of what respect, good will, and love such a soul deserves from us Orthodox Christians, and so on."²⁹ This theme of community celebration and generosity, and of the true Orthodoxy of the seemingly ignorant peasants, appears in accounts of baptisms that occurred in other villages.³⁰ Such accounts, organized around the reactions of the villagers, were aimed as much at constructing Orthodox identity—at demonstrating the essential soundness and piety of the common people—as at recounting the welcoming of a convert. And the foil to that Orthodox piety and self-defence, as in this Perehonivka story, is the fanatical Jewish community and the danger it presented to priests and converts.

²⁸ Ibid., 419.

²⁹ Ibid., 422.

³⁰ See, for instance, Iliashevich, "Iz Umanskago uezda," 110.

Jewish communities frequently accused the clergy of kidnapping their children. These abduction narratives were countered in the Russian-language press with accounts of Jewish fanaticism.³¹ An important theme in the clergy's baptism accounts is the victimization of the Orthodox priest who helps a convert. For instance, in 1872 Father Petro Bobrovsky wrote asking the St. Vladimir Brotherhood for help with the case of a twelve-year-old boy whom he was scared to christen. He described his and his colleagues' troubles upon baptizing Jews. "On Trinity Sunday last year I baptized a Jewish woman, and what happened?" he wrote. "The whole time the Yids [*zhidy*] in *kagals*, especially at night, walked around my house with the intention of stealing a horse or doing some other evil. And seven weeks after the baptism they kidnapped the woman, who was already engaged, and what they did with her is unknown." In another case, a fellow priest baptized a Jew and had four horses stolen for his trouble. "Such bitter experiences take away any energy for mission among us," he lamented.³²

In fact, despite this priest's comment, one gets very little sense from published or archival sources of an active mission to the Jews. On the contrary, most clergy presented their role in conversions in very passive terms, at best. As in the Perehoniivka case discussed above, where the young woman confided her intention to convert to a fellow peasant who did not even think to refer her to the priest, the village pastor often presented himself as the last to hear that someone desired to convert. *KEV* did publish a translation of a German brochure of advice on how to missionize the Jews in 1892.³³ But this was the only article directly on the subject to ever appear in that periodical. The passive way in which priests tended to present their role in converts' spiritual journeys suggests that they did not see missionary activism as particularly likely to please their superiors.

When mass popular violence against Jews began to roll across the Southwestern Land in the spring of 1881, *KEV* at once condemned violence and endorsed anti-Jewish attitudes. An editorial declared that the clergy would naturally heed the appeal of the governor-general to speak out against the violence to their parishioners. But while agreeing that it would not be hard for priests to make the point that the disorder was against God, Christianity, and the tsar's wishes, it argued that "It will be more difficult for the clergy to refute references to everyday sources of the general popular irritation against the Jews." The editorial continued: priests should not dwell on these issues, though; instead, they should focus on pointing out that beatings would not solve social problems. Rather, the Orthodox ought to live sober, hardworking lives so that the Jews "cannot overpower us."³⁴ Thus the emphasis continued to be on the need for moral self-improvement to solve ethnic problems.

Although there is little indication of particular clerical activism in preventing pogroms, there is also no evidence that priests directly promoted such violence, at least before 1905.³⁵ Sermons by village pastors published in *KEV* in the wake of the

³¹ Freeze, "When Chava Left Home," 164, 170, 187.

³² Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivskoi oblasti (Kyiv). f. 2, op. 8, spr. 135, ark. 2–2ob.

³³ "Nieskolko sovietov missioneram sredi iudeev," *KEV*, 1892, no. 3: 76–77.

³⁴ "Prizyv g. glavnago Nachalnika kraia, obrashchennyy k prikhodskomu, osobenno selskomu dukhovenstvu," *KEV*, 1881, no. 18: 7.

³⁵ I found no mention of clergy in the massive collection of documents in TsDIAK, f. 274, op. 1, spr. 238, t. 1, relating to the pogroms in late April 1881 in Kyiv province. On the case of a priest put forward for a reward for helping to avert violence, see: TsDIAK, f. 190, op. 1, spr. 75. See also

pogroms emphasized the universality of God's love and the applicability of his laws (and those of the tsar) to all people regardless of race, religion, or status.³⁶ The prevention of violence, and even the promotion of ethnic peace, continued to be a theme in *KEV*. For instance, in the 1900 obituary of Archpriest Nikolai Uspensky, the author presented defence of the Jews as one of the deceased's virtues. Indeed, he observed that "During the Jewish pogrom in Kyiv, thanks to the influence of Father Nikolai, the crowd did not touch one single Jewish shop in the Halytskyi bazaar. The Jews remember this, which explains why many of them were in attendance when the deceased's body was carried out and followed it to the grave, openly expressing their sorrow."³⁷ What is particularly notable about this description is its place in the larger final point of the obituary about Father Nikolai's "humane attitude" toward both Poles and Jews. Uspensky had spent a dozen years in Chornobyl as a young pastor, years that coincided with the Polish Insurrection of 1863. According to the eulogist, "The Poles did not much like Father Nikolai because of his patriotic outlook. In spite of this, he used his influence more than once to stop the peasants from bloody reprisals against the Poles.... Once, at night, a crowd of peasants went to Father Nikolai and declared: 'Batiushka, bless our knives; before the sun rises, not one Pole will be left alive in the town [Chornobyl].' The departed [Fr. Nikolai] spent a long time convincing the peasants not to turn to popular summary justice, and the word of their respected pastor had its effect."³⁸ The parallel set up in this obituary suggested that the successful Kyiv eparchial priest walked a delicate line between national religious "self-defence" and the prevention of violence with respect not just to Jews, but to Poles as well.

This juxtaposition of a pastor preventing violence against both Jews and Poles, and the importance that a short obituary placed on demonstrating the deceased's effectiveness as a pastor in a multi-ethnic environment, hints at a crucial feature of the story of relations between Jews and Orthodox priests in Kyiv eparchy: this relationship must be understood in the broader context of anxiety about the ethnic and political fate of the region and about that region's essential Orthodoxy in the face of ethnic diversity. In their memoirs and their writings on a variety of pastoral topics, the clergy of Kyiv eparchy constantly emphasized the special challenges the church faced in Ukraine's Right-Bank provinces.³⁹ Reflecting the longstanding popular tradition of seeing "the

I. Michael Aronson, *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 140. The role of the clergy in anti-Semitic activity after 1905 needs further exploration; see Khiterer, "The October 1905 Pogrom," 27, and her "Jewish Life in Kyiv at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," *Ukraina moderna* (Lviv), no. 10 (2006): 90. The tone of articles in *KEV* remained similar to the earlier period. See, for instance, Fr. A. Glagolev, "K pravoslavnym khristianam," *KEV*, 1905, nos. 43–45: 1084. Ricarda Vulpius suggests that the clergy were very ambivalent about the anti-Semitic right wing; see her "Ukrainische Nation und zwei Konfessionen: Der Klerus und die Ukrainische Frage, 1861–1921" *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 49, no. 2 (2001): 250–51.

³⁶ See Shimansky, "Pouchenie," 5–7; and Fr. Ioann Nemerovsky, "Pouchenie o samovolnoi raspravie s evreiami, proizvodimoe 9 maia," *KEV*, 1881, nos. 24–25: 5–6.

³⁷ Fr. K. Korolkov, "Protoierei Nikolai Grigorevich Uspensky," *KEV*, 1900, no. 24: 1105.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1104.

³⁹ See, for instance, *KEV*, 1866, no. 19: 585; and P. Petrushevsky, "O shtundizmie," *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii* 25, no. 1 (January 1884): 46.

Jew as an integral part of the system of exploitation imposed upon Ukraine by the Poles,” they frequently coupled “the Poles and the Yids,” using the phrase as a shorthand for this perceived challenge to Orthodox identity.⁴⁰ Thus, for example, the son of a village priest in Kyiv gubernia who served in the early and mid-nineteenth century recalled how his father complained that the “local Yids and [Polish] lords [*zhidy i pany*]” had allegedly started whispering campaigns to foment conspiracy at the time of the 1830 uprising.⁴¹ This pattern also arose in the obituaries of notable priests of the eparchy.

For instance, when Father Petro Antonovych Petrushevsky, renowned for his fight with evangelical sectarianism, died in 1907, his obituary emphasized that he regarded sectarianism as just one more sorrow—this time a Germanizing one—for a region that already suffered from Polish influence. In his retirement, it reported, he worried about the effects of the Revolution of 1905: “regarding the obvious participation of *inorodtsy* [aliens], especially Poles and Jews, in all deplorable events of our fatherland, he often said: ‘I’ve been expecting this for a long time already.’”⁴² And when the eparchial school council launched the journal *Zapadno-russkaia nachalnaia shkola* in 1906, the lead articles still emphasized the significance of the perilous ethnic condition of the region. As one author noted, “There is no doubt that here the need for such schools was far more palpably felt than in Russia’s central provinces, in view of the almost open attack on our faith and nationality on the part of the eternally hostile [non-Orthodox] other-believers [*inovverskie*] and alien [*inorodskie*] elements (Catholic Poles and Jews).”⁴³ Pastoral work seemingly inevitably confronted ethnic complexity.

In general, the writings of priests in Kyiv eparchy reveal a strong sense of place and regional identity.⁴⁴ As they wrote of their experiences with Jews or spoke of them in their pastoral work, they contributed to a discourse of ethnic threat from the Jews and the Poles, with the Ukrainian peasantry as both their victims and the repository of authentic Orthodox values. This discourse played an important role in the definition of a regional “South Russian” or “Little Russian” identity in the mid-to late nineteenth century.⁴⁵ Indeed, as both John Klier and Faith Hillis have suggested, anti-Semitism was a common feature of what eventually became characterized as “Ukrainophile” and “Russophile” outlooks in the region—a feature that reflected

⁴⁰ John Doyle Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855–1881* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 207.

⁴¹ “Ukrainskaia derevnia vtoroi chetverti nynieshniago stolietia, po vospominaniam dietstva,” *Kievskia starina*, 1882, no. 4: 39.

⁴² *Sviashchennik Petr Antonovich Petrushevsky (Nekrolog)* (Kyiv: Tipografiia Imperatorskago Universiteta sv. Vladimira, 1907), 14.

⁴³ P. Petrushevsky, “Tserkovno-shkolnoe obrazovanie preimushchestvenno v Zapadno-russkom kraie,” *Zapadno-russkaia nachalnaia shkola*, 1906, no. 1 (January): 19.

⁴⁴ See my article Khezer Kolman [Heather Coleman], “Pravoslavnoe dukhovenstvo, istoricheskaia pamiat i malorossiiskaia identichnost v Kieve XIX v.,” in *Istoricheskaia pamiat i obshchestvo v Rossiiskoi Imperii i Sovetskom Soiuze (konets XIX – nachalo XX veka)* (St. Petersburg, forthcoming).

⁴⁵ On “Little Russian” identity, see Andreas Kappeler, “Mazepintsy, Malorossy, Khokhly: Ukrainians in the Ethnic Hierarchy of the Russian Empire,” in *Culture, Nation, and Identity*, ed. Andreas Kappeler et al (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2003), 174–75.

local preoccupations much more than those of the imperial state.⁴⁶ For instance, in the mid-1860s, when ethnic tensions were high after the Polish Insurrection, a village pastor in Kyiv eparchy, Afanasii Nedzelsky, published *Iuzhnorusskaia narodnaia pravda*, a virulently anti-Polish and fervently Russian monarchist catechism of "South Russian" history and identity. Nedzelsky reformulated the ordeals of the past into articles of a "South Russian" faith designed to politicize the peasantry and turn it away from alleged Polish Catholic propaganda. The Jews appeared as a component of the Polish threat, in particular as the Polish landlords' allies who had been awarded the lease to the village church and demanded money from the parishioners for its use.⁴⁷ Similarly, in the 1880s Petro H. Lebedyntsev, a prominent Kyiv clergyman, historian, and Ukrainophile, recalled his first impression, as a young priest in the 1850s, upon coming to take up his parish in the town of Bila Tserkva. "To a person travelling through," he wrote, "this ancient Cossack stronghold would seem like nothing but a Polish-Jewish small town [*polisko-zhidovskoe mestechko*]." Lebedyntsev would henceforth make use of his pastoral visits with parishioners to record the oral history of the town and devote his ministry and his spare time to the reclaiming of Bila Tserkva for Orthodoxy.⁴⁸ For these priests, local ethnic self-defence was intimately bound up with their pastoral mission.

Thus moral reform and pastoral work were highly ethnicized in the understandings of Kyiv eparchy's parish priests. The argument about the need for moral self-improvement to solve ethnic problems underpinned the 1864 founding document of the St. Vladimir Brotherhood, an association of clergy and laity in the eparchy often represented in the literature on Jewish-Christian relations as an agency for conversion of the Jews.⁴⁹ Although it certainly did establish an asylum for converts from Judaism in 1871, the brotherhood was initially launched to combat Polish influence in the wake of the 1863–64 revolt. The society's charter noted that the brotherhood had not "declared irreconcilable blind hatred toward the Poles, but rather the development of the internal strength of Orthodoxy in the mass of the people, and wants to put Latin-Polish propaganda in a position to be unable to endanger us substantively." Over the years the primary threat to Orthodoxy would change as the brotherhood's priorities shifted towards mission to the Jews in the 1870s, then to evangelical sectarians in the 1890s. But the strategy remained one of strengthening the Orthodox in the face of heterodoxy.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ See Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question*, 203, 220; and Faith C. Hillis, "Between Empire and Nation: Urban Politics, Community, and Violence in Kiev, 1863–1907" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2009), 9–10, 89, 110.

⁴⁷ Afanasii Nedzelsky, *Iuzhnorusskaia narodnaia pravda* (Kyiv: Tipografiia Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavry, 1866), 7, 8, 10. For a refutation of this stereotype, see I. Galant, *Arendovali-li evrei tserkvi na Ukrainie?* (Kyiv: Rabotnik, 1909).

⁴⁸ P. L-v [Lebedyntsev], "Razskazy starykh liudei o starykh vremenakh," *Kievskaja starina*, 1884, no. 8: 716–17.

⁴⁹ See, for example: Agursky, "Ukrainian-Jewish Inter-marriages," 140; and Klier, "State Policies," 105.

⁵⁰ *Otkrytie Kievskago sviato-Vladimirskago, pri Sofiiskom soborie, bratstva i proekt ustava bratstva* (Kyiv: Tipografiia I. i A. Davidenko, 1864), 5; Protopriest I. Troitsky, *50-lietie Kievskago Sv. Vladimirskago bratstva* (Kratkaia zapiska) (Kyiv, 1914), 10–11.

There was not just one voice or just one story in the encounter between Jews and Orthodox priests in late imperial Kyiv province. Rather, this is a profoundly ambivalent tale. Histories of violence have quite naturally dominated the narrative, as has suspicion of conversionary ambitions. These components were certainly present. But we need to conduct examinations of violence with new lenses in order to expand our knowledge of these relationships. The sources examined here reveal fairly predictable economic and social tensions, but also peaceful cohabitation and even grudging admiration for Jewish piety. No religious prejudices against the Jews, such as the blood libel or responsibility for the death of Christ, appeared.⁵¹ Certainly, as John Klier pointed out, proximity may have generated curiosity, but not necessarily understanding.⁵² However, as Smith and Clark point out, “living together entailed arrangement. Historians have often overlooked this rich world of give and take, knowledge and ignorance, living together and apart.”⁵³ An examination of how Orthodox clergy perceived the Jews helps to uncover some more aspects of the day-to-day interaction of Jews and their neighbours and how these relationships shaped each side’s understanding of itself as well. It also provides a corrective to each side’s rhetoric of conflict and persecution.


Encounters with Jews and the way they were recounted worked together to generate a discussion about identity—of the peasants with whom the priests worked, of the priests as defenders of the Orthodoxy of their region, and of the leaders of the common people—and about the fate of the Southwestern Land. Kyiv eparchy’s clergy brought their local voices and experiences and interpretations to the state-supported campaign to “reclaim” Right-Bank Ukraine for Orthodoxy. They understood their pastoral mission in ethnic terms as religious self-defence in a drama in which they and their parishioners were the victims of alien intruders on their Orthodox territory. In the piety and devotion of those parishioners lay the hope for the region; their religious failings could also be blamed on the confusion and temptations such an environment presented.⁵⁴ The Jews thus constituted only one, albeit an important one, of several “Others” in relation to whom the identities of Kyiv eparchy’s priests were being formed and reworked in the mid- and late nineteenth century.

⁵¹ John-Paul Himka notes similar attitudes in Austrian-ruled Galicia in his “Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism in the Galician Countryside during the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Aster and Potichnyj, *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, 147.

⁵² Klier, “Christians and Jews,” 163.

⁵³ Smith and Clark, “The Fate of Nathan,” 19.

⁵⁴ See, for example, Petrushevsky, “O shtundizmie,” 46.



When Churches Emigrate: Some Observations from the Canadian Experience

Frances Swyripa

The arrival of Easter in the spring of 1897 caught a party of Ukrainian immigrants from the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the railway station in Calgary, still far from their destination of homesteads among their compatriots east of Edmonton. As Greek Catholics, they would normally take baskets laden with decorated eggs and rich foods that broke the Lenten fast, including the ritual round bread or *paska*, to church to be blessed. Tradition was important, especially at a time of personal upheaval, so the Ukrainians gathered together bread, eggs, and butter and approached a local Roman Catholic priest. Unable to communicate, he assumed the food was a gift and, worried that the donors could ill afford such generosity, politely ate only a little of each item. Horrified, his guests beat a hasty retreat with the remains. Apparently, speculated an amused *Edmonton EB*, they preferred an unblessed half loaf to no loaf at all.¹

This unintentionally entertaining and seemingly simple incident, one of many reflecting the mutual incomprehension between newcomers and hosts, had implications beyond disappointed and shocked believers and an obliging but clueless priest. Emigrating without their familiar clergy, and to a country where the Eastern-rite Greek Catholic Church headed by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky in Lviv had no jurisdiction, Ukrainians came under the control of the French-dominated Roman Catholic hierarchy in western Canada. In other words, the Calgary priest was spiritually responsible for the Easter faithful with their baskets, and over the coming years both he and his church would have to change to accommodate their needs. Ultimately, and despite initial resistance, the Roman Catholic hierarchy agreed to share its space with a separate and parallel ecclesiastical structure. But if the establishment of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Canada in 1913 created a novel situation for Canadian Catholicism, the new immigrant institution also looked quite different from its Galician counterpart. Not only were married priests, the norm in the Eastern rite, forbidden to serve in North America, but what had been a “national” church at home found itself demoted to a lesser “ethnic” entity abroad. The face of Latin-rite Catholicism in the Canadian Prairies was itself changing. English-speaking Irish bishops increasingly replaced or augmented French ones, and new immigrant groups—whose churches in their homelands were also often “national” institutions—competed with Native and French followers inherited from the fur trade.

The Canadian experience offers a fascinating example of what happens when churches emigrate, especially if they are national or quasi-national in character, rep-

¹ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 20 April 1897.

resent well-established societies, and have long enjoyed unchallenged power and status. For much of its history not only a fluid frontier society but also a nation in the process of formation, post-Conquest Canada lacked both entrenched religious interests and an established church. Except for the Roman Catholic Church under the Jesuits in New France, immigrant churches entered an environment that undermined their accustomed prominence and authority. This novel situation forced them to adjust their self-image, negotiate for position and recognition, and learn to function, at least in dealings with the surrounding society, as minority institutions. Moreover, the constant fluidity of that environment made the outcome of interaction unpredictable, even unprecedented. Most of these Old World national or quasi-national churches arrived more or less simultaneously, during the great immigration boom of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and had a particular resonance in the Prairies. Perhaps most crucially, they tended to come without a prior tradition of emigration and/or missionary impulse to provide guidance and assist with the transition, and without a minority tradition and consciousness to profit from a well-developed survival mentality or strategy.

This essay identifies four phenomena emerging from the Canadian experience that merit further research, both for their impact on individual transplanted churches and their emigrant/immigrant faithful and for the evolution of Canadian Catholicism, Protestantism (specifically its Anglican and Lutheran variants), and Orthodoxy. They are the transformation of national or quasi-national churches into minority ethnic institutions that maintain, or try to maintain, their distinctiveness, inclusion within continental organizational frameworks, denominational co-operation across national or ethnic lines, and relations between the parent church in the homeland and its Canadian offspring. More generally, these four phenomena illuminate the role religion played in Canadian society as a function or facet of ethnicity, and they comment on the contribution of religion to homeland-diaspora relationships and the Canadian-American dynamic.

National Distinctiveness Undermined

In the homeland, national or quasi-national churches help to define the nation-state and/or to inform a sense of peoplehood. As such, the images, rituals, and pronouncements associated with sacred space not only foster a group's uncontested religious identity but also blur the distinction between faith and secular political consciousness. Emigration, however, strips these familiar and unquestioned national-religious identifiers of their presumed universality and authority.² Most importantly, they are no longer equated with the imagined essence and unity of the nation—be it Catholic Poland or Italy, Orthodox Russia of the tsars, or Anglican England under the British monarch and archbishop of Canterbury. Rather, they now define simply one ethnic group among many and stress its difference from other Canadians. Unlike its parent, the emigrant church also encounters individuals and institutions of the same faith but different national origins, with whom it competes and must negotiate.

² The phenomenon is explored in my article "The Mother of God Wears a Maple Leaf: History, Gender, and Ethnic Identity in Sacred Space," in *Sisters or Strangers? Immigrant, Ethnic, and Racialized Women in Canadian History*, 341–361, ed. Marlene Epp, Franca Iacovetta, and Frances Swyripa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

Its new role thus entails a jockeying for position and power for which it is ill prepared, at the same time as having to recreate an infrastructure in an alien and often unsympathetic environment with limited resources on which to draw. A second feature of such emigrant churches is a magnified cultural identity fashioned around symbols that express a "national" identity in homeland terms, but an "ethnic" one in the Canadian context. Finally, in a peculiar twist, some emigrant national or quasi-national churches find their Old World balance upset when the bulk of group members in Canada belong to a minority or regional faith in the homeland.

Historically the most pervasive symbols serving simultaneously to distinguish groups and rally members around an Old World national identity and its unifying faith were the saints in whose honour emigrant churches were named. In addition to being holy men and women, many of these individuals were also kings, queens, and other figures important in the identity of the nation. Thus early nineteenth-century Irish immigrants in Montreal chose St. Patrick, who brought Christianity to Ireland, for the church where they could pray in English surrounded by reminders of their Irishness and not the Frenchness of mainstream Catholicism in the city. Early twentieth-century Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox immigrants in the Prairies favoured their own Christianizers, SS Volodymyr and Olha, rulers of Kyivan Rus', the precursor of modern Ukraine. Poles preferred St. Casimir (king, benefactor of the poor, and Poland's patron saint) or St. Stanislaus (bishop, martyr, and symbol of Polish unity). Germans liked northern saints: Bruno, Hubert, Oswald, and Gertrude. And in the late twentieth century Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Blessed Virgin of Medjugorje, and the Vietnamese Martyrs showed recent arrivals from Latin America, Europe, and Asia perpetuating the pattern. All such saints expressed a politicized religious consciousness as well as faith, and they divided worshippers and the places where they worshipped into "us" and "them." No Ukrainian parish, for example, would pick St. Patrick or Our Lady of Guadalupe as its patron, just as no Irish parish would instinctively gravitate to the Vietnamese Martyrs or to the Marian apparition at Medjugorje, whose promise of peace resonated among Croatian refugees from wartorn Yugoslavia. Far from all-embracing Christian symbols, such saints functioned as ethnic symbols inaccessible or undesirable to outsiders, even within the same denomination, whose internal divisions emigration brought to the fore. There were, of course, exceptions (like Andrew, the patron saint of Scotland and apostle to the Slavs), whose multinational appeal forced emigrating peoples to rethink their special relationship to them.

In the homeland the exclusivity of national saints and the broader implications were never an issue, at least from the perspective of national or quasi-national churches. French, Polish, Irish, and Italian Catholic faithful could simply be Catholic and take their accompanying Frenchness, Polishness, Irishness, and Italianness for granted. The same held true for Greek, Russian, and Serbian Orthodox faithful, Swedish and Norwegian Lutherans, or English Anglicans. In challenging Old World certainties and privileges, the Canadian environment both made emigrant churches more aware and protective of their national (ethnic) peculiarities and obliged them to adapt to the new country's multicultural reality. Despite underlying similarities, the Orthodox, Anglican, and Catholic examples that follow represent a variety of national (ethnic) experiences, both before and after emigration, that elicited distinctive responses to the Canadian situation.

Under the tsars Russian nationality, Orthodoxy, and autocracy officially reinforced each other, underscoring not only the alliance of church and state but also the assumption that to be Russian was to be Orthodox, and that to be Orthodox was to be Russian. However, the pre-1917 Russian Orthodox Church in Canada, its missionaries subsidized and controlled by the Holy Synod in St. Petersburg, found itself serving a primarily Ukrainian and Romanian population in rural Alberta that came not from the Russian Empire but from the crownland of Bukovyna in Austria-Hungary; its Edmonton-based priests also ministered to a sprinkling of genuine Russians, Greeks, and Serbs both in the city and as far away as the mining communities of the Crowsnest Pass. And for Ukrainians at least, given the denial of a separate Ukrainian people in the Russian Empire, the political agenda of Russian Orthodox priests stimulated a debate over national identity. These priests' Communist successors, as the Bolshevik Revolution subordinated a much diminished church at home to the atheistic Soviet state, also put Ukrainian-Canadian adherents of the patriarchal Russian Orthodox Church outside the mainstream of Ukrainian life in Canada. Eventually Canadians of Romanian, Greek, and Serbian origin acquired their own ethnic Orthodox churches, preserving (or recreating) "national" churches without, however, the infrastructure or standing in society their homeland counterparts enjoyed. But the experience of the pioneer Russian Orthodox Church and Orthodox faithful in Canada begs the question: How do religion and ethnicity interact when the emigrant church possesses a national identity and/or political agenda different from that of believers?

This question touched the emigrant Anglican Church in Canada only peripherally, and only in the context of Native converts, not Old World believers seeking a fresh start in Canada. (Similarly, proselytizing among the Natives had also compromised the ethnic exclusivity and identity of the Roman Catholic Church in New France.) As essentially a settler church, the Church of England in Canada did not possess the same missionary thrust that characterized the Anglican experience in British colonies in Africa. Nonetheless its role in Christianizing Canada's aboriginal population and eagerness in assisting the government in their assimilation had a huge impact. It culminated, at the end of the twentieth century, in the collective soul-searching arising from residential school abuses and the threat of financial bankruptcy in the wake of lawsuits seeking victim compensation.³ But the issue that most distinguished the Church of England in Canada in the early years concerned its establishment status in the homeland and sense of entitlement to equivalent standing in British North America. In Upper Canada (present-day Ontario), created after the arrival of United Empire Loyalists from the newly independent United States at the end of the eighteenth century and thereafter attracting British settlers from abroad, the emigrant Anglican Church fought vigorously to retain its Old World privileges. The campaign focussed on access to the Clergy Reserves, land set aside in the Constitutional Act of 1791 for the support of "Protestant" clergy.⁴ That it ultimately failed, in the face of

³ In 2003 the Anglican Church of Canada and the Federal Government in Ottawa formalized a deal in which the former would be responsible for no more than thirty per cent of the cost of validated claims and the latter would pick up the tab for the remainder. See <cbcnews.ca>, 11 March 2003, accessed on 16 November 2008.

⁴ See Curtis Fahey, *In His Name: The Anglican Experience in Upper Canada, 1791–1854* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991); and, for the two main protagonists over the Clergy

strong Methodist opposition to preference for the Church of England, raises tantalizing questions about not only the impact of emigration on national churches, especially when their position in the homeland was arbitrarily secured against other denominations, but also the democratizing influence of the frontier. Anglicanism itself emerged from the experience aware that it could not automatically assume pre-eminence by right or tradition and would have to readjust accordingly.

As for Canadian Catholicism, it is of utmost significance that in 1774, after the Conquest of New France, the British formally recognized the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec. This gesture set the stage for the church to identify Catholicism as one of the pillars of French-Canadian identity and to become itself the champion of French-Canadian survival. With the arrival of first Irish immigrants in Quebec and then a host of immigrant peoples in the Prairies, where the French formed a minority of a minority Catholic population, language and identity issues (including, for Ukrainians, their distinctive rite) challenged this specific equation of nationality and faith. The repercussions have never been thoroughly addressed by either Canadian Catholic or Canadian ethnic historians, perhaps because they undercut the notions of a universal church and multicultural harmony. Nonetheless a few observations are in order. Irish-French struggles for parish and diocesan control and Ukrainians' efforts to secure their own bishop and Eastern-rite Ukrainian priests have received the most attention, with the focus on creating and preserving ethnic identity and communities in Canada.⁵ Much less attention has been paid to non-French, non-English-speaking, Latin-rite Catholics, especially in the experimental days of the settlement-era Canadian West. Raymond Huel has argued that in defending the French language and Catholic institutions, the French hierarchy and its priests in the Prairies became defenders of multiculturalism, thus making a "distinctive contribution" to the evolution of the West as a mosaic. Crucially, he said, they realized that the way to safeguard the faith of non-English-speaking immigrants was through their national languages, and so committed themselves to securing priests and religious orders of the same background and financially supporting minority-language newspapers.⁶ However, the evidence suggests a different interpretation of French clerical attitudes and actions on the part of the peoples affected. Hungarian-Canadian historians, for example, have criticized the lack of effort by the archbishop of St. Boniface to

Reserves, J. L. H. Henderson, ed., *John Strachan: Documents and Opinions* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969), and Egerton Ryerson, *The Story of My Life: Being Reminiscences of Sixty Years' Public Service in Canada*. (Toronto: W. Briggs, 1883).

⁵ On Ukrainians, see, for example, the articles by Andrii Krawchuk and Mark McGowan in *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity*, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 206–237; and Orest Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Period, 1891–1924* (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1991), 155–236, 381–409, 486–96. On Irish-French relations in the Canadian West, see, for example, Brian Rainey, "The Fransaskois and the Irish Catholics: An Uneasy Relationship," *Prairie Forum* 24, no. 2 (1999): 211–17; Robert Choquette, "John Thomas McNailly et l'erection du Diocèse de Calgary," *University of Ottawa Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (1975): 401–16; and Raymond Huel, *Archbishop A.-A. Taché of St. Boniface: The "Good Fight" and the Illusive Vision* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2003).

⁶ Raymond Huel, "French-Speaking Bishops and the Cultural Mosaic in Western Canada," in *Religion and Society in the Prairie West*, 53–65, ed. Richard Allen (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1974).

provide Hungarian settlers with Hungarian priests, blamed the church leadership in the Prairies for retarding the growth of Hungarian ethnocultural institutions, and called Central and East European Catholics "pawns" in the church's campaign to preserve the linguistic and cultural rights of francophones in the West.⁷

A final issue, originating entirely in the vagaries of population movements abroad, highlights an unusual phenomenon in the relationship between faith and national churches in the homeland and their fate in emigration. Here Ukrainians offer the best example. While the great majority of Ukrainians in Europe in the late nineteenth century lived under Russian rule and were Orthodox, Eastern-rite Catholics from Galicia in the Habsburg Empire dominated the movement to Canada. Thus the religious heritage and identity of Ukrainian Canadians contrasted sharply with the homeland, vaulting the provincial Galician Catholic church into the voice of Ukrainian "national" interests in Canada and making it more than competitive with its emasculated and assimilationist Russian Orthodox rival. But then unanticipated developments in the Prairies intervened, with major consequences for both Canadian Catholicism and Orthodoxy. In 1918 creeping denationalization within the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Prairies (notably Latinization under the influence of French and Belgian priests and bishops) led to the establishment of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada as a genuinely independent and "national" Ukrainian church. In other words, the new institution owed its existence equally to the specific Ukrainian immigrant experience and the repercussions of the response of emigrant churches more generally to their changed circumstances. At the same time Ukrainians (unlike Orthodox Romanians or French Catholics, for example) were left with two claimants to the title of the "true" Ukrainian church embodying the essence of the Ukrainian people, eliminating any synonymy between religion and ethnic (national) identity.

Canadianization and Continentalism

If the founders of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church and Latin-rite Catholics like the Hungarians identified the French-dominated Roman Catholic hierarchy in the Canadian West with unwanted national assimilation, within mainstream society the Prairie experience became a catalyst to ecumenism. Among those of both recent and distant British origin, small and scattered settler populations encouraged the biggest and most "Canadian" of church unions, the formation of the United Church in Canada in 1925 from a merger of Methodists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists. Less inclined to see their religious identity swallowed because of the related ethnic associations, foreign emigrant churches also Canadianized at different speeds. For example, while the Benedictine monks who established St. Peter's Colony of German Catholics in east-central Saskatchewan represented a North American movement, relocating their community from Illinois and maintaining ties south of the border, the German-speaking female religious they invited to provide health care and education came from Austria (Sisters of St. Elizabeth, 1911) and Germany (Ursulines, 1913).⁸ The pioneer

⁷ See N. F. Dreisziger et al., *Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 69–70, 80–81.

⁸ Peter Windschigel, *Fifty Golden Years, 1903–1953: A Brief History of the Order of St. Benedict in the Abbey Nullius of St. Peter, Muenster, Saskatchewan* (Muenster: St. Peter's Abbey, 1953), 47–61.

Ukrainian Catholic Church stood in marked contrast, precluding facile conclusions about the gendered dimensions of becoming Canadian. The Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate who accompanied the Basilian Fathers to Alberta in 1902 quickly Canadianized, attracting their first novice almost immediately, but the clergy (perhaps because readily available land deterred would-be priests) tended to come from Galicia until the Second World War intervened. For many emigrant churches arriving in the settlement-era Canadian West, however, the neighbouring United States was the primary factor in their subsequent evolution and identity. Cross-border denominational ties rooted in a common homeland church most frequently relegated the Canadian body to a subordinate role at the same time as it chafed against American values and control. Only rarely did control lie north of the border: rural Alberta, for example, long served as the headquarters for the combined Canadian-American province of the Ukrainian Sisters Servants and Basilian Fathers.

The first examples of an American shadow come from the Orthodox world, past and present, and illustrate American advantages in terms of the emigrant church's roots and/or the number of faithful south of the forty-ninth parallel. The pioneer Russian Orthodox Church in the Prairies fell under the jurisdiction of the Diocese of the Aleutians and North America, headquartered in San Francisco and successor of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Alaska. The current Orthodox Church in America, which inherited many Russian Orthodox congregations in both Canada and the United States in the decades after 1917, maintains its seat in the state of New York. And the earliest Romanian Orthodox parish (established 1898) in rural Alberta now belongs to a continental Romanian church whose archdiocese is in Chicago. Even that distinctly Canadian immigrant and fiercely independent creation, the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, initially looked south, and in 1924 it accepted Archbishop Ioan Teodorovych of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States as its primate. The ensuing relationship between these two churches is significant for what it reveals about the Canadian body's attitudes towards external control. Its governing consistory insisted upon administrative freedom (that Teodorovych resided in the United States proved helpful in this regard), and when the Canadian church eventually broke with Teodorovych, it did so in part because he refused to consult it over his controversial reconsecration.⁹

The remaining examples involve Scandinavian Lutheran churches, whose pioneer Prairie congregations consisted of new immigrants from overseas joined by former compatriots relocating from the American Midwest. Personal ties with Swedish and Norwegian communities south of the border, together with already existing emigrant Swedish and Norwegian churches in the United States, had a profound impact on Canadian religious life. Congregations were not only often served by American pastors, but also often by "junior partners" in denominational structures emerging from and reflecting the American experience and headquartered in the United States. For example, New Stockholm Lutheran Church, established in 1889 to serve the Swedish settlement in southeastern Saskatchewan, relied on the Swedish Lutheran Church (Augustana) in the United States for its literature, hymns, Swedish and English translations of the Bible, and pastors. It affiliated with the Minnesota Conference

⁹ See Oleh Gerus, "The Reverend Semen Sawchuk and the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 16, nos. 1-2 (1991): 67-77.

of the Augustana Synod, which provided financial support and, in 1913, helped create the synod's Canadian Conference. New Stockholm became a "Canadian church" only in the 1980s as part of the newly formed Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada, two decades after being affected once again by a major reorientation within Lutheran ranks in the United States.¹⁰

The actual impact of American influences has been addressed more directly in the Norwegian case. Calling Lutheranism one of the principal identifiers of Norwegian-ness in Canada, the author of the Norwegian-Canadian history *From Fjord to Frontier* assessed the fallout from the fact that until 1967 the Norwegian Lutheran Church belonged to "a larger continental church body" led from Minnesota. A clear benefit was the establishment, in 1911 and 1915 respectively, of Lutheran colleges in Camrose, Alberta, and Outlook, Saskatchewan. Less positively, by insisting on use of the Norwegian language well into the interwar years (unlike the American churches), Canada attracted more conservative, less assimilated pastors from south of the border. Yet an American-trained and transient ministry ignorant of Canadian conditions simultaneously fanned nationalist sentiments, resulting in the opening of a Canadian theological seminary in Saskatoon in 1939. *From Fjord to Frontier* commented as well on the reorientation within continental Lutheranism in the 1960s that also affected New Stockholm. Canadian Norwegian churches, it said, objected to "American" in the name of the new merger and the subordination it conveyed, spurring them to help form the new (and autonomous) Evangelical Lutheran Church of Canada in 1967. Finally, the book complained about what it described as middle-class conformity, formality, and liberal values (such as social dancing) in late twentieth-century American Lutheranism, and commented on Canadian resistance to American pressures, especially from certain faculty members at Camrose Lutheran College.¹¹

The Homeland Relationship

The relationship between Canadian churches and their homelands involves a number of dynamics that attest to the ongoing relevance of Old World history and current events to the ethno-religious identity of Canadians as individuals and of their churches as institutions. It raises questions about whether, and in what circumstances, those Old World ties undercut or complement an evolving Canadianism and how the repercussions reverberate in the larger society. It also raises questions about the power balance between Canadian and parent churches, including whether, and with what implications, the junior institution graduates from a position of dependence and/or subordination to one of autonomy or, more rarely, superiority. Finally, and most crucially, it raises questions about what in these processes is common to emigrant churches regardless of their location, and what reflects the peculiarities of Canadian history and society. The examples below suggest the complexity of the answers.

¹⁰ See Virgil Lundquist, *A Century of Faith: New Stockholm Lutheran Church, 1889–1989, Stockholm, Saskatchewan* (Stockholm, SK: Centennial Committee, New Stockholm Lutheran Church [1989]), 3, 8–9, 11, 14, 16.

¹¹ Gulbrand Loken, *From Fjord to Frontier: A History of Norwegians in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), 127–46, 165, 200–206.

First, there are the homeland symbols that the faithful and their priests place in their churches, enabling private sacred space to reverse the transformation from national into ethnic institutions that occurs in their contacts with mainstream society. Here Old World saints face no competition, so that their presence restores and even intensifies their power as politicized national symbols. Some such symbols identify worshippers with the nation-building aspirations of the homeland. Hungarian pioneers in rural Saskatchewan, for example, painted the coat of arms of Hungary (which includes the Crown of St. Stephen, Hungary's first king and patron saint) on the wall of the sanctuary of the stone church built in 1908.¹² Completed in 1947 and painted inside by an artist from the post-war anti-Communist displaced-persons immigration, St. Josaphat's Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral in Edmonton featured not only the trident, Ukraine's national emblem banned in the Soviet Union, as a decorative motif, but also Hitler, Stalin, and Lenin among the damned in the Last Judgement.¹³ Given the Cold War and its own sacrifices fighting the Nazis, the Edmonton public would undoubtedly have countenanced this mixing of religion and contemporary homeland politics. The experience of the Italian parish of La Madonna della Difesa in Montreal, however, revealed the dangers of an emigrant church identifying with "un-Canadian" political symbols from the homeland. It started innocently, when the Italian-born artist Guido Nincheri commemorated the 1929 Lateran Pact between Benito Mussolini and Pope Pius XI creating the Vatican City State with a fresco above the altar that included the fascist dictator on horseback, the dominant figure in the tableau. But when Italy entered the Second World War beside Germany and a nervous Canadian state began to hunt for homegrown fascists, Mussolini's presence no longer celebrated a much-welcomed Catholic event. Instead, it suggested political disloyalty, and Nincheri (who had added the dictator on orders from church officials) was arrested and interned together with several hundred suspect Italian "enemy aliens." Half a century later, although some Italian Canadians considered the painting an embarrassing and painful reminder of a difficult time, to most it symbolized the perseverance and resilience of their community and they wanted it kept. Rehabilitation was also forthcoming within mainstream circles, despite war veterans' demands that Mussolini be removed, and in 2002 the Church of La Madonna della Difesa became a national historic site.¹⁴

Second, secular homeland symbols and related rituals can privilege certain ethnic churches at the expense of others. For example, in 1901 in Edmonton memorial services for Queen Victoria were held not only in All Saints' Anglican Cathedral, an official gesture replicated in Anglican churches across the country, but also in the Russian Orthodox chapel, underlining family ties between the British monarch and the

¹² Our Lady of Assumption Roman Catholic Church, Kaposvar, Saskatchewan, visited 11 August 2002; there is also a statue of St Elizabeth of Hungary in the sanctuary.

¹³ See, for example, Orest Kupranets, *Katedra sv. Yosafata v Edmontoni* (Edmonton: Ukrainska Katolytska Eparkhiia Edmontonu, 1979); and Mykhailo Khomiak, ed., *Yulian Butsmaniuk* (Edmonton: Kanadske Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, Oseredok na Zakhidniu Kanadu, 1982).

¹⁴ *Globe and Mail*, 27, 28 August 2002; and *Montreal Gazette*, 25 August 2003. See also Roberto Perin, "Making Good Fascists and Good Canadians: Consular Propaganda and the Italian Community in Montreal in the 1930s," in *Minorities and Mother Country Imagery*, 136–58, ed. Gerald Gold (St John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University, 1984); and Franca Iacovetta, Angelo Principe, and Roberto Perin, eds., *Enemies Within: Italian and Other Internees in Canada and Abroad* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

Russian tsar and briefly destigmatizing otherwise marginal Slavic peasant immigrants.¹⁵ Nonetheless, the Church of England was unique, becoming an established church in English-speaking Canada in all but name. The comfortable symmetry that long existed between Britishness and Canadianism clouded the distinction between sacred and secular to elevate Anglicans' English ethnicity and homeland-based political identity into a class of its own. Hanging the Union Jack or a picture of the reigning monarch in an Anglican church, secular images that epitomized Canadians' imperial identity and constitutional underpinnings, was quite different from painting Stalin or Mussolini on the walls. Similarly, hosting the rituals that commemorated landmark events in the collective life of the nation elevated the Church of England above other Christian denominations—identifying Anglicanism with the state and state interests and equating its agenda and priorities with those of the community at large. Edmonton's All Saints' Cathedral, for one, initially refused to relinquish its establishment functions, insisting in 1967 that it and not St. Joseph's Roman Catholic Cathedral should host the memorial service for Canada's first French-Canadian (and devoutly Catholic) governor general, Georges Vanier.¹⁶ Canadian Anglicanism was clear proof that a religious hierarchy complemented and reinforced the country's historical ethnic hierarchy, with the British at the top.

Third, as faith communities, emigrant churches can evolve in directions that set them apart from their non-emigrating counterparts. Both Canadian Anglicanism and the Episcopal Church in the United States came to hold more liberal attitudes than not only the Church of England but also its offshoots in other one-time colonies, especially in conservative Africa. By the late twentieth century, for instance, tensions over the ordination of female and openly gay bishops and the blessing of same-sex unions threatened to destroy the worldwide Anglican communion. The differences are explained in part by Anglicanism's experience on the two continents: in North America, an "emigrant" church proper serving a largely British population; in Africa, an imperial proselytizing church serving non-white converts. But the differences conceivably also lie in the peculiar secular and frontier forces brought to bear on religious institutions and their followers in the New World. Historians of Canadian Mennonites and Doukhobors, religious minorities in the Russian Empire who came to the Dominion to escape persecution, have commented on the abandoning of Old World restraints within those two groups. Frank Epp attributed the unparalleled "denominationalism and fragmentation" plaguing Mennonites in North America to "perhaps the frontier ... perhaps the individualistic emphasis not only in economics but in religion." George Woodcock noted how the extremism of the Sons of Freedom—nudism, arson, and dynamiting—was peculiar to Doukhobors in Canada, as much the product "of stresses generated in a society emerging from the pioneer stage, as any of their more conformist neighbours." Like the Métis, he said, they were "representatives of simple cultures caught in the trap of a closing frontier, with nowhere farther to go in their efforts to escape from the modern state."¹⁷

¹⁵ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 24 January and 1 February 1901.

¹⁶ See the discussion in my article "The Monarchy, the Mounties, and Ye Olde English Fayre: Identity at All Saints' Anglican, Edmonton (1875–1990s)," in *Canada and the British World*, 322–38, ed. Philip Buckner and Ken Coates (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006).

¹⁷ Frank Epp, in *Mennonite Mirror*, January 1975; and George Woodcock, *The Doukhobors* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 10–11.

Fourth, and again qualifying the transformation of national into ethnic institutions, war or revolution in the homeland can upset the traditional relationship between the parent church and its Canadian progeny, giving the latter prestige, status, and responsibilities separate from its position in Canadian society and facilitating a Canadianization of outlook and personnel. Among Doukhobors and Mennonites, large-scale emigration from the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, augmented by flight from Soviet rule and attrition within the Soviet Union in the twentieth, created the unusual situation where the fall of the Iron Curtain saw as many Doukhobors living in Canada as in the successor states to the USSR, and proportionately more Mennonites living in Manitoba than anywhere else in the world.¹⁸ Canada as a haven or "saviour" for churches under attack in the homeland is best illustrated, however, by the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec. Whatever else they thought of British rule, French-Canadian clerics rejoiced at avoiding the excesses and impiety of the French Revolution, which, in crippling the church in France, increased their own authority and prestige.¹⁹ Something similar happened when the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine in 1944 destroyed the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia (it was formally banned in 1946), forcing its remnants underground and depriving the people of one of their biggest defenders. For the duration of the Cold War unprecedented obligations and prominence accrued to the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada (from providing bishops for Europe to sending priests and nuns to Brazil). Since 1991 it has been indispensable in rebuilding the church infrastructure in independent Ukraine.²⁰

An unexpected legacy of the dismantling of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia comes from the beatification of two dozen martyrs arrested and imprisoned by the Soviets, by Pope John Paul II during his historic visit to Ukraine in 2001. Two of these individuals spent time in Canada, prompting their evolution into New World ethnic symbols and breaking sharply with the traditional preoccupation of saint making in Canada—French or Native and Roman Catholic. Nykyta Budka, who died in a Soviet concentration camp in central Asia, served from 1912 to 1927 as the first bishop of the Canadian church. Vasyl Velychkovsky, the secret bishop of the underground church in Galicia, survived years of forced labour and torture before being sent into exile and brought to Winnipeg by Metropolitan Maxim Hermaniuk. In 2002 Blessed Vasyl's body was exhumed and transferred to a newly built shrine in St. Joseph's Ukrainian Catholic Church, where pilgrims venerate his holy relics and pray for his intercession.²¹

¹⁸ Invitation, centennial exhibit, "Spirit Wrestlers: The Doukhobors," Canadian Museum of Civilization, Hull, Quebec, 18 January 1996 – 12 October 1997 (author's private collection); and, for Mennonites, Gerard Jennisen in the Manitoba Legislative Assembly, quoted in *Preservings* 8 (June 1996): 50.

¹⁹ Ronald Rudin, *Making History in Twentieth-Century Quebec* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Michel Grenon, ed., *L'Image de la Révolution Française au Québec, 1789–1989* (Montreal: Hurtubise, 1989); Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, *The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec* (Toronto: Gage, 1983), 18; and, originally published in French in 1906, André Siegfried, *The Race Question in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 29–35.

²⁰ For the impact of the Second World War and its aftermath in Ukraine on the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, see Claudia Helen Popowich, SSMI, *To Serve Is To Love: The Canadian Story of the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 174–290.

²¹ See, for example, the newsletter *Fully Alive: A Bishop Velychkovsky Martyr's Shrine Publication* (beginning January 2003); John Sianchuk, ed., *Blessed Bishop Nicholas Charnetsky, CSsR*,

Bishop Velychkovsky also links Ukrainians in Canada, especially the post-war anti-Communist displaced-persons immigration, to the suffering of a persecuted homeland and people under Soviet rule. His Winnipeg shrine is also only Canada's second martyr's shrine (the other, in Ontario, honours the seventeenth-century Jesuits tortured to death by the Iroquois), so that Velychkovsky puts Ukrainians on a par with one of Canada's "founding peoples" and, as a Catholic phenomenon, gives the group a special cachet in the Canadian West. Bishop Budka is more complicated. His fifteen years as head of the fledgling Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada were controversial—internally for the schism that produced a Ukrainian Orthodox rival, externally for the pastoral letter he issued on the eve of the Great War urging immigrant support for the Austro-Hungarian "fatherland." This letter has been blamed for much of the suspicion with which Canadians regarded Ukrainian immigrants, who, as subjects of the Habsburg Empire, became prey to a host of restrictive measures, including internment. Budka himself was twice arrested for treason. To Ukrainian Canadians who consider Canada's wartime treatment of their people unjust and a national shame, Budka's beatification represents not only the bishop's own redemption but also the vindication of a wronged ethnic group. For some, his martyrdom transcended his fate at the hands of the Soviets to include his persecution in Canada. The mainstream Canadian press satisfyingly adopted the same sympathetic tone, embracing the former enemy alien as a "Canadian" and one of the nation's own.²²

Conclusion

Emigrant churches do not remain emigrant churches. Over time they become immigrant and Canadian, although, as the above observations suggest, what those two transformations entail depends on a unique combination of circumstances. As has been seen, "national" (often state-supported) churches in the homeland are reduced to minority "ethnic" institutions in Canada, for the most part powerless and unnoticed except in their own communities, themselves subject to assimilatory pressures. In the process of transformation some churches acquire multicultural overtones or form productive intra-denominational relationships across ethnic lines. Others resolutely try to maintain their national (ethnic) distinctiveness. Many continue to be shaped by and to respond to homeland politics, which affects not only their own internal dynamics but also outside relationships, even within the same denomination. In rare instances a diminished homeland church results in unprecedented responsibility and status for its Canadian offspring. Finally, some churches enter an American orbit, although the Canadian response to subordination points to an ethno-religious nationalism that parallels the anti-Americanism observed in other contexts. None of these phenomena have been sufficiently examined, however, to understand what exactly is taking place or what overall conclusions can be drawn.

and *Companions: Modern Martyrs of the Ukrainian Catholic Church* (2002); and the official Web site "Bishop Vasyi Velychkovsky Martyr's Shrine" <www.bvmartyrshrine.com> (accessed 1 August 2008).

²² See, for example, <www.infoukes.com/history/internment/> (accessed 1 September 2008), especially the image of the Canadian flag with embroidered panels, wrapped in barbed wire; *Globe and Mail*, 11 and 23 June 2001; and *Calgary Herald*, 16 June 2001.

The Fourth Rus': A New Reality in a New Europe

*Paul Robert Magocsi**

In May 2006 an international scholarly conference took place in Przemyśl, Poland, under the title “Does a Fourth Rus' Exist?” Reviewing the conference program, it became obvious that the title was basically a euphemistic substitute for an otherwise rhetorical question: “Are Carpatho-Rusyns a Distinct Nationality?”

For those who have long been skeptical about Soviet propagandistic “scholarship” on that topic, such a question may have had some validity during the height of the Cold War in the 1970s. And it was certainly a legitimate question to ask after the revolutions of 1989, when the profound political changes taking place throughout central and eastern Europe brought in their wake the re-emergence of former independent states and the reassertion of identities among seemingly forgotten stateless peoples, including Carpatho-Rusyns. But we are already well into the twenty-first century, by which time Carpatho-Rusyns have de jure or de facto become recognized as a distinct nationality in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic.¹ They have been recorded in the official censuses of those countries and also in Ukraine,² the only country that still does not recognize formally their status as a nationality.³

Much of the scholarly world has also recognized this new reality. In the past decade alone, numerous publications have appeared in which Carpatho-Rusyns are described

* I am grateful to Dr. Bogdan Horbal of New York Public Library for his very useful comments on an earlier version of this essay.

¹ In Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Serbia, and the Czech Republic, Carpatho-Rusyns are classified as a nationality. In Poland, Lemko Rusyns are classified (along with Karaites, Roma/Gypsies, and Tatars) as an ethnic group, although Polish law states that there is no substantive difference between how ethnic groups and nationalities are treated; see <www.msw.gov.pl/portal/pl/178/2958/Ustawa_o_mniejszosciach_narodowych_i_etnicznych_oraz_o_jezyku_regionalnym.html>.

² The national censuses of 2001 and 2002 produced the following results regarding the number of persons who indicated that their nationality was Carpatho-Rusyn: Slovakia—24,000; Serbia—16,000; Ukraine—10,000; Poland—5,900; Croatia—2,300; Hungary—1,100; Romania—200. All of these national censuses, except Ukraine's, also asked a question about native language. The figures for Carpatho-Rusyn as native/mother language were quite similar to the nationality response in all counties except Slovakia, where nearly 55,000 persons responded that Carpatho-Rusyn was their native language.

³ This blanket statement is now technically incorrect. On 7 March 2007 the Transcarpathian Oblast Council adopted by an overwhelmingly favourable vote (71 for, 1 against, 2 abstentions) a resolution recognizing Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality (*natsionalnist*) in the Transcarpathian oblast and requires that the category “Rusyn” is entered in the official list of nationalities in the oblast. The resolution also called on Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada to recognize Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality at the national level. That request has not yet been fulfilled.

as a distinct nationality and culture. Among these are five volumes of what might be called a "national bibliography," containing 4,242 annotated entries of mostly scholarly literature about Carpatho-Rusyns published during the last quarter of the twentieth century; two editions of an encyclopedia with over 1,100 entries on Carpatho-Rusyn history and culture worldwide; and a scholarly series commissioned by an international committee on Slavic languages based in Poland that recognizes Carpatho-Rusyn as one of the fourteen Slavic languages that exist today.⁴ Consequently it would seem superfluous to speculate on the existence of a "fourth Rus'." The discipline of Carpatho-Rusyn studies, however, does face problems and challenges that warrant discussion. I will focus here on a few conceptual and terminological issues.

As strange as it may seem, there is not yet a consensus about what to call the territory, or historic homeland, inhabited by Carpatho-Rusyns. There is confusion about the meaning of the names Subcarpathian Rus', Transcarpathia, and Carpatho-Ukraine. For some writers these names refer to only one part of Carpathian Rus', but for others they refer to all of the lands Carpatho-Rusyns inhabited on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. Less problematic are two other terms: Lemkovyna (the Lemko Region), which generally refers only to Carpatho-Rusyn-inhabited lands within present-day southeastern Poland (although there is debate about Lemkovyna's eastern border); and the Prešov Region, which refers to Carpatho-Rusyn-inhabited lands within present-day northeastern Slovakia. There is also a part of Carpathian Rus' located south of the Tysa (Tisa) River in present-day Romania. I would suggest referring to this area as the Maramureş Region, using the Romanian form of the name in order to distinguish it from pre-1918 Maramorosh (Hungarian: Máramaros) county, most of which was located north of the Tysa River in present-day Ukraine.

Unfortunately, those who write about Carpatho-Rusyns (whether or not they are of Carpatho-Rusyn orientation) tend to forget two important principles: that there is a difference between states and peoples, and that a given people may live within the boundaries of one state or several states. We should also never forget that states come and go, but peoples remain. It is not the Carpatho-Rusyns' fault that their historic homeland, Carpathian Rus', has at times been within the framework of one state and at other times divided between several states.⁵ As the "land of the Carpatho-Rusyns," Carpathian Rus' is defined by the numerically dominant people or nationality that lives on its territory, not by the states that may have ruled the area at one time or another.

⁴ See Paul Robert Magocsi, comp., *Carpatho-Rusyn Studies: An Annotated Bibliography*, vol. 1, 1975–1984 (New York: Garland, 1988), and vols. 2–5, 1985–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009 (New York: Columbia University Press/East European Monographs, 1998–2006); idem and Ivan Pop, eds., *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002, rev. ed. 2005); and Paul Robert Magocsi, ed., *Rusynsky iazyk*, 2d, rev. printing (Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski, Instytut Filologii Polskiej, 2007).

⁵ Until 1772 Carpathian Rus' was divided between the Polish Kingdom and the Hungarian Kingdom. From 1772 to 1918 it was entirely within the Habsburg Monarchy or Austro-Hungarian Empire (i. e., Austrian-ruled Galicia and the Hungarian Kingdom). From 1919 to 1938 it was divided among Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania; from 1939 to 1944 among Nazi Germany, Slovakia, and Hungary; from 1945 to 1991 among Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Romania; and from 1991–93 to the present day among Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Romania.

At this point it may be useful to address the misplaced belief, or myth, that has come to dominate the mindset of some Carpatho-Rusyns—namely, that Subcarpathian Rus' (Ukraine's present-day Transcarpathian oblast) is the homeland of *all* Carpatho-Rusyns and, therefore, that Carpatho-Rusyns in Poland (the Lemko Region), Slovakia (the Prešov Region), and elsewhere should show deference to Subcarpathian Rus'. Such views are not tenable on either historical or demographic grounds. For example, Carpatho-Rusyns living south of the Carpathians were not divided by international borders until as recently as 1939. Moreover, the earliest and most influential figures connected with the first national awakening (Aleksander Dukhnovych and Adolf Dobriansky) were based in the Prešov Region, not in Subcarpathian Rus'. Even more important is the demographic factor. In 1910, a time when political manipulation regarding census data was relatively limited, there were 1,102 villages in which at least fifty per cent of the inhabitants were ethnic Carpatho-Rusyns. Of these villages, fewer than half—forty-six per cent—were in Subcarpathian Rus', while nearly the same proportion, forty-four per cent, were in the Lemko and Prešov regions.⁶ Why, then, should we speak of the Lemko and Prešov regions as some kind of appanage to the "historic homeland" of Subcarpathian Rus'?

Scholars and other writers on Carpatho-Rusyn topics not only need to keep in mind the distinction between states and peoples; they should also not allow their research agendas and conceptual understanding to be determined by the existence of present-day political boundaries. The one homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyn people is Carpathian Rus', a territory that straddles the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains roughly from the Poprad River in the west to the upper Tysa River in the east. At the present time it is divided among four countries—Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Romania; or perhaps it would be just as reasonable to say that (as of the year 2011) it is divided between only two political entities—the European Union and Ukraine.

Like any territory, Carpathian Rus' has regions within it. Specifically there are four such regions, which happen to coincide more or less with state boundaries: in Poland, the Lemko Region, or Lemko Rus'; in Slovakia, the Prešov Region, or Prešov Rus'; in Ukraine's Transcarpathia oblast, Subcarpathian Rus'; and in Romania, the Maramureş Region.

It is true that one of these regions, Subcarpathian Rus', had the status of an autonomous territory at certain periods in the twentieth century, although its self-rule was quite limited and certainly not the equivalent of sovereignty or statehood, as some authors would have us believe.⁷ Another region, Lemko Rus', claimed to function as

⁶ A list of all Carpatho-Rusyn villages and the administrative entities within which they were located throughout the twentieth century is found in my book *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and Their Descendants in North America*, 4th, rev. ed. (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 2006), 110–206. The figures here are based on my map *Carpatho-Rusyn Settlement at the Outset of the 20th Century with Additional Data from 1881 and 1806*, 3d ed. (Glassport, PA: Carpatho-Rusyn Research Center, 2011), which indicates all villages where Carpatho-Rusyns lived between 1806 and 1920.

⁷ It is interesting to note that a recent history of Subcarpathian Rus' by Ivan Pop, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague: Libri, 2005), appeared in a series by a respected Czech publisher (*Lidové noviny*) devoted to the history of states (*Historie států*). Subcarpathian Rus' came into existence in 1919 and was promised autonomy within the framework of Czechoslovakia. But real political autonomy was not granted to the region until October 1938. That autonomy came in the wake of the Munich

a republic for several months after the First World War, but its "independence" came to an abrupt end as soon as the authorities in Warsaw decided to give greater attention to integrating under its rule that part of interwar Poland.⁸ Then there was the much heralded symbolic "republic for a day" of Carpatho-Ukraine (March 1939), and later Transcarpathian Ukraine. The latter entity, which functioned for about seven months in 1944–45, proclaimed from the very outset its intention to unite with Soviet Ukraine. Therefore, it can hardly qualify as an entity that achieved independent statehood in reality or as a goal.⁹

Certainly Carpathian Rus' as a whole has never had independence of any kind. But the fact that it never achieved statehood does not make Carpathian Rus' any less real. After all, Friesland, Flanders, Catalonia, or Lombardy have also never (if ever) functioned as states in the modern era, yet no one questions their existence. Like Friesland, Wallonia, Occitanie, and the numerous other stateless regions of Europe, Carpathian Rus' is inhabited by a people with a distinct historical, linguistic, literary, musical, and artistic heritage that has been and continues to be the subject of an increasingly sophisticated scholarly and popular literature. The very names and concepts of Carpathian Rus' and Carpatho-Rusyns are not anything new. As a geographic concept, Carpathian Rus' was used by the early twentieth-century historian Nykolai Beskyd, and it was the term used by Carpatho-Rusyn activists who put forth political demands to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.¹⁰ And with regard to the appropriate ethnonym for the group, we should not forget that the renowned nineteenth-century national awakener, Mykhailo Luchkai, entitled his six-volume magnum opus *A History of Carpatho-Rusyns*.¹¹

Pact, which marked the first stage in the dismantling and eventual destruction of Czechoslovakia (and short-lived autonomous Subcarpathian Rus' as well) in March 1939. That Subcarpathian Rus' could not be considered a state at this time is made clear in the article "Autonomy" in Magocsi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 22–23.

⁸ The most comprehensive study of the little-known Lemko republics (there were two) is by Bogdan Horbal, *Działalność polityczna Łemków na Łemkowszczyźnie, 1918–1921* (Wrocław: Arboretum, 1997).

⁹ A good example of the tendentious effort to link all these short-lived experiments (excluding the Lemko republics) and to argue that their existence allegedly justifies speaking about Carpatho-Rusyn statehood is found in Petro Hodmash and Ivan Turianytsia, comps., *Od avtonomnoi Podkarpatskoi Rusy do suverennoi Zakarpatskoi Ukrainy* (Uzhhorod: Obshchestvo podkarpatskykh rusynov, 1996).

¹⁰ As early as in the 1870s the Galician Rus' scholar Yakiv Holovatsky also used the term "Carpathian Rus'," although he understood the term to mean all Rus'-inhabited lands in the Habsburg Empire, i.e., eastern Galicia, northern Bukovyna, and Subcarpathian ("Hungarian") Rus'.

¹¹ The work, written in Latin, was completed in 1843 but not published in the original language (together with a Ukrainian translation) until the second half of the twentieth century, first as *Historia Carpato-Ruthenorum/Istoriia karpatskykh rusyniv* in several volumes of *Naukovyi zbirnyk Muzeiu ukrainskoi kultury u Svydnyku* (1983–99), then separately as Mykhailo Luchkai, *Istoriia karpatskykh rusyniv: Tserkovna i svitska, davnia i nova azh po nash chas, napysana na materialy dostovirnykh avtoriv, korolivskykh hramot ta arkhivnykh dokumentiv Mukachivskoi ieparkhii*, 6 vols. (Uzhhorod: Zakarpattia, 1999–2011).

Let us move from names to content. In other words, what are the criteria that justify our use of the concept Carpathian Rus' and what distinguishes Carpatho-Rusyns as a people from their neighbours?

Carpathian Rus' is the name of a territory comprised of settlements (mostly villages), fifty per cent or more of whose inhabitants at the outset of the twentieth century were Carpatho-Rusyns. It is certainly true that, like many other historic regions, not all the inhabitants were adherents of the "titular" nationality. Hence, throughout Carpathian Rus' there lived several other peoples (numerical minorities), who in some cases formed a plurality, or even a majority, of the inhabitants in certain villages and towns.¹² As for the "titular" group, the criterion used here for determining who was a Carpatho-Rusyn is self-ascription—namely, persons who answered on three decennial censuses (1900, 1910, 1920) conducted in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and the successor states of Poland and Czechoslovakia that either their mother tongue or their nationality was Carpatho-Rusyn.¹³

In order to not be accused of proposing a circular argument—that is, Carpathian Rus' is where Carpatho-Rusyns live, therefore Carpatho-Rusyns exist because there is a place defined as Carpathian Rus'—it seems appropriate to address the proposition that Carpatho-Rusyns are a distinct people. When, in the course of the nineteenth century, ethnographers and linguists began turning their attention to Carpathian Rus', there arose a debate about the relationship of its inhabitants to neighbouring peoples. It was relatively easy to draw distinctions between, on the one hand, the East Slavic Carpatho-Rusyns and, on the other, the West Slavic Poles and Slovaks to the north and west, the Finno-Ugric Magyars to the south, and the Latinate-speaking Romanians to the southeast. More problematic was to determine the relationship between Carpatho-Rusyns and other East Slavs living north and east of the mountain crests in what were then the Habsburg-ruled Austrian crownlands of Galicia (east of the San River) and Bukovyna. The East Slavs in these two crownlands also called themselves Rusyns, although during the first decades of the twentieth century an ever increasing number began to identify as Ukrainians. Today virtually all East Slavs in eastern Galicia and northern Bukovina consider their identity and language to be Ukrainian. Only in Carpathian Rus' is the term "Rusyn" (with its variants "Rusnak" and "Lemko") still used as an ethnonym by large numbers of East Slavs, a certain percentage of whom consider themselves as belonging to a distinct nationality.¹⁴

¹² On these groups and their relationship to Carpatho-Rusyns and Carpathian Rus', see "Czechs," "Germans," "Gypsies/Roma," "Jews," "Magyars," "Poles," "Romanians," "Russians," "Slovaks," and "Ukrainians" in Magocsi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 83–87, 135–36, 217–21, 314–16, 387–89, 418–19, 429–31, 464–67, and 511–14.

¹³ I give priority to Austro-Hungarian statistical data (1900 and 1910), because census-takers asked the question about mother tongue. For example, and by way of contrast, interwar Czechoslovak censuses asked the question about nationality. This often led to confusing results, whereby traditionally Carpatho-Rusyn-inhabited villages may have had very few Carpatho-Rusyns in one census (1921), but many more in another (1930), the "missing" ones having identified themselves as Czechoslovaks—which they certainly were according to citizenship.

¹⁴ While it is true that the term "Rusyn" is widespread as a self identifier, we know that some persons consider it to indicate a distinct East Slavic nationality, while others believe it is only an older or regional name for the Ukrainian nationality. Some limited but instructive sociological research has been done precisely on this topic for Ukraine's Transcarpathian oblast—Aleksandr

The problem of the relationship between Carpatho-Rusyns and other East Slavs was reflected in the manner that scholars classified the inhabitants of Carpathian Rus'. Most literature published during the twentieth century refers to the East Slavic ethnographic groups living along both slopes of the Carpathian Mountains as Lemkos, Boikos, and Hutsuls. This tripartite formulation is repeated without reflection, effectively as if it were a litany, in a wide body of scholarly and non-scholarly publications. But does this repetition of the tripartite litany, even by scholars who have no political agenda, necessarily mean that it is a correct or reasonable reflection of reality?

In fact, the earliest scholarly studies about Carpatho-Rusyns that date from the second half of the nineteenth century speak of four, not three, groups who were differentiated by their dialectal speech, material culture, and cultural values. These groups, roughly from west to east, included the Lemkos, Krainiane, Dolyniane, and Verkhovyntsi. It is instructive to note that these terms were not used by the inhabitants themselves, but were given to them by their neighbours. Instead the East Slavs of Carpathian Rus' traditionally described themselves simply as Rusnaks, Rusyns, or as the people of the Rus' faith (*rus'ka vira*). During the first decades of the twentieth century some local leaders managed to convince Rusnaks living on the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains (and west of the Oslawa River) that they should call themselves Lemkos, a term that became the group's ethnonym after a few decades.¹⁵

Some combination of the four ethnographic subdivisions listed above was adopted by scholars of various political and national persuasions, including the Austrian Hermann Bidermann,¹⁶ the Russians Grigoriĭ De-Vollan and Timofei Florinsky,¹⁷ the

Pelin, "Dinamika mezhetnicheskikh otnoshenii Zakarpatia 1995–1998 gg.," *Uchenye zapiski Simferopolskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, 1999, no. 11: 76–84; and for eastern Slovakia—Mária Homišinová, "Nazory na etnickú identifikáciu a etnonym rusínskej/ukrajinskej minority na Slovensku," in Marián Gajdoš et al., *Rusíni/Ukrajinci na Slovensku na konci 20. storočia: K vybraným výsledkom historicko-sociologického výskumu v roku 2000* (Prešov: Univerzum, 2001), 90–96.

¹⁵ The term "Lemko" first began to be used to describe an ethnolinguistic group in the 1820s, but it took more than a century before it became widespread among one group of Carpatho-Rusyns—those living north of the mountain crests in western Galicia. Until well into the twentieth century, Poles referred to all Ukrainians as "Rusini." Not wanting to be confused with Ukrainians in eastern Galicia, the intelligentsia speaking on behalf of East Slavs living in Galicia west of the Oslawa River proposed the term "Lemko" as an ethnonym. By the 1920s most of the East Slavs in the area now known as the Lemko Region had adopted "Lemko" instead of "Rusnak" or "Rusyn" as a self-designation. For details, see Ivan Teodorovich, "Lemkovskaia Rus'," *Nauchno-literaturnyi sbornik Galitsko-Russkoi Matitsy* (Lviv) 8 (1934): 11–13; and Bohdan O. Struminsky, "Nazva liudei i kraiu," in *Lemkivshchyna: Zemlia – liudy – istoriia – kultura*, vol. 1: 11–22, ed. Bohdan O. Struminsky, vol. 206 (1988) of *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (New York).

¹⁶ Hermann Ign. Bidermann, *Die ungarischen Ruthenen, ihr Wohngebiet, ihr Erwerb und ihre Geschichte*, vol. 1 (Innsbruck, 1862), 71–100. Bidermann spoke of three groups: Verkhovyntsi, Dolyshnians (or Bl[i]jaky), and Slovakized Rusyns ("slovakisirten Ruthenen"). He did not consider the Hutsuls part of the "Hungarian Rusyns."

¹⁷ G. A. De-Vollan, *Ugro-russkaia narodnyiia piesni* (St. Petersburg, 1885), 5–26. De-Vollan spoke of three groups: Verkhovyntsi, Dolyniane, and, together, Spyschaky (the Carpatho-Rusyns of Spish county) and Krainiane (referring to the Rusnaks of present-day northeastern Slovakia). Timofei Florinsky, in his *Slavianskoe plemia: Statistiko-etnograficheskii obzor sovremennago*

Galician Ukrainophile Vasyl Lukych,¹⁸ the Bukovinian Russophile Hryhorii Kupchanko,¹⁹ and the Subcarpathian Rusynophile Yurii Zhatkovych.²⁰ These writers also agreed that the most important group in terms of numerical size and geographical extent were the Dolyniane, and that the second numerically largest groups were the Krainiane (that is, the Rusnaks of present-day eastern Slovakia) and the Lemkos. At the same time they pointed out that the Verkhovyntsi and Hutsuls were peripheral in terms of their small numbers and location along the edges of Carpathian Rus'. In the literature that appeared before the First World War, only one author, the Hungarian scholar of Carpatho-Rusyn background Antal Hodinka, considered some Hutsuls as part of the Rus' people of Subcarpathia.²¹

Despite these earliest writings on the subject, during the first half of the twentieth century Ukrainian scholars adopted another analytical schema. They divided Carpathian Rus' from west to east into only three ethnographic and linguistic regions—Lemko, Boiko, and Hutsul—each of which included territory on the northern and southern slopes of the mountains. This tripartite categorization allegedly proved that the East Slavs on the southern slopes of the Carpathians were the same as those on the northern slopes. In other words, they were Ukrainian. The most influential scholar to propose the tripartite schema was the Galician-Ukrainian linguist Ivan Pankevych. This conceptual framework has been subsequently adopted in Ukraine by regional ethnographers (e.g., Yurii Hoshko) and historians of wooden church architecture, and it dominates in all Ukrainian and some non-Ukrainian encyclopedic literature.²²

Subsequent research (including that of the Russophile linguist Georgii Gerovsky, his Ukrainian contemporary Ivan Zilynsky, and the Transcarpathian Ukrainian ethno-

slavianstva (Kyiv, 1907), 41–42, refers to five groups: Lemkos, Verkhovyntsi, Dolyniane, Krainiane, and “a few” Hutsuls.

¹⁸ Vasy Lukych, “Uhorska Rus’,” in *Vatra: Literaturnyi sbornyk* (Stryi, 1887), 177–83. Lukych also omitted the Hutsuls and spoke of three groups: Verkhovyntsi, Dolyniane, and, together, Krainiane and Spyshaky.

¹⁹ Hryhorii Kupchanko, *Uhorska Rus' y ey russky zhytely* (Vienna, 1897), 46–62. Kupchanko referred to three groups: Verkhovyntsi, Dolyniane, and Krainiane-Spyshaky.

²⁰ Yurii Zhatkovych, “Zamitky etnografichni z Uhorskoi Rusy: Podil uhorskykh rusyniv,” in *Etnografichniy zbirnyk Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1896), 1–2. Zhatkovych spoke of three groups: Verkhovyntsi, Bliakhy (or Dychky), and Dolyshniaky (or Namuliaky).

²¹ Anton Hodinka, “Die Ruthenen,” in *Die österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild*, vol. 5, pt. 2 (Vienna, 1900), 401–18.

²² Already in the nineteenth century Lukych (see note 18) used the Lemko-Boiko-Hutsul classification when referring to language. The tripartite schema formed the conceptual framework for Ivan Pankevych's major monograph on Carpatho-Rusyn dialects, *Ukrainski hovory Pidkarpatskoi Rusy i sumezhnykh oblastei*, no. 9 (Prague, 1938); see esp. pp. 356–98. His linguistic classification was subsequently adopted as an ethnographic concept, and it has continued to appear in all Soviet and non-Soviet Ukrainian-language reference works. It is elaborated upon in encyclopedic works for each region: Yurii H. Hoshko et al, eds., *Hutsulshchyna: Istoryko-etnografichne doslidzhennia* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1987); idem, *Boikivshchyna: Istoryko-etnografichne doslidzhennia* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1983); Struminsky, *Lemkivshchyna*, 2 vols (1988); Yurii Hoshko, ed., *Lemkivshchyna: Istoryko-etnografichne doslidzhennia*, 2 vols. (Lviv: Instytut narodoznavstva NAN Ukrainy, 1999–2002); and the Soviet-Marxist historiographical work that praises “progressive scholars” for having decisively undermined the view that Carpathian Rus' is distinct from the rest of the East Slavic world: Roman F. Kyrchiv, *Etnografichne doslidzhennia Boikivshchyny* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1978).

grapher Mykhailo Tyvodar) suggests that the tripartite Lemko-Boiko-Hutsul classification schema cannot be supported by either linguistic or ethnographic data.²³ It therefore seems appropriate to return to a variant of the subdivisions first proposed in the late nineteenth century and continued by a few scholars since then.²⁴ This would suggest that Carpatho-Rusyns are divided into two basic groups, western and eastern, separated more or less along the Oslawa and Laborec rivers.

The western group consists of the Lemkos on the northern slopes of the Carpathians (present-day southeastern Poland) and the Rusnaks on the southern slopes (northeastern Slovakia). Until World War II the Lemkos inhabited 179 villages and the Rusnaks 283 villages, which together accounted for 44 per cent of all villages in Carpathian Rus'. Despite living on both sides of the Carpathian crests, the Lemkos and the Rusnaks have maintained close contact over the centuries. Such contacts were enhanced by the fact that the Carpathian ranges are at their lowest precisely between the Poprad and Oslawa/Laborec rivers along the Polish-Slovak border. In particular, it was the Lemkos who went southward for employment as annual summer-season agricultural workers (in the Hungarian plain) and also to participate at various times of the year in pilgrimages and other religious festivals at sites in Carpatho-Rusyn-inhabited northeastern Slovakia. One result of such social interaction was frequent intermarriage between Lemkos and Rusnaks as well as wide-ranging mutual cultural and linguistic relations between these two subdivisions of the western group of Carpatho-Rusyns.²⁵

The eastern group of Carpatho-Rusyns consists of East Slavs living only on the southern slopes of the mountains. These include the Dolyniane and the Verkhovyntsi. The Dolyniane inhabit 401 villages, which account for thirty-eight per cent of the

²³ The Russophile linguist Georgii Geroysky identified eight basic dialects and six transitional dialects in Carpathian Rus' south of the mountain crests. See his "Jazyk Podkarpatské Rusi," in *Československá vlastivěda*, pt. 3, *Jazyk* (Prague: Sfinx, Bohumil Janda, 1934), 460–80. Even earlier the Galician Ukrainian linguist Ivan Zilynsky indicated four dialectal groups (Lemko, Boiko, Central Transcarpathian, Hutsul) in Carpathian Rus'. He designated the largest dialectal region, which coincided with villages inhabited by the Dolyniane, as Central Transcarpathian and distinct from Boiko dialects in the highlands (Verkhovyna) and in Galicia. See his *Karta ukrainskykh hovoriv*, in *Pratsi Ukrainskoho naukovoho instytutu* (Warsaw), vol. 14 (1933). Zilynsky's classification has been followed by subsequent Ukrainian linguists, including those who prepared the authoritative *Atlas ukrainskoi movy*, vol. 2, *Volyn, Naddnistrianshchyna, Zakarpattia i sumizhni zemli*, ed. Ya. V. Zakrevska et al (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1988); see esp. map 4 therein.

²⁴ Aleksander Bonkalo, a Hungarian scholar of Carpatho-Rusyn origin, spoke of four ethnographic subdivisions: Lemkos, Dolyshniane, Boikos (who called themselves Verkhovyntsi), and Hutsuls. See Sándor Bonkáló, *A Rutének (Ruszinok)* (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat Kiadása, 1940), 70–90; and its English translation: Alexander Bonkáló, *The Rusyns* (New York: Columbia University Press/East European Monographs, 1990), 60–84. It seems remarkable, but even after Soviet rule was established in the region, one Soviet Ukrainian scholar, Hryhorii Stelmakh, argued that Transcarpathia should indeed be considered a distinct ethnographic region because both its highlanders (Verkhovyntsi) and lowlanders (Dolyniany) form a distinct people. See H. Iu. Stelmakh, "Etnohrafichno-folklorna ekspedytsiia 1946 roku v Zakarpattia," *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu mystetstvoznavstva, folkloru ta etnografii AN URSR* (Kyiv), 1947, 300–303.

²⁵ For details on these close ties, see Roman Reinfuss, "Związki kulturowe po obu stronach Karpat w rejonie Łemkowszczyzny," in *Łemkowie w historii i kulturze Karpat*, vol. 1: 167–81, ed. Jerzy Czajkowski (Rzeszów: Spotkania, 1992).

total in Carpathian Rus'; they cover most of the Transcarpathian oblast (historic Subcarpathian Rus') of Ukraine from the Shopurka River in the east to the border with Slovakia and beyond (south of the Vihorlat Ridge). The Dolyniane are considered the oldest East Slavic settlers in Carpathian Rus', their ancestors having come from Polissia and Podillia sometime during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Consequently the Dolyniane have retained some of the most archaic and distinctive forms of Carpatho-Rusyn speech. For centuries they were isolated from contact with other East Slavs to the north (Galicia) and east (Bukovyna); on the other hand, their material and spiritual culture as well as their language has been strongly influenced by the Magyars, with whom they share a common ethnographic boundary enhanced by easy access between the Carpathian foothills and the Hungarian Plain.²⁶

The Verkhovyntsi are a geographically peripheral group, inhabiting only sixty-nine villages along the upper slopes of the Carpathians in the northwestern and north-central part of the Transcarpathian oblast. Whereas they share many features with the Boikos living on the northern (Galician) slopes, the high mountain crests and few passes have rendered contacts with Galicia limited and difficult. Geography has clearly made a difference in relations between the inhabitants in this part of the Carpathians. In contrast to the mountain crests farther to the west, where Lemkos and Rusnaks have traditionally remained in close contact, the Boiko inhabitants of Galicia did not look southward, but rather were drawn by geography and communication routes northward and eastward toward the rest of Galicia.

Finally, there are Hutsuls who live east of the Shopurka River and in the valleys of the upper Tysa River and its tributaries (Chorna Tysa, Bila Tysa, and Ruskova). They inhabit only twenty-four villages, which represent a mere two per cent of all villages in Carpathian Rus', and are the most recent settlers in the region, with most of their villages dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They have traditionally used the ethnonym "Hutsul" to distinguish themselves from the Dolyniane/Rusnak lowlanders and have maintained close contacts with the Hutsuls north and east of the mountain crests, in Galicia and Bukovyna respectively. There is yet no consensus whether Hutsuls—at least those living on the southern slopes of the mountains—should (or want to) be considered a Carpatho-Rusyn ethnographic group.

Despite the peripheral nature of the Verkhovyntsi and Hutsuls (whose villages together total only nine per cent of all villages in Carpathian Rus'), it is these two ethnographic groups that have received the most attention in scholarly writings. This is perhaps because their geographic isolation has prompted some scholars to believe that they represent the purest, or least corrupted, version of some earlier form of culture.²⁷ By the same token the Dolyniane, whose cultural characteristics represent a

²⁶ For details on the Dolyniane and on Carpatho-Rusyn–Magyar cultural and linguistic relations, see Alexander Bonkalo, "Die ungarländischen Ruthenen," *Ungarische Jahrbücher* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1921) 1: 318–341; and Petro Lyzanets's linguistic atlas in 3 vols.: *Magyar-ukrán nyelvi kapcsolatok* (Uzhhorod: Uzshorodi Allami Egyetem, 1970), *Vengerskie zaimstvovaniia v ukrain-skikh govorakh Zakarpattia: Vengersko-ukrainskie mezhiazykovye svyazi* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1976), and *Atlas leksychnykh madiaryzmiv ta ikh vidpovidnykh v ukrainskykh hovorakh Zakarpatskoi oblasti URSR* (Uzhhorod: Uzhhorodskyi derzhavnyi universytet, 1976).

²⁷ Ivan Pop has argued that the populist interest in patriarchal societies, which allegedly preserved elements of a "true national culture" (*istynno narodnoi kul'tury*), is what motivates on-going interest in the Hutsuls and Verkhovyntsi at the expense of the numerically larger and more representative

kind of amalgam (bricolage) with their Magyar neighbours, are considered of less scholarly interest, even though they clearly comprise the numerically largest group of Carpatho-Rusyns.²⁸ The emphasis that scholars have given to the peripheral Verkhovynsi and Hutsuls, whose ethnographic and linguistic characteristics are more similar to the inhabitants living just north and east of the Carpathians, lends credence to the argument that allegedly all of the East Slavs of Carpathian Rus' are culturally and linguistically Ukrainian. More systematic study of the Dolyniane and Lemkos/Rusnaks shows, however, the fallacy of assuming that the periphery is representative of the whole.

Having just emphasized that the Verkhovynsi and Hutsuls living on the southern slopes of the Carpathians have characteristics that are more in common with inhabitants on the northern slopes, what justifies including them within the boundaries of Carpathian Rus'? Here one needs to look to geography and history as a determining factor.²⁹ Since the establishment of the first states in central and eastern Europe, the crests of the Carpathian Mountains formed an administrative boundary that separated the inhabitants on the southern slopes from those on the northern slopes. Those same Carpathian crests also coincided with a dividing line that determined different geographic spheres. The southern slopes are part of the Danubian Basin. There all rivers, transportational patterns, and centres of trade and commerce point southward. For nearly a millennium the dominant state structure in the Danubian Basin was the multinational Kingdom of Hungary, of which the Carpatho-Rusyn area was an integral part. Thus, while it is true that there may be some similarities in the language and religion of the East Slavic inhabitants on both sides of the Carpathian Mountains, those living on the southern slopes were part of an entirely different geopolitical sphere until as recently as 1945.

Within that geopolitical sphere, the inhabitants of Carpathian Rus' developed a common political culture and sense of historical tradition that was enhanced by developments connected with demands for political autonomy. For nearly a century, from 1849 to 1944, during every significant political crisis in central Europe Carpatho-Rusyns demanded—and most of those living south of the Carpathians were at times accorded—autonomy. Lemko Rusyns living north of the Carpathians also hoped to join their brethren to the south. It was in fact the Lemko Rusyns who were among the first to formulate maps (submitted to the Paris Peace Conference and other international bodies) that outlined the boundaries of Carpathian Rus' from the Poprad River in the west to the upper Tisza River in the east. Thus geopolitical, historical, and ethnographic characteristics, not to mention self-ascription, are the most important criteria in defining Carpathian Rus' as a territory and Carpatho-Rusyns as the numerically dominant—though not exclusive—people within its borders.

groups in Carpathian Rus'; that is, the Dolyniane, Rusnaks, and Lemkos. See his article "Ethnography," in Magocsi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 107–12.

²⁸ The most systematic discussion of the Dolyniane is found in Mykhailo P. Tyvodar, "Etnohrafichne raionuvannia ukraintsiv Zakarpattia," *Carpatica-Karpatyka* (Uzhhorod) 6 (1999): 32–44. However, Tyvodar considers the Dolyniane, Hutsuls, Boikos, and Lemkos part of the Ukrainian ethnoses.

²⁹ The following discussion is described in greater detail in my article "Mapping Stateless Peoples: The East Slavs of the Carpathians," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 39, nos. 3–4 (September–December 1997): 301–31, esp. 312–18.

In conclusion, there are a few principles that warrant repeating for those of us who research and publish on topics of central and eastern Europe in general and in the field of Carpatho-Rusyn studies in particular. The subject of our discipline is the historic land called Carpathian Rus', a territory whose inhabitants, at least until 1920, were in the majority Carpatho-Rusyns. Scholarly projects may deal with Carpathian Rus' as a whole or with one or more of its component regions.

Those authors who decide to deal with a particular region, whether Subcarpathian Rus', Prešov Rus', Lemko Rus', or the Maramureș, should never forget that they are writing about only one region that is part of a larger whole—Carpathian Rus'. As for the appropriate ethnonym for the people who are the primary subject of our discipline, it is Carpatho-Rusyn. When writing about inhabitants in specific parts of Carpathian Rus', one might wish to use related terms like Lemkos, or preferably Lemko-Rusyns, Rusnaks (in reference to Carpatho-Rusyns in present day Slovakia), and Subcarpathian Rusyns for Carpatho-Rusyns in Ukraine (but certainly not the ethnically meaningless term *zakarpatsi* [Transcarpathians]).³⁰ If the subject of inquiry is immigrants and their descendants, it is most appropriate when dealing with Serbia and Croatia to speak of Vojvodinian Rusyns, Bachka Rusyns, or Srem Rusyns, and, in the case of North America to speak of American Rusyns or Canadian Rusyns. Finally, recognizing that English has become an important instrument of international communication, the appropriate terms to describe the subject of our inquiry in that language are: "Carpatho-Rusyn" or simply "Rusyn" (but not "Ruthenian"³¹) for the people, and "Carpathian Rus" for their historic homeland.

By the outset of the twenty-first century Carpatho-Rusyn studies has certainly developed into a serious scholarly discipline in which a wide variety of scholars worldwide are directly or indirectly engaged.³² At the very least scholars within this community should promote a certain degree of terminological and conceptual consistency in their publications.

³⁰ It seems that during Soviet times those Carpatho-Rusyns in Transcarpathia (Subcarpathian Rus') who wanted to maintain some sense of distinctiveness could do so only by using the territorial designation "Transcarpathian." Consequently, there were—and still are in post-Soviet Ukraine—references in verbal discourse and in print to the "Transcarpathian people," "Transcarpathian songs," even the "Transcarpathian language" (*po-zakarpatsky*). Since the Transcarpathian oblast includes Magyars, Roma, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Romanians, as well as Carpatho-Rusyns and other nationalities, the adjective "Transcarpathian" is meaningless in ethnic terms. Therefore one should not confuse "Transcarpathian" with ethnic categories and, where necessary, refer only to the Carpatho-Rusyn people, Carpatho-Rusyn songs, the Carpatho-Rusyn language, and so on.

³¹ Some authors still use the term "Ruthenian" as an ethnonym for Carpatho-Rusyns. The term derives from the Latin word for Rus' and is still used by the Vatican to describe the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo in Ukraine and the Byzantine-rite eparchies in the United States. In the interest of impartiality, "Ruthenian" should be avoided, because in the eyes of many Orthodox it is associated (often negatively) with the Vatican and the Roman Catholic world.

³² For a list of over a hundred scholars whose publications confirm that they accept the view that Carpatho-Rusyns represent a distinct people and culture, see <www.rusyn.org/pdf/WARCListOfScholars.pdf>.



Groping toward Soviet Power in the Countryside: The Non-Party Peasant Conferences of Kharkiv Province in 1920

Mark R. Baker

Soviet power, or more accurately, the Moscow-centred, Bolshevik-controlled variant of “Soviet power,” came very slowly to the peasants of Kharkiv province (gubernia). In fact, one could argue that in many villages of Soviet Ukraine the centre’s control was never solidly established before Stalin’s forced collectivization drive initiated another civil war in the late 1920s. This interpretation challenges a quite common assumption evident in some recent works by Ukrainian historians on the “establishment of the Soviet regime” in the countryside. These historians portray this “establishment” as one of all-powerful, malevolent Bolsheviks bent on forcing all peasants to submit to their authority while brainwashing them with propaganda.¹ Such a view belies the story found in the documents of the period. The relationship between peasants and Bolsheviks was not simple or purely antagonistic. At times peasants supported the Bolsheviks, even called themselves Bolsheviks, and fought for them; at other times they resisted (both passively and violently) the Bolsheviks and their policies. A discussion of this protracted process, however, is too vast and complicated to describe in an article of this length. Instead, I will examine only one episode in this longer story: early 1920, when, despite two previous failed soviet governments, many peasants of Kharkiv province welcomed the return of “Soviet power” and sought accommodation with what they viewed as the lesser evil—the newly reformed Worker-Peasant Government of Ukraine. Although this is a relatively brief and early event in a longer process, it reveals a great deal about peasants’ desires and attitudes towards soviet power and about communists’ responses to peasants’ expressed concerns. The basic positions in this long struggle can already be seen in formation.

Following the debacle of June 1919, when, on a wave of large-scale anti-Communist peasant revolts, General Anton Denikin’s Volunteer Army advanced easily across Ukraine, pushing out the second “Worker-Peasant Government” and Red Army, the leaders of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) (RKP[b]) and, following closely, those of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (KP[b]U), sought to make amends in Ukraine. In November 1919 the RKP(b)’s Central Committee passed the resolution “On Soviet Power in Ukraine,” laying out the Party’s new position.

¹ The most pertinent studies include O. I. Hanzha, *Ukrainske selianstvo v period stanovlennia totalitarnoho rezhymu (1917–1927 rr.)* (Kyiv: Natsionalna akademiia nauk Ukrainy, Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2000); and various works by Yaroslav Malyk, especially, his and Oleh Bereza’s *Zaprovadzhennia radianskoho rezhymu v ukrainskomu seli (1917–1920)* (Lviv: Vydavnychnyi tsentr Lvivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni Ivana Franka, 2001).

Supposedly drafted by Lenin himself, the resolution demanded that Communists take all possible measures to eliminate anything hindering the development of Ukrainian language and culture. In addition, great effort was to be made to win over poor and middling peasants. While affirming its food-supply policy of state procurement at set prices and compulsory quotas (*prinuditelnaia razverstka*), the Party stressed that the extraction of peasants' surplus be limited to that strictly necessary for the Ukrainian poor, workers, and the army, "paying special attention to the interests of the middle peasantry." Concerning the communes and other collective forms of agriculture, the Party stressed that "no force would be permitted," threatening severe punishments "for any attempts to implement this matter by the use of force."² On 21 December the newly created All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (*Vseukrrevkom*) basically repeated this resolution in its proclamation of victory over Denikin's forces in Ukraine.³

For their part, the peasants of Kharkiv province appear to have greeted the return of the Communists if not with hyperbolic enthusiasm (as Soviet historians often claimed), then at least with a willingness to co-operate. One might suppose that these peasants had many reasons to fear and loathe the return of "Soviet power" to their villages, at least as much as any of the other regimes that had been contesting for power in the region since 1917. Having experienced the tsarist government's repeated mobilizations of their men and livestock during the Great War and then the hopes of the February Revolution, after which they seized most of the land in the agrarian revolution of 1917–18 and subsequently suffered through the battles between pro-Bolshevik forces and the Ukrainian Central Rada's troops, the German army's brutal and arbitrary plundering during its occupation of Ukraine in 1918, the invasive and forceful actions of the second Soviet government of spring 1919, and then the Volunteer Army's occupation, these peasants were exhausted, very confused, frustrated, and afraid; what they desired most of all was to be left alone. None of the governments pretending to power in Ukraine would have given them this, least of all the Communists, bent on creating a new world order. And yet, what the documents on this period reveal is peasants' almost unbelievable readiness to seek a middle ground with the new Soviet authorities, along with repeated expressions of and insistence on their understanding of "soviet power."⁴

² A. G. Egorov and K. M. Bogoliubov eds., *Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Sovetskogo Soiuz v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, vol. 2, 1917–1922 (Moscow: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1983), 199–201; and M. I. Ksenzenko, *Zavershennia revoliutsiinykh zemelnykh peretvoren na Kharkivshchyni (hruden 1919 – berezen 1921 rr.)* (Kharkiv: Vydavnytstvo Kharkivskoho universyteta, 1968), 47–48. Two weeks later, at the Eighth All-Russian conference of the RKP(b), held on 2–4 December 1919, the resolution "On Soviet Power in Ukraine" was unanimously approved.

³ Cited in Jurij Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917–1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination*, rev.ed. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 256–57. The *Vseukrrevkom* was created in Moscow, as Soviet troops were marching into Kharkiv on 11 December 1919, by a joint meeting of the Presidium of the All-Russian Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. The *Vseukrrevkom* was to be the ruling body in Ukraine until the "Petliurists" and "White Guardists" had been completely removed from Ukrainian territory. See V. M. Volkovynsky and S. V. Kulchitsky, *Khrystian Rakovsky: Politychnyi portret* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury Ukrainy, 1990), 125.

⁴ In this article, I will use lower-case "soviet" to refer to peasants' use and understanding of the term, and capitalized "Soviet" to refer to its use by the emerging Soviet state. One might prefer to

Some of the most illuminating sources on this issue are the records of the "non-party" peasant conferences (*bezpartiini selianski konferentsii*), which were first held in February 1920, about two months after the Red Army's return. These conferences have been largely overlooked as a source. Soviet historians either mentioned them only in passing as evidence of the peasants' support for the new regime,⁵ and the new land law in particular, or dismissed them as poorly organized, "kulak-infested" affairs, not expressing the views of the poor and middling peasantry.⁶ Indeed, this interpretation sprang from the sanitized official reports produced *after* the conferences. But if one looks a little deeper into the documents, and especially at the available stenographic records, quite a different picture emerges. These conferences were in some sense "non-party," more literally "without parties" (*bezpartiina*), which did not mean that no parties were represented, but that all "legal" parties were. The term "non-party" seems to have referred only to the presumed political mindset of the peasants and not to the content or subject matter of the conferences themselves. Party representatives from the KP(b)U, Borotbists, Borbists, and Left Socialist Revolutionary Internationalists spoke at these conferences, presenting peasant delegates with political alternatives on the current situation, the new land law, and food-requisition policies. More important, unlike most later, massive, Communist-led assemblies, these conferences were *not* well orchestrated affairs. Thus the conferences' records reveal much about peasants' attitudes toward the authorities, their own ideas about "soviet power," and how it should be organized at this crucial historical juncture.

The reasons the KP(b)U gave for calling these conferences were expressed in a circular to all Party organizations from the head of the Department for Work in the Village (Otrabsel), V. Nevsky, dated 26 December 1919. Nevsky explained that "a necessary condition for our successes in the rear and at the front is the participation of the wide labouring masses in Soviet construction and our Party life." The conferences were to be both a forum for propagandizing to peasants the importance of Soviet power and for attracting them to help in "Soviet construction," the rebuilding of the economy, and the implementation of the Party's policies. Nevsky explained in great detail how the conferences were to be carried out, stressing intensive preparation. Before calling the conferences, Party workers were to determine local conditions and attitudes and to consider the more general military and political situation. They were to carry out exhaustive agitational and propaganda work before and during the election of conference delegates. Party leaders at the county (povit) level were to prepare reports well in advance, stressing all the good that Soviet power was doing for the people, the importance of the Red Army's victory over the counter-revolution, that its defeat meant the return of the landlords (pany), and finally, that only with the peasants' energetic help and support could the Red Army accomplish this task.⁷

use Ukrainian "*rada*," since most peasants in Ukraine were Ukrainian speakers. However, I almost never encountered documentary evidence of peasants in Kharkiv province or elsewhere in Ukraine using "*rada*."

⁵ For examples, see M. I. Kulichenko, *Bolsheviki Kharkovshchiny v borbe za vlast sovetov (1918–1920 gg.)* (Kharkiv: Izdatelstvo Kharkovskogo universiteta, 1966), 188; and K. K. Shyian and S. Ya. Ostrovsky, *Mynule i suchasne sela* (Kharkiv: Kharkivske knyzhkove vydavnytstvo, 1963), 129.

⁶ See Ksenzenko, *Zavershennia revoliutsiinykh zemelnykh peretvoren*, 56.

⁷ *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika*, 83–85; quoted in full in I. P. Voloshchuk, M. A. Rubach, et al., eds., *Radianske budivnytstvo na Ukraini v roky hromadianskoi viiny, 1919–1920: Zbirnyk*

Unfortunately for the Party, these instructions appear to have had very little impact on the conferences' progress. Ambiguity over what the centre meant by "non-party" gave peasants the opportunity to employ their own interpretations of the conferences' purpose. The clearest example of this clash of interpretations occurred right after the conferences began across the province. At the opening of every county conference the local party organizers presented to the peasant delegates a presidium composed of the leaders of the county's party organizations (mostly Communists), and in every case the peasants rejected it.

The most emphatic example occurred at the Kharkiv county "non-party" peasant conference that began in Kharkiv (the centre of Communist support in Ukraine) on the morning of 8 February 1920. In his opening speech to the 322 assembled peasant delegates, comrade Nakonechny, one of the province's leading Bolsheviks, informed the delegates that this conference had been called "in order to hear the voice of the peasants, to observe here those shortcomings that were made in the localities, and to take measures on this account to solve these questions as the peasants express them." The conference was called from "the thick [*tolshcha*] of those 'non-party' peasant masses who, closest of all, clash with the very question of life." The peasants were to discuss the most crucial questions in order that the authorities might better resolve those questions so that the peasants would come to understand that "worker-peasant power is their own authentic power. And that it was created for them, by them, and from them. Hence, comrades, I wish you happy success in the resolution of our questions (applause)."⁸ Nakonechny then presented the proposed presidium's members, who had been nominated "by the agreement of the [party] fractions" in advance and who included three "Communists-Bolsheviks," two "Communists-Borotbists," two from a "group of non-party [*gruppa bezpartiinykh*]" delegates,⁹ and one Left Socialist Revolutionary Borbist.¹⁰ With considerable overconfidence he then stated: "in order that we do not spend a lot of time here on these elections, I propose that you confirm this presidium."¹¹

The clamorous melee that Nakonechny's words provoked cannot be recounted here in detail; it lasted the entire first day, late into the night of the evening session.¹² Most

dokumentiv i materialiv (Kyiv: Akademiia nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, 1957), doc. 12, pp. 31–35 (quotations on 31). Elections were to be carried out in phases, from the village assembly to the county conferences with a ratio of one representative per five thousand citizens.

⁸ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kharkivskoi oblasti (hereafter DAKhO), f. R-202, op. 2, spr. 19, ark. 4.

⁹ It seems that a group of peasants had secured sufficient numbers before the conference opened to elect leaders to represent them.

¹⁰ This is not the place to discuss the intricate political and programmatic differences amongst the political parties, which the new regime allowed to operate legally at this time. I should note, though, that by early 1920 the KP(b)U had formed an alliance with the Left SRs and the Borotbists; see James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 59. The Borotbists' basic programmatic difference from the KP(b)U was their desire to create a truly independent Ukrainian Soviet republic with a separate army and administration; See Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine*, 271.

¹¹ DAKhO, f. R-202, op. 2, spr. 19, ark. 4.

¹² In the stenographic report this took up 47 single-spaced, tightly typed pages: DAKhO, f. R-202, op. 2, spr. 19, ark. 4–51.

peasant delegates opposed the pre-selected presidium; in expressing their opposition they revealed much about their interpretations of the conference's purpose and the political situation in general. A few quotations from them will suffice:

Comrades, I myself think that if this is our peasant conference that has gathered here, then we must ourselves elect the presidium, but we do not have to elect that [presidium] proposed to us. If we choose from our own midst, then we will know whom we elect....

[another]: I will add to what the previous speaker said that if you [party leaders] provided the liberty [*svobodu*] to gather today, then could you please [*budte dobri*] give us the freedom [*voliu*] to elect the members of the presidium from amongst ourselves, those whom we ourselves propose? Once we, non-party [peasants], have gathered, then we must express our will. So be good and give us the will to propose non-party [peasants] to the presidium....

[another]: We must elect those people who will express the voice of the people and not vote for any kind of party, and therefore we should elect from among the conference [participants] and not from parties.¹³

Re-entering the fray and attempting to re-establish order, Nakonechny tried to explain "normal conference procedure" to the delegates. He claimed that all conferences were carried out in this way, noting the examples of the recent Kharkiv "non-party" workers' conference and the working women's conference (then taking place right next door). It was simply more efficient and less time-consuming to elect the predetermined presidium. Moreover, those already proposed were also "from the conference"; they were "just like you, who have come forth here, but they can better conduct the meeting of our conference than just anyone." He noted that there were in fact two "non-party" delegates on the proposed presidium. If the peasants chose from amongst themselves, then, he predicted, "from the 36 *volosti* [rural districts of Kharkiv county] there would be no fewer than 36 candidates," and in the end "happence people [*sluchainye liudi*]" not capable of leading the conference would end up on the presidium.¹⁴

Not heeding Nakonechny's plea, from his seat the very next speaker, retorted, "It seems to me that this presidium that has already been nominated is not from this conference, but from separate groups [*ot otdelnykh grupp*], because many people did not participate [in their nomination]; everyone is here and we must elect the presidium from our own midst."¹⁵ After him another peasant spoke at length; he concluded: "we need those representatives who know our peasant life, those who will stand up for our peasant interests."¹⁶ After several more attempts by Nakonechny to control the debate, still another peasant expressed what must have been a common feeling among the delegates: "The thing is that you [the party leaders] say that we [the peasants] or someone who we propose will not be able to direct the conference. But what sense is there in that if on the presidium [only] parties' representatives will be sitting, [and] who will speak while the people will sit and listen. You ask [us] why

¹³ DAKhO, f. R-202, op. 2, spr. 19, ark. 5-7. As will become clear, to the peasants "the conference" meant the peasant delegates, and definitely not the party leaders.

¹⁴ DAKhO, f. R-202, op. 2, spr. 19, ark. 7-8.

¹⁵ Ibid., ark. 8. It seems that the conference organizers held a meeting the previous day at which the proposed presidium was chosen. Most of the peasant delegates were not at that meeting.

¹⁶ Ibid., ark. 10.

we are afraid of party representatives we would approve, but we ask you: why are you afraid of those peasants we would elect [?]"¹⁷

Thus continued the debate for many hours, the peasants certainly not speaking in unison but universally opposing the party list. Moreover, they repeatedly drew a distinction between "we"—the peasants (the "non-party" or "the conference") and "you"—the parties. Eventually some peasant delegates began proposing alternative methods for electing the presidium: some suggested simply that each candidate from the proposed party list step forward and say who he was and from where so that the peasants could determine whether he was "of them" (*svoi*) or not. Others proposed that new "non-party" candidates be nominated "from the conference" and voted on individually. Finally, someone proposed that a recess be declared so that all representatives from each *volost* could gather together and select one candidate from amongst themselves; then those thirty-six *volost* representatives would gather and select the presidium. When Nakonechny managed to stop the debate and put his proposed pre-selected party list and the three other proposals to a ballot, the first three received very few votes, but the last proposal—to elect by *volost*—was "accepted unanimously."¹⁸

After a recess Nakonechny presented the new presidium, composed of seven "non-party" delegates, to the conference.¹⁹ Not only all party leaders, but even the two peasant delegates representing the "non-party group" in the originally proposed presidium were not elected, perhaps tainted by their association with the parties. Surprisingly, many peasants were still not satisfied, complaining that of the thirty-six *volost* representatives chosen, only seven ended up on the presidium. Expressing the fear that those seven delegates would only speak and fight for the interests of their own *volost*, several peasants demanded that each of the newly proposed presidium's members step up to the podium, say who he was and, "recount his own biography," as one peasant put it.²⁰ In the end, however, the overwhelming majority of the delegates confirmed the non-party presidium as a whole.²¹

The peasant delegates elected to the Zmiiv county conference were also confused about the meaning of the term "non-party." An official report on this conference claimed that "kulaks" manipulated this misunderstanding in order to sneak their representatives into the conference, thus explaining the undesirable outcome.²²

¹⁷ Ibid., ark. 11.

¹⁸ Ibid., ark. 13.

¹⁹ Ibid., ark. 14. These were: M. Kovalenko, D. Zakharchenko, S. Tomakh, D. Semenenko, F. Verizhenko, B. Derecha, and E. Dolgoruchenko.

²⁰ Ibid., ark. 15.

²¹ Ibid., ark. 22–24, 51. Actually, this was not quite the end of it. After a short break, the party leaders convinced the newly elected presidium to ask the conference to allow five party members (three Bolsheviks, two Borotbists, and one Borbist) onto the presidium while preserving the chair position for a "non-party" peasant. After more debate the parties' "additions" were accepted unanimously except for seven abstentions.

²² Of course, only those who wrote this report knew what they meant by "kulak elements." As was pointed out some time ago, the term "kulak" (*kurkul* in Ukrainian) signified "in any particular period, different things amongst the Bolsheviks themselves" (Moshe Lewin, "Who was the Soviet Kulak?" *Soviet Studies* 18, no. 2 [October 1966]: 191). In general, the Soviet authorities used this term to label and criminalize any peasants who resisted or challenged them, regardless of those

Strangely, the same report provided data contradicting the "kulak" accusation by listing the party and social breakdown of the delegates: ten "Communist-Bolsheviks" with twenty-five sympathizers, five Borotbists with five sympathizers, and three Borbists with five sympathizers. The rest were "non-party" delegates: twenty "poor peasants," thirty "kulaks," and "about 150" "middling peasants."²³ During the elections to the presidium the "kulaks" had supposedly argued that because the conference was composed of "non-party" delegates, the presidium must be "non-party" as well. The conference delegates rejected the list of candidates proposed by the three party fractions and instead elected "unsuitable people" to the presidium.²⁴ By contrast, the stenographic report on the same conference noted: "all Communist Bolsheviks were consciously rejected, because before the election each candidate was asked about [his] party affiliation [*partii nosi*]."²⁵ In fact, two party leaders were eventually elected to the presidium: Lobanov (a Communist), chair of the county *revkom* (revolutionary committee), and Levchenko (a Borbist). However, "under complicated circumstances," during which "all possible exclamations [*vozglasy*] were poured down on Lobanov, such as, 'Go away! There is the road,'" they quit the presidium. The next day, 7 February, at the party leaders' insistence—"almost in the form of an ultimatum"—a compromise was reached, and the delegates re-elected the presidium. The new presidium was composed of two Bolsheviks, one Borotbist, one Borbist, and three "non-party" individuals.²⁶

Long debates about the presidium's composition occurred at every county conference. However, that some conferences eventually accepted a presidium that included party members suggests that these peasants wished to be heard, to feel they were in control of the conference, but that they also saw a need to co-operate with party leaders.

After the peasant delegates finally elected their own presidiums, the county conferences moved on to discussing what was referred to as "the current moment." Under this topic KP(b)U leaders sought the peasants' confirmation of "Soviet power" and their ruling position, but the debate often widened into a discussion of how power should be organized in Ukraine. The most radical position on this issue was taken at the Bohodukhiv conference, about which regrettably little information has

peasants' economic or social position. For a similarly styled report on the Bohodukhiv conference, see DAKhO, f. R-202, op. 2, spr. 18, ark. 16.

²³ Ibid., ark. 19. The report claimed that because the mandate forms of many of the delegates had not yet been confirmed in the localities, it was not possible to confirm how many kulaks "concealed their property positions." Unfortunately I have not yet managed to uncover any other data on the conference delegates' social position or on how they were elected. It does seem that all of them were male and knew some Russian; they were likely literate and mostly leaders of village and *volost* communal assemblies.

²⁴ The deputy chairman, Bocharov, was described as "an old man, a speculator from Chuhuiv *volost*, who constantly complained about a wagon of salt that had been taken from him" (Ibid., ark. 19–19ob). The term "old man" was frequently employed as a euphemism for "kulak," probably because most of the wealthier people in the village who controlled the *skhod* (village assembly) were older men. Those using the label may also have hoped in this way to appeal to younger men, anxious to get away from their old patriarchs.

²⁵ Ibid., ark. 25.

²⁶ Ibid., ark. 19ob.

survived. Revealing the great influence of the Borotbists in this county, the conference resolved that "Ukraine, with its socio-economic and politico-national particularities, should constitute itself as a separate national economic organism and can be developed successfully only when it will have its own Ukrainian ruling centre."²⁷ The first task of the Ukrainian proletariat and poor peasantry was proclaimed to be "the creation of a united Ukrainian ruling centre, which will be subordinate only to the Third Communist International and a United Ukrainian Communist Party."²⁸ It should be made clear that this was the only county conference at which national independence played an important role.

At all the other conferences, for which we have much better documentary records, debate on the "current moment" centred around whether to trust the new Soviet government, "the Bolsheviks," and party intellectuals in general. At the Valky county conference, after the Communists had laid out their position and the other party leaders had criticized them at length, peasant delegates launched into another protracted and critical debate.²⁹ In the end the parties proposed two different resolutions, but peasant delegates refused to accept either; instead they proposed electing a commission of five delegates to work out a separate resolution. The peasants' resolution proposed a rather eclectic set of new measures: the complete abolition of the death penalty; the establishment of a united revolutionary front of political and economic equality for workers and labouring peasants; the creation of a "united revolutionary front of left-socialist soviet parties" (clearly bemoaning the party leaders' mutual mudslinging); and the establishment of a barter system (*tovaroobmin*) and labour exchange (*trudoobmin*) between the city and the village. In addition, this resolution recognized as "essential the existence of a strong regular Red Army under the united supreme command of Soviet Ukraine and [Soviet] Russia, tightly bound in a single, revolutionary discipline." Almost all peasant delegates accepted their commission's resolution; most of the party leaders abstained from voting.³⁰

One of the most revealing debates occurred at the Kupiansk county non-party conference, following a speech on the current moment by the Communist Sazonov, who called on poor and middling peasants "to unite in fraternity with the workers" in reconstructing the ruined economy and helping to consolidate soviet power.³¹ The peasants' responses suggest that they were either not listening very closely to the party leaders' speeches or had other priorities. Delegate Yevremenko, the first to speak after

²⁷ On the Borotbists' influence in Bohodukhiv county, see: DAKhO, f. R-431, op. 1, spr. 3.. ark. 13. This fond should contain the protocols of the Bohodukhiv "non-party" peasant conference, but they are missing; nor is it in f. R-203, op. 1, spr. 129, which is supposed to contain the protocols of meetings of Bohodukhiv county's soviet organs, conferences, congresses, and so on. I was not able to find any further references to the Bohodukhiv "non-party" conference anywhere in the DAKhO.

²⁸ DAKhO, f. P-1, op. 1, spr. 141, ark. 2.

²⁹ Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh orhaniv Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAHO), f. 1, op. 20, spr. 269, ark. 23.

³⁰ DAKhO, f. R-89, op. 1, spr. 173, ark. 1-2. Delegates attending the Izium county conference expressed similar distrust toward the Bolsheviks and the county *revkom*, and they also drafted and passed their own resolution on the current moment. See Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vldy ta upravlinnia Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAVO), f. 2, op. 1, spr. 827, ark. 11-13, originally cited in Voloshchuk and Rubach, *Radianske budivnytstvo*, doc. 114, 201.

³¹ DAKhO, f. R-203, op. 1, spr. 144, ark. 137.

Sazonov, asked the party leaders why the county remained under martial law, and he proposed that the conference pass a resolution for the swift election of executive committees of soviets (instead of the imposed revolutionary-military committees). Then a delegate named Honchar declared: "tsarism has ended, but in place of tsarism someone is again oppressing us worse than tsarism." A delegate named Popov disagreed, stressing that under tsarism they had been treated like cattle: the power of the people had been proclaimed in 1917, but in fact it still did not exist, and he warned that if workers continued to act separately from peasants, "there will never be any understanding." Obviously perplexed by the proceedings, a delegate named Hryhorenko then asked why the conference had been called. A delegate named Shapovalov complained that although the dictatorship of the proletariat had been ruling ("tsarstvuet") since October 1917, peasants continue to be oppressed: "Peasants were oppressed by the Whites, [and] they were oppressed by the Reds. Peasants are like cattle." He insisted that the *revkoms* stand "on the side of the revolution, and not the dictatorship. We peasants have not seen freedom since 1 October 1917." Demanding that the peasant conference not disperse until it had called for the immediate election of executive committees, he concluded: "as long as there will be a military dictatorship, there will be evil." One peasant delegate complained about "the food-supply agents' 'merciless requisitions'; another, that party members were receiving privileges, such as riding in the heated cars on trains. Party leaders tried to call peasants to unity and to support the new regime, but they had no success.³²

The third crucial issue discussed at these conferences—the new land law—was the one question on which peasants expressed general agreement with the party leaders. Almost all non-party delegates approved of the new law, though a few did express concern about confiscating lands belonging to "kulaks."

At all county non-party conferences it was the government's next position—on food supply—to which peasants most unequivocally objected. Bolshevik leaders stressed the disastrous state of the economy and the sacrifices peasants had to make to restore it, mainly by supplying food to workers to enable them to rebuild and construct new industries. The leaders proposed three crucial measures: (1) a monopoly on all necessities; (2) the elimination of speculation and free trade in these items; and (3) the well-planned, state-controlled distribution of them among workers and labouring peasants. They stressed that much of what was requisitioned would be used to feed Red Army soldiers and "the starving workers of the Donbas," and that the burden placed on poor and middling peasants would not be great, "because the grain and forage will be taken mainly from the kulaks' surpluses."³³

When party leaders opened up the issue to debate, however, peasant delegates immediately began listing numerous arbitrary and unjust actions food-supply agents had committed while requisitioning. At the Kupiansk county conference, for example, a delegate named Dralov complained that an agent, Stadnik, had shot one of his *volost's* best breeding bulls. A delegate named Pleskach reported that in his *volost* agents had arrested the chairman of the *revkom* and held him hostage in a cold barn until the mostly poor peasants delivered all the requisitioned grain. Others confirmed his story, especially noting the activities of one agent, Galygin, who had been seizing

³² Ibid., ark. 138.

³³ Ibid., ark. 150–50 zv.

grain from the poor and arresting those who refused to give. A delegate named Sazinov complained that "agents seize almost everything and, besides, do not protect the people's wealth." Warning that the agents' behaviour would only lead to disaster, he accused the authorities of ignoring these abuses. Emboldened by these complaints, a delegate named Gerasimov declared: "all agents are the same." He especially objected that when the agents arrived, they did not allow the peasants to call an assembly to decide whether to give grain or not.³⁴

The Communist Party leaders became increasingly frustrated with the delegates' complaints and unwillingness even to discuss what the leaders thought was the central issue. A Communist, Ruban, demanded that delegates stop conversing amongst themselves and focus instead on the food-supply question. Another Communist, Liuksenberg, admitted that mistakes had been made and that many of the delegates' complaints and censures were just. He stressed, however, that Soviet power was at a crucial moment when whether "soviet power will remain on the map or not" would be determined. The Communist Sazonov was granted the final word in the debate: he claimed that the delegates had not criticized the essence of his party's position and that to allow free trade would mean "to sign the death sentence of Soviet power." He then read out the Communists' resolution on food supply, noting the three main points, and concluded with a call to "all for whom Soviet power, the power of peasants and workers, is dear, to execute their sacred duty before the valiant Red Army and all toilers and to surrender surplus grain to the state food-supply organs."³⁵

Delegate Tur, who had assumed the role of the peasants' leading spokesman, then stepped up to the podium and pointed out that the Communists' resolution would install "the laws of Great Russia, but in Ukraine these laws are not acceptable to us." He proposed (as usual) that the delegates form a committee to work out their own resolution. The Communists reacted with great frustration. Liuksenburg insisted that "we must decidedly know whether you support Soviet power's policy on the food-supply question or not. Once you recognize Soviet power and [its] state [and] that you will support it in everything, clearly you must accept and implement all the principles for the construction of Soviet power and in particular the food-supply question." The majority of delegates acquiesced to this near ultimatum, but a few still insisted on changes and noted other agents' abuses. The conference eventually accepted the Communists' resolution with some minor amendments.³⁶

At other conferences intense debate on the food-supply question led to some concessions, but when Communist leaders insisted, the delegates gave in. The peasant delegates at the Izium county conference refused to vote for the Communists' resolution; instead they elected a forty-eight-member commission to draft their own resolution, but twelve hours later the latter was still unable to do so. A second commission was then elected consisting of twenty-seven members; it managed to draft a resolution proposing that free trade be allowed, but that there be an intensive struggle against speculation. However, when the county *revkom* leaders (all Communists) pushed peasants to decide between their resolution and "the return of the counter-revolution," most delegates rejected their own resolution and voted for the *revkom*'s

³⁴ Ibid., ark. 150 zv.-51.

³⁵ Ibid., ark. 151-52; quote on 152.

³⁶ Ibid., ark. 152 zv. and 153.

after gaining acceptance of a few important amendments: food-supply agents were to calculate a *volost's* requisition quota based on the amount of land sown and not the *volost's* total arable land; and they were to take into account Red Army detachments' requisitions and determine universal standards for requisitioning raw versus milled grains.³⁷ In a sense, the peasant delegates had forced the party leaders to regulate the requisitions with greater precision, and they let the authorities know that demands they considered unjust would not be tolerated.³⁸

The food-supply question was also hotly debated at the Kharkiv county conference. Peasant delegates insisted so strongly on consulting with their constituents that eventually the conference was forced to take a week-long break so that delegates could go home and discuss the question with their voters. After this recess and party leaders' failed attempts at regaining control of the conference's presidium, the peasant delegates proposed and then adopted their own resolution, which placed numerous conditions on the Communists' proposals. Eventually a Communist named Sosnovsky managed to convince the peasants to admit the necessity of fulfilling the food-supply quotas as an amendment to their resolution. But the debate did not end there. On 25 February the peasant-chairman, Tomakh, managed to get one more amendment into the final resolution: "those *volosti* that do not possess the forces to fulfill the assigned requisition quota will have the right to petition about decreasing the quota or about its complete removal."³⁹

Clearly the sources on these conferences reveal several aspects of peasants' attitudes toward the new regime at the moment of its final assumption of power in Ukraine. First, at these conferences peasants sought to take the new regime's propaganda at its word. The conferences were supposed to be "non-party," and peasant delegates repeatedly resisted the election of a presidium pre-selected from amongst party leaders. Second, the delegates' resistance to these leaders' rule over the conferences suggests their great and continuing distrust of non-peasants, and of political parties in particular. Third, peasant delegates at some conferences expressed ideas that suggest an emerging sense of national consciousness amongst some delegates. Probably, largely as a result of exposure to the Borotbists' ideas, perhaps even at the conferences themselves, these peasants were beginning to get a sense of themselves as part of a Ukrainian nation extending beyond their very local village lives. Fourth, peasant delegates expressed a near-universal approval of the new land law because it gave them most of the land, did not force them to redistribute their own land, and forbade all coercion in the creation of collective farms. Fifth, almost all peasants strongly resisted the food requisition policy proposed at the conference, often obtained major concessions, and sometimes replaced it with their own resolution. Finally, when party leaders demanded that peasants choose between their numerous disagreements with soviet power and support for the latter, the peasants consistently chose compromise. Although they disagreed with a number of the new regime's policies and

³⁷ Voloshchuk and Rubach, *Radianske budivnytstvo*, doc. 114, 201–202; and "Informatsiia Khar'kivskoho hubkomu KP(b)U pro robotu povitovykh bezpartiinykh selianskykh konferentsii. Liutyi 1920 r.," cited from TsDAVO, f. 2, op. 1, spr. 827, ark. 11–13, and TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 2, spr. 366, ark. 4–6.

³⁸ Voloshchuk and Rubach, *Radianske budivnytstvo*, doc. 114, 203–204.

³⁹ TsDAVO, f. 5, op. 1, spr. 166, ark. 32; and DAKhO, f. 202, op. 1, spr. 21, ark. 102.

actions, they still preferred it to the most easily imaginable alternatives—the return of the Whites or the Germans.

Unfortunately, Communist leaders seem to have paid very little attention to these peasant delegates' many and varied criticisms, comments, and protests of party policies and, at the same time, not sufficiently appreciated peasants' willingness to compromise for the sake of soviet power. As official summaries of the non-party peasant conferences suggest, these leaders wrote off these conferences as "kulak-infested," unwilling to believe that poor and middling peasants would "consciously" object to their policies or have different ideas of how "soviet power" should be organized. In late spring 1920 the head of the Kharkiv Provincial Soviet's information department sent the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs a report on these conferences, claiming that they had been characterized by "the struggle of kulaks with the poor." He boldly stated that the clearest evidence that most of the conference delegates were "kulaks" was their "attitude toward the Communists during the election of the conference's presidium." In other words, class position did not determine one's political views; rather, one's political views determined one's class. The department head noted that the Communists' food-supply resolutions in particular had provoked "bitter arguments , and in the majority of cases, if they were not outright rejected, then they were accepted with great changes, mainly concerning the necessity to preserve free trade, supposedly temporarily." Claiming that the main reason for these problems at the conferences was that "the village was still not differentiated" between poor peasants and kulaks, he recommended intensive work in the village and the organization of committees of not well-off peasants instead of a second attempt at the non-party peasant conferences.⁴⁰

Hence, one of the major conclusions one might draw from these non-party peasant conferences is that the "great misunderstanding" between the peasants of Ukraine and the Communists of the Worker-Peasant Government of 1919, which Andrea Graziosi has well described,⁴¹ was only one of many similar misunderstandings that were never really cleared up by either side. One of the main results of these misunderstandings, and especially the regime's insistence on implementing its food-supply policy, was a large number of violent peasant uprisings across Ukraine, beginning in April 1920 and continuing (off and on) until 1924, at least in Kharkiv province.⁴² Somewhere inside such evidence there lies the basis for imagining an alternative historical scenario. Peasants were interested in and willing to support some form of soviet power and a socialist program, but they were also looking for a compromise with the regime. The Communists were simply not capable of making such compromises or listening to peasants' frequently conciliatory positions. The result was a protracted period of repeated government requisitions that provoked peasant uprisings followed by violent suppression.

⁴⁰ TsDAVO, f. 5, op. 1, spr. 166, ark. 32 zv.

⁴¹ Andrea Graziosi [Graziosi], *Bolsheviki i krestiane na Ukraine, 1918–1919 gody: Ocherk o bolshevizmakh, natsional-sotsializmakh i krestianskikh dvizheniakh* (Moscow: Airo-XX, 1997); and idem, *The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1996).

⁴² For reports on outbreaks of what the regime called "banditry" continuing to the end of 1924 in Kharkiv province, see DAKhO, f. R-200, op. 1, spr. 59, ark. 131 and 133 (for statistics).

Concerning the establishment of Soviet power, then, perhaps the best that can be said is that an uneasy and ambiguous "truce" slowly and unevenly took shape between the Soviet authorities and the villagers. Peasants never did obtain what they called "soviet power"—control over their daily lives and work, "free trade," and the right to dispose of the fruits of their labour as they saw fit. And they certainly did not receive freedom from outside interference. One could argue that such dreams could not have been realized by any of the governments pretending to power in this space and time. If Ukraine and Russia were to modernize, peasants had to become modern citizens and come to grapple with an intrusive and pervasive state. However, the approach and methods of this "Worker-Peasant Government," even this second-time returned, reformed, and more conciliatory version, did little to appease the peasants and much to provoke them. In response, peasants complained loudly, resisted fulfilling and delivering desperately needed and insistently demanded foodstuffs, deserted from the Red Army, and, when pushed sufficiently, rose up against the government they had once thought shared their understanding of "soviet power." The regime responded with violence, greater attempts at infiltrating the villages and dividing the peasantry, and, eventually and, begrudgingly, with the New Economic Policy—a less than complete compromise. The violence eventually waned, but an understanding between peasants and the Party was never really achieved. The temporary "truce" would not last through even the first renewed attempts at forcing peasants onto collective farms. The results would prove disastrous, most of all for the peasants themselves, so many of whom died of starvation in the famine of 1932–33.



Доктор Фауст. Мотиви історіософії Освальда Шпенглера в літературній публіцистиці Дмитра Донцова

Оля Гнатюк

Кожен рядок, написаний не для того, щоби служити
активному життю, вважаю марним.

Освальд Шпенглер,
«Песимізм?»

Тільки «Європа», тільки Захід виховує фаустівську
душу, що робить її господарем світу.

Дмитро Донцов,
«Фауст контра Драгоманов»

Активізм як один зі складників концепції інтегрального націоналізму Дмитра Донцова бере початок у тогочасній європейській думці, на якій спиралися праві, зокрема й націоналістичні ідеології. Вплив філософії Освальда Шпенглера на формування європейських націоналістичних ідеологій є незаперечним. Про зв'язок Шпенглера із розвитком цієї течії написано багато, натомість майже недослідженим залишається вплив його історіософії на концепцію української історії та культури 1920-х років. Дослідники звертали увагу передовсім на твори, особливо на памфлети Миколи Хвильового. Тільки двоє канадських дослідників – Роман Рахманний¹ (Роман Олійник) та Мирослав Шкандрій² – вказали на безпосередній зв'язок Донцова з філософією Шпенглера. Дещо більше уваги цьому питанню приділив польський історик Томаш Стрик³.

Шпенглерова праця «Сутінки Європи» відіграла важливу роль у перебігу тогочасної дискусії про європейськість української культури. Тут одразу слід зауважити, що Шпенглерову візію історії, що постала одразу після поразки німців у Першій світовій війні й мала чітке завдання щодо німецької нації, українські мислителі в різні способи достосовували до потреб ситуації, в якій опинилась їхня власна нація, а трансформації, котрим піддавали концепцію Шпенглера, часом бували такі докорінні, що з цієї концепції залишалась лише діагноза ситуації західної культури – тієї, що неминуче котиться до занепаду.

¹ Роман Рахманний, «Дмитро Донцов і Микола Хвильовий, 1923–1933», в його кн. *Роздуми про Україну. Вибрані есеї та статті, 1945–1980* (Київ: «Просвіта», 1997), 506–507.

² Myroslav Shkandrij, *Modernists, Marxists, and the Nation: The Ukrainian Literary Discussion in the 1920s* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992).

³ Tomasz Stryjek, *Українська ідея narodowa okresu międzywojennego. Analiza wybranych koncepcji* (Wrocław: Funna, 2000), 181–88.

Прикметно, що автори, особливо сучасники Шпенглера, використовуючи саме цей елемент із його історіософії, піддають інтерпретації назву його головної праці – «Der Untergang des Abendlandes» («Сутінки Європи», польською – «Zmierzch Zachodu», російський переклад 1923 року «Закат Европы») як «запад» або «падіння»⁴ Заходу. Подібно робив Донцов, вибірково трактуючи ідеї Шпенглера. Однак, на противагу до українських письменників і критиків, які ототожнювали себе з марксизмом, а також до тих, хто належав до течії неослов'янофілства, він був далекий від пророкування кінця західної цивілізації. Як пише Томаш Стрієк, «Німецький філософ представив ... ідеї боротьби “білої раси”, або ж Європи (під проводом Німеччини) з “кольоровою”, себто Росією, слов'янами й балтійцями. У такий спосіб він запропонував ідею месіянства Німеччини на Сході, а Донцов використав її, вдавшись лишень до географічного – на Україну – зміщення (“східний рубіж Заходу”»)⁵.

На Шпенглераві твори посилялися вельми часто, проте у досить довільний спосіб інтерпретували його концепцію. Від початку 1930-х до кінця 1980-х років в Союзі Радянських Союзів Шпенглера трактували як предтечу фашистської ідеології⁶, що було очевидним надужиттям, бо його катастрофізм не міг узгоджуватись із обов'язковим історичним оптимізмом націонал-соціалістів. Так само й у Польщі під кінець 1930-х років висловлювали переконаність у тому, що погляди Шпенглера становили «якщо не підстави, то в кожному разі дуже поважні стимули розвитку ідеології націонал-соціалізму»⁷. Автор єдиної польської монографії, присвяченої німецькому історіософу, висловив переконаність, що «політичні ідеї Шпенглера становлять *topoi* всякої антидемократичної думки у Ваймарській Республіці»⁸. Найобгрунтованішим здається визнання Шпенглера як одного з перших представників течії так званого революційного консерватизму⁹, що шукав третьої дороги поміж марксистським соціалізмом і демократичним лібералізмом. Стосунок цього напрямку до фашизму не був однозначний, хоча легко можна вказати на ідеї, якими згодом скористалась гітлерівська пропаганда, що не означає, нібито можна ототожнювати фашистську ідеологію з поглядами Шпенглера та інших представників революційного консерватизму (Юнгер, Гофмансталь, Шмітт) або й його попередників (Ніцше).

⁴ Освальд Шпенглер, «Падіння Заходу», *Основи*, 1997, № 33 (11): 123–32.

⁵ Stryjek, *Ukraińska idea narodowa*, 188.

⁶ Шпенглера критикували не лише представники офіційної ідеології. Аж ніяк не офіційний письменник Андрей Платонов 1938 року у рецензії «Нашестя саламандр» Карела Чапека писав: «Сучасний фашизм широко використовує книжки Шпенглера як філософію володарів та ідеологію фіорерів, як засіб тиску тих, хто працює, як знаряддя їх прогресуючої експлуатації, що веде людей до духовної та фізичної смерті» (А. Платонов, «Размышления писателя», с. 192, цит. за: Adam Pomorski, *Duchowy proletariusz III Przyczynek do dziejów la-markizmu społecznego i rosyjskiego kosmizmu XIX–XX wieku [na marginesie antyutopii Andrieja Platonowa]* [Варшава: OPEN, 1996], 242).

⁷ Zygmunt Lempicki, «Oswald Spengler», в його кн. *Wybór pism*, т. I (Варшава: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), 44.

⁸ Andrzej Kolakowski, *Spengler* (Варшава: Wiedza Powszechna, 1981), 121.

⁹ Wojciech Kunicki, «Wprowadzenie», в кн. *Revolucja konserwatywna w Niemczech, 1918–1933*, упор. Wojciech Kunicki (Познань: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1999), 81.

Найважливіша Шпенглерова праця, «Der Untergang des Abendlandes», перший том якої побачив світ 1918 року, в рік, коли закінчилась Перша світова війна, а другий – 1922 року, була видана в період, що був величезним потрясінням для Німеччини – після воєнної поразки та, як наслідок, втрати значної частини території. Катастрофічна візія історії, провіщення швидкого занепаду останньої великої цивілізації, представлена у Шпенглера, не постає, однак, безпосередньо з аналізу політичної ситуації, в якій опинилась Німеччина після Першої світової війни. Як доводить у своєму дослідженні бельгійський історик ідей Едвард Вергофштадт, «основна ідея і часткова її розробка датуються ще передвоєнним часом»¹⁰. Отож можна припустити, що до величезного успіху, що його зажила ця книжка як у Німеччині, так і за її межами, спричинилося не так те, що Шпенглер вписав свою візію в образ реальної поразки Німеччини, як те, що вона побачила світ тоді, коли суспільні настрої сприяли візіям такого ґатунку, а бажання мати філософську інтерпретацію кінця часів серед читацької публіки було величезне. Ось як описує тогочасну інтелектуальну атмосферу Томас Манн у напрочуд критичній рефлексії на «Сутінки Європи»: «Прощається читання. І люди читають не для розваги або одурманення, але задля правди, аби духовно озброїтися. В інтересах публіки “красне” письменство у вужчому значенні поступається літературі критично-філософській, експериментові духу»¹¹.

У цій діагнозі – виразні аналогії до тогочасної ситуації в Східній Європі. Про історіософію Шпенглера інтенсивно точилися дискусії не лише в Німеччині, але й в міжвоєнній Речі Посполитій і в СРСР. Його ідеї «були живо присутні в європейській гуманітаристиці (у тому числі й польській) у міжвоєнні роки»¹². Вони стали поживою для європейського катастрофізму, співтворячи, а може навіть формуючи інтелектуальну атмосферу 1920-х років.

Філософія Шпенглера виростає з течії, критичної до філософії позитивізму й спирається на німецьку філософію життя. Безпосередніми попередниками Шпенглера були Ніцше, Дільтей і Бергсон. Метафізичну настанову його концепції історії становило переконання про єдність космосу й універсальних законів, що керують життям: народження і смерті, появи та загибелі, початку і кінця всіх речей. Шпенглер у якомусь сенсі переносив історію в сферу природи, представляючи біологістське розуміння історії, в філософії якого всі форми життя підпорядковані тим самим законам, що й органічна природа: «проминання, виникнення і зникнення є формою всього, що реальне: від зірок, долі яких не можемо відгадати, аж до аморфної людської маси на нашій планеті. Індивідуальне життя тварини, рослини чи людини так само минуче, як життя народів і культур. Кожне творіння підпорядковано занепаду, кожна думка, кожна дія, кожен винахід – забуттю. Скрізь довкола нас можна відчутти втрачені історії великої долі. Всюди перед нашими очима лежать руїни давньої історії змертвілих культур»¹³.

¹⁰ E. Verhofstadt, «Oswald Spengler – Tomasz Mann: Spotkanie na nizinie», *Literatura na świecie*, 1977, № 11: 360.

¹¹ Thomas Mann, «O nauce Spenglera», *Literatura na świecie*, 1977, № 11: 346.

¹² Andrzej Kołakowski, «Wstęp», в кн. Oswald Spengler, *Historia, kultura, polityka: Wybór pism* (Варшава: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1990), 6.

¹³ Spengler, *Historia, kultura, polityka*, 36–37.

Історія людства була для нього лише моментом у перспективі історії космосу. Все живе мусить пройти необхідні стадії розвитку, від народження і молодості через зрілість до старості, відмирання і смерті. Ці універсальні закони проявляються в динаміці двох форм буття: *Dasein* і *Wachsein*, себто існування несвідомого, вегетативного, рослинного та існування свідомого, тваринного та людського. Існування несвідоме має ритм і напрямок, натомість існування бадьоре – напругу і протяжність. Властивістю першого є періодичність, друге ж характеризує полярність. У дослідженні «Людина і техніка» з протиставлення *Dasein* і *Wachsein* Шпенглер виводить опозицію поміж травоядами й хижаками, яка виявиться засадничою розрізнявальною ознакою в філософії Донцова.

У своїй концепції Шпенглер поєднав два порядки – біологічний і аксіологічний, при чому «цінності, що закладають культуру, виявляються цінностями “життя”, вкоріненими біологічно»¹⁴. *Liebensphilosophie* має у Шпенглера крайній прояв: «Ідея життя скрізь має подібну внутрішню форму: плодіння, народження, ріст, в’янення, відмирання – ідентичну від найменшої інфузорії аж до могутньої культури»¹⁵. Основою культури, котру розуміють як цілість, є, відтак, явища несвідомого існування. В процесі розвитку культури з’являється напруга поміж ними та явищами свідомого існування – витворами людської діяльності. Розквіт культури настає коли вони перебувають у стані рівноваги. Коли ж ці другі явища здобувають перевагу, перші натомість поступово відмирають, настають їх сутінки. Переважання явищ свідомого існування притаманне для останньої стадії розвитку культури, усвідомлюваної як одне ціле, а цією останньою стадією, стадією сутінків культури, є цивілізація¹⁶. В усіх цивілізаціях, що зникають, з’являється імперіалізм і цезаризм, а в діяльності особистостей – агресивна активність і відчайдушний героїзм. На чолі держави, коли культура перебуває в стадії розквіту, стоїть монарх; а коли вона входить у період занепаду – вождь і диктатор. Саме цей Шпенглерів мотив особливо радо підхоплював Донцов.

У загальній історії Шпенглер виокремив вісім високих культур: вавилонську, єгипетську, китайську, індійську, мексиканську, античну, західноєвропейську та російську. Як стверджує філософ, вони є автономними й ізоморфними, хоча їхні історії мають аналогічний розвиток. Ці культури є виразником трьох душ: магічної (перші п’ять), аполлонівської (культура стародавньої Греції та Риму) і фаустівської (західноєвропейська культура). Цей поділ походить із філософії Ніцше («Народження трагедії») та розрізнення аполлонівського й діонісійського первнів, безперервна боротьба яких додає європейській культурі драматизму. Автор «Сутінків Заходу» прямо покликається на Ніцше¹⁷, однак запроваджує нове поняття замість двох стихій – душу аполлонівську й фаустівську; витвором цієї другої є західна культура. Фаустівську культуру характеризує динамізм і активізм. Шпенглер здійснює явне перенесення властивостей описуваної так культури в засяг германської культури; західна культура, культура фаустівська, виявляється формацією, природа якої є німецькою. Як стверджував Анджей Колаковський, шпенглерівські «символи

¹⁴ Kolakowski, *Spengler*, 8.

¹⁵ Oswald Spengler, «Problemy metafizyczne», в кн. Kolakowski, *Spengler*, 150.

¹⁶ Kolakowski, *Spengler*, 66.

¹⁷ Spengler, «Dusza kultury», в кн. Kolakowski, *Spengler*, 224.

фаустівської культури вводять нас у коло типових “*völkische*” ідей, що витають у німецькій культурі від доби романтизму»¹⁸. В межах західноєвропейської культури він протиставляє північну, протестантську позицію південній, католицькій позиції; приписує римський родовід першій і, навпаки – стародавніх римлян наділяє пруськими рисами. Поняття фаустівської культури, Фауст як символ європейськості, з'являється мало не в усіх українських есеїстів того часу: від Донцова і Хвильового до, здавалося б, таких далеких від постромантичних концепцій нації авторів, як Богдан-Ігор Антонич або Микола Зеров.

Початок кінця західноєвропейської культури Шпенглер вбачає у Французькій революції, з її гаслами свободи, рівності й братерства. Уособленням першого є Франція, другого – Англія, третього ж – Німеччина, при чому в його уявленні свобода символізує розклад, яскравим виявом чого є сходження Франції з арени історії. Негативно оцінює Шпенглер і французьку просвітницьку філософію, а також ренесанс. Символом величчя західної культури для нього є готика.

Багато уваги Шпенглер присвячує також російській культурі та пов'язаними з її розвитком небезпеками. Його переконаність у тому, що в майбутньому, після «сутінків Європи» може розпочатися динамічний розвиток російської культури, здається, виростає не так зі спостережень, як із читання російських панславів¹⁹, особливо з праці Ніколая Данілевського «Росія та Європа» (1869), автор якої, представник біологістського розуміння історії людства, виділив десять окремих цивілізаційних утворень, що розвиваються за однаковими законами, а проте є цілком ізоморфними. В концепції Данілевського Росія мала виконати свою цивілізаційну місію через об'єднання всіх слов'янських народів і синтез чотирьох елементів, що разом складають велич попередніх цивілізацій. Шпенглер не був захоплений такою візією. У праці «Пруський дух і соціалізм» він пише: «хоч би якими глибокими були духовні, а отже, релігійні, політичні й економічні суперечності поміж британцями, американцями, французами, порівняно з російськістю вони зливаються в один замкнутий світ... Справжній росіянин нам духовно так само чужий, як римлянин із часів імперії чи китаєць із далеких доконфуціанських часів, який раптом з'явився би серед нас»²⁰. Саме таке протиставлення західної та російської культури особливо охоче експлуатував Донцов, хоча цю процедуру він уперше здійснив за кілька років до 1919 року, коли було видано цитовану працю Шпенглера²¹. Донцов, безсумнівно, знав твори Данілевського, про що свідчать безпосередні посилання²². Шпенглерові вислови про молодшу російську культуру використали у своїх концепціях так звані євроазіяти в Росії, а також Микола Хвильовий, який здійснив характерне перенесення акценту з культури російської на українську.

¹⁸ Kołakowski, *Spengler*, 105.

¹⁹ Шпенглер ніколи не покликався безпосередньо на Данілевського, однак історики ідеї стверджують, що такий вплив справді був. Пор. Pitirim Sorokin, *Modern Historical and Social Theories* (New York: Dover, 1963), 73–82.

²⁰ Spengler, *Historia, kultura, polityka*, 228.

²¹ Уперше Донцов висловив свої антиросійські погляди в праці *Модерне москвофільство* (Київ: накладом автора, 1913).

²² Пор., напри., Донцова «Крок вперед (До “літературного” спору)», *Літературно-науковий вістник*, 1926, № 10: 182–89.

Після появи першого тому «Сутінків Європи» Шпенглерові закидали крайній песимізм. Відбиваючи закиди («Песимізм?», 1921), філософ дещо уточнив свою концепцію, стверджуючи, що він оперує поняттям «сутінки» в значенні доповнення. Це відкрило дорогу месіяністським інтерпретаціям²³, а в пізніших політичних творах Шпенглера можна знайти додаткове підтвердження резонансності цього вчинку. Під час Другої світової війни, пишучи «Дух нашої давнини», Донцов також звернувся до месіянізму. Шпенглер увійшов в історію філософії як катастрофіст. А однак не виглядає на те, щоби цей принциповий для його історіософії мотив знайшов продовження в українських філософів. На перший плян вийшов месіянізм, який у Шпенглера найвиразніше проявляється в розвідці «Пруський дух і соціалізм». Як стверджує Колаковський, «метафізична візія космосу, що пульсує споконвічним ритмом, візія історії, вписана в цей ритм, виявляються – врешті-решт – рамкою для означення месіянстичної ролі німецького народу, виконання з честю і гідністю його місії “доповнення”, “увінчання” ходу західноєвропейської культури.... Гадана теорія виконує функцію міту»²⁴.

Ні Донцов, ні Хвильовий не представляли своїх поглядів на місію народу та його місце в усезагальній історії як зв'язну концепцію, базовану на якихось теоретичних передумовах. А однак вони обоє багато завдячують Шпенглерові особливо в цьому питанні. Переконаність у місії, яку має виконати власна нація перед лицем всезагальної кризи європейських цінностей, живила багатьох тогочасних філософів. Проте Донцов (а слідом за ним і Хвильовий) творчо використав Шпенглерові концепції у своїх творах, при чому – на що звернув увагу Томаш Стрик – в період Другої світової війни Шпенглерові ідеї чимраз дужче проникають у філософію Донцова²⁵.

Після такої презентації головних мотивів філософії Шпенглера спробуємо подивитися, як їх використовує і змінює Донцов. В інтерв'ю із поетом і есеїстом Юрієм Кленом, датованим 1933 роком, редактор «Вісника» стверджував: «Щодо Шпенглера ... я не цілого Шпенглера приймаю. Шпенглера – автора “хижаків і траводів”, Шпенглера – погромцю “фелагства” і т.зв. “пролетарської революції” – приймаю без застережень. Але іншого – не зовсім. По перше, ніяк не можу писатися на його зневажливу критику Англії, яку (Англію) я вважаю за найкращий витвір теперішньої цивілізації»²⁶. Вже з цих слів виразно видно, що Донцов вибірково сприймає твори Шпенглера, відкидаючи, зокрема, критику політичної культури Заходу і, відтак, його історичний песимізм. Подібно, як в інших випадках, він і тут є еkleктиком, запозичуючи погляди про сенс історії в історіософії Гегеля; а проте здійснює модифікацію, замінюючи раціоналізм Гегеля на ірраціоналізм, а також додаючи біологістські елементи, взяті з Ніцше.

²³ Пор. напр.: «Це власне ми, сучасні західноєвропейці, маємо втілити останні можливості, що містяться в нашій культурі і не є до кінця реалізованими, а серед нас саме німці покликані їх втілити». (Spengler, *Historia, kultura, polityka*, 11).

²⁴ Kolakowski, *Spengler*, 13–14.

²⁵ Stryjek, *Ukraińska idea*, 188.

²⁶ Роман Рахманийн, «Дмитро Донцов і Юрій Клен, 1933–1939», в кн. *Ювілейний збірник Української вільної академії наук в Канаді*, упор. Олександр Баран, Олег В. Герус і Ярослав Розумний (Вінніпег, 1976), с. 120; цит. за: Роман Рахманийн, «Дмитро Донцов і Микола Хвильовий», 507.

Донцов приписував культурі особливу роллю, вважаючи, що саме з неї розпочнеться процес національного відродження; ба більше: на його думку, без повноцінної культури не може існувати здорова нація. У публіцистиці він присвячував більше уваги тавруванню культури, на його думку неповноцінної, яку він означував як «провансальську». Поезія Провансу символізувала, за його твердженням, параліч культури, брак достатньої волі до життя її творців і самої нації. За аналогією, Донцов у цей спосіб окреслював явища українського культурного та політичного життя, несвідомі або недостатньо свідомі головної мети свого існування та діяльності, себто здобуття незалежності. Цю політичну мету Донцов уважав абсолютним виявом українськості; лише в незалежному бутті остаточно буде зреалізовано місію нації. Провансальські риси він убачав як у політичному житті, так і в українській культурі. Близький Донцову Євген Маланюк означував аналогічні явища значно безпосередніше – малоросійськістю, комплексом Гоголя, або ж «недоукраїнськістю», словом, у ширшому контексті, коли йдеться про явища європейської культури, недостатньо сформованою національною свідомістю. Представникам «провансальської» течії – а в його інтерпретації ними були всі сучасні політичні опоненти, а також їхні ідейні попередники – приписано риси, які в Шпенглера пов'язані з «траводіними» – приреченими на те, щоби бути жертвою. У своїй критиці української культури редактор «Вістника» стверджує, що стан культури є віддзеркаленням стану національної свідомості – «провансальства», що передає світогляд пасивних «траводів».

Протилежністю для «провансальства» в розумінні Донцова було «фаустівство», або ж, у Шпенглеровій термінології, фаустівська культура, що є синонімом (у розумінні цих філософів) європейської культури. Для Донцова це вірець, до якого має прагнути українська культура, вірець, часто протиставлюваний убогості українського культурного та політичного життя²⁷, що символізує назва одного з есеїв «Фавст контра Драгоманов». Риси представників фаустівської культури у Донцова відповідають шпенглерівському «хижакові».

Третім елементом, що виконує функцію контрапункту, була російська культура, що, в розумінні Донцова, є втіленням зла й азійського варварства. Внаслідок кількасотрічної належності українських земель Російській Імперії, як стверджує Донцов, бацilia російської культури підточує здорове тіло української культури. Отже, як видно, в концепції українського публіциста існують два полюси: Росія – Європа. Автор однозначно оцінює елементи цієї схеми: Росію ототожнює із гнобленням духу й нації, Європу ж потрактовує як символ свободи духу. Україна, з рації свого геополітичного розташування, приречена на вибір поміж Росією та Європою. Традиція уповноважує визнати Україну як «східню стіну Заходу», тому всі прояви узалежнення («провансальства») Донцов вважає за зраду як традиції, так і історичної місії України.

У праці «Націоналізм», написаній 1926 року, Донцов найповніше виклав і обґрунтував ідею дихотомічного поділу націй. Стверджуючи, що війна є батьком усіх речей, він визнавав, що сильні особистості завжди прагнуть підкорити слабких. У цьому місці нас особливо цікавить питання класифікації націй – на підкорені й ті, які підкорюють, пасивні й активні, вживаючи формулювань

²⁷ Пор.: Дмитро Донцов, *Націоналізм*, в його *Творах*, т. 1 (Львів: Кальварія, 2001), 171.

автора, нації «феллахів», «плебеїв», «рабів» (категорії, що відповідають поняттю «травоїдних» або ж Шпенглерівських «рослиноїдів») і нації «господарів», «володарів», «патрициїв» (категорії, що відповідають поняттю «хижаків»). «Травоїди», нації рабів, прагнуть до здобуття спокою, гармонії, стабілізації і вбачають у цьому найвищу цінність, так розуміють щастя. «Хижаків», нації «господарів», убачають свою мету в пануванні, в прагненні здобути владу. В бурхливих подіях, які принесла Перша світова війна, Донцов бачить шанс на те, що нація-плебей стане нацією-володарем²⁸. Ця переміна є для нього головною метою. Від того, до яких цінностей покликається література, на думку Донцова, залежить духовний стан нації, її воля до життя і самореалізації. Як він уважає, українські письменники, яких, з огляду на їхнє місце в суспільстві, він вважав проводирями нації, утікають від життя, є пасивними споглядачами, а не активними його учасниками, створюючи естетику рабів, найчастіше добровільних.

Пам'ятаючи про Шпенглерове протиставлення травоїдів і хижаків та приписувану їм відмінність духовного стану²⁹, подивимося тепер як Донцов достосовує цю опозиційну пару до потреб своєї літературної публіцистики. Як уважає редактор «Літературно-наукового вістника», тон українській літературі задає «травоїдна естетика». Сучасну літературу він називав літературою гречкосіїв, а також стверджував, що література, яка репрезентує лицарські ідеали, огорнуло цільовите забуття³⁰. Він таврував іділічне уявлення дійсності, філософію непритишення злу. Українські письменники – як він їх подає – шукають гармонії та спокою, вбачаючи в цих цінностях красу, тим часом як справжнє життя (і краса) проявляється в дисгармонії, суперечностях і боротьбі: однак творці втікають від нього, «замикаючись у анемічній красі свого естетичного гетто»³¹. Донцов вказав на причини цієї хвороби, що підточує організм нації та її культури, вже в есеї, написаному ще десять років перед тим, «Криза нашої літератури». Як він уявляв, причин було дві: внутрішня – психологія раба й властива йому пасивність, що породжує «декадентське розуміння краси», та зовнішня – невідповідність характерові епохи. Українській культурі бракує динамізму, волі життя. Митці не хочуть бачити красу в світі, в якому ніщо не є, а все стається, в якому панують суперечності, в якому – тут Донцов перефразовує Геракліта – «війна є батьком усіх речей»³². Як у давні часи, роздумує автор,

²⁸ Там само, 50.

²⁹ Пор.: «Хижак є найвищою формою вільного життя. Воно означає максимум свободи для інших і для себе, максимум відповідальності за себе, самотності, крайню необхідність утримувати себе при житті за посередництвом боротьби, перемоги та нищення. Високого рангу людському родові надає те, що він хижацький.

Оскільки доля травоїдних – стати здобиччю, вони, відтак, намагаються уникнути свого призначення, втікаючи без боротьби. Натомість хижак здобуває здобич. Життя цих перших є в найглибшій його суті оборонним, другого – наступальним, суворим, жорстоким, руйнівним.... У травоїдних індивідуальну й сильну душу заміняє множина, громада, спільні відчуття і діяльність маси. А чим менше потребуєш інших, тим сильнішим ти є.... Отож існує ... етика хижаків і етика травоїдних» (Spengler, *Historia, kultura, polityka*, 40–42).

³⁰ Дмитро Донцов, «Криза нашої літератури», *Літературно-науковий вістник*, 1923, № 4, цит. за його кн. *Дві літератури нашої доби* (Торонто: Гомін України, 1958; передрук: Львів, 1991), 48.

³¹ Донцов, «Наше літературне гетто», в його кн. *Дві літератури нашої доби*, 215.

³² Донцов, «Криза нашої літератури», в його кн. *Дві літератури нашої доби*, 48.

література могла гармонізувати із духом своєї епохи, так у часи величезних потрясінь і змін – не тільки у суспільному просторі, але й у сфері духу, в епоху «занепаду матеріалізму і народження ірраціонального, неспокійного прагнення того, що нове», такі тенденції є смертельно небезпечними для нації. Ця хвороба може знищити весь організм нації, роблячи його нездатним до опірності й неспроможним бути суперником іншим націям³³. Автор відмовляє від того, щоби гнатися за чужими взірцями, а натомість радить повернутися до власної, цієї «по-справжньому національної» традиції, повної героїчного патосу і духу звитяги. За позитивних культурних взірців для наслідування, яким є, зокрема, «Слово о полку Ігоревім», проглядає расистська ідеологія: «Хіба ж у цих героях, у цій мові, в цьому світогляді не вчувається завойовницько-хижацький дух білої раси, тієї білої раси, яка від [битви при] Пуатьє на каталонських землях, у наших степах – залізною рукою стримувала подібні походи монголів? Хіба ж це не є мова всіх конкістадорів, що завойовують континенти? Мова тих, кому належить світ?»³⁴.

Подібну мову вживав Шпенглер, пишучи про поділ на травоядів і хижаків у праці «Людина і техніка», але й значно радикальніші, ніж він, автори (Розенберг, Крік, Шефер), чий зв'язок із фашизмом аж надто очевидний, а також попередники фашизму, поміж інших Гіббон, Гобіно, Шальмайер. Зокрема, до цих останніх належав Г'юстон Чемберлен, англо-німецький філософ культури, який у праці «Die Grundlagen des XIX Jahrhunderts» обґрунтував «історичну місію арійської раси». У цитованому фрагменті Шпенглерівськими є «хижаки» і дух білої раси (інша справа, що, за Шпенглером, слов'яни не належали до білої раси; він зараховував їх спільно з балтійцями до кольорової раси). Замість означення «вікінги крові»³⁵, Донцов уживає «конкістадори», безсумнівно, будучи захоплений іспанськими завоюваннями Нового Світу і, з другого боку, прагнучи уникнути очевидної непослідовності. Бо ж вікінги (або ж варяги) завойовували й землі Київської Русі, про що йдеться в цитованому тексті Шпенглера, однак Донцов напевно хотів уникнути згадок про це, оскільки це руйнувало би його концепцію повернення до героїчних часів і забутої традиції давньої княжої Русі. У цьому фрагменті також звучить відлуння тези про вибрану расу (тут: білу, в основній версії расизму – нордичну расу) як расу господарів (завойовників світу) і єдиного в історії творця справжньої культури.

У раніше цитованій статті з 1932 року «Наше літературне гетто» Донцов пропонує за взірцем Шпенглерівської етики поділити й естетику, при чому старається наперед відбити атаки критики й можливе звинувачення в тому, що він приписує літературі службову роллю. Він робить це, вдаючись до аргументів Ніцше: цитує розлогі фрагменти «Невчасних роздумів». «Мистецтво як стимул життя» – до цього зводиться висновок, базований на Ніцше. Таку назву носить інша стаття Донцова, в якій він розправляється з автотелічним розумінням мистецтва та гаслом «L'art pour l'art»³⁶. У цьому місці видно, в який спосіб у

³³ Там само, 66–67.

³⁴ Там само, 67.

³⁵ Spengler, «Człowiek i technika», в його кн. *Historia, kultura, polityka*, 68.

³⁶ Донцов, «L'art pour l'art чи як стимул життя?», в його кн. *Дві літератури нашої доби*, 225–57.

Донцова філософія Ніцше поєднується із Шпенглеровою. Ніцше є суттєвим доповненням, а в питанні, яке нас тут цікавить, він відіграє роль незаперечного авторитету. Його погляди подано так, щоби визнати їх незаперечними та вагомішими супроти інших ідей філософів і письменників, що їх приймає Донцов³⁷.

Об'єднуючи поділ людей на «траводних» і «хижаків» із надлюдиною Ніцше, Донцов прикладає ці ідеї до літератури. Боротьба внутрішньої натури з природою, а не покірنا згода на довоколишню дійсність, і зміна, динамічний процес, а не тривання – ці суперечності, яким Донцов приписує, вслід за Шпенглером (і Гегелем), ціннісні характеристики, і далі вписані в естетичну концепцію. Нова етика для нього невіддільна від постульованої нової естетики в українській літературі: «ідея, про яку тут мова, це ідея естетики відважних людей, яку я протиставляю естетиці траводних.... Це естетика, що вже має в нас своїх герольдів і починає кристалізуватися як окремішнє течія; я назвав би її ново-романтизмом. Вона постає із нової (анти-траводної) етики нового покоління, котре відкидає “безпредметний культ терпіння”, а на життєві удари реагує як на “особисту зневагу”»³⁸. Художньому втіленню цієї своєрідної «естетичної теорії» Донцов присвятив чотири роки по тому розвідку «Трагічні оптимісти»³⁹, в якій, покликаючись на ніцшеанське «*amor fati*» як філософію відваги⁴⁰, він створив образ покоління героїчних творців, пов'язаного з «Вістником», що його він редагував. Донцов стверджував, що тільки в цій філософії є справжня краса. Парадокс у тому, що він пов'язував її з апокаліпсисом. Це один із небагатьох текстів Донцова, в якому з'являється візія кінця історії; можливо, він піддався сугестивній поезії та пророчим візіям такого близького йому і охоче згадуваного Маланюка. Здається, що менший вплив тут мав Шпенглерів катастрофізм. Однак безсумнівно, що постулати, які стосуються нової естетики в українській літературі, походять від Шпенглера. Порівняймо тональність двох фрагментів:

Маланюк, Клен, Теліга, Мосендз, Ольжич – і може, ще один або двоє – ось ці трагічні оптимісти, котрі побачили красу в героїзмі.... У кожную тему вони внесли *твердість, наполегливість, завзяття* і абсолютну відсутність пози: “горда земля”, “горді душі”⁴¹.

Твердість, римська твердість починає тепер панувати в світі. Швидко для чогось іншого вже не буде місця. Мистецтво – так, але в бетоні й сталі, поезія – так, але писана людьми зі сталевими нервами й нещадним поглядом, релігія – так, але бери співаник, а не Конфуція на черпаному папері, і йди до церкви, по-

³⁷ Безсумнівно, Ніцше не був незаперечним авторитетом для Донцова. Донцов, вочевидь, не приймав критики історичного мислення, яку здійснював Ніцше, та його спротив філософії Гегеля. За Ніцше, історична свідомість може бути головною підставою інертності особистостей. Донцов не міг би погодитися з таким поглядом, а проте в жодному зі своїх творів він не критикує Ніцше; вдається до своєї стратегії: вибирає поміж поглядів Ніцше ті, які можуть бути придатні для його цілей.

³⁸ Донцов, «Наше літературне гетто», 224.

³⁹ Донцов, «Трагічні оптимісти», в його кн. *Дві літератури нашої доби*, 279–85.

⁴⁰ Пор.: «Боротьба внутрішньої природи із зовнішньою вже не відчувається як нещастя ... але відчувається як великий сенс життя, який облагороджує – так думав Ніцше: *amor fati*» (Spengler, «Człowiek i technika», в його кн. *Historia, kultura, polityka*, 43).

⁴¹ Там само, 284. Курсив мій – О. Г.

літика – так, але здійснювана державними діячами, а не реформаторами світу. Ніщо інше береться до уваги⁴².

Донцов подає це протиставлення в категоричний спосіб, стверджуючи, що існують дві літератури, спрощено – література слабких людей, рабів, і література людей вільних і сильних, що слід однозначно пов'язувати із концепцією надлюдини Ніцше. Бачення нової літератури, що виникає на руїнах старої, неспроможної задовольнити виклики нової епохи, візія літератури, що формує людей чину, супроводжувала Донцова від миті, коли він очолив редакцію «Літературно-наукового вістника». Вольове зусилля, напруга, динамізм – це, за Донцовим, елементи, необхідні для того, щоб українська література стала повноцінною. Не до кінця зрозуміло, якому етапові розвитку культури в загальному сенсі, виділеному в Шпенглера, відповідала би описувана так культура. Бо ж Донцов не впроваджує розрізнення між культурою та цивілізацією як запанування етапу розвитку культури; напевно, для нього це було другорядне питання в Шпенглеровій концепції. Безсумнівним, однак, є те, що принцип протилежностей, що його він приймає, постійної боротьби цінностей, вкорінення у «житті», і явищ, створюваних людьми, вказує на стан рівноваги між цими полюсами, що у Шпенглера характеризує високі культури в повноті розквіту⁴³.

Те, що у творах історіософа є описом минулого стану речей (рівновага протилежностей), у Донцова відповідає постульованому станові, що його принесе недалеке майбутнє. Візію цієї майбутньої культури, в якій запанують нова етика й естетика, передано за допомогою метафори; назва статті – «Наше літературне гетто» – відсилає читача до поняття, пов'язаного із непроникністю, автаркією. «Ця нова етика й естетика – тільки вони – зруйнують мур нашого гетто, яким, до певної міри, ми добровільно себе оточили». Донцов не випадково використав поняття «гетто», а не «загумінок», або повсюдно вживане в літературній дискусії в Советській Україні «просвіта» як синонім автаркічної позиції, закритості до всіх впливів іззовні. Підсилюючи негативно забарвлені означення та протиставляючи їх цінностям, що мають принести бажані зміни, автор свідомо маніпулює емоціями. Наскільки тривожні це були зусилля свідчить завершення статті: «І на равнині із гетто, як і на саме гетто, прийде колись кінець». Звісна річ, не можна відчитувати ці слова через призму воєнного досвіду та Голокосту, оскільки це було би надужиттям: автор використовує цю метафору в середині 1930-х років. Але складно не визнати, що такого штибу вислови співтворили атмосферу чимраз більшої ненависті й взаємних упереджень у 1930-х роках.

Із дихотомічним поділом на «траводів» і «хижаків» у Донцова безпосередньо пов'язана категорія фаустівської культури, часто означувана як фаустівська людина або ж фаустівська душа (за Шпенглером) або ж дух Фауста (Хвильовий). Цій культурі Донцов приписує такі властивості, як активність, експансивність, індивідуалізм, неспокійний дух, себто якості, аналогічні до тих, що їх приписують «хижакам». У Шпенглера⁴⁴ цей зв'язок не є таким безпосереднім: «кожний

⁴² Spengler, «Pesymizm?», в його кн. *Historia, kultura, polityka*, 100.

⁴³ Spengler, *Historia, kultura, polityka*, 9.

⁴⁴ Пор.: «Аполлонівською відтепер називатиму душу античної культури, яка обрала чуттєво присутнє, індивідуальне тіло як ідеальний тип для того, що протягне. Від часів Ніцше це означення зрозуміле кожному. Протиставляю їй фаустівську душу, символом якої є чистий,

із цих культур приписують як ті властивості, що були характерні для несвідомого існування та "життя", так і ті, що їх приписували існуванню в бадьорому стані та цивілізації⁴⁵. Як пам'ятаємо, «травойдні» у Шпенглера були приречені на те, щоби бути жертвою, пасивна покірність долі, а «хижаки» були творцями своєї долі. Людина, що належить до фаустівської культури, має нечисленні риси, що їх приписують несвідомому існуванню (*Dasein*) та декілька рис, важливих для «життя»: динамізм, активність та історичність. Риси існування в бадьорому стані (*Wachsein*), що їх Шпенглер приписує людині фаустівської культури – це самосвідомість, самотність до безкінечности, внутрішня розірваність, драматизм.

Найповніше риси «фаустівської людини» Донцов виклав у праці «Націоналізм» (1926). Томаш Стрик, аналізуючи це питання, виділяє шість елементів, що разом складають Донцовський зразок людини: волюнтаризм і антиінтелектуалізм; революційність і антипацифізм; романтизм, догматизм та ілюзіонізм; фанатизм і аморальність; потреба синтезу націоналізму й інтернаціоналізму; «творче насильство» та визнання авторитету «ініціативної меншости»⁴⁶. У публіцистичних текстах і есеях того періоду часто зринає ця проблема, проте в більш «літературній» формі. Автор покликається безпосередньо до фаустівської легенди, вбачаючи в демонізмі позитивні цінності й стверджуючи, що «негативний полюс творчої сили, що править світом» – це, за своєю природою, рушійна сила всіх великих справ, а жоден геній не може без неї обійтися. В есеї «Крок вперед» (1926), опублікованому того ж року, що й «Націоналізм», а отже, ледве через кілька років після виходу «Сутінків Європи», що починаються з повторення – майже *ceterum censeo* – підставової для Донцова ідеї – необхідности розірвати зв'язки з російською культурою та повернутися до Європи і тим самим долучаючись до головного стрижня літературної дискусії в Україні, автор оприявнив власне розуміння фаустівської людини та культури, яку вона творить. Ними були нестримне прагнення до майбутнього, потяг до слави, до вираження себе, до панування, до подолання всіх перешкод, що стоять на дорозі до цих цілей. Саме цих рис, на думку редактора «Вістника», була позбавлена українська література. До цього начебто спричинилися народники та послідовники Драгоманова, тим самим позбавляючи українську культуру і саму націю прагнення до майбутнього. Цей есей присвячено якраз аналізу негативних рис української культури. Бажані якості, загальні в європейській культурі, з'являються лишень у нечисленних представників української культури (Шевченко, Леся Українка). Решта залишаються вірні ліризмові, не оживленому навіть щонайменшим духом бунту, або ж бездарно копіюють те, що, на думку Донцова, є самою есенцією європейської культури – демонізму і прометейзму.

Донцов, спрощуючи концепцію Шпенглера, вважав, що життя складається з двох первнів – активного та пасивного, з маси і сили⁴⁷, а українські творці

безмежний простір, а «тілом» є культура західніх країн, що розквітла в Х столітті водночас із народженням романського стилю на нордичних рівнинах поміж Лабою і Тахо» (O. Spengler, «Dusza kultury», розд. 3, ч. 2, в його кн. *Zmierzch Zachodu*, т. I: цит. за: Kołakowski, *Spengler*, 224).

⁴⁵ Kołakowski, *Spengler*, 103.

⁴⁶ Stryjek, *Ukraińska idea*, 173.

⁴⁷ Д. Донцов, «Фавст проти Драгоманова», в його кн. *Наша доба і література* (Львів, 1936); передрук. в його кн. *Дві літератури нашої доби*, 40.

культури добровільно відмовилися від активізму. У такий спосіб вони прирекли націю на пасивне буття (зване у Шпенглера несвідомим буттям) і позбавили його головної творчої риси: індивідуалізму, роблячи, внаслідок цього, з народу безвольну масу, суспільство, неспроможне прорватися до незалежності. Головною причиною Донцов уважав брак волі. Це характерне для Донцова переплетення ідей трьох філософів: Гегеля (велика нація – історична нація), Ніцше (воля сили) та Шпенглера (сприйняття історії та політики як сфери сильних творчих особистостей). Цей філософський еклектизм веде безпосередньо до націоналістичної ідеології. Здатність нації накинати свою волю, диктувати умови в стосунках із іншими націями, Донцов уважав виявом її життєвої активності й необхідною умовою збереження національного буття.

Погляди Донцова на це питання не вирізнялися нічим особливим на європейському тлі. Нація, потрактовувана як основна цінність, що має метафізичне обґрунтування, як і її потяг до самореалізації – себто створення сильної держави за допомогою всіх доступних засобів – це категорія, спільна для всіх європейських націоналізмів.

В есеї «Росія чи Європа», що був своєрідним підсумком літературної дискусії в Советській Україні, Донцов тісніше пов'язує фаустівську людину, яку бачить як двигун, що є рушієм західної цивілізації, з поняттям раси. Туга за великим призначенням, повсякчасні поривання і розмах волі, вже приписуються не фаустівській людині й не нації, але європейській расі (у Шпенглера – білій расі). Донцов тут здійснює цікаву річ: бажаючи приписати Україні європейські риси, – також із перспективи теорії раси, – він впроваджує варязький елемент, раніше оприявлений у Маланюка – як у поезії, так і в есеїстиці. У такий спосіб варягів (нормандців) було визнано прапращурами українців, що в дусі теорії раси робить із них білу расу, до того ж расу германську.

Донцов вдається до порівняння, базованого на аналогії до фізичних процесів. Українська нація – а точніше її душа – перебуває в стадії кристалізації довкола варязького первня, проте хаос і безлад, що їх впроваджує російська культура, перешкоджають національній структурі «застигнути». Єдиним методом, завдяки якому може відбутися процес кристалізації (читай: оздоровлення душі) є «перетоплення її у вогні та залізі тієї європейської культури, в якій викувалась чудова й сильна душа європейця, яка любить впорядковувати життя за своїм уподобанням»⁴⁸.

Напередодні Другої світової війни Донцов звернувся до іншого символу. Дух Фауста, вочевидь, виявився занадто поетичною метафорою як на часи, що вимагають чину. У публіцистиці Донцова це місце займає нова метафора – середньовічного лицарського закону, що був префігурацією партії фашистського типу⁴⁹. Члени цього ордену є людьми, що вже пройшли етап гартування, незламні, наділені рисами, що прикметні для каст ватажків. Нахненні спільною ідеєю, вони мали прищепити її загалові. В часи Другої світової війни цей середньовічний мотив здобуде центральне місце в концепції Донцова. Захоплення середньовіччям, виникнення Руської держави, має обґрунтування не лише в історіографічній традиції, але й у тогочасних поглядах, поширених у німецькій

⁴⁸ Д. Донцов, «Росія чи Європа», в його кн. *Наша доба і література*, 85.

⁴⁹ Д. Донцов, *Партія чи орден?* (Львів, 1938).

історіософії, зокрема у Шпенглера, який вбачав у середньовіччі зразки, варті наслідування в сьогоденні. Його підхопили сучасні ідеологи. На думку Йоганна фон Леєрса (von Leers), нацистського ідеолога расизму, нордична раса подарувала світові, поміж іншого, лицарську ідею середньовіччя, романський стиль і готику, великих гуманістів Відродження, поезію Данте, Шекспіра й Гете, а також сучасну техніку.

Зачарування Донцова середньовіччям як взірцем величі та сили культури було помітне від початку 1920-х років⁵⁰. Найбільше уваги він присвятив героїчному епосові «Слово о полку Ігоревім» і лицарській етиці, яка в ньому проявляється. В поетичних образах цього твору він віднаходив символи панування, війни, життєвої енергії, себто риси, приписувані фаустівській культурі. Донцов стверджував, що повернення до цих джерел відновить велич української культури: «Динаміку і порив, волю минулих віків, коли люди ще думали, що *toute la vie est dans l'essor* – треба воскресити в собі нашої літературі! Лише поворотом до великих споминів нації, коли вона не терпіла, а творила, жила не квилінням і мрією, а волею і чином, – залагодимо і кризу нашої літератури, яка є лише частиною загальнонаціональної кризи»⁵¹. У праці «Дух нашої давнини» (завершена 1943 року, видана в Празі 1944-го), ґрунтуючись на Шпенглерівській конструкції раси, Донцов творить нову концепцію відродження, цього разу базовану на середньовічному ідеалі лицаря, члена касты, «творця культури та імперії».

Зв'язки Донцова зі сучасною йому європейською філософією не є достатньо досліджені. Подібно як Унамуно або ж Еволі, йому приписували – і небезпідставно – пропагування фашистської ідеології. Хоча він був не політиком, а ідеологом і вправним публіцистом, та для прихильників націоналістичного руху він став харизматичним духовним провідником. Багато хто заплатив життям за відданість ідеям, що проповідував Донцов. І лише дуже нечисленні поклонники Донцова спромоглися згодом на критичну переоцінку.

Запозичена в Шпенглера метафора Фауста, що символізувала культуру Заходу, така важлива в міжвоєнній публіцистиці та концепції «трагічного оптимізму» Донцова, стала віссю, навколо якої оберталися українські літературні дебати 1920-х років. Водночас вона стала і префігурацією долі цієї формації.

⁵⁰ Див. Д. Донцов, «Криза нашої літератури», в його кн. *Наша доба і література*, 67–68.

⁵¹ Там само, 68.

The “Zborni” of Khortytsia, Ukraine: The Last Stop for Some Kulaks En Route to Stalin’s Special Settlements

Colin P. Neufeldt*

In his review of *Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture*, John-Paul Himka wrote:

Ukrainian history has been nation-centered, not state-centered history. If the Ukrainian people is the subject of a historical narrative, then a story peculiar to another people is just a digression, something that does not fit.... It has always been a problem to incorporate within national narratives the story of others, except when they are the “others” that are important as opponents and as nations against which the history-writing nation defines itself.¹

In making these comments Himka was reiterating some important observations that Johan Dietsch recently made about how Ukrainians have dealt with the Jewish Holocaust and the 1932–33 Famine in Soviet Ukraine (now often referred to as the Holodomor). According to Dietsch, Ukrainians have not come to terms with the Holocaust, and as a result they have had trouble integrating the Holocaust into the history of Ukraine. One reason for this, writes Dietsch, is that Ukrainians view the millions of Jewish victims of the Holocaust as being in “competition” with the millions of Ukrainian victims of the Holodomor, an event often interpreted in Ukraine and elsewhere as an act of state-sponsored genocide.² Using the Holodomor,

* The author thanks Lynette Toews-Neufeldt, Serhy Yekelchuk, and the anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions in preparing this article.

¹ John-Paul Himka, review of Johan Dietsch, *Making Sense of Suffering: Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukrainian Historical Culture*, and Stanislav Kulchytsky, “Holod 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraini iak henotsyd / Golod 1932–1933 gg. v Ukraine kak genotsid,” *Kritika* 8, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 686.

² See, for example, L. Stakhniv-Diachenko, “Novyny z Ligy proty zneslavlennia ukrainskoho imeny,” *Svoboda*, 10 June 1980; Peter Borisow, “So-called Omissions in the Ukrainian Famine Bibliography,” <eposhta.com>, 22 May 2003; Georgii Kasianov, “The Holodomor and the Building of a Nation,” *Russian Politics and Law* 48, no. 5 (September–October 2010): 32f, 40; Ivan Katchanovski, “The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides in Orange Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no.6 (August 2010): 982; Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “‘Capital of Despair’: Holodomor Memory and Political Conflicts in Kharkiv after the Orange Revolution,” *East European Politics and Societies* 25 (2011): 603; Glenn Sharfman, “The Quest for Justice: The Reaction of the Ukrainian-American Community to the John Demjanjuk Trials,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 2, no. 1 (2000): 68ff, 78; Johan Öhman, “From Famine to Forgotten Holocaust: The 1932–1933 Famine in Ukrainian Historical Cultures,” in *Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Cultures in*

Ukrainians, he says, have created their own "victimization narrative" and are generally not interested in integrating the Holocaust into the Ukrainian historical narrative because this "would seriously undermine the whole tragic conceptualisation of the Ukrainian past."³

Himka's and Dietsch's comments about Ukrainian reluctance to incorporate narratives of "others" apply not only to the Holocaust and Holodomor, but also to other events in Ukraine's history. One such event is dekulakization, a campaign that was integral to state-sponsored collectivization of the Soviet countryside in the late 1920s and early 1930s and resulted in the purge of undesirable elements through extraordinary measures such as expropriation, arrest, imprisonment, exile, and execution. As is the case with the Holodomor, the dekulakization campaign in Ukraine has often been interpreted by Ukrainian historians as part of a larger anti-Ukrainian campaign initiated by the Stalinist regime to punish Ukrainians for past attempts to exert their nationalist aspirations. As a result, the story of dekulakization in Ukraine is often presented as a singular history of the Ukrainian people as victims; consequently, Ukrainian historians have largely ignored the dekulakization experiences of "others" or have given them short shrift.⁴

Contemporary Europe, 242, ed. Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003); John-Paul Himka, "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora," *Spaces of Identity* 5, no. 1 (April 2005) <www.univie.ac.at/spacesofidentity/_Vol_5_1/HTML/Himka.html>; idem, "A Central European Diaspora under the Shadow of World War II: The Galician Ukrainians in North America," *Austrian History Yearbook* 37 (2006): 26; Yuri Shapoval, ed., *The Famine-Genocide of 1932–1933 in Ukraine* (Kingston, Ont: Kashtan Press, 2005), i, ii, 6; Stanislav V. Kulchytsky, *Holodomor in Ukraine, 1932–33: Interpretation of Fact* (Kyiv: National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2008), 13ff; and David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (New York: Central European University Press, 2007), 59, 241ff, 303ff.

³ Dietsch, 170, as cited in Himka's review of Dietsch's *Making Sense of Suffering*, 686. See also Elena Ivanova, "Changes in Collective Memory: The Schematic Narrative Template of Victimhood in Kharkiv Museums," *The Journal of Museum Education* 28, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 17–22; Elena Ivanova, "Ukrainian High School Students' Understanding of the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 18, no.3 (Winter 2004): 402–20; and John-Paul Himka, "Obstacles to the Integration of the Holocaust into Post-Communist East European Historical Narratives," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 50, nos.3/4 (September–December 2008): 359–72.

⁴ See, for example, Volodymyr M. Danylenko, Heorhii V. Kasianov, and Stanislav V. Kulchytsky, *Stalinizm na Ukraini: 20–30-ti roky* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1991); Stanislav V. Kulchytsky, "Mizh dvoma viinamy (1921–1941 rr.)," in idem, ed., *Storinky istorii Ukrainy XX stolittia: Posibnyk dlia vchytelia* (Kyiv: Osvita, 1992), 61–104; idem, *Ukraina mizh dvoma viinamy, 1921–1939 rr.* (Kyiv: Vydavnychyi dim "Alternatyvy," 1999); Yurii I. Shapoval, *Ukraina XX stolittia: Osoby ta podii v konteksti vazhkoj istorii* (Kyiv: Heneza, 2001); Mykola M. Shytiuk and Anatolii M. Bakhtin, *Pivdenna Ukraina: Kolektyvizatsiia i holod, 1929–1933 roky* (Mykolaiv: Askel, 2007); and Petro Kardash, ed., *Zlochyn* (Melbourne: Fortuna, 2003). One Ukrainian historian who has researched ethnic minorities in Ukraine is Vasyl I. Marochko. He argues that living conditions in Soviet Ukraine's national raions in Ukraine in 1932–33 were not substantially different from those in Ukrainian communities. To my knowledge, however, Marochko has not examined the experience of ethnic minorities during dekulakization. See his chapter "Natsionalni menshyny v roky holodomoru," in *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraini: Prychyny ta naslidky*, 527–37, ed. V. A. Smolii et al. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2003); V. I. Marochko, ed., *Silskohospodarskyi soiuз na-*

But the history of dekulakization in Ukraine is not just a singular account of Ukrainians. It is more variegated than this and includes the history of non-Ukrainian ethnic minority groups whose experiences of what happened during the late 1920s and early 1930s do not always square with the Ukrainian version of anti-Ukrainianism. It may even come as a surprise to some historians that the majority of people targeted for dekulakization in some regions of Ukraine were not Ukrainians but non-Ukrainian ethnic minorities. Such was the experience of Mennonite kulaks (better-off peasants) living in four *zborni* (collection settlements) established in the Khortytsia German national raion situated along the Dnipro River near Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine.⁵ Located in some of the least desirable areas in the raion, the *zborni* served as transit settlements for many of the raion's kulaks after they were evicted from their homes and awaited exile to the Soviet government's *spetsposelki*—special kulak settlements in the northern and eastern reaches of the USSR. The raion's four *zborni* were populated almost entirely by one group of people in 1930: Mennonite kulaks. In fact, of the 452 individuals who were initially moved into the four collection settlements, 438 (96.9 per cent) were Mennonites.⁶ From these numbers one would expect that the raion was comprised almost exclusively of Mennonites. While Mennonites and ethnic Germans did constitute the largest ethnic group there in 1929—almost two-thirds of the approximately 19,700 residents—the Ukrainian community that formed the remaining one-third of Khortytsia raion's population largely avoided the dekulakization process during the first years of collectivization.⁷

These statistics call into question whether the singular interpretative approach of examining dekulakization in Ukraine solely from the perspective of ethnic Ukrainians is a reliable interpretive paradigm. This paper will show that it is not, because it fails to adequately explain the dekulakization experience of ethnic minorities in

shchadkiv hollandskykh vykhodtsiv na Ukraini (1921–1927): Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, Natsionalna akademiia nauk Ukrainy, 2000); and idem, "Holodomor v Ukraini: Prychyny i naslidky (1932–1933)," *Osvita*, no. 21 (1993): 3–9.

⁵ The word *zbornyi* (pl. *zborni*) is an example of *surzhyk*, the mixed Ukrainian-Russian pidgin vernacular. In the archival records "*zbornyi*" is sometimes used in conjunction with Russian "*poselok*" (settlement) or Ukrainian "*vyselok*" (new settlement) to identify a collection settlement. In some documents the Ukrainian word *zbirnyi* (pl. *zbirni*) is also used to identify a collection settlement. See Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zaporizkoï oblasti, fond 235, opys 3, file 48 (hereafter DAZO 235/3/48 and so on).

⁶ DAZO 235/3/47. My use of the term "Mennonite" is not restricted to those who were active members of a Mennonite church; it also includes ethnic Mennonites who belonged to the larger Mennonite community. When referring to Mennonite villages and colonies, I will include both the Ukrainian name of the village or colony followed by the common Mennonite name in parentheses: i.e., Pavlivka (Osterwick). The one exception to this practice will be the town, colony, and raion of Khortytsia (Khortitsa), which will hereafter be referred to only as Khortytsia.

⁷ The Khortytsia national raion, which included thirty-eight villages, had a cultivated area of more than 44,700 hectares and included the former Mennonite colonies of Khortytsia and Yazykovo. The raion was subdivided into twelve village soviets: (1) Khortytsia; (2) Nyzhnia Khortytsia (Nieder Khortitsa); (3) Kichkas (Einlage); (4) Baburka (Burwalde); (5) Smoliansk (Schöneberg); (6) Pavlivka (Osterwick); (7) Shyroke (Neuendorf); (8) Nikolaipol (Nikolaifeld); (9) Zelenyi Hai; (10) Veselivske; (11) Lukashevo; and (12) Novo-Zaporizhzhia. In 1929 the raion's total population was just over 19,750 people (12,365 Mennonites and Germans, 6,569 Ukrainians, 530 Russians, and 286 Jews). See DAZO 235/1/757.

raions such as Khortytsia. More specifically, this paper will analyze what factors led to the creation of Khortytsia raion's *zborni*, why the Mennonites were more likely to find themselves in these settlements than ethnic Ukrainians, and what life was like for the settlement residents. By examining the Mennonite experience in the raion's *zborni* it will become clear that a new narrative of dekulakization in Ukraine — one that incorporates the voices of “others”—is long overdue.

Khortytsia raion's *zborni* were established in response to comments that Yosif Stalin made at a conference of Marxist agronomists in late December 1929, when he boldly announced that the nation's kulaks would be “liquidated as a class.”⁸ Although Stalin did not elaborate on what he meant by “liquidated,” it was not hard to imagine what he had in mind. The Bolshevik regime had already implemented a series of harsh economic and social policies in 1928–29 that initiated an all-out war against the kulak. These policies included grain-expropriation campaigns, repressive taxes, confiscation of property, and arrest—all of which were intended to isolate kulaks from their family, neighbours, and communities.

Shortly after Stalin issued his order to liquidate kulaks, the Politburo prepared a secret decree entitled *Concerning Measures for the Liquidation of Kulak Farms in Raions of Wholesale Collectivization* (hereafter the Politburo Decree). When the decree was issued on January 30, 1930, the Politburo deemed its contents too sensitive for general publication. It subsequently issued a special order preventing the entire decree from being published; instead, only excerpts were forwarded to *okruha* and raion Party committees in early February.⁹ The document was considered to be too sensitive to release in its entirety because, among other things, it categorized kulaks into three groups, stated the total number of persons in each category, and dictated what their fate would be. The decree identified the most dangerous kulaks as the “counter-revolutionary kulak *aktiv*” (“category-1 kulaks”), and set their numbers at 60,000 in the entire USSR, of which 15,000 were in Ukraine. The OGPU¹⁰ was ordered to summarily execute any members of this group who were allegedly involved in counter-revolutionary or terrorist disturbances, and to arrest and exile the rest. The second group of kulaks listed in the Politburo Decree was the “kulak *aktiv*” (“category-2 kulaks”). Approximately 150,000 families in the USSR (of which 30,000 to 35,000 households were in Ukraine) fell into this category, and they were to be exiled to the Northern Territory, Siberia, the Urals, or Kazakhstan. The third group of kulaks (“category-3 kulaks”) was considered to be the least threatening to the regime. Their punishment involved confiscation of their property and their relocation to newly established settlements in remote areas within their home raions.¹¹

⁸ Yosif V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1946–1951), 12: 167.

⁹ Lynne Viola et al, eds., *The War against the Peasantry, 1927–1930* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 207ff, 228ff; V. Vasilev and Lynne Viola, eds., *Kollektivizatsiia i krestianskoe soprotivlenie na Ukraine: Noiabr 1929–mart 1930 gg.* (Vinnytsia: Lohos, 1997), 147–51; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 54.

¹⁰ The acronym of Obedinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie (United State Political Administration), the name of the Soviet secret police from 1922 to 1934.

¹¹ Vasilev and Viola, *Kollektivizatsiia*, 147f; and Lynne Viola, *The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin's Settlements* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 22ff.

The decree provided few details on how local officials were to implement the Politburo's wishes with respect to the establishment of settlements for category-3 kulaks. It stipulated that the latter were to be resettled on new plots of land away from collective farms—presumably to prevent kulak infection from spreading to collectives. An excerpted version of the Politburo Decree sent to officials in Soviet Ukraine also suggested that between ten and twenty families should be relocated in each new settlement.¹² But the decree did not clearly indicate who was to be in charge of selecting the sites for these settlements. It also did not state how far away these new settlements were to be from urban centres, government installations, or other kulak settlements, and it failed to indicate what amenities (such as access to water and food supplies) should be considered in selecting the settlement sites. Local officials were left to work out these details on their own.

The Politburo Decree was also vague in its directions regarding the administration of these new category-3 kulak settlements. It stipulated that after consulting with the *okruha* (Russian: *okrug*) executive committee (hereafter OEC), the raion executive committee (hereafter REC) was to appoint special three-man committees (*troikas*) or plenipotentiaries to administer the kulak settlements. Unfortunately the decree did not indicate the scope of these administrators' authority and failed to provide them with any guidelines on day-to-day operations. The decree was also silent about which government body was responsible for overseeing all of these new category-3 kulak settlements on a nation-wide basis. Was the OGPU in charge, or was some other government body ultimately responsible for these settlements?

The Politburo Decree also hinted at the treatment of category-3 kulaks in their new settlements, but specific details to help officials on the ground were absent. For instance, the decree directed that resettled category-3 kulaks be allowed to retain only "minimum quantities of the means of production" required for farming their new plots.¹³ But what did such "minimum quantities" include? Could a category-3 kulak be allowed to keep any farm equipment (e.g., a plow) or a horse to work the new plots of land, or was even this out of the question? If so, could the kulak be allowed to keep a shovel or an axe? For officials responsible for running these new settlements, the decree provided no guidance on these questions. The decree also stated that category-3 kulaks were to be assigned compulsory agricultural-production quotas to be delivered to both state and co-operative bodies.¹⁴ But what kind of agricultural production could these kulaks engage in and what quantities were they expected to produce? Were they only limited to growing crops, or could they also raise livestock and poultry? What crops were they required to grow, and what percentage of their production was to be earmarked for government quotas? Finally, the decree ordered every OEC to establish programs to put category-3 kulaks to work in special labour units and "colonies" in lumber, road, land-reclamation, and other projects.¹⁵ But there was no mention of whether these kulaks were to be paid anything for their labour or what kind of work regime was expected of them. Local authorities were left to decide these matters on the fly.

¹² Vasilev and Viola, *Kollektivizatsiia*, 148.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

By early February 1930 the contents of the Politburo Decree, as well as other directives from Stalin and the Bolshevik leadership, had filtered down to officials in Soviet Ukraine. In mid-February the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine had determined how many kulaks were living in each region of the republic and declared that 472 kulak households (2,360 people) were to be exiled from Zaporizhzhia *okruha*, where the Khortytsia national raion was located. It also ordered the roundup and resettlement of category-3 kulaks on an expedited basis.¹⁶

Ukrainian, Russian, German, and Jewish authorities all played a role in the dekulakization process in Khortytsia raion, but a large number of the officials who implemented the government's dekulakization orders were ethnic Mennonites. This was understandable, given the fact that Khortytsia raion had been a Mennonite colony in tsarist times and Mennonites still comprised a significant portion of the population. In fact, it was precisely because of the raion's large German-speaking Mennonite population that the Soviet government officially recognized it as an ethnic German national raion in September 1929, just a few months before Stalin's December speech to the agronomists.¹⁷ By then hundreds of Mennonites were serving in a variety of government positions in the raion's village soviets, collective farms, committees of poor peasants, revision commissions, people's court, Komsomol cells, Party Committee, and REC. Between 1928 and the summer of 1930 some of the most influential Party members in the raion were Mennonites. Heinrich G. Rempel, for example, served as the REC chairman until early January 1930; he was replaced by another Mennonite, Johann P. Quiring, who served as chairman until the end of June 1930.¹⁸

¹⁶ Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy. Kyiv. fond 1, opys 20. list II, file 3192 (hereafter TsDAHOUOU 1/20/II/3192 and so on), 1/20/II/3142, 1/20/II/3744, and 1/20/II/3190.

¹⁷ The decision to grant Khortytsia this status developed from an existing Soviet policy that gave every Soviet nation its own national territory. This recognition of Khortytsia as a German national raion also reflected the Bolsheviks' *korenizatsiia* (indigenization) program that encouraged each national group to develop its culture and use its language in government institutions within the group's national territory. By 1926 the Soviet Ukrainian government recognized seven German national raions, two of which had substantial Mennonite populations: (1) Molochansk in Melitopol *okruha*, which included the Molochna (Molotschna) Mennonite colony; and (2) Vysokopilskyi in Kherson *okruha*, which included the Zahradivka (Sagradowka) Mennonite colony. See Meir Buchsweiler, *Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs—ein Fall doppelter Loyalität* (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1984), 147f; idem, "Die Sowjetdeutschen—außerhalb der Wolgarepublik—im Vergleich mit anderen Minderheiten 1917 bis 1941/42," in *Die Deutschen im Russischen Reich und im Sowjetstaat*, ed. Andreas Kappeler, Boris Meissner and Gerhard Simon (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1987), 77f; *Der Bote* (hereafter DB, Winnipeg), 3 January 1929, 3; *Natsionalni menshyny v Ukraini, 1920–1930-ti roky: Istoryko-kartohrafichnyi atlas* (Kyiv: Chetverta khvyliia, 1996), 63–79; and Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 12.

¹⁸ See DAZO 235/1/814, 235/1/808, 235/1/815, 235/1/781, 235/1/823, 235/2/138, and 235/1/811; Oblpartarkhiv Zaporizkoho obkomu KPU, fond 7, opis 1, file 138 (hereafter OZOKPU 7/1/138 and so on); and my article "Separating the Sheep from the Goats: The Role of Mennonites and Non-Mennonites in the Dekulakization of Khortitsa, Ukraine (1928–1930)," *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 83, no. 2 (April 2009): 235ff.

With Mennonites in charge of many of the most important political institutions in Khortytsia raion, it was inevitable that they were thrust into the role of implementing the dekulakization orders that came from Moscow, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Zaporizhzhia. The Khortytsia REC, for example, was responsible for co-ordinating the dekulakization campaign in the raion; it issued orders to the village soviets to identify kulaks in their locale and called upon village activists, committees of poor peasants, local collective farms, and special liquidation commissions of poor peasants to finalize the lists of kulak households for their areas. The lists were then forwarded to Chairman Quiring and his secretary, Johann J. Wilms—two senior Mennonite officials in the Khortytsia REC—who reviewed the kulak lists with other members of the REC and subsequently forwarded orders to local soviets to commence the next stage in the dekulakization process—the expropriation of kulak property and the eviction of kulaks from their homes. Under their orders kulak land, homes, livestock, farm equipment, and personal property were itemized, seized, and then transferred to local collectives or auctioned off. The evicted kulak families were allowed to keep some clothing, food, and tools, but the total weight of what they could retain was restricted to between twenty and thirty poods (720 to 1,080 pounds). The male head of the kulak household was often arrested and brought to a local jail, where he was held until imprisonment or exile. The remaining family members were ordered to move into abandoned peasant shacks, where they waited for officials to decide their fate.¹⁹

From the outset the Khortytsia REC and the village soviets focused primarily on the Mennonite-populated villages to supply the three to five per cent of Khortytsia raion's population needed to meet the kulak quota the government required from Zaporizhzhia *okruha*.²⁰ There were a number of reasons why so many more Khortytsia Mennonites were selected for dekulakization than any other group in the raion. First, these Mennonites generally had larger landholdings than their non-Mennonite neighbours, and therefore they fit more easily into the government's slippery definition of "kulak." Past counter-revolutionary activity—such as Mennonite opposition to the Bolsheviks during and after the Revolution, support of the German-occupation troops during the Civil War, and the demand for special treatment for their communities during NEP—was another reason why Mennonites were dekulakized in higher numbers than non-Mennonite populations in Khortytsia. A third factor had to do with ethnic hostility: anti-German sentiment existed at every level of the government, and officials supervising the Khortytsia national raion routinely complained about the disproportionately high number of kulaks in the German (Mennonite) villages and the need to clean up the raion, which had a reputation as one of the "worst" kulak-infested raions in the region. A fourth reason for higher Mennonite dekulakization rates in Khortytsia raion had to do with the strong religious cohesiveness that existed in the Mennonite villages. Dekulakization, officials believed, would drive a wedge between the Mennonite religious leadership and their congregations, ignite class warfare in the communities, and coerce more Mennonites to join the collectives. The anti-sectarian attitude of the Bolshevik leadership was another reason why Mennonite names

¹⁹ See DAZO 235/5/69, 235/3/49, 235/2/95, 235/3/47, 235/3/49, 235/3/50, 235/3/52, 235/5/76, 235/5/72, 235/5/79, and 235/5/76; and my article "Through the Fires of Hell: The Dekulakization and Collectivization of the Soviet Mennonite Community, 1928–1933," *Journal of Mennonite Studies* 16 (1998): 10ff.

²⁰ OZOKPU 1/963/43.

appeared on kulak lists in Khortytsia raion; in its decrees in early 1930 the Politburo identified sectarian communities, as well as religious associations and church councils, as possible bases of support for kulaks, disenfranchised persons, and anti-Soviet elements. Finally, dekulakization was an effective means of punishing Mennonites for their past emigration activities. This became evident in 1929, when more than 9,000 Soviet Mennonites fled to Moscow in a last-ditch attempt to obtain exit visas. Their desperate plight made international headlines, created a foreign-relations crisis, and embarrassed the Soviet government.²¹ Those who failed to escape from mother Russia were either exiled or returned to their home villages, where most were summarily dekulakized.

In the early months of 1930 local officials quickly attained their quotas of Khortytsia raion's kulaks, and final preparations were made to deport the raion's category-1 and category-2 kulaks from Ukraine. By February 1930 the OGPU had already scheduled rail transports for March 3–10 and March 23–27 to evacuate these kulaks from Zaporizhzhia *okruha*.²²

And what was the fate of those kulaks in Khortytsia raion who were considered to be category-3 kulaks and allowed to remain in Ukraine? Raion officials held many of the adult male kulaks in custody and temporarily relocated their families to huts that had recently been vacated by widows and poor peasants who had taken possession of the homes of evicted dekulakized peasants. Sometimes one village soviet exchanged its kulaks for those of another village soviet. Kulaks from the villages of Pavlivka (Osterwick) and Dolynsk (Kronstal), for example, were resettled in the Nyzhnia Khortytsia (Nieder Khortitsa) and Baburka (Burwalde) areas, while kulaks from Nyzhnia Khortytsia and Baburka were resettled near Pavlivka and Dolynsk.²³

This exchange of kulaks presented a series of problems for local officials. First, it was not in keeping with the directives from Moscow. The Politburo Decree made it clear that category-3 kulaks were to be resettled away from collective farms and that the REC was to establish troikas or plenipotentiaries to administer the kulak settlements.²⁴ Inexplicably, this was not done in Khortytsia raion, at least not during the height of the dekulakization frenzy in February 1930. Perhaps local officials were not

²¹ DAZO 235/2/138, 235/2/97, 235/3/47, 235/3/23 and 235/3/28; OZOKPU 9/879/4; *Menno-nitische Rundschau* (hereafter MR, Winnipeg), 20 November 1929, 12ff; DB, 13 November 1929, 4; DB, 4 March 1931, 3; DB, 25 March 1931, 3; Neufeldt, "Separating the Sheep from the Goats," 287ff; H. J. Willms, ed., *At the Gates of Moscow*, trans. George Thielman (Yarrow: Columbia Press, 1964), 56ff; John B. Toews, *Lost Fatherland: the Story of Mennonite Emigration from Soviet Russia* (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1967); Harvey Dyck, *Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 162ff; and my article "The Flight to Moscow, 1929: An Act of Mennonite Civil Disobedience," *Preservings* (Winnipeg), no. 19 (December 2001): 35ff.

²² Vasilev and Viola, *Kollektivizatsiia*, 171–73; and Colin Neufeldt, "Reforging Mennonite *Spetspereselentsy*: The Experience of Mennonite Exiles at Siberian Special Settlements in the Omsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, and Naryn Regions (1930–1933)," *Journal of Mennonite Studies* 30 (2012): 278ff.

²³ DAZO 235/3/47. It is not entirely clear from the documentation why villages were ordered to exchange category-3 kulaks. Perhaps officials believed that separating these kulaks from their immediate families and neighbours would make it more difficult for them to receive food, money and other assistance.

²⁴ Vasilev and Viola, *Kollektivizatsiia*, 147.

aware of these provisions of the Politburo Decree or had assumed that resettling category-3 kulaks was the OGPU's job. It is also possible that local authorities had been so busy identifying kulaks, expropriating their property, and preparing them for exile that they had little time to consider new settlement sites for category-3 kulaks. A second problem with the practice of villages exchanging kulaks dealt with the challenge of monitoring them. Kulaks living in peasant shacks scattered throughout the villages and countryside made it very difficult for officials to track their activities and movements. This arrangement also created a logistical nightmare if it became necessary to transport the kulaks elsewhere. A better, more permanent arrangement had to be found.

Finding such an arrangement, however, was put on hold after an article by Stalin appeared in *Pravda* on March 2, 1930. Entitled "Dizziness from Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective Farm Movement," the article claimed that in the drive to collectivize and dekulakize the countryside, "excesses," "violations," and "distortions" had been committed by raion-level Party and soviet officials who had become "dizzy from success."²⁵ The article seemed to call the whole dekulakization process into question; not surprisingly, its publication had immediate reverberations, as peasants soon began attacking local officials for going too far in their efforts to collectivize the countryside and cleanse it of kulaks.

Despite this peasant backlash against local officials, Stalin's "Dizziness from Success" did not result in an immediate moratorium on dekulakization efforts in Ukraine. In fact, dekulakization and evacuation operations continued in Ukraine for more than a week after the article appeared. A total of 2,850 kulaks (519 families) residing in Zaporizhzhia *okruha* were rounded up by the OGPU, herded into cattle cars, and transported out of Ukraine between 6 and 9 March 1930.²⁶ The locomotives pulling these wagons were headed for the *spetsposelki*—special settlements in the USSR's Northern Territory, the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan, where kulaks were sent to work as forced labourers in lumber, mining, construction, and agricultural operations established to supply materials for the nation's industrialization program.²⁷

After these kulaks had departed, the process of evacuating more kulaks from Khortytsia raion came to a halt. By the middle of March the REC began to put the brakes on the entire dekulakization campaign in response to the criticism that local officials had been too zealous in their dekulakization and collectivization efforts.²⁸ The Khortytsia REC now scrambled to determine what measures it should implement in light of the new directives from Moscow. More specifically, something had to be done with those category-3 families that had been dispossessed of their property and evicted from their homes, but not yet resettled. Many local officials elected to keep the male heads of the kulak households in custody while considering the options for dealing with their families.²⁹ In March 1930 Quiring, Wilms, and their Mennonite colleague

²⁵ Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 12:191–99.

²⁶ Vasilev and Viola, *Kollektivizatsiia*, 202.

²⁷ For the Mennonite experience in the Gulag, see my Ph.D. diss., "The Fate of Mennonites in Ukraine and the Crimea during Soviet Collectivization and the Famine (1930–1933)" (University of Alberta, 1999), 95ff.

²⁸ See OZOKPU 7/1/120a; and Neufeldt, "Separating the Sheep from the Goats," 280ff.

²⁹ According to Anganetha (Sawatsky) Pauls (interviewed by Harry Pauls in Abbotsford, BC, October 2008), while many of the male heads of dekulakized households remained incarcerated

Heinrich A. Dyck (the REC's technical secretary) forwarded a directive to local village soviets instructing them to set aside varying amounts of land in their respective areas for category-3 kulak settlements. Some villages—such as Smoliansk—were ordered to set aside as little as eighteen hectares of land, while other villages—such as Dolynsk (Kronstal) and Novo-Slobidka (Rosengart)—were required to allocate as much as ninety hectares. The directive also stipulated that one hectare of land should be set aside for each member of a kulak household to a maximum of five hectares per household. Although the directive was also sent to Ukrainian village soviets in the raion, it was the Mennonite settlements that were ordered to set aside the largest tracts of land for the proposed kulak settlements.³⁰

After the village soviets advised the REC of prospective sites for kulak settlements, Quiring and Wilms sent a secret memo to the OEC of Zaporizhzhia *okruha*. The memo—dated May 10, 1930—stated that given the number of dekulakized households in Khortytsia raion there ought to be no fewer than four kulak settlements in the national raion. The memo then listed seven possible kulak settlement sites, highlighting the positive and negative features of each proposed location. It noted the location of each site and its distance from the nearest villages and collectives, the size of the site in hectares, the type of soil at the site, and whether or not the site had access to water. Quiring and Wilms also commented on what made some sites more suitable than others; for example, a site was less desirable if the land could not easily be parcelled out for farming purposes or if it was too near a busy road, a collective farm, another proposed kulak settlement site, or a government installation (such as the Dnipro Hydroelectric Dam).³¹ Although the memo did not specifically mention proximity to railway lines, it appears that this may have been a consideration, as a number of the proposed sites were close to existing railway lines that could facilitate the transportation of kulak families to and from the settlements.

Virtually no action was taken to create the kulak settlements in the first few months after Quiring and Wilms submitted their secret memo to the OEC. It is not clear why the OEC delayed taking action.³² Perhaps the department was busy dealing with other matters. It is also possible that the reverberations from Stalin's "Dizziness from Success" article had not yet run their course in the spring of 1930, and OEC officials may have been waiting for clearer signals from Moscow and Kharkiv as to how dekulakization should proceed. Quiring, Wilms, and other members of the

after the publication of "Dizziness from Success," some of the dekulakized families were allowed to return to their home villages and look for work. In some cases the adult children of dekulakized households from Khortytsia were even allowed to travel, and some went to work in the former Mennonite colony of Molochna (Molotschna) in the Molochna German national raion.

³⁰ DAZO 235/1/825.

³¹ DAZO 235/3/47. The seven proposed kulak settlement sites varied in size from 52 to 113 hectares. They were located on poor-quality soil but had access to water.

³² It was not just the Khortytsia REC that was slow in resettling category-3 kulaks. A top-secret OGPU directive dated May 6, 1930, stated that the resettlement of category-3 kulaks was taking place in a chaotic manner and that resettlement had either not begun or was extremely sluggish in many regions across the USSR. The directive also blamed local officials for not paying any attention to the matter or believing that resettling category-3 kulaks was the OGPU's responsibility. See V. Ivnitsky et al, *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, 1927–1937: Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000), 429ff.

Khortytsia REC became preoccupied with other matters, such as defusing criticism that the REC had been overzealous in its dekulakization efforts. After "Dizziness from Success," the REC received numerous petitions from dekulakized families requesting reconsideration of their cases. By June 1930 it had reviewed at least eighty-seven such petitions from dekulakized families, seventy-three of which were from dekulakized Mennonite families. In considering these requests for leniency, however, the Mennonite-dominated REC did not appear to be very magnanimous. Only twelve petitions (half of which were from Mennonite families) resulted in the cancellation of dekulakization orders.³³

Not long after Quiring, Wilms, and Dyck completed their review of kulak petitions, major changes took place in the leadership of the Khortytsia REC. All three officials either resigned from or were forced out of the REC by the end of July 1930 and were replaced by non-Mennonites. One of the few remaining Mennonites who held a significant position in the REC was Ivana Penner—a relatively low-level official who was promoted to secretary of the REC. The change in leadership also marked the end of the Khortytsia German national raion: after one year of existence, it was annexed by the Zaporizhzhia city soviet in September 1930.³⁴

The annexation of Khortytsia raion marked the beginning of a new round of repression for its kulaks. In the latter half of 1930 the Soviet government commenced a second round of dekulakization, in which all peasants identified as kulaks were to be exiled and resettled. This meant that category-3 kulaks would no longer be permitted to remain near their native villages; instead they would eventually be evacuated to *spetsposelki*. By August 1930 widespread dekulakization campaigns had resumed in Khortytsia raion with the establishment of troikas that reviewed kulak lists to determine which dekulakization orders should remain in force. These troikas often rubber-stamped orders confirming the dekulakization of large numbers of Mennonites in the raion, and in some cases they issued new dekulakization orders for families that had been rehabilitated.³⁵ As a result of the work of these troikas, many of the raion's dekulakized Mennonites who had not been exiled in February and March were now on the list to be evacuated.

Shortly after Zaporizhzhia annexed Khortytsia raion, the new presidium of the Khortytsia REC met in September 1930. Of those present at the meeting, the only Mennonite was the secretary, Ivana Penner. The first order of business dealt with kulak settlements. Having consulted with the OEC, the REC selected sites for four *zborni* in the raion. In coming to its decision, it appears that the REC relied on the information provided in the secret memo from Quiring and Wilms, as the sites selected for the *zborni* were essentially the same as those they had proposed.³⁶

Now that locations for the *zborni* had been finalized, representatives of the Zaporizhzhia OEC and Khortytsia REC advised local village soviets about the settlements

³³ DAZO 235/3/50; and Neufeldt, "Separating the Sheep from the Goats," 280ff.

³⁴ DAZO 235/1/808; and Buchsweiler, *Volksdeutsche*, 148. Mennonites, such as Penner and Friesen (secretary of the REC's finance commission), continued to serve in the REC in late 1930, but they no longer had the same influence that they had between 1928 and mid-1930. See DAZO 235/2/158; 235/2/159.

³⁵ See Viola et al., *The War against the Peasantry*, 322; and Ivnitsky et al, *Tragediia sovetskoi derevni*, 2: 495ff; and DAZO 235/2/97 and 235/3/48.

³⁶ DAZO 235/3/48.

and their administration. Discussions ensued about how much land would be set aside for each kulak family in a *zborni*. The general principle adopted was that each resident of a kulak household would be allotted one hectare of land. But there were two exceptions: a single kulak with no family members would receive a minimum of two hectares, while kulak families with more than five family members would receive no more than five hectares. This last exception was essentially a way of punishing kulaks with large families; these households had to make do with whatever food they produced from their five hectares, regardless of whether they had five mouths to feed or eleven.³⁷

Three of Khortytsia raion's four *zborni* were located relatively close to each other in the Baburka (Burwalde), Nyzhnia Khortytsia (Nieder Khortitsa), and Pavlivka (Osterwick) areas. *Zborni* no. 1 was a 120-hectare parcel between Baburka and Kanzerovka (Rosental); a state farm bordered on one side of the settlement, the banks of the Dnipro River on another, and land from neighbouring villages on the remaining sides. It was the largest of the four *zborni* and could accommodate up to twenty-four kulak households; it was also the only one of the four *zborni* that exceeded the Politburo Decree's recommendation of ten to twenty families per settlement. *Zborni* no. 2 was located between Nyzhnia Khortytsia, Baburka, and Novo-Slobidka (Rosengart), and could accommodate twenty kulak households on a 109.5-hectare parcel. At *zborni* no. 3 eighteen households were resettled on 89.5 hectares situated between Pavlivka and Novo-Slobidka (Rosengart). The first three sites were relatively close to railway lines, which facilitated the eventual deportation of these families. *Zborni* no. 4, which was located farther north and was more isolated than the other three *zborni*, was the smallest kulak settlement in Khortytsia raion. It consisted of 83.56 hectares near Shyroke (Neuendorf) and Malashivka (Neuenberg), and could accommodate seventeen households.³⁸

The majority of the first residents at Khortytsia raion's four *zborni* were Mennonites: seventy-three families resettled from eight Mennonite village soviets in the raion. Some of the kulak families arrived in the fall of 1930, while others came in the spring of 1931. In many cases they arrived without their male heads, as these men were still in custody. The first five Ukrainian families to arrive at the *zborni* were from the Novo-Zaporizhzhia and Veselivske rural soviets; rather than being kept together, they were assigned to different settlements. At *zborni* no. 1, for example, two Ukrainian families were resettled among twenty Mennonite families.³⁹ At *zborni* no. 2, one kulak household was Ukrainian and the remaining nineteen were

³⁷ DAZO 235/3/47 and 235/3/48.

³⁸ DAZO 235/3/48; and Vasilev and Viola, *Kollektivizatsiia*, 148.

³⁹ Of the ninety-eight kulak resettlers at *zborni* no. 1, six were Ukrainians and ninety-two were Mennonites. The two Ukrainian families were those of Ch. Kulbalka of Novo-Zaporizhzhia and S. P. Misko of Nikolaipol (Nikolaifeld). The Mennonite families included those of Vasilii P. Martens and Jakob H. Pauls of Khortytsia; Abram P. Harms of Pavlivka (Osterwick); Jakob J. Fröse of Smoliansk (Schöneberg), Abram K. Pauls of Baburka (Burwalde); Peter. P. Petkau of Kichkas (Einlage); Abram P. Peters, Johann J. Klassen, Jakob A. Bergen, and Abram Braun of Shyroke (Neuendorf); Gerhard M. Penner, Abram J. Kröker, Peter P. Siemens, and Jakob P. Petkau of Nyzhnia Khortytsia (Nieder Khortitsa); and Kornei D. Peters, Heinrich H. Rempel, Heinrich K. Peters, Peter F. Kasper, Heinrich Peters, and Kornei J. Zacharias of Nikolaipol (Nikolaifeld)]. See DAZO 235/3/48.

Mennonite.⁴⁰ Two families at *zbornyi* no. 3 were Ukrainian and the other sixteen were Mennonite.⁴¹ There were no Ukrainian families at *zbornyi* no. 4, which consisted of seventeen Mennonite families.⁴²

People of all ages moved into the *zborni*. At least forty-four (56 per cent) of the seventy-eight families initially sent to these kulak settlements had a male family member who was fifty or older. There was even a seventy-nine-year-old Mennonite kulak registered for one of the settlements, but officials decided to allow him to stay in his home village because of his advanced age. Because the overwhelming number of families at the *zborni* had three or more children, a large percentage of the resettlers were children.⁴³

Each *zbornyi* was subdivided into five or six areas. An area for kulak accommodations (17–22 hectares) was usually set aside near the centre of each *zbornyi*. Surrounding the residence area were plots for growing cereal crops (62–87.5 hectares), a vegetable garden (4.25–6 hectares), some pasture land (4.5–15.6 hectares), and an uncultivated area (1.56–18.03 hectares). The area set aside for accommodations was a precisely demarcated allotment subdivided into equal strips of land (i.e., 125 by 20 meters). Each kulak household was assigned one strip; because there were no existing accommodations, the immediate task of each kulak family was to build a shelter on its strip. This was no small feat, as most kulaks had been so thoroughly dekulakized that they had only a few personal belongings, little or no money, and no access to building materials. Consequently the shelters were often crude sod huts or wooden shanties that offered little protection from the winter cold.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ At *zbornyi* no. 2 there were two Ukrainians and 132 Mennonites. The sole Ukrainian family was that of S. M. Pratchko of Veselivske. The Mennonite families included those of: Abram J. Dyck and Jakob A. Petkau of Khortytsia; Peter P. Janzen, Jakob J. Wölk, Peter P. Zacharias, and Gerhard J. Sawatsky of Pavlivka (Osterwick); Peter J. Rempel of Kichkas (Einlage); Dietrich D. Hildebrandt, Jakob H. Siemens, and Kornei K. Bergen of Shyroke (Neuendorf); Isaak I. Bergen, Abram A. Schmidt, and Martin I. Unger of Nyzhnia Khortytsia (Nieder Khortitsa); Peter A. Bergman, Kornei D. Friesen, David I. Braun, David D. Letkeman, Heinrich P. Neufeld, and Peter D. Peters of Nikolaipol (Nikolaifeld). See *ibid*.

⁴¹ Of the 117 residents at *zbornyi* no. 3, six were Ukrainians and 111 were Mennonites. There were two Ukrainian families: T. Koloiasnyi's of Khortytsia and O. Moskalenko's of Veselivske. The Mennonite families were those of Kornei K. Penner of Khortytsia; Isaak A. Klassen, Anton A. Funk, Peter I. Wiens, and David J. Klassen of Pavlivka (Osterwick); David B. Klippenstein of Smoliansk (Schöneberg); Heinrich P. Petkau of Baburka (Burwalde); Kornei K. Wiebe of Kichkas (Einlage); Peter P. Dyck and Isaak F. Ens of Shyroke (Neuendorf), Johann J. Siemens of Nyzhnia Khortytsia (Nieder Khortitsa); and Heinrich J. Zacharias, Abram J. Heinrichs, David M. Kozlovsky, Peter J. Hiebert, and D. A. Rempel of Nikolaipol (Nikolaifeld). See *ibid*.

⁴² All of the 103 individuals at *zbornyi* no. 4 were Mennonites. They included the families of Peter P. Janzen of Khortytsia; Johann I. Klassen, Abram P. Siemens, Jakob J. Winter, and Isaac Bergen of Pavlivka (Osterwick); Abram K. Schapansky of Baburka (Burwalde); Johann K. Martens and Heinrich G. Martens of Kichkas (Einlage); Abram A. Bergen and Franz K. Ens of Shyroke (Neuendorf); Heinrich H. Pankratz and Heinrich A. Pankratz of Nyzhnia Khortytsia (Nieder Khortitsa); and U (?) K. Heinrichs, D. H. Giesbrecht, Heinrich F. Kasper, Franz J. Peters, and Abram A. Rempel of Nikolaipol (Nikolaifeld). See *ibid*.

⁴³ See *ibid*.

⁴⁴ See *ibid.*; DAZO 1429/1/35; DB, 1931, 4; DB, 20 May 1931, 5; DB, 10 June 1931, 4; and DB, 1 July 1931, 4..

Not everything that the kulak households grew on their plots was for their own use. Local authorities routinely imposed unrealistic grain quotas on the *zborni*; they often confiscated the resettlers' surplus crops and occasionally their land to make up for deficiencies in local grain procurement quotas. This practice was in keeping with the provisions of the Politburo Decree, which stated that resettled category 3 kulaks would only be allowed to retain the minimum quantity of the means of production required for farming, and that they were to be assigned agricultural production quotas that were to be delivered to local authorities. From time to time, authorities also searched the resettlers' residences for grain and required them to sign statements indicating that they were not hiding or withholding any grain from the state. Not surprisingly, these raids depleted what little grain the resettlers had. Packages with food and foreign currency from relatives in the West helped some resettlers make up for the shortfall, but local authorities usually took a sizeable cut of the contents of the packages before they were released to their intended recipients.⁴⁵

Unfortunately, resettlers without Western contacts could not count on local relatives or friends to assist them; providing aid to the resettlers carried with it the very real possibility that the benefactors would be labelled as kulak sympathizers and end up in the *zborni* themselves. This effectively quelched the benevolent urges of family or friends. Some kulak resettlers resorted to begging, but even this means of survival was denied those who lived in *zborni* that prohibited panhandling. When describing the plight of the resettled kulak families, one eyewitness reported the following in early 1931:


How they are able to survive is a mystery, because the people have nothing except a little bit of furniture which others have left behind for them. No horse, no cow, no money, no obligations, everything was taken from them.... In the previous year when dekulakization was being carried out, the German party members were of the opinion that when dekulakization was carried out here then one could finally live in peace and quiet... But up until today, dekulakization is still proceeding.⁴⁶

Resettlement in the kulak villages was tantamount to internal exile—a life of toil and poverty with virtually no rights or privileges. The Politburo Decree required category 3 kulaks to work in special labour units on road construction, timber felling, or land reclamation projects.⁴⁷ Members of Khortytsia raion's *zborni* were regularly required to do back-breaking work for local officials who were under pressure to complete local community, road, and construction projects (such as the Dnipro dam) on time and under budget. Wages were low and payment infrequent; resettlers at one settlement worked for 240 days before they received any payment for their labour. These harsh working conditions, combined with the primitive living arrangements, se-

⁴⁵ See *DB*, 10 December 1930, 3; *DB*, 17 December 1930, 3; *DB*, 11 March 1931, 4; *DB*, 18 May 1932, 4; *DB*, 26 July 1933, 3; B. H. Unruh, "Bericht XXII," *Centre for Mennonite Brethren Studies* (hereafter *CMBS*), Winnipeg, 9 January 1931, 1; idem, "Bericht XXIV," *CMBS*, March 1931, 4; *DB*, 18 May 1932, 4; *DB*, 10 December 1930, 3; *DB*, 17 December 1930, 3; and Neufeldt, "The Fate of Mennonites in Ukraine and the Crimea," 76ff.

⁴⁶ *DB*, 20 May 1931, 5. Some of the resettlers worked on large-scale projects, such as the Dnipro Dam.

⁴⁷ Vasilev and Viola, *Kollektivizatsiia*, 148.



Map of zborni no. 1. Three fields (I, II, and III) surround the area where the 24 kulak families had their huts. The map also lists the resettlers' names on their vegetable plots (field II)

Source: DAZO 235/3/48.

verely weakened the health of many kulaks before their eventual deportation to the *spetsposelki*.⁴⁸

There is no doubt that the existence of the *zborni* eroded the cohesive structure of surrounding Mennonite and Ukrainian communities. By breaking up large numbers of kulak households into small kulak enclaves and forcing them to live in harsh conditions, local authorities were better able to supervise and manage their kulak populations, and to demonstrate to non-dekulakized peasants what was in store for those deemed to be enemies of the state. In this respect, the *zborni* played an important role in softening opposition to joining Soviet collective farms: the kulak settlements served as blunt examples of what working conditions might be like in the exile camps and how miserable life could be for those who did not voluntarily join the collective farms.

Within a year of their arrival at the *zborni*, most of the resettlers were loaded onto the cattle cars and transported to Stalin's *spetsposelki*. The trip lasted anywhere from one to three weeks, with as many as fifty people in one car. In these overcrowded

⁴⁸ See DB, 11 March 1931, 5; DB, 10 June 1931, 4; and Unruh, "Bericht XXV," CMBS, 29 April 1931, 1ff.

conditions where food and water supplies were spartan and infrequent at best, and where protection from the frigid cold weather was virtually non-existent, it was inevitably the very young, the sick, and the old who succumbed to premature death.⁴⁹ Those who survived the horrors of the journey into exile were forced to create new special work settlements with kulaks from other ethnic groups and regions in the USSR. For many of Khortytsia raion's Mennonite resettlers, their experience in the *zborni* was the last time they were part of a Mennonite community.

What was clear to most residents of the Khortytsia raion *zborni* was that their resettlement in the far reaches of the USSR had very little to do with an anti-Ukrainian campaign aimed at punishing Ukrainians for their nationalist aspirations. From the perspective of most residents, regional and local authorities had targeted the Khortytsia raion Mennonite community to supply the bulk of the kulaks for the national raion. The Mennonites comparatively large landholdings, their past counter-revolutionary behaviour, the underlying ethnic hostility between local officials and German-speaking minorities, the regime's anti-sectarian attitudes, the religious cohesiveness of the community, and the aggressive attempts by Mennonites to emigrate were all factors that resulted in Khortytsia raion's Mennonites being dekulakized in much higher numbers than their Ukrainian neighbours. As a result, it was the Mennonites—not the Ukrainians—who felt the brunt of the dekulakization campaign in the Khortytsia national raion between 1928 and 1930.

The Mennonites were not exclusively passive victims of dekulakization, however. Some were active participants in implementing Stalin's dekulakization measures in their villages. Mennonite government officials, for example, were involved in identifying and dekulakizing the kulaks in the Khortytsia national raion in 1929–30; some of these same officials also proposed the first sites for the *zborni* to regional officials, and at least one Mennonite official participated in the establishment of the Khortytsia raion's four *zborni*. Mennonite officials often played a lead role in implementing the process and creating the infrastructure that resulted in so many of their coreligionists being identified as kulaks and resettled in the *zborni*. In this respect, Mennonites share some responsibility for the creation of these category 3 kulak settlements and the suffering of those who were forced to live there.

That the majority of the first residents of Khortytsia raion's *zborni* were Mennonites—almost ninety-seven per cent—clearly shows that they were Mennonite *zborni*. The Mennonites were the first to build shelters at the sites, plow the land, grow crops, and devise survival strategies in this hostile environment. The Mennonites were the pioneer resettlers at the *zborni*, the test case for local officials to determine whether it was possible for kulaks to survive in such an environment. But throughout this horrible ordeal the Mennonite resettlers had others of like mind, culture, and faith with whom to share their tribulation and offer mutual comfort and encouragement.

For the Ukrainian community in Khortytsia raion, the *zborni* experience was substantially different. Because Mennonites were the primary targets of the first dekulakization campaign in the raion in early 1930, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians were able to avoid the most repressive measures. On the whole, the raion's Ukrainians were spectators rather than victims in the dekulakization drama that

⁴⁹ Neufeldt, "The Fate of Mennonites in Ukraine and the Crimea," 93ff.

unfolded in 1930; many of them looked on as the dispossession, disenfranchisement, and resettlement of their Mennonite neighbours took place. Five Ukrainian families did find themselves in the *zborni* in late 1930 and early 1931, but the larger Ukrainian community dodged this first sweep of the dekulakization net. In this respect, being Ukrainian in a German national raion had distinct advantages: Khortytsia raion was a comparatively safe place for a Ukrainian to ride out the first year of dekulakization because ethnic Ukrainians were far more likely to evade dekulakization than their Mennonite neighbours.

The experiences of those evacuated to Khortytsia raion's *zborni* clearly demonstrate that dekulakization in some regions of Ukraine was not as anti-Ukrainian as some historians would have us believe. In the case of Khortytsia raion, dekulakization had very little to do with anti-Ukrainianism in 1930, and almost everything to do with being a Mennonite. At the same time, the Mennonite experience in the *zborni* calls into question conventional Ukrainian historiography on dekulakization, which, intentionally or not, tells a Ukrainian narrative that excludes all "others." Only when historians pay more heed to the dekulakization accounts of ethnic minorities in Ukraine will more comprehensive, state-centred narratives be written. Until that happens, our understanding of this tragic period in Ukrainian history will remain incomplete, and the history of "others" will continue to be, as John-Paul Himka noted, "something that does not fit."



Edmonton Newspaper Reports about the 1932–1933 Famine in Ukraine

Serge Cipko

In 1993 an article in the *Edmonton Journal* entitled “The Politics of Famine” quoted the Harvard University economist Amartya Kumar Sen: “There has never been a famine in any country that’s been a democracy with a relatively free press.” Sen provided the example of India, which had no episodes of mass starvation since independence in 1947 despite experiencing occasional years of food shortages. “My point really is that if famine is about to develop, democracy can guarantee that it won’t. When newspapers are controlled, it’s amazing how ignorant and immune from pressure the government can be” Sen contended.¹

The famine of 1932–33 in Soviet Ukraine took place under a totalitarian regime that practiced censorship. At that time the daily *Edmonton Journal* (est. 1903) was one of many newspapers in North America trying to make sense of the sometimes contradictory information it was receiving about mass starvation in the Soviet Union. Such information also appeared in other newspapers published in Alberta’s capital, which then had a population of approximately 80,000: in the daily *Edmonton Bulletin* (est. 1880); in *Ukrainski visti* (est. 1928), the Ukrainian-language weekly of the city’s nearly 5,000-strong Ukrainian community;² and in the weekly *Western Catholic* of the Catholic Archdiocese of Edmonton.

This paper focuses on reports about the famine that appeared in Edmonton’s two dailies. The *Edmonton Journal* (hereafter *EJ*) was founded as a political rival to the *Edmonton Bulletin* (hereafter *EB*). Although the *EJ* supported the Conservative Party of Canada and the *EB* was pro-Liberal Party of Canada, on occasion their coverage of the famine overlapped. One notable difference was the *EB*’s reliance on dispatches from the Dutch-Canadian journalist Pierre van Paassen, who travelled to the Soviet Union.

During 1932 readers of the *EJ* were made aware that there were problems in the Soviet countryside. In early April the newspaper quoted the Riga correspondent of *The Times* about the temporary suspension of Soviet efforts to collectivize the peasantry while shock brigades were being organized to hasten spring seeding.³ An article in mid-May again referred to a scarcity of food in the countryside in the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, where, *The Times*’s Riga correspondent said, the “harvest was above the average last year.”⁴ In early June the *EJ* made reference to a letter, dated 12 April,

¹ “The Politics of Famine: It’s Never Fair to Blame Just the Weather,” *Edmonton Journal*, 24 January 1993; reprinted from the *New York Times*. Sen is the author of *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

² “Kilko ye ukrainsiv v Edmontoni?” *Ukrainski visti*, 15 March 1933.

³ “Famine Feared in Russia; Grain Planting Neglected,” *EJ*, 6 April 1932.

⁴ “Russia’s Wheat Supply,” *EJ*, 17 May 193.

from a man in the Belarusian district of Minsk to his daughter in northern Alberta. The letter stated that wheat was scarce because "all the grain was taken away from us and sold last fall."⁵ Then, in August 1932, a report in the *EJ* indicated there were delays in harvesting in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, areas which, it was said, had experienced a devastating drought the previous year. Soviet newspapers blamed poor organization and "increased activities of the Kulaks against collective farmers in the form of grain thefts and general persecution" for the fact that only sixty-five per cent of the grain had been harvested in Ukraine.⁶

In 1933 the famine was discussed in the *EJ* alongside other Soviet-related stories, such as the matter of lifting restrictions on Canadian trade with the USSR, the possibility of U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union, and the threat of deportation of a Doukhobor leader in Canada, Peter Veregin, to the USSR. At the start of the year reports mentioned problems in grain requisitioning and food shortages in the Soviet Union. An *EJ* story published on 3 January 1933 concerned the sentencing to death of "three of the highest Communist party and Soviet officials in the Orekhovsky district" of Ukraine and eight others to imprisonment "upon their conviction of treason in sabotaging the government's grain collection plan." The three to be executed were charged with "arbitrarily lowering the government's grain-collection quotas, and falsely reporting on the extent of the crop to the central authorities, and branded as counter-revolutionaries, traitors and betrayers of the working class."⁷ Later in January A. C. Cummings of the *EJ*'s London Bureau noted that some reports "say that before the next harvest comes round [the Soviet Union] may face a worse food shortage than she has known for years."⁸

Other reports about the USSR published in early 1933 gave no indication that food shortages were being experienced, in part because they really concerned the period before the famine. In its 11 February 1933 issue, for example, the *EJ* published the impressions of Charles Richert, an "irrigation expert from Alberta ... [serving as a] consultant engineer in the building of a 100,000-acre irrigation project ... in the sub-Caucasian lands at the eastern end of the Black Sea." Writing in the summer of 1932, Richert spoke of the Soviet people as "great lovers of music and the theatre, [who] drink lots of wine and vodka and above all enjoy elaborate meals. I am told, however, that the latter now bear only a faint resemblance to former times." He added that "with copious rains the crops are wonderful and soon will be ready for the combine. We have fruits such as mulberries and strawberries in abundance and last fall ate the greatest amount of grapes in our lives."⁹

⁵ "In Russia Today," *EJ*, 2 June 1932.

⁶ "Soviet Harvest Suffers Setback," *EJ*, 11 August 1932.

⁷ "Prominent 'Reds' Get Death Terms," *EJ*, 3 January 1933.

⁸ "Russia's 'Food-Battle,'" *EJ*, 31 January 1933. That seemed to contradict what Col. J. H. Mackie, who was described as "prominent in recent years as an intermediary between Canadian and Russian industrialists," suggested earlier in the month. Mackie wrote: "I discussed Russia's wheat supply with Mr. Bogdanov [chair of the Amtorg Trading Corporation], whose 'latest information was that wheat collections in Russia during the past month were above expectations[.] and ... his opinion was Russia would not be forced to import wheat' ('Doubts Russia in Need Wheat,' *EJ*, 3 January 1933).

⁹ "Soviet Russia Fascinates Young Lethbridge Couple," *EJ*, 11 February 1933. Before his departure to the Soviet Union, Alsace-born Richert was employed by the Lethbridge Northern Irrigation Project.

The earliest sign that a famine was well under way in the USSR came in the *EJ*'s 17 February 1933 issue, which quoted an address Rev. E. E. Shields of Chicago delivered in Toronto: : "[t]here are well-authenticated reports of cannibalism in certain areas of the U.S.S.R."¹⁰ Then on 25 February the *EJ* reported that Ralph H. Webb, mayor of Winnipeg and Conservative member for Assiniboia, told the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba that he daily read between thirty and fifty letters from the USSR that "asked for food, clothing, shoes, and not for money." Webb added that people "would be astonished if they learned how much was going out of Winnipeg every week for the needy of Russia."¹¹

The following month the *EJ* reported that the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan was considering the offer of shipments of wheat to the starving people in the USSR. On the afternoon of Wednesday, 15 March 1933, the legislature had suspended its sitting on the motion of Dr. John M. Uhrich, the member for Rosthern. His motion read that the assembly adjourn to "consider a matter of urgent public importance." Uhrich, a member of the assembly's Liberal opposition, read letters that he and others in the Rosthern area had received from the USSR. The Mennonite board in Rosthern, he said, were receiving 700 to 800 letters a week from people in the USSR asking for help. Members of both sides of the assembly, including the premier of the province, James Anderson, agreed on the "urgent need of offering assistance, possibly by shipping wheat to the starving people of Russia." Uhrich suggested that the attention of the federal government be drawn to the matter and steps be taken to ship 10 million to 20 million bushels of wheat to the USSR.¹²

It is not clear if any action followed from this motion, but the news prompted W. S. Plawiuk to write a letter to the editor. Plawiuk alerted the *EJ*'s readers about the thousands of letters Ukrainian Canadians had received in the autumn of 1932 asking not for money, but for grain and flour. "We tried to make arrangements to collect 400,000 to 500,000 bushels of wheat to be shipped to Ukraine," he said, "but the Soviet government through their charitable institutions refused to accept our offer, stating: 'In view of satisfactory harvest this year, proposal is not necessary in the absence of real need' [sic]."¹³

On 24 March 1933 the *EJ* wrote about Rose Kritzevosky, a thirty-year-old woman, who "got out of Soviet Russia more by luck than good management" and was bound for Alberta. When a reporter asked her what the USSR was like, she replied: "there was terrible starvation and many people were dying in the rural districts." The article did not state where Kritzevosky was from, but only that her parents were "still in Russia."¹⁴

As the year progressed, readers of the *EJ* came to know more about the famine of 1932–33 to some degree through the efforts by the Ukrainian community in Edmonton

¹⁰ "Say Cannibalism Exists in Soviet," *EJ*, 17 February 1933. The report did not elaborate. However, the *EB* quoted Rev. Shields about "instances where the authorities gave people permission to go to the morgues and obtain bodies for human food" ("Toronto Speaker Charges Russians with Cannibalism," *EB*, 17 February 1933).

¹¹ See "Some Aid Needy of Russia," *EJ*, 25 February 1933.

¹² "Claims Russian People Starving," *EJ*, 16 March 1933. The rarely used motion allowed a member to raise an important matter and have it discussed, putting the business on hold until the debate was concluded and the motion was withdrawn.

¹³ "Soviets Refused Wheat," *EJ*, 20 March 1933.

¹⁴ "Russian Woman Reaches Tisdale," *EJ*, 24 March 1933.

to draw attention to it. In early April 1933 four hundred people attended a meeting of the Ukrainian National Association and the Ukrainian War Veterans' Association. Referring to "Communitistic internationalism" as a "new cover for extreme fascism," it was declared at the meeting that "thousands of Ukrainians are starving to death, thousands have been exiled to Siberia, and thousands have been jailed for asking for justice."¹⁵ On 13 April 1933 a more comprehensive report noted that at a recent mass meeting of Ukrainian organizations in Edmonton, letters were read that referred to famine in Soviet Ukraine and spoke of instances of cannibalism. One of the resolutions at the meeting charged that "famine conditions in the Ukrainian territory, probably the richest section of eastern Europe, were due to the Soviet system and acts of the Russian authorities." The account continued that "Action by the provincial, dominion and British governments to initiate a movement with other nations and humanitarian organizations to help the starving people and also urge upon the Soviet government the need of stopping exports from Ukraine was urged in a resolution passed by the meeting." Dr. I. Verchomin, one of the speakers at the meeting, which also protested Communist propaganda and actions in Canada, described the efforts of the Ukrainian community through the Red Cross to have grain shipped from Canada to Ukraine. The efforts were unsuccessful, he noted, because of Soviet unco-operativeness.¹⁶

The Edmonton action was one of many that would be organized nationwide during the spring and summer of 1933. The one held in Calgary on 3 June was typical for its forwarding of resolutions to Premier John Brownlee of Alberta and Prime Minister Richard Bennett.¹⁷

On 7 June the *EJ* reported that while passing through Winnipeg on her way to Edmonton to join her husband, Sophie SI[i]usarenko from the village of Perehonivka in Soviet Ukraine spoke about widespread hunger in her country. "There is not enough bread or potatoes in Ukraine, let alone other bare necessities," she said, and went on to add that in the previous year six hundred people in her village had died of starvation.¹⁸ A couple of months later, on 9 August 1933, in response to the contradictory reports it was hearing about the situation in the USSR, the *EJ* published an editorial stating that when "much is being written about Russia by those who have had the opportunity of acquiring a thorough knowledge of conditions there, little attention deserves to be paid to conclusions reached by visitors who cannot have had the time to make anything more than surface observations." The editorial went on to say that many such visitors came away with the idea that the USSR was in much better shape than the outside world thought, but that was not the impression that the Labour Party MP for East Hamilton, Humphrey Mitchell, received. Mitchell had sent a letter in which "he stated that he had never seen such suffering as he did in Russia among those who appeared to be peasants and unskilled workers."¹⁹

¹⁵ "Ukrainians Protest," *EJ*, 4 April 1933.

¹⁶ "Charge Horrible Conditions Exist under Soviet Rule," *EJ*, 13 April 1933.

¹⁷ "Protybolshevyski rezoliutsii v Kalgarakh," *Ukrainski visti*, 21 June 1933. In Edmonton *Ukrainski visti* called on the community to join together in a broad "anti-Bolshevik front." See "Na protybolshevyskyi front," *Ukrainski visti*, 21 June 1933. Members of the community responded by staging rallies in various locations of Alberta. In the spring of 1933 a rally was also held in Saskatoon; see "Tells of Horrors in Russia Today," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 2 May 1933.

¹⁸ "Says Ukrainians Die of Starvation," *EJ*, 7 June 1933.

¹⁹ "What to Believe about Russia," *EJ*, 9 August 1933. Mitchell later served as the minister for labour in the Liberal government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. The *EB* also

Later in August the *EJ* published an interview with Peter J. Lazarowich, an Edmonton barrister who had recently returned to the city after nearly a year in Europe, during which he had spent some time in Prague, a major centre of interwar Ukrainian émigré life. In the interview Lazarowich mentioned the famine in Soviet Ukraine. Ukraine had been considered the granary of Europe, he said, but “today it is the centre of the most appalling famine in its history due to the internal strife and bad government in the various states.”²⁰ Lazarowich’s reference to a famine in Ukraine prompted an editorial in the newspaper two days later. The editorial began by drawing attention to Lazarowich’s statement, which “must have proved startling to many readers.” How could this be so, the editorial said readers might ask, when during the past two or three weeks there were reports of large crops in Europe and a reduction of the supplies needed to be purchased. But Lazarowich’s statement was supported by other sources of information, the *EJ* editorial continued, and it drew attention to the appeal the archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Theodor Innitzer, issued in which he spoke of catastrophe even at a time of a new harvest. The editorial also pointed to fund-raising efforts in Germany to “relieve distress among the Russo-German inhabitants of the Ukraine” and that after hearing what a fellow American and two Germans returning from the USSR had to say, an American correspondent “cabled that the indications were that the estimate of 4,000,000 deaths due to malnutrition in rural Russia during recent months was too low.” The *EJ* editorial further observed that even Walter Duranty of the *New York Times*, who had dismissed the famine reports as an exaggeration or malignant propaganda, acknowledged that there were some deaths, putting the death rate in the winter and spring at four times the normal. The editorial expressed the belief that unlike during the Soviet famine of 1921–22, the current food shortage in the USSR was due not to climatic conditions but “solely to the government’s farm collectivization policies.”²¹

More corroboration of the existence of a famine came in two accounts published in the *EJ* in October 1933. One was provided by Mrs. H. Satanove, who had recently returned to Edmonton after leaving in February for a tour of the USSR and Palestine. Satanove, who herself had emigrated from the Russian Empire in 1911, described the USSR as “a success” but stated that “her people have been caught in the wheels of their own progress.” Disease, she said, was “rampant, terrible. I saw heartrending scenes.” The *EJ* reported that as Satanove “stood talking to a banker in Romna, Russia [i.e., Romny in northeastern Ukraine],” she felt “something beneath her heel. She turned, looked down ... It was a child—dead of starvation.”²²

reported about Mitchell’s impressions, noting that he had written a message to Mayor John Peebles stating that he had not seen “such suffering in my life” as he had witnessed in the Soviet Union. See “Life in Russia One of Suffering Says Labor M.P.,” *EB*, 19 July 1933.

²⁰ “War Certain Says Lawyer,” *EJ*, 30 August 1933.

²¹ “Russia’s Famine,” *EJ*, 1 September 1933. The *EB* also reported that Cardinal Innitzer advised that even at a time of a new harvest catastrophe loomed in four months and, once again, millions of lives would be lost. At a time when the world was almost choked with a surplus of wheat and food, the cardinal said, people were starving in the USSR. The cardinal warned that famine, accompanied by infanticide and cannibalism, threatened all religions and all races equally. See “Archbishop Says Famine Sure to Come,” *EB*, 2 September 1933.

²² “Marching War Legions, Starving Children, City Woman’s Picture of Soviet Russia,” *EJ*, 5 October 1933. “Romna” is very likely the city of Romen in northeastern Ukraine.

A few days later, the *EJ* cited letters Ukrainians in Canada received from Ukraine and also referred to Maria Z[h]uk of Kalmazovka in the Odesa region, who, after landing in Canada, on her way to Consort, Alberta, "told of a case last spring in which a young married couple ... killed and consumed their two small children. The gruesome crime was accidentally discovered when a pig was stolen from the Kolhosp [collective farm] ... and the members of the *militsiia* organized a search of all the houses in the vicinity in an endeavour to locate the stolen "treasure." The head of one child was apparently found in an oven. Cats and dogs had disappeared, Zuk related, and "people also consumed all the field mice and frogs they could obtain." The only food the people could afford, she said, was a "simple soup prepared of water, salt and various weeds."²³

On 25 October 1933 the *EJ* turned over space to Peter Lazarowich to discuss the famine. In terms of the number of victims the famine had claimed, Lazarowich said: "It is difficult to estimate the loss of human life but the consensus of opinion is that it will exceed the figures reached during the famine in 1921-22, which was officially placed at about 5,000,000." As to why the famine was allowed to take place, Lazarowich opined that the "Russian Soviet government is deliberately determined to starve most of the population of the Ukraine in order to beat it into complete submission to the principles of Communism[,] which the Ukrainian peasant masses have hitherto vigorously resisted and repudiated."²⁴

The following month, in November, the *EJ* published the impressions of George Palmer, who had worked as a reporter for *Moscow Daily News*. When asked about food shortages in the USSR, Palmer denied that there were any, remarking "I never saw so many healthy, robust men and women as I did there." Palmer's claims prompted a letter to the editor. The letter writer noted that it was surprising that Palmer could miss the famine in his travels up and down the country when Menonites in Saskatchewan and Ukrainians across Canada were receiving thousands of letters that related deplorable conditions.²⁵ Palmer dismissed that letter and others: "My own experience in the Soviet Union gives the lie to most of the assertions made." "I want a letter that gives concrete details such as name of person who died of starvation, the town or village, the time. Just one letter with these concrete details so that an investigation could be made." If thousands of people were dying of starvation in Alberta, Palmer continued, he was quite certain that it would be possible to obtain the details of at least one case. Until such proof was forthcoming, "I am still of the opinion that the stories of famine, cannibalism, etc., purporting to be from the Soviet Ukraine are, like Mark Twain's death, 'grossly exaggerated.'"²⁶

Palmer was unlikely to sway the members of the Ukrainian community in Edmonton who had complained that offers of help to the starving were being turned down by the Soviet side and who expressed the belief that because Ukrainians were being repressed under Polish rule in Galicia and Volhynia and subjected to famine under Soviet rule, the Ukrainian nation was threatened on both sides of the Polish-Soviet border. In the evening of Sunday, 23 July 1933, a number of Ukrainians in

²³ "Starving Parents Eat Own Children," *EJ*, 10 October 1933.

²⁴ "Famine in the Ukraine," *EJ*, 25 October 1933.

²⁵ "Ukrainian Citizen's Reply," *EJ*, 28 November 1933.

²⁶ "Russian Conditions," *EJ*, 20 December 1933.

Edmonton met in the Edelweiss club hall to hear speeches about the situation in the partitioned Ukrainian lands. The *EJ* reported that a resolution “offering a protest alleging a conspiracy between the Polish and Soviet governments” to exterminate the people of Ukraine by “crucifying them on the Cross of Golgotha” had been passed at that meeting.²⁷

Such protests as the one of July 1933 were also covered in the *EB*.²⁸ On 11 May 1933 the *EB* published an article entitled “Hunger in the Ukraine” by a special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*. The unnamed correspondent noted that the population in Ukraine and northern Caucasus was starving. The correspondent further related that he/she was told by Communist officials that now that heavy industry had been built up, agriculture would be next.²⁹

On 8 August 1933 a letter to the editor appeared in *EB* under the heading “The Real Russia.” Signed “Canadian,” it was written in response to Robert J. Cromie, publisher of the *Vancouver Sun*, who in a recent interview about his trip to Moscow had spoken favourably of the USSR. In late July 1933, Cromie had stated that “some critics say that conditions were not too bad in Moscow, but down in the Ukraine people were starving. Someone from the Ukraine told me that the people in Moscow are starving, too.” Everything that one heard about the USSR, he continued, was both “true and untrue.”³⁰ The letter-writer remarked that had Cromie gone to the provinces, he would have seen hundreds of thousands of famished orphans and millions of “declassed” people without shelter and starving. People with relatives in the USSR, the letter-writer went on to say, could provide more reliable information about the real state of affairs there.³¹

A week later, the *EB* announced that journalist Pierre van Paassen would be sending “hot cables” on his “Russian trip.” Since van Paassen “speaks both German and Yiddish,” the *EB* said, “he will be able to converse freely with the natives.”³² Van Paassen, who was born in the Netherlands and educated in a Calvinist parochial school, moved to Canada in 1911 and studied for the ministry at Victoria College in Toronto. Before he embarked on a career in journalism, he served as an assistant pastor in a Ukrainian (Ruthenian) mission in Alberta for the Methodist Church. During his career

²⁷ “Alleged Persecution in Ukraine is Scored,” *EB*, 24 July 1933.

²⁸ “Ukrainians Make Strong Protest,” *EB*, 24 July 1933, 9. The Ukrainians, the *EB* said, had made a “[s]trong protest against alleged inhuman treatment” in the USSR at a meeting of the Ukrainian National Association in Edelweiss Hall. The protestors also drew attention to the imprisonment and sentencing of a large number of Ukrainians by the Polish government. According to the *EB*, the resolution passed at the meeting read: “35 millions of Ukrainians are being persecuted, oppressed, starved and murdered by the Soviet government of Russia.” There were two reports published in April, one of which noted that “[s]peakers [at a meeting] charged the Soviet government with artificially creating famine in the Ukrainian territory which is the richest part of Eastern Europe because while people are dying of starvation at the same time the Soviets have exported abroad many millions of bushels of wheat, corn, oats and barley.” See “Edmonton Ukrainians Protest Oppression Ukraine Population,” *EB*, 13 April 1933, 13.

²⁹ “Hunger in the Ukraine,” *EB*, 11 May 1933, 4.

³⁰ “Finds Russian Life is Normal,” *EJ*, 29 July 1933, 3. See also “Russian Life Given Praise by Publisher,” *EB*, 29 July 1933, 2.

³¹ “The Real Russia,” *EB*, 8 August 1933, 4.

³² “Pierre Van Paassen to Send Hot Cables on Russian Trip,” *EB*, 14 August 1933, 1.

as a journalist, he wrote for several Canadian and American newspapers, and travelled to different parts of the world. Beginning in 1932, van Paassen spent three years in the Soviet Union as a correspondent for the *Toronto Star*.³³

As promised, van Paassen began to deliver his reports to the *EB*, which were also carried by the *Toronto Star*. In a 12 September article entitled "Future of Soviet Depends on Successful Harvesting," van Paassen related that he had spoken to a prominent Bolshevik official, who had just returned from a tour of inspection of a railway system in Ukraine. The official spoke of a stampede when hunger came, so urban workers were mobilized to cut grain. The Kulaks, van Paassen was told, had such an influence on poorer peasants that "the whole rural Ukraine became the scene last winter of a most bitter phase in the class struggle. There is no question but the Ukraine is the most reactionary region in the Union. Besides the well-known causes of drought and a bad crop last year, the peasants of Ukraine have not taken kindly to the collective farm idea."³⁴

An article in the *EB* the next day placed van Paassen in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast. In his report, van Paassen said that witnesses of all walks of life, some of whom had lived through the 1921 famine on the Volga, "tell me that the privations in the Ukraine did not quite reach the proportions of that earlier catastrophe when ten millions died of hunger and typhus." But everyone agreed, van Paassen continued, that from January 1933 until a few weeks ago the situation had been calamitous. There was little evidence of that situation at present, van Paassen went on to say, and so he could not give an eyewitness account. He then added: "The grain collectors were ruthless last year. There was a drought. There was a campaign to bring the government to a fall or at least to embroil it in grave difficulties. There was a bitter social and political conflict." The bad times, Van Paassen said, lay behind, and he took that to be "the simple explanation for the general reticence. People rather talk of the future than of the past except historians."³⁵

In the meantime Ukrainians in Edmonton continued to stage rallies to draw public attention to conditions in Soviet Ukraine. On 14 October 1933 the *EB* reported that local Ukrainians had gathered at the town hall to voice protest "against alleged ruth-

³³ An anti-fascist, he interviewed Hitler in 1934 and was a guest of Mussolini for six weeks. See *New York Times*, 9 January 1968, 43, which noted that he was fluent in "French, Italian, German and Hebrew, in addition to Dutch and English, and in college had specialized in New Testament Greek."

³⁴ "Future of Soviet Depends on Successful Harvesting," *EB*, 12 September 1933, 3.

³⁵ "Ukraine Practically Won Over to Soviet Farm Plan," *EB*, 13 September 1933, 1. The *EB* had no editorial similar to the *EJ*'s "Russia's Famine," but in October 1933 it did comment on Ukraine and the Soviet Union in light of Pierre van Paassen's reports. "In the Ukraine, Mr. Van Paassen writes, there is a good crop of wheat: but the peasants are not reaping it and will not eat it." a 19 October *EB* editorial began. "The reaping is being done for the Government, by labour-saving machinery operated by a few hands," it continued, and added that the families "who formerly won their living from the land are wandering the roads." The editorial then went on to note that the USSR had largely accomplished in a few years the industrialization that took other countries generations to achieve. But the achievement, it said, seemed to land them all in the same place, "where 'wealth accumulates but men decay,'" remarking that "Humanity is about the least wanted commodity on earth today, whether in Soviet Russia or in the countries where the citizen is allowed to accumulate private capital and employ it" ("The Human Surplus," *EB*, 19 October 1933, 4).

less collections of grain from the people of the Ukraine, who are said to be in a starv-ing condition at the present time.”³⁶

On 8 November the *EB* reported the arrival from Soviet Ukraine of the family of Rabbi Isaac Haft. The newspaper described the newcomers as the “[f]irst family to come to Edmonton with first hand information regarding conditions in southern Russia in the last five years.” The *EB* was told that conditions in winter 1932 and the summer of 1933 had been very severe; that there was hardly any crop in 1932 and even coarse bread was a luxury; and that there had been an outbreak of typhoid in the summer.³⁷

Then in December the *EB* carried a news item concerning an appeal made by Cardinal Innitzer. The archbishop of Vienna had published an appeal on 1 December for contributions to relieve “the starving millions in southern Russia.” The *EB* reminded its readers of the appeal the cardinal had made in August 1933.³⁸ There was a similar story in the *Edmonton Journal*. While in his second appeal Cardinal Innitzer said that the new Soviet crop was insufficient and predicted a famine would again occur in the winter, the *Edmonton Journal* informed its readers that dispatches from Moscow in October 1933 indicated that the crops were good which “gave assurance of adequate food supplies.”³⁹

From where could Cardinal Innitzer’s concern have stemmed? Perhaps articles in the *Western Catholic* may offer a clue. Back in August 1933 that newspaper reported that a Jesuit priest, after his return to the Vatican from a secret visit to the USSR, informed Pope Pius XI of people wandering “aimlessly across the land in search of enough black bread and dried fish to keep body and soul together.” When Pope Pius XI heard the priest’s estimate that there would be “between ten and twelve million deaths from starvation” occurring, “the Jesuit was shocked to see tears streaming down the face of the Pontiff.”⁴⁰

Then in October 1933 the *Western Catholic* informed its readers of a joint letter by the Ukrainian Catholic bishops in Galicia that declared “Ukraine to be in the clutches of death, its people dying of starvation and the situation, resulting from Bolshevik action, growing worse from day to day.” They appealed for a worldwide protest.⁴¹

³⁶ “Voice Protest Soviet Action in Ukraine,” *EB*, 14 October 1933, 8.

³⁷ “Rabbi Haft’s Kin Arrives from Russia,” *EB*, 8 November 1933, 13. See also “Wife and Family of Jewish Rabbi Arrive from Ukraine,” *EB*, 8 November 1933, 6, and “Rabbi’s Family Here from Ukraine,” *EJ*, 8 November 1933, 14. Rabbi Haft’s family had come to Edmonton from Poltava.

³⁸ “Cardinal in Plea Asks Aid for Russians,” *EB*, 2 December 1933, 3.

³⁹ “Appeals for Aid Soviet’s Starving,” *EJ*, 2 December 1933, 19.

⁴⁰ See “Pope Weeps As He Hears of Millions Starving in Russia,” *Western Catholic*, 30 August 1933, 6.

⁴¹ “Catholic Bishops of Ukraina [sic] Appeal to World against Soviet Injustice,” *Western Catholic*, 18 October 1933, 1. The story of the joint letter was also featured in Edmonton’s Ukrainian-language weekly *Ukrainski visti*. On 20 September 1933 that paper published a pastoral letter by Bishop Basil Ladyka, a former pastor of St. Josaphat Ukrainian Catholic Parish in Edmonton, dated 13 September, on the subject of the famine. The letter spoke of the suffering of the Ukrainian people under the “tyrannical regime” of the “godless communists” that had been imposed by “Muscovite invaders.” Pope Pius XI had for the past three years been vigorously protesting the anti-Christian policy of the Soviet regime, the spiritual leader of the Ukrainian

In the autumn of 1933 Ukrainian groups in North America continued to urge that attention be drawn to the famine in Ukraine. On 2 October, the Ukrainian National Council in Canada, based in Winnipeg, wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt "with an urgent request to take the necessary steps to arrange for an immediate neutral investigation of the famine situation in Ukraine." The council's bulletin, dated 15 September 1933, was submitted to the American leader. It included the testimony of Maria Zuk of Kalmazovka.⁴² In October 1933 readers of the *EJ* would also hear her account.

Catholic Church in Canada noted, but since then the situation had become worse. People fortunate enough to leave Greater Ukraine (the Ukrainian SSR), he said, provided stories of starvation and cannibalism. Bishop Ladyka appealed to God to shorten the days of grief of the Ukrainian people and asked that they may soon be able to pray to Him in freedom, under their own government, one that would give to its citizens a "better destiny and the holy truth of Christ." He called on all believers to help with prayer and protest, and to announce to the world the calamity that had befallen "Greater Ukraine" (Soviet Ukraine). "U khvyli narodnoho horia." *Ukrainski visti*, 20 September 1933.

⁴² M. Wayne Morris, *Stalin's Famine and Roosevelt's Recognition of Russia* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994), 193–96.

The *Zhinviddil* Resurrected: Soviet Women's Organizations in Postwar Western Ukraine

Yoshie Mitsuyoshi

Since the 1970s historians have examined various issues surrounding the important Women's Department (Russian: *Zhenotdel*) of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), ranging from the life and activities of its famous founder, Alexandra Kollontai, through the *Zhenotdel*'s struggle with the Bolsheviks' misogynistic attitudes, to the final phase of the *Zhenotdel* and its liquidation process in 1930, thereby contributing greatly to the establishment of women's studies within Soviet studies in the West.¹

Fewer studies have been undertaken of Soviet women after the official liquidation of the *zhenotdel*, however, and the voices of women in political organizations has become virtually inaudible. Although "work among women" continued in the form of the *zhensektor* (women's section), and, in the non-Russian republics, the *zhenotdel* and delegates' meetings are said to have continued throughout the Second World War, to date no major study of this work has emerged.²

Toward the end of the Soviet era, particularly during the perestroika period of the late 1980s, a small group of British feminist historians examined another form of women's organization, the women-only *zhensovet* (women's councils; Ukrainian: *zhinrady*). The *zhensovet* began appearing from the late 1950s, becoming the focus of attention both in the Soviet Union and in the West by the mid-1970s, first during International Women's Year in 1975 and again in 1987, when Gorbachev advocated the strengthening of the *zhensovet* in his speech at the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While not denying the fundamental premise of the Soviet one-party state—that any independent or non-party groups and movements were not formally permitted—Genia Browning, the sole Western scholar of the *zhensovet*, presented them as spontaneous organizations comparable to women's consciousness-raising groups in Western countries.³ However, the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union stalled further inquiry into these "Soviet" women's organizations. Instead, attention and interest in the 1990s was directed at the growing

¹ See, for example, Richards Stites, *The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia, Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860–1930* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Elizabeth Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); and Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women at the Gate: Gender and Industry in Stalin's Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

² Paula A. Michaels, "Motherhood, Patriotism, and Ethnicity: Soviet Kazakhstan and the 1936 Abortion Ban," *Feminist Studies* 27, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 307–333.

³ Genia K. Browning, *Women and Politics in the USSR: Consciousness Raising and Soviet Women's Groups* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

"real" feminist movement and women's organizations in post-Soviet society. Under these circumstances, the *zhensovet*, like all "official" women's organizations throughout the former Soviet-bloc countries, were discredited as superfluous, artificial organizations unworthy of serious scholarly inquiry.⁴

An effort to bridge the gulf between the *Zhenotdel* of the 1920s and the *zhensovet* under Khrushchev and Gorbachev occurred in the late 1990s. A number of studies of the *obshchestvennitsa* (wives' movement of the late 1930s) in which groups of women—mainly housewives—were organized according to their husbands' workplace and work status in order to engage in a variety of socio-cultural, often female-oriented, activities, offer scholars of Stalinist society a lively discussion topic.⁵ Indeed, Mary Buckley argues that the *obshchestvennitsa* movement actually inspired both Khrushchev's *zhensovet* and Gorbachev's efforts to revitalize them during perestroika. However, studies of the *obshchestvennitsa* have barely dealt with the period after the Second World War.

This study examines women's organizations in western Ukraine during the period immediately after the Second World War. I argue in this paper that, in this region, the seemingly straightforward transition of women's organizations from the 1930s to the 1960s was not as smooth as one might imagine. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), one of the strongest national movements in Eastern Europe in the twentieth century, traditionally involved women in its underground organizations and worked with women's own community movements.⁶ While some women chose to devote themselves to the OUN-affiliated underground Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), others were turned off by the OUN's paternalistic treatment of women. After occupying Western Ukraine (eastern Galicia, western Volhynia, Transcarpathia, and Bukovyna) in the wake of the Second World War, the newly arrived Soviet authorities launched a Soviet-style "emancipation" of women under the slogan of gender equality and sponsored a variety of welfare programs. Meanwhile the rest of the Soviet Union had retreated into social conservatism and traditional values, a process in which women had become "double-burdened" in paternalistic high Stalinist society. Caught in the midst of a bloody war between the Soviet state and the Ukrainian nationalist underground, Western Ukrainian women found themselves at a crossroads where two opposing political ideologies, Stalinist Communism and Ukrainian Nationalism, competed with each other for the recruitment of women. The women constituted an indispensable reservoir of labour for both sides. The duties expected of them were far removed from those suggested by the Stalinist gender policies imposed on women in

⁴ For a good overview of official women's organizations in the former Communist countries, see Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe* (London: Verso, 1993), 182–215.

⁵ See Rebecca Balmas Neary, "Mothering Socialist Society: The Wife-Activists' Movement and the Soviet Culture of Daily Life, 1934–41," *Russian Review* 58 (1999): 396–412; Thomas G. Schrand, "Soviet 'Civic-Minded Women' in the 1930s: Gender, Class, and Industrialization in a Socialist Society," *Journal of Women's History* 11, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 126–50; Mary Buckley, "Untold Story of *Obshchestvennitsa* in the 1930s," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 4 (1996): 569–586; and idem, "The Soviet 'Wife-Activist' Down on the Farm," *Social History* 26, no. 3 (October 2000): 282–98.

⁶ See Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884–1939* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988).

the rest of the USSR. A close examination of Soviet Communist Party archives reveals a unique and complicated picture of women's organizations in Western Ukraine, in which the *Zhenotdel*, delegates' meetings, and *zhinrady* coexisted.

The mobilization of Western Ukrainian women in the postwar era has not always been a neglected theme among historians. Soviet historians have produced several studies on the Sovietization of Western Ukraine, mainly focusing on the region's collectivization and economic achievements. Works published in the 1970s and 1980s often contain, if in passing, a brief overview of women's experience as an integral part of Western Ukraine's Soviet transformation.⁷ Soviet scholars described the Party's organizational role in attracting women to the building of socialism through their participation in collectivization and politics. Some scholars studied the topic in depth.⁸ Their heavily doctrinaire interpretations notwithstanding, these works have provided valuable data for this paper.

The Women's Departments, Delegates' Meetings, and Women's Councils

In late July 1944 the Soviet army entered Lviv, the historic capital of Western Ukraine and embarked upon re-establishing the Soviet regime in the region, which had been interrupted by the German invasion of the USSR that began on 22 June 1941. The major tasks facing the Soviet leaders were the restoration of the economy, the re-establishment of state and Party organizations, and the consolidation of Soviet power in Western Ukraine, all of which the underground OUN and UPA resisted militarily. In fact, the numerous decrees and measures that the Soviet authorities implemented were, not coincidentally, related to changes in the tactics of the Nationalist forces. Similarly, in terms of women, the Soviet regime's decision to organize women reflected the Nationalists' tactical change in their recruitment methods. In 1944 and 1945 the OUN and UPA considerably increased their efforts to recruit women. Initially involving a handful of women in ancillary positions because

⁷ E.g., Ye. V. Safonova, *Ideino-vykhovna robota Komunistychnoi Partii sered trudiashchyykh vyzvolennykh raioniv Ukrainy v roky Velykoi Vitchyznianoi viiny, 1943–1945 rr.* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Kyivskoho universytetu, 1971), 163–65; O. A. Kirsanova, *Rozvytok suspilno-politychnoi aktyvnosti trudiashchyykh zakhidnykh oblastei URSR u protsesi budivnytstva osnov sotsializmu* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1981), 146–58; and A. Kondratiuk, *Ideino-politicheskaia robota partiinykh organizatsii v period sotsialisticheskoi perestroiki zapadnoukrainskogo sela, 1944–1950 gg.* (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Lvivskoho universytetu, 1972), 96–97.

⁸ E.g., L. M. Bakhmatova, "Diialnist partiinykh orhanizatsii zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy po zaluchenniu zhinok-selianok do kolhospnoho budivnytstva, 1945–1950," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1969, no. 10: 49–55; Yu. M. Trofymiak, "Diialnist Komunistychnoi Partii Ukrainy po zaluchenniu zhinok zakhidnykh oblastei do aktyvnoi uchasti v hromadskomu zhytti, 1944–1950 rr.," *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu*, 1968, 54–59; idem, "Dobir i vykhovannia kerivnykh kadrov z aktyvu zhinok, na materialakh zakhidnykh oblastei URSR, 1946–1955 rr.," *Naukovi pratsi z istorii KPRS*, no. 37 (1970): 123–30; N. D. Bondarchuk, "Hromadsko-politychna i trudova aktyvnist zhinok Izmailshchyny, 1944–1952 rr.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1984, no. 3: 95–102; Nina P. Shevchenko, *Uchastie zhenshchin v sotsialisticheskikh preobrazovaniakh v zapadnykh oblastakh Ukrainy, 1939–1950 gg.* (Lviv, 1989); and idem, "Borotba za likvidatsiiu nepysmennosti i malopysmennosti ta pidvyshchennia zahalnoosvitnoho rivnia zhinok zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrainy, 1945–1950," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1983, no. 6: 105–12.

of the shortage of men, especially young men, in its armed struggle with Polish, German, and Soviet military forces, the Ukrainian Nationalist underground began relying increasingly on women and girls in every sector of its activities. Women's increased participation was reflected in their frequent appearance in Soviet reports.⁹ Consequently the Soviet side soon began applying its own gender-specific tactics to counter those of the Nationalists.

Party leaders in Western Ukraine had previously expressed the need to organize local Ukrainian women for the building of socialism. In Drohobych oblast there had already been a sporadic effort to direct women, in the form of a women's council, against the Nationalists.¹⁰ The official announcement of the mobilization of women occurred in April 1945, when a decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, entitled "On Work among Women in the Western Oblasts," laid the foundation of Soviet gender politics in Western Ukraine for the following years.¹¹ The decree emphasized the importance of political work among the female population, namely ensuring its support for the Soviet regime, its active participation in social, economic, and daily life, and the organization of women in the struggle against the "Ukrainian-German nationalists." To accomplish these goals, all local Party committees in Western Ukraine were instructed to organize delegates' meetings and *zhinrady*.

As supervising institutions, departments for work among women (*viddily po roboti sered zhinok*) were created in the Party committees of the eight Western Ukrainian oblasts and Izmail oblast.¹² The organization of women assumed the form of both delegates' meetings and *zhinrady*, contrary to the fact that the latter were understood to be the "spiritual heirs" and "continuation" of the former.¹³ Women's councils began appearing in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s as part of Khrushchev's attempts to reorganize Soviet society. In the wake of his repudiation of Stalinism, Khrushchev attempted to reconstruct the Soviet state and society by eliminating bureaucratic privileges and encouraging mass participation in social organizations such as trade unions and volunteer groups, including women's councils. Loosely linked to trade-union or Party committees, women's councils were engaged in a wide range of political, economic, and cultural activities. Although the women's councils can not be attributed to a single founder (Khrushchev), unlike Kollontai's *zhenotdel* or Sergo Orzhonikidze's *obshchestvennitsa*, archival evidence from Western Ukraine actually indicates that they probably first existed there when Khrushchev was first secretary of the CP(B)U. Also, according to Browning, some of the earliest models of women's councils were formed during the war, often in Ukraine or Moldavia.

⁹ See Jeffrey Burds, "Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944–1948," *Cahiers du monde russe* 42, no. 2–4 (April–December 2001): 279–319.

¹⁰ Yu. Yu. Slyvka et al, eds., *Suspilno-politychnyi rozvytok zakhidnykh oblastei URSR, 1939–1989: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1989), 83.

¹¹ The text of the decree, signed by the Ukrainian Politburo on 5 April 1945, is in Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAHOU), fond 1, list 6, file 859, fols. 133–36.

¹² The territory of what became Izmail oblast was occupied by Romania from 1918 to 1940 and again from 1941 to 1944. It became part of Odesa oblast in 1954.

¹³ Browning, *Women and Politics in the USSR*, 54.

What was the relationship between the women's councils, delegates' meetings, and women's departments? Like its predecessor of the 1920s, the delegates' meeting organized the female population as a whole. According to the April 1945 Central Committee decree, a delegates' meeting consisted of twenty to forty women, each elected from among every ten to fifteen women in villages, factories, schools, administrative bodies, or collective farms. During their term of three to six months, delegates attended meetings for their political education. In practice, the number of delegates varied widely, depending on the number of adult women in each institution or village. For example, in Kamianka-Buzka raion in Lviv oblast, which had 9,097 adult women in early 1945, 323 delegates were elected for twenty meetings, so that a delegates' meeting consisted of sixteen or seventeen delegates, with one delegate elected from among every thirty women.¹⁴ By contrast, for the delegates' meeting at Lviv University, which had 182 female employees, seventeen delegates were elected, or one delegate from among every ten women.¹⁵

The work of delegates' meetings was aimed at "mass political education, the liquidation of illiteracy and semi-illiteracy among women, mobilization of women into the active struggle against the Ukrainian-German nationalists, [and] preparation of qualified female cadres for responsible positions in the economy."¹⁶ When a delegates' meeting was not in session, the women's council was to perform the "daily guidance" of the work of the delegates' meeting. A women's council consisted of three to seven women chosen from the delegates; therefore when delegates were re-elected, so were the members of the women's councils. The plans of the activities of the delegates' meetings and women's councils had to be approved by the Party organizations. The work of women's councils was divided into sections, such as culture, education, industry, trades, school, elections, land, and sanitation. The type of section varied, depending on the location of the women's council. As a rule, each section had to include at least three delegates. However, a women's council did not simply involve the selection of more politically conscious women at a delegates' meeting; it also included unelected delegates, who often were professionals (e.g., physicians, nurses, teachers, librarians). They would join a section or give lectures at seminars or delegates' meetings.

To implement the April 1945 decree's intentions for delegates' meetings, women's councils performed a variety of daily activities. Reports outlining what kind of work women activists successfully did or did not perform reveal the wide range of their expected duties. In the immediate postwar years, the members of women's councils were engaged in activities directly related to reconstruction: helping families of soldiers with their agricultural work; repairing schools, hospitals, daycare centres, and dormitories; and providing assistance to war orphans. With respect to cultural and educational activities, they read newspapers to workers at factories, prepared news broadsheets, and organized cultural exhibitions, film and theatre presentations, and concerts. These cultural activities were often held in connection with major political events and meetings, such as the election of Soviet deputies, May Day, International

¹⁴ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Lvivskoi oblasti (hereafter DALO), fond P-3, list 2, file 291, fol. 19.

¹⁵ DALO, fond P-3, list 1, file 491, fol. 114.

¹⁶ TsDAHOUO, fond 1, list 6, file 859, fols. 133–36.

Women's Day celebrations, the tenth anniversary (1949) of the unification of Ukraine, and the anniversary of the October Revolution. During an election, delegates and members of women's councils often worked as "female-agitators" by organizing people for special campaigns and conducting seminars, lectures, and "conversations." The duty of the women's council was to make certain that the entire electorate voted. A detailed report on the activities of a women's council, especially of its chairwoman, could reveal who the most active women were, thus creating a reservoir of personnel for Party and state organizations. Being the chairwoman of a women's council often led to a series of promotions. In 1947 two of the four female deputies in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet from Lviv oblast were former chairwomen of women's councils.

Unlike their counterparts in the rest of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, the women's councils in Western Ukraine in the late 1940s were not organized hierarchically. Women's councils, like delegates' meetings, were set up at local soviets, factories, administration buildings, schools, collective farms, and housing offices, but there were no raion-, oblast-, or republic-level women's councils or delegates' meetings. The women's councils were supervised by "women's organizers" and local Party committees that operated within the women's department at the oblast Party committee. Therefore, it is fair to say that even though women's councils were not directly under Party control, they were subject to the strong guidance of the women's departments, unlike many of their counterparts in the 1960s, which were closely linked to trade unions. In short, women's organizations in Western Ukraine functioned in a three-tiered system of delegates' meetings as broad mass organizations, women's councils as groups of more politically conscious women, and the Party's women's departments as supervising bodies.

The oblast women's department consisted of a chairwoman and three instructors. Each instructor was assigned to supervise about twelve raions (in the case of Lviv oblast) for inspection and consultation. The women's organizers at the raion Party committees were responsible for women's affairs at the raion level; in fact, they had the most direct contact with the local female population at large.

Officially the women's department existed from 1945 to 1956, but sources confirm that it was most operative and active from 1945 to 1951, the period when social transformation occurred in Western Ukraine.¹⁷ Large-scale general re-elections of members of delegates' meetings and women's councils were held in Western Ukraine in May 1946, June 1948, and December 1949. Each election was turned into a propaganda campaign focusing on the major problems relating to the mobilization of women in the region: the first re-election highlighted early organizational difficulties, while the next two addressed the Fourth Five-Year Plan and collectivization. Each time, all Western Ukrainian oblasts steadily increased the number of delegate meetings, delegates, and women's councils. The first goal of the women's organizers was to provide all local soviets with a women's council and a delegates' meeting. When this task was not accomplished, raion Party committees and women's organizers were repeatedly instructed to do so. Especially in the countryside, the number of women's councils and delegates' meetings often corresponded to the number of local soviets. In the cities, in addition to the local soviet, women's

¹⁷ "Zhinviddily," in *Ukrainskyiadianskyi entsyklopedychnyi slovnyk*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Holovna redaktsiia Ukrainskoiadianskoi entsyklopedii, 1986), 625.

councils were formed at factories or other institutions. As the collectivization process accelerated from 1947 onwards, the number of women's councils at collective farms increased.

Work and Organizational Problems

How did women's departments, delegates' meetings, and women's councils work in practice? In late May 1945, one month after the April decree, the first Oblast Congress of Women was held in Lviv. Within less than a month after Germany's surrender, the Lviv Opera Theatre was filled with more than eight hundred people. The congress was featured in the headlines of the local newspaper *Vilna Ukraina* for four days.¹⁸ Women delegates gave speeches about their difficult experiences under Polish rule and German occupation, and they thanked the Red Army for liberating Lviv. Some women were already reporting about the work of their women's councils, which had been officially launched only a month earlier. Olena Mykytenko, the women's organizer in Bibrka raion, explained that her women's council had already been operative for three months, helping the families of Red Army soldiers with field work, aiding mothers with many children to obtain benefits, or doing repair work at schools. She stated that her raion had 187 active delegates and twenty-four chairwomen in the councils. Their stated duty was "to struggle against the German-Ukrainian nationalists."¹⁹ In July 1945, in Lviv oblast, which had 606 local soviets, there were 808 delegates' meetings, 484 of which were held in villages, and 342 in institutions. There were 8,626 delegates, of which 5,942 were from villages, and 2,684 from institutions. Lviv oblast had 742 women's councils, of which 447 were formed in villages, and 324 in institutions.²⁰ Behind such numerically impressive reports and the bombastic celebrations, however, women's organizational tasks had only begun, and the difficulties women's organizations faced even before starting their work among women were overwhelming.

Among the many problems, three closely interrelated issues stemmed from Western Ukraine's unique situation in the Soviet Union. The first problem, which occurred during the formation of Soviet Party and state structures in Western Ukraine in general, was that women's organizational work suffered from ignorance, inefficiency, and a lack of qualified personnel. The second problem, the lack of "local" Ukrainian women in the Soviet administration, constituted the most serious dilemma for the Soviet regime. The third problem was that the work of women activists was considerably hindered by the OUN and UPA underground, which saw them as collaborators and attempted to punish them by any means available.

In November 1945, six months after the April decree, the Party's Central Committee issued a decree urging that organizational work among women be undertaken more effectively and appropriately.²¹ The November decree specifically referred to the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the April decree in Stanislav and Chernivtsi oblasts, where women's organizers had not been appointed in all raions. Ten of thirty-eight raions in Stanislav oblast and two of twenty in Chernivtsi oblast had no raion

¹⁸ *Vilna Ukraina*, 30 May and 1, 2, and 3 June 1945.

¹⁹ DALO, fond P-3, list 1, file 197, fol. 30.

²⁰ DALO, fond P-3, list 1, file 323, fol. 77.

²¹ TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 6, file 841, fols. 32–38.

women's organizers. The decree also denounced local Party organizations for a variety of offenses. They had failed to inform young women about the "fascist nature of Ukrainian nationalist ideology." Many villages in both oblasts had never elected members for delegates' meetings and women's councils. Even where women's councils and delegates' meetings had been set up, they were functioning very poorly. Meetings were being held rarely or informally. Important issues, such as "the domestic and international policies of the Soviet Union," "what the Soviet regime was giving working women," and "the perspective and tasks of the future development of our state" were being unsatisfactorily explained to women.

To remedy this situation, the November decree instructed both oblasts to appoint all of their raion women's organizers by 1 December 1945, to improve other work among women, and to report by January 1946 on how successfully the original April decree was being fulfilled. Not surprisingly, the harsh wording of the announcement and the allotment of such a brief time period did not improve matters, so the Party's Central Committee issued a third decree with similar content in the spring of 1946 urging the completion of organizational work, this time accompanied by instructions to hold general re-elections for all delegates' meetings and women's councils in all of the Western Ukrainian oblasts.²² Stanislav oblast was again criticized for not fulfilling the November decree, since it was still missing eight raion women's organizers. The situation was no better in the other oblasts. In Rivne oblast five raions out of thirty-one had no women's organizers, and the oblast women's department had only one instructor, which was far from satisfactory. Lviv oblast, which had three instructors, repeatedly told the Central Committee that it was being assigned too much work and could not properly carry out its duties, which required travel to and supervision of several raions.²³

The lack of qualified women was the major reason for the insufficient organizational progress. However, as a result of the Central Committee's three decrees and pressure from the oblast women's department, women's organizers were assigned to most, if not all, raion party committees. The question whether these organizers were capable of carrying out their duties posed another problem. Comments questioning their capabilities abound in instructors' reports. As well, women's organizers often divulged their inadequate qualifications in their own monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual reports to the oblast women's departments by submitting them very late or after long intervals or by not following the required format. In addition, the "work among women" in the countryside generally lagged behind that of their urban counterparts. The organizers in Lviv's five raions were efficient, worked diligently among women, and submitted detailed reports to the women's department of the Oblast Party Committee (*Obkom*) every month. The official forms for women's department reports measured virtually all of the work among women in terms of quantity—the number of delegates' and women's council meetings, conferences, lectures, seminars, daycare centres, mothers with many children, or female Stakhanovites. In addition, these numbers were inaccurate not only in terms of the reliability of the sources but also with respect to simple arithmetic. After receiving the report from Krakovets raion, the director of the Lviv women's department, Raisa Vyshemirska, asked the report's

²² TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 9, file 390, fols. 123–28.

²³ DALO, fond P-3, list 2, file 150, fol. 5.

author: "You said that in your raion there are twenty-three delegates' meetings, of which eight are in villages, six at factories, four at institutes, and that the total is eighteen. So which is the correct number, eighteen or twenty-three?"²⁴ On another occasion she kindly corrected the misspellings of her name and that of the department: "It is called the Women's Department of Work among Women at the Lviv *Obkom*, not the Women's Organizational Department of the Lviv *Obkom*."²⁵

Such mistakes were plentiful, especially during the the first two years of women's work—1945-46—when women's organizers as well as local Party organizations did not fully understand their duties. In Stanislav oblast, seven organizers out of thirty-seven were declared incapable of carrying out their duties because of their inexperience and semi-literacy.²⁶ The issue of literacy was in fact a very complicated and serious problem in Western Ukraine as a whole. The majority of women's organizers were actually recruited from outside Western Ukraine, mostly from the eastern part of the republic and elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Many of them were Russian-speakers and had little or no command of the Ukrainian language.²⁷ It is surprising that the above-mentioned problems were caused mainly by women from eastern Ukraine and Russia, who, one should expect, would have been more qualified and efficient in comparison with the "illiterate and backward" local western Ukrainian women.

The lack of local cadres was the most serious problem and therefore constituted a major obstacle to the Sovietization of Western Ukraine.²⁸ While the exact number of Russians and "eastern" Ukrainians who immigrated to Western Ukraine after the Second World War is unknown, it is generally estimated that more than half of the so-called "leading" cadres and administrative positions were occupied by the newcomers. One study indicates that in 1946 native Western Ukrainians occupied fewer than thirteen per cent of the *nomenklatura* posts.²⁹ Not surprisingly, the situation in women's organizations was even worse because local women were severely under-represented in the Party organizations (see table 1).

In 1947 every Western Ukrainian oblast except Transcarpathia recruited only one or two women's organizers from the local population. Drohobych, Lviv, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts had no local women's organizers. In 1947 Lviv, the historic capital of western Ukraine and the centre of the nationalist movement, had no local Ukrainian women among its women's organizers, and even the chairwoman of the oblast's women's department was not local. In Transcarpathia oblast, on the other hand, eight out of fifteen women's organizers were recruited from the local population, which resulted in a high percentage than elsewhere. One explanation for this stark contrast was the unique situation in Transcarpathia: the relative weakness of the OUN and the UPA there, the local population's relatively passive attitude and dependence on the Soviet authorities, and the ensuing relatively quick pace of collectivization.

²⁴ DALO, fond P-3, list 1, file 265, fol. 113.

²⁵ DALO, fond P-3, list 1, file 265, fols. 51, 57.

²⁶ TsDAHOOU, fond 1, list 23, file 4581, fol. 178.

²⁷ This was the case with the women's organizer in Zhovkva raion. See DALO, fond 3, list 2, file 150, fol. 54.

²⁸ Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 91.

²⁹ O. S. Rublov and Yu. A. Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelihentsii: 20-50-ti roky XX st.* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1994), 212.

TABLE 1. Women's Organizers in the Raion and City Party Committees in the Western Ukrainian Oblasts, January 1947

| <i>Oblast</i> | <i>Required number of organizers</i> | <i>Actual number of active organizers</i> | <i>Number of active local organizers</i> |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| Volyn | 33 | 29 | 1 |
| Drohobych | 31 | 31 | 0 |
| Lviv | 37 | 37 | 0 |
| Rivne | 31 | 29 | 2 |
| Stanislaw | 38 | 35 | 2 |
| Ternopil | 41 | 40 | 0 |
| Transcarpathia | 15 | 12 | 8 |
| Chernivtsi | 20 | 20 | 0 |
| Izmail | 16 | 16 | 2 |
| Total | 262 | 249 | 15 |

Source: TsDAHO, fond 1, list 23, file 4581.

Heavy reliance on outsiders was also evident in the ethnic composition of the women's councils. For example, in the fifty-six women's councils in Chervonoarmiiskyi (now Lychakiv) raion in Lviv only seven chairwomen were recruited from among the local female Ukrainian population. Of the remaining forty-nine chairwomen, twenty-four were Russian, eighteen were from "eastern" Ukraine (i.e., from the territory of interwar Soviet Ukraine), four were Jewish, and one each was Estonian, Armenian, or Polish.³⁰

Even if qualified women were available, many female activists were afraid of OUN or UPA retaliation and therefore reluctant to support the Soviet regime openly. Indeed, the work of women's departments and women's councils was hindered by both competing camps. The Soviet authorities had to ensure that the female cadres were also politically reliable and often did not trust the local women or their husbands and sons, who could have been involved in the nationalist underground. The OUN and UPA saw anyone who supported the Soviet regime as a "traitor to Ukraine" and condemned him or her to death. A specially organized underground intelligence service unit carried out punishments of suspected Soviet collaborators.³¹ Reflecting the severity of the nationalist-Soviet confrontation, examples of nationalist obstruction of the women's mobilization are abundant. During the 1947 elections to the Supreme Soviet, for instance, the OUN's call for a boycott caused many local Ukrainian women to abstain from voting. Furthermore, many women were afraid to attend conferences or meetings because of OUN and UPA influence in the villages. However, it is nonetheless important to note that the brutality and violence of the Soviet forces surpassed those perpetrated by the nationalist undergrounds. During the immediate post-Second World War period, Soviet military and security forces began a brutal campaign of repression in Western Ukraine. Nearly 90,000 nationalist insurgents were killed by the Soviets, and more than 200,000 people from

³⁰ DALO, fond 3, list 1, file 490, fol. 139.

³¹ See Burds, "Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine."

Western Ukraine, including the families of nationalist personnel, were deported to Siberia.³²

Among the many women who worked for the Soviets regime, the chairwomen of the women's councils and female collective farmers were two of the most visible targets. In view of the fact that one of the reasons for organizing women was the struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists—as stated in the Central Committee's decree—women activists were expected to fulfill dangerous duties. In so doing, some of the abler women activists were targeted as enemies by the the OUN and UPA. Insurgents carried out reprisals against Soviet activists regardless of their ethnic origins, even against local Ukrainian women who, in their view, had betrayed Ukraine. At a delegates' meeting that took place in Busk raion, Lviv oblast, in June 1945, Zabronska, the chairwoman of the women's council, spoke about how she had suffered under Polish rule and German occupation and called on women to participate actively in the "socialist economy." The next day "Banderites" killed her. This incident undoubtedly made other women afraid of becoming visibly involved in Soviet work.³³ A more shocking incident happened in October 1948, when nationalists killed Mariia Matsko, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. Matsko was a peasant woman from Yavoriv raion, Lviv oblast, and a kolkhoz worker. Although the official press mentioned only that she had died "while on duty,"³⁴ secret Party documents indicate that "nationalists" murdered her in her apartment. The documents reveal that Matsko was targeted precisely because she was a prominent Soviet activist and the chairwoman of a women's council. From 1945 on Party reports had frequently mentioned her as a leading local figure in organizing women, helping to organize the kolkhoz, and publicly condemning the nationalists. During the elections to the Supreme Soviet in 1946 Matsko served as the head of the electoral committee in her raion. Despite death threats, she fulfilled her duties effectively, and the inhabitants of her village finished voting much earlier than other villagers.³⁵ By 1947 she was a deputy in the republic's Supreme Soviet.

The Representation of Women in Western Ukraine: Locals vs. Outsiders

Although the majority of women activists were recruited from Ukraine's "eastern" oblasts and Russia, it would be a simplification to conclude that the low number of local women in leading positions was evidence that the Soviet authorities extensively relied on outsiders and remained an alien regime for the population of Western Ukraine. It is true that Soviet authorities were suspicious of local Ukrainian women. At the same time, however, it was an absolute necessity to recruit members the local population into the Soviet administration in order to justify the extremely unpopular Soviet presence. Despite the danger women activists faced, directives from Kyiv and the oblast women's departments repeatedly instructed local Party

³² Serhy Yekelchuk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 8.

³³ DALO, fond P-3, list 1, file 265, fol. 112.

³⁴ *Vilna Ukraina*, 8 October 1948.

³⁵ DALO, fond P-3, list 1, file 488, fol. 162.

officials to increase the recruitment of local women to leading posts. The Soviet authorities strenuously emphasized gender equality, sponsored welfare programs to mobilize women for the transformation of the economy and society, and tried to recruit local Ukrainian women who, ideally, embodied the "Soviet heroine" as model Soviet workers and mothers. Women from other oblasts could not be represented in Soviet public discourses in Western Ukraine. For any Soviet public event, such as women's conferences, elections to the Supreme Soviet, celebrations of International Women's Day, or the tenth anniversary of the 1939 unification of Ukraine, delegate seats were reserved for local Ukrainian women.

In January 1947 the First Conference of Women from the Western Ukrainian oblasts was held in Kyiv. It was one of the few occasions where women from Western Ukraine were at the centre of publicity in Soviet Ukraine. The delegates celebrated their "liberation" from Poland and Germany. Dressed in traditional and regional Ukrainian costumes, they were photographed sitting together with Ukrainian leaders, including Khrushchev. Out of 495 delegates, 468 were selected from among the local population of Western Ukraine; half of them had a peasant background.³⁶ The composition of the delegates and the minutes of the conference proceedings reveal the image the official Soviet discourse sought to project of Western Ukrainian women: that they were local peasant women. Lviv oblast sent the largest group of delegates. Out of ninety-three delegates, only four were chairwomen of women's councils, and only four more were raion women's organizers.³⁷ This suggests that the vast majority of the women's organizers and chairwomen of women's councils in Western Ukraine at that time could not represent that region because they were not local Ukrainians. Khrushchev's speech at the conference clearly revealed the importance of local Western Ukrainian women in the struggle against the nationalists:

Peasants are generally not very trusting people, [and] they definitely want to look for and see what something is by themselves. So it is good that you have learned for yourselves "what the Soviet state is about," especially for women. Well, do not get upset. I do not want to offend you, and it is not your fault. It is our universal misfortune that women are backward in their political development. Peasants and workers in Western Ukraine are backward, but peasant women lag behind even more. This is a fact, and nothing can be done about it. Therefore, our enemies, in their struggle against us, are relying on the backwardness of peasant women and have believed that women could not support the Bolsheviks [and] did not support the Communists because women wanted to return to the old system. They are depending on this perception of women because most of them are illiterates.³⁸

Khrushchev then presented the delegates with a role model sitting at the presidium—Pasha Angelina, the most famous female Stakhanovite in the Soviet Union—and called for their active participation in collectivization.³⁹ After the conference ended the delegates toured Ukraine and visited factories, schools, and daycare centres. The event was extensively publicized in the republican and local newspapers and in the women's magazine *Radianska zhinka*. After returning to Western Ukraine,

³⁶ TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 75, file 208, fol. 16.

³⁷ TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 75, file 207, fol. 2.

³⁸ TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 23, file 4579, fol. 26.

³⁹ *Radianska zhinka*, 1947, no. 1–2: 11. Angelina was originally an ethnic Greek from Crimea.

the delegates shared their experiences and impressions at local women's conferences and meetings.

The construction of the media image of Soviet Western Ukrainian women followed the general pattern of the Stalinist heroine—a backward and uneducated woman born into a poor peasant family who rises, in the wake of collectivization, to a responsible position within the kolkhoz.⁴⁰ In Western Ukraine, ethno-national traits were added to this image justify the “Soviet liberation” of both women and Western Ukraine. Such women participated in the elections to the Supreme Soviets in 1947. The sole female deputy elected from Lviv oblast to the All-Union Supreme Soviet and the four women deputies elected to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet were local Ukrainian women. They all fit the model of the Soviet heroine, with emphasis on their “Western Ukrainianness.” One deputy to the Supreme Soviet, Oleksandra Pastushyna, had been an underground Communist activist since the interwar period, and her husband had been killed by the Germans. Mariia Kikh, a former member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine and a Soviet partisan, became the deputy chair of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and the next chair of the women's department in Lviv in 1948. Featured on the front page of an issue of *Radianska zhinka* as a “daughter of the people,” Kikh was a strong advocate of local female cadres. At her request, in the late 1940s *Radianska zhinka* began publishing a special section on women's councils in Western Ukraine. In her memoirs published in the 1970s, Kikh described her devotion to the building of a socialist society.⁴¹ Another deputy, Iryna Vilde, was a renowned Soviet Ukrainian writer and a frequent contributor to *Radianska zhinka* whose husband had been killed by nationalists. She masterfully described the life of Western Ukrainians from the perspectives of various social classes.⁴² The other two deputies to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Mariia Matsko and Pavlyna Moskal, were the chairwomen of women's councils. Matsko herself was killed by nationalists in 1948.⁴³ In order to increase the number of model Soviet women in Western Ukraine, the Soviets repeatedly urged Party organizations to promote local women to leading posts. Indeed, the women's organizers' reports to the authorities were always concerned with how many local women had been recruited, promoted, or awarded. Being local became a crucial designation in the Soviet Union's affirmative-action programs for the local Ukrainian population.

Nevertheless, despite all the efforts at creating Soviet Ukrainian women, the dichotomy between local and non-local women continued. By the end of 1949, out of thirty-seven women's organizers, only four women, including Kikh, were recruited from the local population. In comparison with the situation from 1945 to 1947, when

⁴⁰ For the Soviet public discourse on women, see Choi Chatterjee, *Soviet Heroines and Public Identity, 1930–1939*, The Carl Beck Papers no. 1402 (Pittsburgh: Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1999); and Jeffrey Brook, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 89–93.

⁴¹ M. S. Kikh, *Kraiu mii voz'ziednanyi* (Lviv: Kameniar, 1979).

⁴² For a discussion of memoir and autobiographical literature by women activists, including Kikh and Vilde, see my article “Public Representation of Women in Western Ukraine under Late Stalinism: Magazines, Literature, and Memoirs,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 54 (2006), no. 1: 20–36.

⁴³ See *Vilna Ukraina*, 9, 11, 12, 25, and 31 January 1947.

there were no local women's organizers, this statistic may indicate progress, but the number of Russian women's organizers also increased from seven in 1946 to twelve in 1949 (see table 2).

TABLE 2: Ethnic Composition of the *Zhinviddil* in the Lviv *Obkom*

| | 1946 | 1949 | 1950 |
|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Ukrainian | 28 (0 local) | 23 (4 local) | 28 (3 local) |
| Russian | 7 | 12 | 7 |
| Polish | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Belarusian | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Source: DALO, fond 3, list, 3, file 499, fols. 1, 188.

Despite the efforts of the women's department and the authorities' directives to involve local women in socialist construction, the recruiting process did not succeed. Moreover, the recruitment of local women was further hindered by local Party officials, who were obviously reluctant to pay attention to women's issues. Many examples indicate that such officials, especially in the raion-level Party organizations, did not pay adequate attention to the instructions to promote local women to responsible positions. In Ternopil oblast, for example, the head of the women's department, noted in her regular monthly report to Kyiv that no local woman had been recruited into the Party in Vyshnivets raion, even though active and productive women were available.⁴⁴

The circumstances of the non-local women also made the ethnic dichotomy difficult to overcome. From the perspective of such women, Western Ukraine could offer an opportunity for upward mobility for Soviet women from elsewhere in Ukraine and from Russia. In addition to their ideological reliability and the fact that most women came to Western Ukraine because of their husbands' postings there, economic and social considerations also played a major role in the decision of these women to migrate westward in their twenties and thirties: faced with the chaotic postwar reconstruction and material difficulties, they may not have been able to find suitable employment in their hometowns, where returning soldiers from the front were assuming the responsible positions that may once have been held by women during the war.⁴⁵ These women faced dangerous problems and difficulties, including the threat of death. Even in the mid-1950s a woman from "eastern" Ukraine wrote a letter to Khrushchev stating that she could not get a "responsible" job or an education in Western Ukraine: "You [Khrushchev] emphasized that there are no two Ukraines, east and west, there is just one Ukraine, united within the brotherly Soviet state. So I am a Ukrainian, but I do not have the right to work in a responsible position or study at school."⁴⁶ This letter indicates that as a result of the excessive pressure to promote local Ukrainian women, some non-local women were disadvantaged by the Soviet regime's affirmative-action program. Thus, contrary to the grandiose official con-

⁴⁴ TsDAHOVO, fond 1, list 23, file 4581, fol. 174

⁴⁵ For women's lives after the Second World War, see Greta Bucher, "Struggling to Survive: Soviet Women in the Postwar Years," *Journal of Women's History* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 138–59.

⁴⁶ Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, fond 5, list 30, file 6, fols. 33–35.

struction of the new Soviet heroine in Western Ukraine, the public voices of non-local women were largely excluded from official Soviet Ukrainian rituals.

Conclusion

In recent years scholars of the history of Soviet women have sought to re-evaluate the various organizations created for Soviet women. The women's department of the Party and women's councils in postwar Western Ukraine provided another type of women's organization that differed from those that were previously described. Unlike the *zhenotdel* in the 1920s, the women's department in postwar Western Ukraine was not created on the initiative of women's themselves but by the Party's direct order. As well, contrary to the previously perceived image, the women's councils in Western Ukraine were far from being either spontaneous organizations or confined to domestic duties. Many activities of the women's councils were the same as those undertaken by the *zhenotdel* in the 1920s, the *obshchestvennitsa* in the 1930s, and the *zhinrady* in the 1960s. Also, to a certain degree, the work among women was similar to that resulting from the Ukrainian women's movement in interwar Galicia. However, in Western Ukraine, the bastion of one of the strongest nationalist movements in East Central Europe in the twentieth century, women's duties inevitably involved dangerous responsibilities. The images of "feminine duties" or "social mothering," often associated with the subsequent negative evaluation of the women's councils' lesser political importance, did not apply to Western Ukraine. Indeed, some women, whether local or non-local Ukrainian women, lost their lives while fulfilling their duties.

The Soviet authorities were aware of the importance of recruiting women, especially from the local population, but at the same time they had to ensure the women's political reliability. These incompatible tasks were assigned to women activists. The majority of them were outsiders who became caught up in the different priorities of the directives from Kyiv, local Party officials, and the local female population at large. Some local Western Ukrainian women, though very few, worked for the Soviet regime. The Soviet regime's mobilization of women for socialist transformation produced a dichotomous world consisting of backward, illiterate, and apolitical local Ukrainian peasant women associated with the old way of life, and of newcomers from Ukraine's "eastern" oblasts and Russia.

In the early 1950s references to the *zhinviddily*, especially to the delegates' meetings, gradually disappeared from Party reports. It is assumed that from that time on the power of the *zhinviddily* declined and women's councils finally assumed their own initiative, if not independence, and came at least to engage in more peaceful, less dangerous activities.



Policing Postwar Kyiv: Crime, Social Control, and a Demoralized Police

Serhy Yekelchuk

In the last years of World War II and the immediate postwar years, Soviet cities were plagued with street crime. Extreme deprivations, massive population movements, and the state's concentration on the war effort undermined regular policing; the comprehensive system of social control was faltering. As a result, central Soviet institutions and newspapers were flooded with letters describing the population's plight and demanding action.¹ Regional bosses also received their share of complaints. In November 1945, the Ukrainian party leader, Nikita Khrushchev, read a particularly frantic appeal for help from Kyiv, where, according to the authors, "bandits humiliate[d] peaceful residents with impunity" and "sidewalks [were] drenched in blood."² A directive to improve policing in Kyiv followed, but there were more such letters and resulting directives in the years to come, because the situation did not improve in the first postwar years.³ In fact, in the entire Soviet Union the overall crime rate peaked in 1947 and started declining only the following year after the implementation of the draconian laws of 4 June 1947, which substantially increased the prison terms for the theft of state and private property, as well as for robbery.⁴

It was during this time of uncertainty in late 1947, after the introduction of the new scale of punishments but before any visible reduction in crime rates, that a commission from Moscow arrived in Kyiv to inspect the work of the local regular police, the *militsiia*. As a result of its work, a thick file rich in detail about crime and policing in postwar Kyiv was deposited at the archives of the Soviet Ministry of

¹ See, for example, a summary of such letters received by *Pravda* in the fall of 1945, in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (hereafter RGASPI), 17/122/118, ll. 92–93. See also Elena Zubkova, *Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo: Politika i povsednevnost, 1945–1953* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), 89–94.

² Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh ob'iednan Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAHOUO), 1/41/5, ark. 113.

³ See Martin J. Blackwell, "Regime City of the First Category: The Experience of the Return of Soviet Power to Kyiv, Ukraine, 1943–1946" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2005), 375–95.

⁴ See Peter H. Solomon, Jr., *Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 405–12; I. V. Govorov, "Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i prestupnyi mir (1920–e–1940-e gg.)," *Voprosy istorii*, 2003, no. 11: 147–49; E. M. Kovaleva, "Organizatsionno-pravovye osnovy deiatel'nosti Sovetskoi militsii po bor'be s prestupnost'iu v poslevoennyi period vosstanovleniia narodnogo khoziaistva i liberalizatsii politicheskogo rezhima, sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh reform (1945–1960 gg.)" (candidate of juridical sciences diss., Moscow Academy of the MVD, 2002), 10–12.

Internal Affairs (MVD), now at the State Archive of the Russian Federation.⁵ In this paper, I will use this file, together with some supplementary sources, to reconstruct an important aspect of urban social history: public disorder in postwar Kyiv and the authorities' efforts to curb it.

The provenance history of this source can be reconstructed as follows. On 17 September 1947, the MVD ordered all regional police administrations to submit action plans concerning the "strengthening of the struggle against crime" in the last four months of the year. The Kyiv *Militsiia* Administration obliged by producing a thirty-seven-page document on 25 October. This detailed plan envisaged improvements in all fields of policing, but the measures proposed actually amounted to better efforts and stricter implementation, rather than any radical change of existing practices (1–39). In other words, it was a typical bureaucratic pro forma answer that might satisfy one's superiors in other times. This did not happen, however, because on 9 December the Main *Militsiia* Administration in Moscow replied that the plan was "correct in general," but contained "certain shortcomings," such as insufficient attention to the use of secret agents, lack of focus on eateries and billiard rooms as places frequented by criminals, and the imbalance between "a large number of general patrolling (*obshchenaruzhnykh*) measures and the small number of operative and intelligence actions" (40).

The bosses in Moscow did not approve the Kyiv proposal in part because they knew that the Kyiv police was under investigation. On the personal order of Deputy Interior Minister Ivan Serov, a special brigade of six inspectors from Moscow had just completed a thorough review of the crime situation and policing in Kyiv. A long and fairly critical inspection report was submitted to the chief of the Main *Militsiia* Administration, A. M. Leontev, on 2 December 1947. However, it did not contain any radical recommendations, such as firings or reorganizations (44–202).

This review may have been part of an inner struggle within the central Soviet security apparatus over the control of police force in the Union republics. Serov, in particular, had a long-standing rivalry with the minister of state security, Viktor Abakumov, with both of them trying to compromise each other's appointees.⁶ In this context, the review could either prepare the ground for personnel changes in Kyiv or forestall them by recommending improvements rather than dismissals. It is more likely, however, that tensions leading to this inspection originated in the Ukrainian capital itself. For most of 1947 Khrushchev remained demoted to the position of premier, while Lazar Kaganovich took over as the Party's first secretary eagerly searching for all kinds of shortcomings.⁷ Serov was a former people's commissar of internal affairs of the Ukrainian republic, in which capacity he had worked closely with Khrushchev;

⁵ Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), 9415/3/44. Subsequent references to this file are given in brackets in the main body of the text. I would like to thank Leonid Vaynberg for bringing this file to my attention.

⁶ See Serov's recent biography, Nikita Petrov, *Pervyi predsedatel KGB Ivan Serov* (Moscow: Materik, 2005).

⁷ See Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 234–35; David R. Marples, "Khrushchev, Kaganovich, and the 1947 Crisis," in his *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s* (London: St. Martin's, 1992); and Yurii I. Shapoval, *Ukraina 20–50-kh rokiv: Storinky nenapysanoi istorii* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993), 265–67.

later Khrushchev would make him the first chairman of the KGB. If the review was initiated by Kaganovich, Serov could be doing Khrushchev's bidding in mitigating the inspectors' zeal. Such a scenario would explain the attempts at interference by the apparatus of the CP(B)U Central Committee (reporting to Kaganovich) and the reluctance of inspectors (who reported to Khrushchev's friend Serov) to play along. In particular, the Central Committee bureaucrats Stetsenko, Burlikov, and Demin requested a meeting with the brigade's leader, during which they "expressed their dissatisfaction that, along with covering the negative aspects of *militsiia* work, [he] reported also about the positive ones." Overall, the apparatchiks' comments reflected their "one-sided, negative view" of the work of the Kyiv *militsiia*; they also tried in vain to obtain a copy of the brigade's report (203–203 overleaf).

This model would also explain the subsequent developments and outcome of the entire affair. In mid-December 1947, Stalin suddenly summoned Kaganovich back to Moscow, restoring Khrushchev to his full authority as the Party leader in the republic.⁸ At the same time, on 16 December the Kyiv *militsiia* bosses prepared a rebuttal to the inspection report—a rather daring act given that the Ukrainian Party bureaucrats considered it too mild. The local police officials argued that the inspectors were biased, often presenting isolated cases and minor shortcomings as major problems (212–24). The brigade, in turn, submitted its refutation of Kyiv's rebuttal on 10 January 1948. On 21 January, the Main *Militsiia* Administration rejected all objections from the Kyiv *militsiia* as unfounded and demanded that all the inspectors' comments in future work be considered (233–34). However, no personnel changes took place, as both the Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs, Tymofii Stokach, and the head of the Kyiv *militsiia*, V. Komarov, remained in their posts. The whole affair ended rather innocently with just a series of three regional conferences held in Ukraine in January 1948 on the improvement of police work and subsequent republic-wide seminars of police chiefs between October 1948 and February 1949 (235–36, 248–50).

Khrushchev and his allies may have won strategically, but this did not mean an immediate benefit to ordinary Kyivites, because no shake-up of the local *militsiia* took place. The crime rate did go down as the result of harsher penalties prescribed by the June 1947 laws, but complaints about widespread theft and hooliganism in Kyiv and demands to do something about bad policing persisted into the late 1940s and early 1950s.⁹ The reasons for the slow improvement in the *militsiia*'s work are, in fact, very clearly laid out in the 1947 inspection report.

Recording Crime

At first glance, the crime statistics gave every reason for optimism. The grand total of crimes recorded in Kyiv during 1946 (2,487) was a significant improvement over 1945 (2,948) – a 15.5 per cent decrease. The largest drops occurred in the incidence of robbery (49 per cent, from 74 cases to 38), aggravated theft (46 per cent, from 1,150 to

⁸ The formal decision of the CP(B)U Central Committee is dated 26 December, but apparently Kaganovich left for Moscow even before that, sometime in mid-December. On his recall from Ukraine, see Yu. I. Shapoval, *Lazar Kahanovych* (Kyiv: Znannia, 1994).

⁹ See, for example, Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivskoi oblasti (hereafter DAKO), 1/3/414, fols. 2–3; 1/11/323, fols. 48–49; 5/5/1150, fol. 69.

619), theft of cattle (32 per cent, from 28 to 19), and "malicious hooliganism" (15 per cent, from 77 to 55). At the same time, there was an increase in homicides committed during acts of aggravated robbery (43 per cent, from 7 to 10), aggravated robbery (22 per cent, from 64 to 78), purse snatching (18 per cent, from 38 to 45), and non-aggravated theft (33 per cent, from 651 to 867) (48–49). It is easy to notice, however, that the Kyiv *militiia* reported decreases in less violent crimes and increases in more violent ones, likely because the latter were more difficult to hide. As well, decreases in the incidence of robbery and aggravated theft occurring simultaneously with increases in purse snatching and non-aggravated theft suggest a possible misrepresentation of crimes as less serious offences in order to improve the overall statistical data.

An indirect confirmation of the *militiia*'s complicity is found in the crime clearance statistics. At the same time as the total number of recorded crimes went down, the percentage of cases cleared also went down considerably between 1945 and 1946, from an incredibly high 95.9 per cent to a slightly more realistic 84.1 per cent. The most violent crimes could not be easily moved to another category or left unreported, and they tended to have a lower clearance rate—for example, 65.7 per cent (23 of 35 incidents) for homicides in 1946 (49).

Other statistical tables prepared by the inspectors confirm this interpretation, although their report contains no statements to this effect. Comparing the first ten months of 1947 to the first ten months of 1946, they found a simultaneous decrease in aggravated theft from 546 incidents to 212 and a rise in simple theft from 676 to 896; an increase in robbery from 29 to 38 cases and a decrease in aggravated robbery from 65 to 28. Increases in specialized categories of theft, such as the theft of cattle (31 incidents in 1947) and "stripping children of their clothing" (4 cases) probably also masked more cases of simple and aggravated robbery. But by far the largest drop was registered in the categories that were easiest to manipulate: in malicious hooliganism, from 55 cases to 15 and in "other crimes"—probably minor offences—from 416 to a mere 70. At the same time, there was no way to hide the 50 per cent increase in homicides during the commission of aggravated robbery, from 8 to 12 incidents (53–54).

Again, the trend towards the general decrease in recorded crimes was coupled with the deteriorating clearance rates. During the first ten months of 1946 the Kyiv *militiia* registered 2,094 crimes, and during the same period next year, only 1,471. The overall clearance rate, however, also went down from 83.3 to 78 per cent. A quick look at the data reveals the pitfalls of the statistical games played by the *militiia* bosses. In both years the category of "other crimes" provided the highest percentage of solved cases, 97.4 and 95.7 per cent, but the number of incidents registered in this category went down dramatically from 416 to 70 as police statisticians tried to bring down the grand total of committed crimes (53–54). Thus, in an effort to improve one performance indicator, they worsened the other.

Moscow's inspectors made no comments about the suspiciously large overall decrease in recorded crimes, but they took issue with one of the techniques employed to lower them—the counting of crimes committed as crimes prevented. The emphasis on preventative policing can be traced back to the reforms of the Soviet *militiia* during the 1930s.¹⁰ Ever since then the *militiia* bosses had been putting pressure on

¹⁰ See Paul Mark Hagenloh, "Police, Crime, and Public Order in Stalin's Russia, 1930–1941," (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1999), 2–3; and idem, "'Chekist in Essence, Chekist in

their subordinates to increase the share of prevented crimes in relation to committed crimes. At the city and precinct level the easiest solution was to count those cases where criminals were caught red-handed together with those where they were apprehended before the commission of the crime. This was precisely the technique the Kyivites used to arrive at the impressive number of 392 crimes that were thwarted during the first ten months of 1947, or 26 per cent in relation to the number of crimes committed during the same period (54). The incidents counted as prevention included some glaringly inappropriate cases. For example, a thief entered the apartment of a certain Khabsinska, wounded her repeatedly with a knife, bound her hand and foot, and stole her property. The victim cried out for help as the thief was leaving her apartment, however, and he was apprehended by a policeman who happened to be on the street. Numerous less violent crimes, such as purse snatchings, pickpocketing, and the sale of stolen goods were counted as "prevented" when criminals were caught red-handed. Even a cursory look at the files allowed the inspectors to transfer ninety-seven cases of theft and seven of purse snatching back into the category of crimes committed, which increased the total count there to 1,575 (54–56).

The inspectors also noted the incomplete registration of incidents of pickpocketing. The official statistics counted 118 cases in 1947 with 92 of them solved, resulting in a healthy clearance rate of 78 per cent. At the same time the commission noted that during the first ten months of the year residents of Kyiv submitted to passport departments 441 reports of stolen passports, which had obviously been taken by pickpockets together with the victims' wallets (56). Actually the correct number, including the data for October 1947, was even higher: 503. One also wonders if the whopping 3,549 reported cases of "lost" passports also covered a number of unreported or unregistered thefts (134).

The Kyiv *militsiia* also routinely refused to register petty theft, in particular the stealing of inexpensive clothing and other personal items from communal apartments and dormitories. Far more serious from the inspectors' point of view was intentional slowness in the registering and investigating cases involving missing persons. In May 1947 the mother of seven-year-old Mariia Us reported her daughter's disappearance during a visit to Kyiv. The *militsiia* kept the document in its open files so that it would not spoil the statistics and did absolutely nothing until late July, when they sent a request to the family's home precinct in Obukhiv raion, Kyiv oblast. The letter asked the local *militsiia* to check with the mother whether she had found her child. There was no reply. After locating this correspondence, the Moscow inspectors demanded immediate action; a detective dispatched to Obukhiv raion learned that after fifteen days of searching everywhere the mother had discovered her daughter at a holding tank for homeless children (58–59). There was no happy end to another unregistered disappearance—that of teenager Valentyna Knyr, whose body was found on the bank of the Dnipro River. Although Valentyna had gone missing under suspicious circumstances—she did not come back from a walk with her boyfriend, who then left Kyiv in a hurry—the documentation was also kept in current files and the post-mortem report somehow went missing. In another case, for eleven months

nothing was done about the disappearance of Bykovska, a student at the Physical Education College (58–59).

The inspectors also brought to light a glaring inconsistency between the overall criminal statistics and the data submitted by the Patrol Department. The latter claimed that during the first ten months of 1947 *militiia* patrols in Kyiv prevented 18 robberies, 12 purse snatchings, 271 thefts, and 124 other crimes. They also allegedly solved 31 robberies, 541 thefts, 3 homicides, 108 cases of hooliganism, and 365 other crimes, in the process arresting 118 robbers, 7 murderers, 1,718 thieves, 2,281 hooligans, and 1,625 other offenders. These numbers were highly surprising, since the total number of registered crimes in the city stood at only 1,471, including just 38 robberies and 1,132 thefts. This meant that either the Patrol Department was inflating its achievements or the city *militiia* was concealing the true scale of crime—or both these things were happening simultaneously. The brigade of inspectors preferred to blame the Patrol Department, probably the least damaging of the three possible explanations (74).

It appears that Moscow had no interest in fully dismissing the Kyiv statistics as fraudulent. The general appraisal of the crime situation in Kyiv in the external review report is mildly critical: “Thus, although manifestations of crime are constantly decreasing, they remain at a high level. Dangerous crimes are numerous and have a low clearance rate. Homicides committed during aggravated robbery are solved at a rate of 58.3 per cent, simple robberies at 76.2 per cent, and homicides at 65.4 per cent” (54 and 176). After some bickering between Moscow and Kyiv about which additional cases uncovered by the inspectors should be included in the statistics, the overall crime clearance rate for the period from January to October 1947 was adjusted from 78 to 73 per cent (206, 227 overleaf, and 234). Even such numbers would make many a police chief in contemporary Western Europe and North America proud, but the Soviet authorities placed before the *militiia* unachievable targets based on the maximalist principle of guaranteed punishment for all offenders.¹¹ This made report padding all but inevitable.

Detective Work vs. Security Sweeps

Some of the problems could be attributed to the recent unsuccessful reorganization of criminal investigation in Kyiv. In April 1947 all detectives working at the city's 19 *militiia* precincts were transferred to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Kyiv *militiia* (*Viddil karnoho rozshuku*). This, however, resulted in the precincts' refusal to register any crime reports. Victims had to travel to the city centre to lodge their complaints, and detectives arrived at crime scenes with huge delays. By July the city's *militiia* bosses had scrapped the reorganization, but the lines of authority and responsibility remained blurred—it was not clear when a case belonged to the central CID or to detectives working out of raion stations (47–48). The investigations of serious crimes in the precincts, particularly homicides, showed

¹¹ On this Soviet practice, see Louise I. Shelly, *Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 166. According to Shelly, by the late 1980s the Party leadership expected the *militiia* to clear some 92 to 95 per cent of all recorded crimes, a rate that was not achievable even in countries with the best-trained, best-equipped police forces and a high degree of community co-operation.

little progress even when good leads were available. The CID did not provide any supervision (76).

Yet the Moscow inspectors emphasized another reason for the shortcomings: the inefficient use of informants and police surveillance of criminal dens. The *militsiia* reforms of the 1930s brought these two methods to the fore of good policing practices because they allowed crime prevention; they also reflected the introduction into the regular police force of methods long employed by the Soviet security police.¹² Although the share of crimes that were solved with the aid of police informants increased steadily, at least on paper, from 35.6 per cent in 1945 to 37 in 1946 and 38.5 during the first ten months of 1947, the inspectors saw such numbers as unsatisfactory (49 and 53–54).

In their opinion the main reasons included the low number of informants and their poor selection. The hierarchy of secret police collaborators in the postwar Soviet Union was fairly complex and consisted of several categories. Informers were often criminals, their relatives, or employees of places frequented by criminals; they received irregular rewards in the form of money and food. Agents were almost exclusively active or former criminals; their identities were better protected than those of rank-and-file informers, and they received monthly salary supplements of 200 to 250 rubles. At the same time, agents worked directly with detectives, whereas most informers worked with "residents," usually retired police officers, who were expected to supervise twenty-five to thirty informers and, after 1945, received substantial salary supplements (upward of 500 rubles) for their work.¹³ As of late 1947 the Kyiv CID and precincts had a total of 300 agents and 873 informants. During 1947 the Kyiv *militsiia* had to delist thirty-six agents and 118 informers who had left the city or had not been useful; at the same time it managed to enlist only forty-four people. The inspectors suggested that another ninety-five secret collaborators be delisted because of lack of activity (59–60 and 176). On paper there were also thirty-six residents, although a check by the inspectors disclosed that fourteen of them had either left the city or no longer worked in this capacity. Most residents supervised only between five and sixteen informants, and just two residents worked with nineteen apiece. For the purposes of meeting with their informers, the city *militsiia* had twenty-one secret apartments (62–63).

Secret agents and informants helped more in the investigation of offenses originating from the local professional criminal network, such as robbery (in 60 per cent of solved cases in 1947), aggravated theft (48 per cent), and theft (40.7 per cent). They were considerably less efficient in the investigation of violent crimes, where perpetrators could be people with no connections to the criminal underworld or itinerant felons from elsewhere: homicides (12 per cent) and homicides committed during aggravated robbery (14.3 per cent) (53 and 62). A very large percentage of reports from secret informers proved false. A spot check of the reports received by the detectives of the ninth *militsiia* station, for example, showed that only 49 per cent of the 349 were confirmed. In the same precinct a Captain Havrykov routinely fabricated reports from non-existent informers and freely changed dates on old reports to maintain the appearance of an active informant network (61).

¹² Hagenloh, "Chekist in Essence," 454.

¹³ See I. V. Govorov, "Neglasnaia agentura sovetskoi militsii v 1940-kh godakh," *Voprosy istorii*, 2004, no. 4: 109–11.

In some cases where secret informants actually delivered valuable tips, *militiia* officers were unwilling to pursue them so as not to spoil the crime statistics. One example much discussed in the inspection report and the subsequent correspondence between Kyiv and Moscow was that of the Kurachev gang. Kurachev was a Soviet Army deserter with family roots in Kyiv, who apparently showed up in the city in April 1946 with a group of armed robbers. His gang operated there for a while, with Kurachev's mother selling stolen goods at a bazaar, until a foiled robbery attempt on the street led to Kurachev firing twice at the victim without harming her and then disappearing from the city—probably one of those “prevented crimes” in the police books. Even though the paid agent, “Bela,” reported about Kurachev's activities and a resident named Danilov saw him at the horse races, the city *militiia* took absolutely no steps to search for him at the suggested addresses. Instead the *militiia* chiefs dismissed the reports as unreliable (67 and 227). This was likely because the gang's arrest would lead to a large increase in the number of armed robberies registered in the city, many of which, for the time being, remained unreported, unregistered, or registered as simple theft.

Another component of modern preventative policing that Moscow ordered local *militiias* to implement was the use of police-controlled criminal “entrapment” dens.¹⁴ The inspectors particularly stressed the unsatisfactory work of the Kyiv *militiia* on this front. The existence of a mere five entrapment dens (four near bazaars and one near the main railway station) was considered insufficient for such a large city, especially since during the first ten months of 1947 the *militiia* had solved just two robberies and twelve thefts thanks to its surveillance of the five dens. The Moscow brigade suspected that den keepers, who had been recruited as informants because of some compromising information the police had on them, likely engaged in double-dealing (72 and 176). Indeed this was the case with many entrapment dens and secret informants throughout the Soviet Union.¹⁵ In the meantime Kyiv's *militiia* bosses promised to create fifteen new entrapment dens (8).

However, as was the case in the mid- to late 1930s, the emphasis on preventative undercover policing did not produce tangible results. Instead the Soviet *militiia* turned again to purging the cities of “socially harmful elements” and the enforcement of passport rules as primary policing methods.¹⁶ The Soviet authorities re-established the passport system in Kyiv in March 1944, less than five months after the city's liberation from the Nazi occupation. The *militiia* registered a total of 296,107 people, in the process arresting 552 of them as Nazi collaborators and expelling 172 as former criminals or other undesirables not permitted to reside in the Ukrainian capital.¹⁷ A larger number of people were denied residence permits because they had neither work nor family in Kyiv and were not returning prewar residents; we have the

¹⁴ See *ibid.*, “Neglasnaia agentura,” 114.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 116.

¹⁶ On this change during the 1930s, see David R. Shearer, “Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin's Russia: A Reassessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression,” *Cahiers du Monde russe* 39, nos. 1–2 (1998): 119–148; Hagenlocher, “Police, Crime, and Public Order,” chaps. 3 and 5; and *idem.*, “Chekist in Essence,” 447–75.

¹⁷ Blackwell, “Regime City of the First Category,” 54. See also DAKO, 1/3/26, fols. 311–12, and 5/2/394, fol. 14.

numbers for Pechersk raion, where midway through the process there were 219 such refusals out of 16,682 applications.¹⁸

By late 1947, when Kyiv had 662,766 residents, 17,402 residential buildings, and 895 employers (125), massive regular checks of passports and residence permits constituted the bulk of police work in the city. Thus during the first ten months of 1947 the *militsiia* checked identification papers in 141,222 residential buildings, meaning that they showed up on average eight times in each of the city's 17,402 buildings. Passport checks at factories and organizations took place 2,179 times, or approximately 2.5 times in the first ten months per place of employment. As a result of such colossal efforts, the *militsiia* identified 17,929 violators of the passport legislation: 13,899 people without residence permits, 2,973 with expired passports, and 1,067 without passports (126 and 179). The majority of violators signed written pledges to leave Kyiv or, more precisely, the fifty-kilometer zone around the city in which residence permits were required; many also ended up paying fines. However, 570 of the worst offenders ended up with a criminal record (127).

Yet passport checks were not limited to controlling the observance of the passport and residence permit rules. They also had a more sinister dimension. The Soviet passport system also functioned as a policing tactic aimed at preventing urban crime via social quarantine of "socially harmful elements." This extrajudicial procedure was widely used to cleanse the cities of these undesirables.¹⁹ In the first ten months of 1947 the Kyiv *militsiia* expelled 610 individuals, using Article 38, Part "D" of the Passport Statute, which allowed the removal from big cities of able-bodied people who had not worked or been students for three consecutive months. During the same period passport checks yielded 335 former convicts whom the police registered and saw as primary candidates for future expulsions (26, 127, and 131).

Paradoxically, the Moscow inspectors, who seemingly emphasized operative and intelligence work over mass operations, demanded an increase in passport checks, aiming for monthly checks in all residences, places of employment, and educational institutions. On top of that they wanted to infiltrate dormitories and factories—responsible for most infractions—with informants. The *militsiia* was also expected to check twice a week if those who had signed written pledges to leave the city actually did so (8, 41–42, and 186).

All information about people included in passport checks ended up in the Central Address Bureau, an institution that provided individuals' addresses on request (in the absence of phone books) but also had distinctive policing functions. During the first ten months of 1947, the Kyiv Address Bureau identified 248 common criminals on warrants from other localities, 108 political criminals, and 492 child-support evaders (137). A separate Department of Visas and Registration (in reality just two people attached to the Address Bureau) dealt with the 153 foreigners residing in Kyiv, the three largest groups being 66 Iranians, 31 Czechoslovaks, and 21 Greeks (171–74).²⁰

¹⁸ DAKO, 791/1/25, fol. 17.

¹⁹ See Hagenloh, "Police, Crime, and Public Order," chap. 5; Shearer, "Crime and Social Disorder," 134–137; and Gijs Kessler, "The Passport System and State Control over Population Flows in the Soviet Union, 1932–1940," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 42, nos. 2–3–4 (2001): 477–504.

²⁰ Many of the Iranian citizens living in Soviet Ukraine were actually ethnic Armenians. Since foreign citizens did not have the right to free education and could not own houses, not to mention

Street patrols and spot ID checks complemented passport checks in homes and work places as a means of cleansing Kyiv from various undesirables. Because the sheer number of homeless children and beggars in Soviet cities after the war created problems of social stability, Soviet authorities tended to criminalize homelessness, especially adult homelessness.²¹ The numbers were huge indeed—in the first ten months of 1947, the Kyiv *militiia* made a sweep of streets, unoccupied basements, and attics, picking up no fewer than 9,364 children, of whom 6,355 were determined to be “homeless” (*besprizornye*) and the remaining 3,009 were “unsupervised” (*beznadzornye*) by their parents. The overwhelming majority ended up being sent to *militiia*-run children’s assembly points and eventually to the infamous children’s homes, where military discipline coexisted with hunger and abuse. One hundred children were locked up in labour colonies for petty theft. The *militiia* also fined 945 parents for their failure to supervise their children. Only 139 homeless children, probably those over sixteen ineligible for admission to children’s homes, received real help with employment in the Kyiv region (68).²²

During the same period the Kyiv *militiia* also detained a large number of other street people classified as beggars (1,105), vagrants (2,052), and fortune-tellers (118). Of these the police opened criminal proceedings against 18 beggars and 112 vagrants, and expelled 299 beggars and 1,410 vagrants from the city. An unspecified number of people ended up in seniors’ homes and homes for the disabled, where conditions were hardly better than in the children’s homes (167). The one category that is conspicuously missing is prostitutes, who are mentioned once among the unemployed undesirables with criminal links who were to be expelled from the city (10), but never appeared on the list of those detained or convicted. This is probably a testament both to police corruption and to the difficulties in proving this particular crime.

The final component in the system of social quarantine based on ID checks in Kyiv were neighbourhood constables, consisting in 1947 of 145 *militiia* officers. They were supposed to work closely with the community in preventing crime and were helped by 4,090 volunteer members of the Brigade for Assisting the *Militiia*, 7,100 designated ancillaries (*doveremye litsa*), and 1,870 custodians (161). In fact this army of assistants existed mostly on paper, and these neighbourhood constables focused on ID checks and prophylactic visits to problem households. Some took bribes from people without residence permits (162 and 229).

The drive to ensure regular and total passport control in Kyiv sometimes clashed with the interests of the city’s enterprises, which often confiscated their employees’ passports in an effort to curb labour turnover. Thus both the Keramika Factory and the workers’ school of the Ministry of Light Industry took away passports, which fact

the fact that they were closely supervised by the police, those who planned to remain in the USSR usually tried to obtain Soviet citizenship. See the numerous petitions to this effect, including many from Kyiv, in Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady i upravlinnia Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAVOVU), 1/21/6, 1/21/7, and 1/21/27.

²¹ Shearer, “Crime and Social Disorder,” 128–129.

²² Present-day Russian historians argue that the increase in the number of homeless children in cities during 1946 and 1947 was connected to the famine that raged in the countryside in those years. See V. F. Zima, “Golod i prestupnost v SSSR. 1946–1947 gg.,” *Revue des études slaves* 66, no. 4 (1994): 757–76. This would be true in spades for Ukraine, which was one of the areas hardest hit by this third Soviet famine.

the Kyiv *militiia* attempted to cover up by claiming that they had been collected for stamping with residence permits. The Moscow inspectors did not buy this explanation, but at least the Keramika Factory managed to overfulfill its production plan for 1947 by 16 per cent.²³

Document checks and regular security sweeps on the streets also yielded immense numbers of arms left over from the war. In the first ten months of 1947 the Kyiv *militiia* confiscated four machine guns, six 6 hand grenades 106 submachine guns, 448 army rifles, and 901 handguns from city residents. Only 160 items were confiscated from actual criminals; most were hoarded by ordinary people, in many cases probably as a means of self-defense in the crime-ridden city (121). Indeed, the Kyiv *militiia* itself issued submachine guns to its officers patrolling the city's outskirts (32).

Aside from the sweeping document checks and the cleansing of "socially harmful elements," the professional efficiency of the postwar Kyiv *militiia* remained low. Its card catalogue ("*operativnyi uchet*") of active criminals and criminal groups in the city was hopelessly outdated (65 and 71). Out of a total of 1,248 searches conducted in 1947 in residences of arrested criminals, 706, or 56 per cent, brought no results (119). Police officers routinely arrested people without filling in arrest reports and kept them under guard without a prosecutor's sanction (164). Of the 7,498 people detained in Kyiv in the first ten months of 1947, 1,729—21 per cent—were eventually released. This was an unacceptably high number from the Moscow inspectors' point of view. Apparently many of these detainees were simply caught on the street without any ID papers on them (76 and 177). In other words, blanket measures for population control strengthened public order in general but did not improve investigative work targeting concrete crimes.

A Feeble Police Force

The Moscow inspectors, of course, did not comment on the theoretical contradiction between the focus on social control and on criminal investigations; they wanted the Kyiv *militiia* to strengthen both of these policing functions at the same time. Instead the brigade catalogued the professional reasons why the *militiia* in Kyiv was not up to its many tasks. First on the list was chronic understaffing, especially in the patrol division, where only 56 per cent of vacancies were filled as of late 1947 (152). As a result police bosses had to violate the rules by accepting candidates shorter than 1.7 meters and with less than a seventh-grade education; many had poor knowledge of Kyiv and only a vague idea of their duties (153–54). Even in the "elite" CID there was not a single person with a college degree: twenty-two had graduated from a secondary school, twenty-four had an incomplete secondary education, and thirty had only an elementary education. The majority (67 per cent) of detectives had less than five years' experience on the job, and 28 per cent had worked for less than a year. Ideological criteria were apparently more important in selecting cadres, as an impressive 54 per cent were members or candidate members of the Communist Party (45). Filling positions in the Passport Department, which required literacy in both Ukrainian and Russian as well as good handwriting, was a constant challenge for police bosses (123).

This problem was not limited to Kyiv or to the immediate postwar years. As late as in 1956 the new Soviet minister of internal affairs, Nikolai Dudorov, revealed that

²³ DAKO, 1/3/484, fol. 76.

46 per cent of the entire Soviet *militiia* staff had only elementary-school educations and that a further 42 per cent had not completed secondary school.²⁴ On top of being poorly educated, the Soviet police were also ill-trained, if trained at all. In 1947 the Kyiv *militiia* chiefs were only planning to organize a three-month preparatory course for new recruits (two hundred hours of instruction) in police duties and procedures, but they had begun looking for classrooms, instructors, and textbooks (6 and 31).

Not surprisingly, the investigation of crime scenes left much to be desired. Notwithstanding lectures about dactyloscopy in all precincts, the *militiia* rank and file only slowly adopted the use of fingerprints as an investigative tool. During the first ten months of 1947 experts were called in to take fingerprints, study signatures, or examine bullets only at eighty crime scenes; they established crime simulation in nineteen cases and helped identify criminals in another forty-nine cases. But, as the Moscow inspectors pointed out, during the same period the Kyiv *militiia* had registered 104 violent crimes and 213 aggravated thefts, all of which required the presence of experts at crime scenes (70). At the same time the only equipment experts had at their disposal was several cameras, but not even one microscope (118). Only three out of nineteen precincts had trucks, although the CID was well provided with three trucks, three cars, and four motorcycles (81).

Intelligence and shadowing techniques were also primitive. The usual way of identifying a person to be shadowed was to invite him or her to the building manager's office (112). The secret apartment belonging to the shadowing section was disguised as an office of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, which would explain the steady flow of passersby looking for employment. On top of that, a prewar resident of the same apartment moved into one of the rooms with his family (115–16). One shadowing agent did not notice his ex-wife shadowing him to the secret apartment (111)!

The living conditions of *militiia* personnel explained their high turnover rates and lack of enthusiasm on the job. Most patrolmen lived in three large barracks, while new detectives arriving from elsewhere could barely secure a room in a communal apartment (6 and 153). Rank-and-file police officers complained about pilfering and small meal portions in their canteens (170). Most K-9 instructors kept their canine assistants at home, in their dorm rooms or communal apartments (79).

The low morale of the Kyiv police force found its expression in everything from dirty boots and irregular shaving to drinking and crimes of office. In 1947 four Kyiv *militiionery* deserted, five were fired for drinking and theft, and two were fired for corruption, and two were court-martialed for theft and desertion (154). Altogether in the first nine months of the year the city's police bosses registered 418 disciplinary infractions by their staff, including 75 cases of drinking on the job, 44 of leaving the post, 34 of being late to work, 27 of disobeying orders, 21 of rudeness towards civilians, 13 of desertion, 12 of violating the law, 11 of abuse of office, 6 of theft, and 3

²⁴ Yoram Gorfiltzki, "Policing Post-Stalin Society: The Militia and Public Order under Khrushchev," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 44, nos. 2–3 (2003): 465–80, here 472; and Shelley, *Policing Soviet Society*, 32. The educational level of judges and prosecutors was also woefully inadequate, as the Soviet authorities well realized: see Solomon, *Criminal Justice under Stalin*, 170.

of consorting with criminals (196). One policeman was caught stealing from his comrades in the barrack (170)! Disillusioned policemen did not bother to hide their politically incorrect views from the Moscow inspectors. Sergeant Chaiun, a squad commander in charge of guarding the Lenin Museum in Kyiv and a Party member, declared that he could not stand living in the dorm any longer: "If I had thousands, I would buy myself an apartment, like the Jews do" (224 and 230).²⁵ The commission decried this statement as "close to being anti-Soviet" and representative of the lack of political education in Kyiv's *militsiia* force (170–71).

In the end, the Soviet Ukraine's *militsiia* bosses made all the usual promises to improve policing, but little changed until Khrushchev's reforms of the *militsiia* in the early 1960s. Report padding became even worse in the last decades of the Soviet Union's existence. Almost two years after the inspection, in August 1949, a spot check of Kyiv's Ninth Precinct by the Ukrainian MVD revealed all the same problems listed in the 1947 report: a crime clearance rate of only 75 per cent, poor work with secret informants, and widespread drinking and other infractions by policemen (281–281 overleaf). This time disciplinary actions did follow, but dismissing one station chief had hardly any impact on the life of postwar Kyiv. The preference for sweeping social-control measures over sophisticated preventative methods and efficient operative work, just like police corruption, outlived both Stalin and the Soviet Union.

²⁵ On popular anti-Semitism in postwar Kyiv and its connection to the competition for apartments being reclaimed by returning Jewish residents, see Blackwell, "Regime City of the First Category," 354–374. On anti-Semitism in postwar Ukraine in general, see Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 191–95.



The Yanukovych Election Campaigns in Ukraine, 2004 and 2006: An Analysis

David R. Marples^{*}

Introduction

This paper focuses on the election campaign of Viktor Yanukovych during the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine and his leadership of the Party of Regions (Ukrainian: Partiiia rehioniv, Russian: Partiiia regionov; hereafter PR) in the parliamentary elections of 2006.¹ Starting with the background of the PR and the biography of Ukraine's former prime minister and current president, it looks at the way his campaign was conducted, the positions taken, and the divergence of paths between Yanukovych and former President Leonid Kuchma, who eventually abandoned his former protégé. It is argued that Yanukovych's increasingly desperate electoral tactics gave rise to the generally accepted but fundamentally misguided notion that the 2004 election pitted a pro-Western candidate against a pro-Russian counterpart, and thus the electors' choice determined definitively the path that Ukraine would follow in the twenty-first century. In reality the election is better epitomized by Viktor Yushchenko's slogan that he would remove the "bandits" from power and put an end to the deep corruption associated with the Kuchma presidency. Questions explored here are why the Yanukovych campaign failed in 2004 and why his demise did not prove to be definitive. How were this leader and the party he represented able to recover sufficiently from the comprehensive defeat in late 2004 to become the leading force in the 2006 parliamentary elections and subsequently Ukraine's president? What do these events tell us about the nature of the Ukrainian electorate and society in general? The paper begins with an outline history of the PR as well as brief biographies of Yanukovych and his patron, businessman Rinat Akhmetov, before analyzing the Yanukovych campaign and its results.

History of the Party of Regions, 1997–2004

The PR originated under the name of the Party for Ukraine's Regional Revival (Partiiia rehionalnoho vidrozhennia Ukrainy; Russian: Partiiia regionalnogo voz-

¹ The author wishes to express his thanks to Oksana Mykhed, PhD candidate at Harvard University, for research assistance on this paper. An earlier version was presented at the annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Orleans, 16 November 2007.

A thorough, wry, and entertaining account of the 2004 election campaign can be found in Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). See also Askold Krushelnysky, *An Orange Revolution: A Personal Journey through Ukrainian History* (London: Harvill Secker, 2006).

rozhdenniia Ukrainy).² It was created before the parliamentary elections of 1998 during the first convention of its members, held in Kyiv on 26 October 1997. Delegates from twenty-one of Ukraine's oblasts and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol officially declared the creation of the new political entity. The party's programmatic principles were: an evolutionary and pragmatic approach to the building of a democratic state in Ukraine, and an understanding of the connection between the past and the present of Ukrainian political life. During this first party forum the official list of members and the party's electoral platform were adopted. The "regionalists" were dissatisfied with the results of the 1998 parliamentary elections, in which they had finished nineteenth among thirty participating parties.³ The party's first head and its main leader was the mayor of Donetsk, businessman Volodymyr Rybak,⁴ who was given a three-year mandate to lead the party in March 1999, including both its Political Council and Political Executive Committee. The party's most clearly delineated platform, as its members declared, was the defense of the interests of all regions of Ukraine. A new program was adopted at the second party convention, which maintained that Ukraine could be wealthy only if it invested power in its regions. During the first period of its activity the party gained support and opened offices in all of Ukraine's oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol.

In Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, after the 1998 parliamentary election the party was represented by the Deputy Group for the Revival of Regions (*Hrupa vidrodzhennia rehioniv*), the main program of which was the adoption of legislation directed toward the dynamic development of all regions of Ukraine with consideration for the specific needs of each of them. During the second convention of party members in 1999, an official version of the party program was adopted, and a decision was made to participate in the 1999 presidential elections. The party supported the candidacy of the incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma. At this convention it accepted the concept of the equality of the Russian and Ukrainian languages in Ukraine and thus implicitly the adoption of Russian as the country's second state language. In June 1999 the party formally established a general bloc of political parties entitled *Our Choice* (*Nash vybir*), which supported Kuchma during the 1999 presidential elections and united a number of pro-Kuchma centrist parties.

In July 2000 the leaders of five political parties—the Party for Ukraine's Regional Revival, the Party of Ukraine's Solidarity (*Partiia solidarnosti Ukrainy*), the Labour Party (*Partiia pratsi*), the All-Ukrainian Party of Pensioners (*Vseukrainska partiia pensioneriv*), and the "For a Beautiful Ukraine" Political Party (*Politychna partiia "Za krasnyv Ukrainu"*)—united in a political group that developed the "regionalists'" programs. On 17 November 2000 the third, extraordinary, convention of the Party for Ukraine's Regional Revival officially adopted this unification and made the decision to change the party's name to the "Labour Solidarity of Ukraine" Party for Regional Revival (*Partiia rehionalnoho vidrodzhennia "Trudova solidarnist*

² The Party for Ukraine's Regional Revival is considered to be the basis for the PR. More detailed information about this institution may be found on the PR's official Web page <<http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/ua/about/#>>.

³ <www.partyofregions.org.ua/meet/history>

⁴ For his official biography, see <<http://justus.com.ua/persons/ribak>>.

Ukrainy"). According to its program, the party rejected the traditional division of political views into "left" and "right" and proclaimed its orientation toward the main economic interests of society and smaller social organizations. This united party was led by Volodymyr Landyk, Petro Poroshenko (later a member of the "Our Ukraine" People's Union),⁵ and Volodymyr Rybak. The members of the party's presidium were Nikolai Azarov (from 2002 to 2007 Ukraine's first deputy prime minister and finance minister and since March 2010 the prime minister), Gennadii Samokhvalov, Leonid Chernovetsky (later the mayor of Kyiv), and Efim Zviagilsky (briefly later a deputy prime minister).

In March 2001, after another extraordinary convention, the party finally changed its name to the PR and chose as its leader Russian-born Nikolai Azarov, at that time head of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine.⁶ Developing upon its precursors' ideas, the PR defended the program of strengthening regional principles in society, increasing the level of regional democracy, and representing the interests of Ukraine's regions, and it proclaimed its orientation toward the middle class. It also declared its willingness to co-operate with other political parties with the exception of those on the extreme right. On 29 November 2001 the party reached an agreement with the leaders of four other parties, Mykhailo Hladii, Anatolii Kinakh,⁷ Valerii Pustovoitenko, and Serhii Tihipko, to participate in the 2002 parliamentary elections as a single bloc called For a United Ukraine! ("Za yedynu Ukrainu!"). Before the elections the PR changed its leader from Azarov to Volodymyr Semynozhenko, then Ukraine's deputy prime minister. However, the parliamentary elections were an embarrassing failure for For a United Ukraine! Despite the backing of the pro-presidential media and heavy spending during the election campaign, with only 11.77

⁵ Poroshenko is one of the twenty most influential people in Ukraine and the owner of the Roshen chocolate-factory network. According to his Web site <www.poroshenko.com.ua/?view=6990>, his career as a Verkhovna Rada deputy started in 1998. However, there is no official information concerning his political views and how they corresponded to those of the Labour Solidarity of Ukraine. Nor will one find any comments about how he came to support the "Orange" political groups by 2004.

⁶ Azarov has been known as a strong political ally of Yanukovych since the time of Leonid Kuchma's presidency. He was an author and co-ordinator of the economic policy of Prime Minister Yanukovych's two governments, and he has participated in formulating of fourteen of Ukraine's budgets. All of Azarov's budget projects have been strongly criticized by opposing parties because they have granted too many economic privileges to business groups and neglected the needs of society (e.g., the establishment of excessively high prices for municipal services, inflationary policies, and low salaries for ordinary civil servants). In addition, a significant characteristic of his policies has been his pro-Russian orientation and emphasis on the promotion of the rights of the Russian language in Ukraine.

⁷ From late May 2001 to late November 2002 Kinakh was Ukraine's prime minister. As one of the candidates for the post of president of Ukraine in 2004 and the leader (elected in 2000), of the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (Partiia promyslovtstv i pidpriemtstv Ukrainy or PPPU), he supported the "Orange" group of politicians; see <http://dt.ua/ARCHIVE/vichniy_drugiy-42502.html>. Kinakh and his party were in the Our Ukraine bloc until April 2007. In March 2007, just before President Yushchenko's two decrees about the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada, the PPPU joined the Coalition for National Unity alongside the PR and Kinakh was appointed Ukraine's minister of the economy. Both Yuliia Tymoshenko and Viacheslav Kyrylenko (the newly elected leader of Our Ukraine) were very negatively disposed toward him.

per cent of the popular vote it lagged well behind the two front runners, Our Ukraine and the Communist Party of Ukraine. During the second month of the newly elected Verkhovna Rada, For a United Ukraine!"—which had gained 102 seats—was transformed into a coalition of deputy factions. The PR was represented in the assembly by the Regions of Ukraine faction, led by Raisa Bogatyriova, and the European Choice faction, led by Volodymyr Piekhota. In November 2002 these two groups promoted the candidacy of Viktor Yanukovych, then head of the Donetsk Oblast State Administration, as prime minister of Ukraine and, together with other parliamentary groups, developed action program of the the Cabinet of Ministers.

By early 2003 the PR had emerged as one of the major parties in Ukraine, with about 560,000 members working in 680 local and town party organizations throughout Ukraine.⁸ The party's activity was supported by a political organization called the Union of Youth of Ukraine,⁹ which promoted Yanukovych as its candidate for the 2004 presidential election. On 19 April 2003, in Kyiv, the fifth PR convention selected Yanukovych as their chairman and their party's principal leader. It also recognized the following as the party's main authorities: Nikolai Azarov (head of the Political Council and Ukraine's minister of finance), Andrei Kliuev (a parliamentary deputy), and Volodymyr Rybak (representative of the Cabinet of Ministers in the Verkhovna Rada). In February 2004 the PR endorsed Yanukovych as its candidate for the position of Ukraine's president. Formal confirmation of this decision came on 4 July 2004 in Zaporizhzhia during the PR's sixth convention, and on 24 July 2004 the party created "the community of democratic forces" to support Yanukovych's election campaign.

Viktor Yanukovych

According to Yanukovych's official personal Web site in 2006,¹⁰ the PR leader was born on 9 July 1950 in the Zhukivka workers' settlement near the city of Yenakiieve in Staline (now Donetsk) Oblast. Although his father was of Belarusian origin and his mother was born in Russia, his stated nationality is Ukrainian. After his mother died when he was two years old, the future prime minister and president of Ukraine was raised by his paternal grandmother. He graduated from the Donetsk Polytechnical Institute (now the Donetsk National Technical University) in 1970, obtained a master's degree in international law from the Ukrainian Academy of Foreign Commerce in 1991, and subsequently received a doctorate in economics and the title of professor. Before the 2004 presidential elections the biography of the PR's leader was the subject of public discussions, and information about his educational and academic achievements came under the scrutiny of journalists, who noted that neither the text nor the topics of the Yanukovych's diplomas and dissertation were available.¹¹ Moreover, the forms he filled out as part of the obligatory paper work

⁸ See these numbers at the official Web site of the Regions Party. <www.partyofregions.org.ua/meet/history/>.

⁹ This organization was established officially on 4 July 2002 (see <<http://smru.com.ua/history.php>>) and became widely known during the presidential elections of 2004 as an agitator for Yanukovych among the youth of eastern Ukraine.

¹⁰ See <www.ya2006.com.ua/meet/biography/>.

¹¹ The best examples of research about Yanukovych's unofficial biography are Yana Viktorovych, "Priem'ier-ministr Yanukovych, abo neofitsiina biohrafiiia dlia tykh, khto pidzabuv,"

before the election contain many grammatical and punctuation mistakes, most famously the misspelling "proffesor". Such blunders provided ample material for his opponents to exploit.

In the "working activity" section of his autobiography, Yanukovych states that in 1969 he began working as a gas-works employee at a metallurgical factory in Yenakieve. He also worked at different times as a pipefitter and auto mechanic. For twenty-eight years Yanukovych directed auto-repair and transportation firms in Donetsk Oblast.. His political career started in August 1996 when he took the position of deputy chairman of the Donetsk Oblast State Administration. From May 1997 to November 2002 he was chairman of that this administration. During that period Yanukovych was elected a deputy of the Donetsk Oblast Council, and from May 1999 to May 2001 he headed that council. On 21 November 2002 he was appointed Ukraine's prime minister, a position he retained through the first two rounds of the presidential elections in 2004, relinquishing it only on 7 December. He also held the post again briefly from 28 December 2004 to 5 January 2005. On 4 August 2006 President Viktor Yushchenko and the Supreme Council of Ukraine once again returned Yanukovych to this post. Notably, the official version of Yanukovych's autobiography, which he submitted as a candidate for the presidential elections, does not correspond with the autobiography he submitted to the Supreme Council on 18 November 2002 as a candidate for the post of prime minister.¹² In the earlier version he wrote that he was arrested and tried for robbery and spent nineteen months in a penal colony for juvenile offenders in 1967–68.¹³ In 1970 he was arrested a second time and sentenced to two years in prison for aggravated assault. Despite reports disseminated about the rescinding of all his convictions, Yanukovych's official biography has long remained a subject of skepticism and discussion in the revamped and more critical mass media that emerged after the Orange Revolution and throughout Yushchenko's presidency.¹⁴

Ukrainska pravda, 4 August 2006 <www.pravda.com.ua/news/2006/8/4/45617.htm>; and Volodymyr Boiko, "Kurs kryminalnoho prem'ieroznavstva: Viktor Yanukovych," in *Ukraine Today: Articles, Books, Comments* <<http://kuchma.fromru.com/yanuk/01.html>>. See also the diverse attempts to investigate and comment on Yanukovych's criminal past before and after the presidential elections of 2004: Volodymyr Boiko, "Sudymosti Yanukovycha, slid KDB i analohii z Medvedchukom," *Ukrainska pravda*, 14 May 2004 <www.pravda.com.ua/archive/2004/may/14/4.shtml>; Lina Kushch, "Znyk svidak u spravi pro sudymosti Yanukovycha," for BBC Donetsk <www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/domestic/story/2005/10/051020_yanukovych_criminal.shtml>; Volodymyr Ar'iev, "Zakryta zona," for P'iatiy kanal, 15 October 2004, in *Ukraina segodnia: Stati, knigi, komentarii* <<http://kuchma.fromru.com/yanuk/07.html>>; Olena Kuranda, "Fakt sudymosti kandydativ u prezypyenty pid chas vyborchoi kampanii," *Prozora polityka*, no. 33 <www.tomenko.kiev.ua/docs/content.php?id=prozpol38#_stat2>; Serhii Harmash, "Nemaie dokumentu – nemaie piaru," *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 2004, no. 22 (5–11 June) <www.dt.ua/1000/1030/46696>; and Heorhii Seletsky, "Menia zasosala opasnaia triasyna ...," *Obkom: Obshchestvennaia komunikatsiia* <<http://obkom.net.ua/articles/2004-08/21.0900.shtml>>.

¹² Boiko, "Kurs kryminalnoho prem'ieroznavstva."

¹³ In an interview Yanukovych acknowledged he had served a term in prison. See "Yanukovich pervye rasskazal o tom, kak sidel v tiurme," *Korrespondent*, 25 March 2007 <www.korrespondent.net/main/183880>.

¹⁴ Two biographies of about Yanukovych, which were obviously ordered by PR representatives before the 2004 presidential election, offer a positive image of the former prime minister and may

Rinat Akhmetov

Business tycoon Rinat Akhmetov was the main sponsor of Yanukovych's 2004 election campaign. According to unofficial sources, Yanukovych became the head of Donetsk Oblast State Administration through Akhmetov's support. The latter was number seven in the PR's election list during the 2006 parliamentary election. One of Akhmetov's close allies is Boris Kolesnikov, an important figure in the PR and a deputy prime minister of Ukraine since March 2010. Akhmetov's participation in state policy-making was realized through his influence over the appointment of the prime minister¹⁵ the PR's leaders, and the work of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. This information is well known in Ukrainian society, but it is hardly possible to verify using official sources. Akhmetov's wealth doubled after Yanukovych was first inaugurated as prime minister. Today he is the richest person in Ukraine, with an estimated net worth of around US\$16 billion. Akhmetov himself reported financial assets of US\$12 billion–14 billion in 2004–2006. According to his official biography, he was born on 21 September 1966 in Donetsk into the family of a Tatar coal miner. In the 1990s he graduated from the Department of Economics of Donetsk State University. In 1995 Akhmetov founded the Donetsk-based bank Donhorbank, and in the following year he became president of Donetsk's Shakhtar soccer club, with 99 per cent ownership. No information is available about his university thesis or his teachers and university friends. In his official biography Akhmetov does not indicate the years he entered and graduated from university.

In addition to being a Donhorbank stockholder, in 2004 Akhmetov owned about 60 per cent of the stocks of Lux, the Donbas's major hotel business, and about 90 per cent of the stocks of System Capital Management Holdings (his wife owns the other 10 per cent of this company). He is also the principal stockholder of the Ukraine Tele-Radio Company (98 per cent), the Donbas Palace hotel (99 per cent), and the Sarmat Brewery (98 per cent), and a joint owner of the Kuibyshev Machine-Building Plant in Novo-Kramatorsk (24 per cent), the Kerch Metallurgical Plant (24 per cent), the Druzhkivka Ore Administration (27 per cent), the Azovstal trade house (52 per cent), and the Asko insurance company (17 per cent). Through this stock ownership Akhmetov controlled the hotel industry, mobile phone connections (particularly, the mobile operator DCC), and beer production in Southern Ukraine, and his economic influence in the central part of Ukraine was also growing. According to informal sources, Akhmetov controlled ARS, a Donetsk criminal group whose leaders Yakov Bogdanov and Akhat Bragin (the previous president of the Shakhtar soccer club) were killed in April and October 1995 respectively. Akhmetov became the main heir of his criminal chiefs' millions and of ARS. Later ARS owned the major part of the

be found on his personal server. One of them is a brochure by the popular writer Valentyn Chemerys: *Zahadka Viktora Yanukovycha: Sproba doslidzhennia* (Kyiv: Atoll, 2004). The other is Vera Nikolaieva's booklet *Prikosnis k sudbe: Viktor Yanukovich* (Kyiv: Atoll, 2004). There are many contradictions and unexplained phenomena in these books, particularly concerning Yanukovych's criminal past.

¹⁵ On 26 March 2006 Akhmetov was elected a member of the Verkhovna Rada through the RP list. His influence on the policy of the party and on Yanukovych's activity is evident from Yanukovych's announcement that Akhmetov could conceivably be the PR's candidate for the post of president of Ukraine. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rinat_Akhmetov>.

coal-mining and machine industries in southern Ukraine. In addition to the assets cited above, ARS and Akhmetov's group own machinery factories in Kamensk and Shakhtynsk in the Russian Federation. Besides the Ukraina television and radio company, Akhmetov also owned the Segodnia publishing house and the newspapers *Vechernii Donetsk* and *Segodnia*. The support of such a powerful oligarch ensured that Yanukovych had sound financial backing throughout his election campaign.

Features of the Yanukovych Election Campaign

The Yanukovych campaign began promisingly: in addition to the backing of his own party, the candidate was endorsed by influential individuals and other parties. Most of the parties within the pro-government coalition in the parliament were prepared to back him, including the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) led by the head of the presidential administration, Viktor Medvedchuk. Other parties that were happy to endorse him included the Popular Agrarian Party led by Volodymyr Lytvyn and the Toiling Ukraine (Trudova Ukraina) Party of Serhii Tihipko, chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine. In addition, all of the so-called oligarchs in the Kuchma camp, largely based in the city of Dnipropetrovsk, were prepared to back the candidate offered by the "Donetsk clan" led by Akhmetov. This coming together of oligarchs took place in response to the growing popularity of Yushchenko and his promise to eradicate the "bandits." Nonetheless Yanukovych trailed Yushchenko in opinion polls in the summer of 2004, with 16–18 per cent support compared to the opposition challenger's 23–25 per cent.

From the outset the Yanukovych team was prepared to flout electoral procedures. Thus, in mid-August, the non-governmental Committee of Voters noted that his campaign was deploying state money, property, and equipment for his election campaign and, in a similar vein, state resources were also being applied to hinder his rivals' campaigns. Factories ordered workers to attend rallies on behalf of the prime minister, while traffic police, railway officials, and others were instructed to impede the access of Yushchenko's supporters to the nation's capital or other major cities in Ukraine. On other occasions the elderly were forced to sign nomination forms for Yanukovych before they could collect their pensions.¹⁶ Later in the same month, as he prepared to step down, President Kuchma made a self-congratulatory major speech in Kyiv, citing his alleged achievements and demanding that his successor continue his political course. He insisted that what must occur in the future was a continuation rather than a change. The implication was quite clear: Yanukovych was his designated successor. Kuchma attacked the "Ukraine without Kuchma" campaign and the opposition rallies that had taken place after the death of the opposition journalist Heorhii Gongadze in 2000.¹⁷ The Yanukovych campaign also enjoyed a near monopoly of the official media. As Jan Maksymiuk noted, Medvedchuk controlled UT-1, Ukraine's most popular TV channel, and had influence over two others, 1+1 and Inter. Another three channels —ICTV, STB, and Novyi kanal— were run through President Kuchma's son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk and members of

¹⁶ RFE/RL Daily Report, 19 August 2004.

¹⁷ Donbass, 25 August 2004.

the Dnipropetrovsk clan. The remaining channel of influence, P'iatiy kanal owned by Petro Poroshenko, offered support to Yushchenko.¹⁸

Yanukovych's personal activities did not lend themselves well to public scrutiny. The turning point of the 2004 elections may have been the poisoning of Yushchenko on 6 September, which forced him to stop campaigning for two weeks and was eventually, following his examination at the Rudolferhaus Clinic in Vienna, diagnosed as an attempt on his life. Yushchenko's disfigurement and illness were at first ridiculed by the Yanukovych camp, and there were a number of suggestive reports in the official media that his illness was a result of excessive alcohol consumption. Just eighteen days later in the oddest incident of the election campaign, Yanukovych was rushed to hospital after he was struck by a raw egg when he stepped off his campaign bus in the city of Ivano-Frankivsk. The image of a strong prime minister prepared to stay the course for the years ahead could hardly have been bolstered by his carefully staged delayed collapse once the egg broke harmlessly on his chest. Ostensibly it demonstrated that Yushchenko's supporters were not above "dirty tricks" themselves, but it provided plenty of material for those prepared to see the funny side of the incident. Some felt that the entire event was staged by the prime minister's campaign in order to generate some sympathy for him. Yet, compared to the severity of Yushchenko's illness, it could hardly be taken seriously.¹⁹

Yanukovych began moving sharply away from his very broad electoral platform that implicitly endorsed the multi-vectored foreign policy embraced by Kuchma. Moreover, this change of direction appeared to have the support of Russia and in particular its president, Vladimir Putin. Let us deal with these two issues in turn. By September, with opinion polls suggesting that he was still well behind Yushchenko, Yanukovych unexpectedly announced that he wished to make Russian the second state language and introduce the concept of dual citizenship in Ukraine. He also put forward the idea of a "new structure of European security" in which both Russia and Ukraine could take part.²⁰ Both issues in their earlier form—Ukrainian as the sole state language and single citizenship—had been enshrined in Ukraine's constitution; hence Yanukovych was in no position to make such guarantees. The issues were also potentially divisive ones that might serve to heighten regional rifts between eastern and western Ukraine, ensuring that while the candidate might shore up his support in the former, he would end any possibilities of gaining a foothold in the latter. The issue of the Russian language in Ukraine was not new—it was on the table during discussions between presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma in the mid-1990s—but it was surprising that Yanukovych opted to use it in his program. Kuchma instantly attacked his protégé's statements, commenting that the constitution could not be ignored and Yanukovych was making empty promises in Moscow.²¹

¹⁸ Jan Maksymiuk, "Analysis: Media Not Playing Fair in Presidential Campaign," *RFE/RL*, 27 August 2004 <www.rferl.org/content/article/1054532.html>.

¹⁹ See, for example, Helen Fawkes, "Ukraine PM Hurt in 'Egg Attack,'" *BBC News*, 24 September 2004 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3686368.stm>>.

²⁰ See, for example, Olena Yatsunska, "Mythmaking and its Discontents in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Campaign," *Demokratizatsiya* 14, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 6.

²¹ *Ibid.*

Even more disturbing was the candidate's decision to go to Moscow on 8 October to attend the Congress of the Ukrainian Diaspora (of Russia), as the events that followed were designed to shore up the view that Yanukovych was Moscow's candidate for the Ukrainian presidency. Evidently 560,000 Ukrainians resident in Russia signed Yanukovych's support lists for presidential candidate. More than 1,200 were present at the congress, and they heard the candidate repeat his promises that Russian would be elevated to a state language and he would introduce the concept of dual citizenship after he was elected president. He also maintained that under his leadership Ukraine would continue to co-operate with NATO but would refrain from joining the organization. The congress, which was attended by a coterie of prominent Russian officials (including Moscow's mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and then First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev), endorsed Yanukovych as the only candidate capable of uniting Ukraine and maintaining its good relations with Russia, as well as the leader who could best ensure the continuation of the encouraging economic recovery that began in the early 21st century.²²

On the next day Yanukovych and President Kuchma attended the official celebration of Vladimir Putin's fifty-second birthday, albeit two days after the actual event. Reportedly Russia's Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov had conciliated the Ukrainians with a promise to lift quotas on Ukrainian sugar by 2007 and on alcohol by 2012. When Putin, Kuchma, and Yanukovych met at the residence of the Russian president at Novo-Ogarevo, the Ukrainians were informed that the former could not remain indifferent to the outcome of the presidential elections and that he hoped the wise strategy Kuchma had adopted could be continued. Putin thus stopped short of a direct endorsement of Yanukovych, but given the latter's presence alongside the Ukrainian president, the inference was fairly obvious. When Yanukovych, in violation of protocol, sat next to Putin rather than opposite him, Kuchma made an ambiguous remark that the situation would not alter if the two Ukrainian leaders changed places. Putin responded that he hoped this would be the case, which seemed to observers to indicate that he supported Yanukovych's candidacy. The Russian president's interest in the Ukrainian election had already been manifested during his visit to Kyiv during the campaign. On 26 October he was to make a return trip just five days before the first-round vote, ostensibly to celebrate the liberation of Kyiv from German occupation on 3 November 1943, but with an advancement of the date by a week so that it preceded the election vote.

Before Putin's arrival, the Russian Liberal Democratic Party's leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, arrived in Ukraine with the express intention of campaigning on behalf of Yanukovych and berating Yushchenko for a campaign targeted at dividing the Russian and Ukrainian nations. The benefit of endorsement from such a personality may be questioned. By contrast, Putin was a recognizable and popular figure in Ukraine, and thus Yanukovych may have decided that the Russian president's appearance at such a juncture was well worth the risk. It is worth reiterating that as prime minister Yanukovych—perhaps under Kuchma's guidance—had adopted a moderate and expedient policy of maintaining good relations with both Russia and the EU without a formal commitment in either direction. The common Russian-Ukrainian struggle with fascism, which was also cited by Putin and Yanukovych,

²² See, for example, Jan Maksymiuk, "The Kremlin goes for Yanukovych," *RFE/RL*, 12 October 2004 <www.rferl.org/content/article/1343998.html>; and *Ukrainska pravda*, 8 October 2004.

likely had little impact on the bulk of the electorate, and particularly not to those under the age of fifty. Moreover, Putin's arrival in the Ukrainian capital—particularly when coupled with his remarks during an earlier visit about the two countries having a long common history—could have evoked memories of Ukraine as a “younger brother” or, as one source put it, a servile attitude toward Russia.²³ Again, Yanukovych could be depicted as Russia's candidate. Furthermore, Russia had already made it clear that it wanted to see the Kuchma style and regime perpetuated and would offer concessions if such an outcome resulted from the election. The Russians may not have perceived Kuchma's growing reticence in his support for Yanukovych—it became obvious only during the Orange Revolution—and in turn they may have observed the blatant Western support for Yushchenko's campaign. Putin thus made the sort of blunder he had carefully avoided in the case of Belarus, where Alyaksandr Lukashenka amended the national constitution for a third time in October 2004 to allow him to run as president for more than two terms. The Russian president kept carefully out of that campaign, but in the case of Ukraine he seems to have been incapable of standing aside.

Writing after the first round of the elections, the late analyst Roman Kupchinsky noted that prior to the Ukrainian election the city of Moscow, in which some 1,000 Ukrainians were eligible to vote in the Ukrainian presidential election, was decked out with posters and portraits of Yanukovych. He also cited a statement from Nina Khrushcheva, grand-daughter of the former Soviet-era leader, that the Russian company Gazprom had contributed several million dollars to the Yanukovych campaign.²⁴ The perception of Russian interference, as well as the likely continuation of the practices of the Kuchma regime under a Yanukovych presidency, provided catalysts for the remarkable display of public activism and the emergence of a civic society in Ukraine during the 2004 presidential election. In other words, many voters, and particularly those from the younger generation, resolved to take matters into their own hands, culminating in the protests that followed the announcement of the official results of the second round runoff between Yanukovych and Yushchenko. Yanukovych's negative image was further fueled by the situation in Donetsk, where the oblast council endorsed by 156 votes to one a decision to hold a referendum on whether Donetsk Oblast should have the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine.²⁵ The motion seemed to herald the danger of separatism in Ukraine and the possible secession altogether of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Although Yanukovych refused to endorse the Donetsk Oblast Council's decision, the fact that those responsible were from his main base of support, linked to his previous embrace of Russian as a state language, put him in a difficult position.

Lessons Learned? The Regions Party in the 2006 Parliamentary Election

How was Yanukovych able to resurface as a viable political leader after the debacle of 2004? The PR's official election program submitted to the Central Election

²³ *Ukrainska pravda*, 26 October 2004.

²⁴ Roman Kupchinsky, “Why Putin voted for Yanukovych,” *RFE/RL*, 10 November 2004 <<http://qa.rferl.org/content/article/1344002.html>>.

²⁵ See, for example, *The Moscow Times*, 29 November 2004.

Commission of Ukraine before the 2006 parliamentary elections started with the slogan "prosperity to the people, power to the regions." The first thesis of this program was that at the start of the twenty-first century Ukraine had entered the middle phase of economic development and Yanukovych's government had been the architect of economic transformation, but the new Orange government had interrupted this progressive development. The second point of the program was that "the Orange Revolution" brought to the people of Ukraine not only an economic crisis (this crisis was not documented in any economic indicators), but also an increase in the power and prosperity of the bureaucrats, a decrease in law enforcement, and a wave of persecutions of opponents. Based on these conclusions, the PR proposed a solution to the crisis. In addition to usual slogans about economic growth, social protection, lower and fair taxes, and protection of freedoms, the party insisted on the decentralization of power, federalization, and granting more rights to Ukraine's oblasts. The program emphasized again that Russian should have the status of the second official language in the state. In foreign affairs the program stressed that Ukraine should maintain friendly relations with all neighbouring countries. The PR supported the European integration of Ukraine but stated that this integration should be carried out according to the country's national interests. However, the party was opposed to Ukraine's participation in any military blocs and intended to conduct a referendum concerning Ukrainian membership of NATO. "Normalization" of relations with Russia and joining the "United Economic Space" (created by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus) did not require a referendum, but also should be pursued by Ukraine.

Among the specific steps needed to achieve the PR's goals were taxation, pension, judicial, and administrative reforms (which have been on the agenda of many Ukrainian political parties since independence), improvement of the investment environment, science, and education, an increase in agricultural investment, an improvement of conditions for small and middle-level businesses, military reforms, more support for young people, and a reopening of free economic zones (they had been closed because of large tax shelters and tax evasion in them). Finally, the PR promised in its program that it would take responsibility for its implementation and if in three years all of its principles had not been adopted, the government formed by the party would offer its resignation. According to *Ukrainska pravda*, several consulting groups and advisors helped Yanukovych and the PR during the 2006 parliamentary elections.²⁶ Among them were the Sotsium Expert Analytical Centre headed by Eduard Prutnik; the ex-PR chief of the Inter TV channel Ihor Chaban; American experts Paul Manafort and Robert Doll; and the companies Ogilvy & Mather and Burson-Marsteller, which are associated with Manafort. Also, Rinat Akhmetov worked with a former adviser of the jailed Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The PR's campaign was based on a scathing critique of "Orange" power and on high utilization of TV agitation and advertisements.²⁷ In particular, such TV channels as

²⁶ See Viktor Chyvokunia, "Polittekhnohohy na vyborakh-2006: khto pratsiuuvav na Yanukovycha, Akhmetova, Tymoshenko, Medvedchuka," *Ukrainska pravda*, 12 May 2006 <<http://invivio.net/info/52256.htm>> and <<http://sd.org.ua/news.php?id=9453>>.

²⁷ This description of the PR's 2006 parliamentary election campaign is based on the article "Pre-election campaign of the Party of Regions" at the now defunct link <www.kandydat.com.ua/politika/22_03.htm>.

NTN and TRC Ukraine dedicated special programs to the PR and were highly supportive of it in news and other programs. Also, political advertising on television by the PR surpassed that of the other major parties. Despite this fact, the PR blamed "Orange" authorities for imposing restraints in their access to the mass media. Finally, the PR used local administrative power in eastern and southern Ukraine in order to get additional support.

In order to overcome Yanukovych's possible disadvantage of in face-to-face public debates with political opponents (he had demonstrated his lack of ability to respond quickly and appropriately to his opponents in debates several times, and a propensity to make mistakes), the PR used the tactic of five-on-five debates without the participation of political leaders. This gave the party an advantage, because many of its leading personnel were adept at public debate. The PR's advertisement campaign was based on popular topics of taxes, prices, wages, social-welfare protection, and pensions. The primary slogan of the advertisement was "The improvement of life without delay!" The campaign criticized the "Orange" bloc for its failure to fulfill promises given during the Orange Revolution. The repeated adage was that "Orange" leaders had brought the country into crisis and the PR was the only power that could lead Ukraine out of such a situation. It is worth noting that the Orange leadership's political blunders proved to be the strongest weapon in the PR's hands, not least Yushchenko's failure to fulfill at least one of the promises he made during the 2004 presidential election campaign.

Other major aspects of the PR's 2006 election campaign were yet another proposition to make Russian an official language in Ukraine, friendship with Russia, and a proposal not to enter the NATO alliance until mandated to do so by a national referendum. Yanukovych supported co-operation with the EU, though he did not advocate full Ukrainian membership. Indicating his independence from the Moscow line, he criticized Russia for increasing gas-delivery prices for Ukraine. Finally, the PR drew public attention to possible falsifications of election results by the "Orange" bloc. The result of this better managed campaign was an electoral victory in which the PR was the leading party in the 2006 parliamentary elections, receiving 32.14 per cent of the vote and 186 seats in the parliament. Together the three "Orange" parties gained 41.93 per cent and received 243 seats, which was enough to form a coalition (more than 225 seats). However, personal ambitions, an unwillingness to make compromises with close allies, and numerous intrigues undermined a possible coalition of the Our Ukraine People's Unity party, the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), and the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and it led to the formation of a coalition of the PR, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the Communist Party of Ukraine.

One can point to four main reasons for the PR's success in the 2006 parliamentary elections. First, the party had strong financial support, which allowed for abundant advertisements, administrative support, and possibly bribes to the Socialist Party of Ukraine and deputies from other parties. Second, the PR maintained a strongly centralized and autocratic organization, which did not allow any intriguing or factionalism. Third, the constant mistakes of the "Orange" bloc parties, which were fighting for power, arguing, and intriguing against each other, paved the way for a PR-led coalition to take power. Finally, the very passive and short-sighted position of President Yushchenko should be mentioned: he did not attempt to unite the "Orange" forces that had served him so well two years earlier. Nevertheless, as

Table 1: Results for the PR in the 2006 Ukrainian Parliamentary Election

| Oblast or city | Per cent of voters "for" | Rating |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|--------|
| Luhansk | 74.33 | 1 |
| Donetsk | 73.63 | 1 |
| City of Sevastopol | 64.26 | 1 |
| Crimea Autonomous Republic | 58.01 | 1 |
| Kharkiv | 51.70 | 1 |
| Zaporizhzhia | 51.23 | 1 |
| Mykolaiv | 50.34 | 1 |
| Odesa | 47.51 | 1 |
| Dnipropetrovsk | 44.98 | 1 |
| Kherson | 39.14 | 1 |
| Poltava | 20.38 | 2 |
| Kirovohrad | 20.10 | 2 |
| Transcarpathia | 18.65 | 3 |
| Zhytomyr | 17.98 | 2 |
| Chernihiv | 15.60 | 2 |
| Chernivtsi | 12.72 | 3 |
| City of Kyiv | 11.76 | 3 |
| Sumy | 10.92 | 3 |
| Cherkasy | 10.66 | 4 |
| Khmelnyskyi | 9.99 | 3 |
| Kyiv | 9.87 | 4 |
| Vinnitsia | 8.15 | 4 |
| Rivne | 7.24 | 4 |
| Volyn | 4.49 | 4 |
| Lviv | 3.01 | 5 |
| Ternopil | 2.02 | 6 |
| Ivano-Frankivsk | 1.94 | 6 |

Source: <www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd2006/w6p001e.html>

Table 1 shows, the sources of support for Yanukovych and the PR remained very similar to those during the campaign of 2004. Perhaps of note was that they regained some support in the central and southern oblasts, but their votes remained negligible in Galicia and very weak in other areas of the west.

Conclusion

Although the 2004 presidential election campaign ended in defeat for Yanukovych, responsibility may lie as much with his supporters as with the candidate himself. The

image of the candidate—at least in Kyiv, Western Ukraine, Western Europe, and North America—was a very negative one for a number of reasons, not least being his disreputable past, close association with the Kuchma regime (Yushchenko's own association was conveniently overlooked), and his apparent wish to move Ukraine into a direction that would see it linked more closely with Russia, counter to the general direction of the previous thirteen years, when both previous presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, had been wary of too close an attachment to the northern neighbour. The PR in theory wished to unite the country by expressly recognizing the needs and interests of the various parts of the country. Its support base comprised not only the main industrial regions, but also big business and Ukraine's most powerful oligarchs, some of whom were associated with the corrupt practices conducted over the previous few years. The results of each presidential election to date had seen Ukraine divided into almost two disparate halves, but in 2004 western and west-central (Right-Bank) Ukraine had expanded into areas hitherto known for their support of Leonid Kuchma in 1994 and Communist leader Petro Symonenko in 1999. Yanukovych survived because of the failure of the new Yushchenko administration to take measures against its rivals. Kuchma was allowed to retire gracefully (somewhat similar to the situation in Russia after the retirement of the equally corrupt Boris Yeltsin), and the Orange coalition quickly began dividing into various factions until the dismissal of Prime Minister Yuliia Tymoshenko and her Cabinet some nine months later.

This paper has maintained that the division of Ukraine into (1) a pro-Western or nationalist and (2) a pro-Russian (and to some extent proto-Communist) segment is ill advised, but as a theory it was given credibility by the unusual role Russia played in the 2004 elections. It is posited that there were and remain two distinctly polarized regions of Ukraine, neither of which are representative of the country as a whole. On the one hand are Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Yanukovych's power base, which is clearly oriented toward pro-Russian policies and closer political and linguistic ties with Russia. On the other is Galicia, which has always been a distinctive region and glorified some of the nationalist heroes of the 1930s and 1940s, as well as maintaining the closest of ties with the Ukrainian diaspora in the West. It is equally unrepresentative, and one analyst has suggested that the concept of a single independent Ukraine has divided the country into areas according to the degree to which they embrace "Ukrainianness." In this regard the first place is Galicia, followed by other parts of western Ukraine, central Ukraine, and lastly eastern Ukraine, which embraces "incorrect" attitudes.²⁸ The western region, along with President Yushchenko, has also adopted a national historical narrative that includes the genocidal famine of 1932–33 (paradoxically it occurred in central and eastern Ukraine, where it has received much less recognition) while perceiving the integral nationalists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as the architects of the modern state through their selfless sacrifice against both the German invaders during the Second World War and, more importantly, the Red Army and other Soviet forces. However, for the most part residents of Ukraine do not subscribe to these two antithetical mindsets.²⁹

²⁸ Mikhail Pogrebinsky and Aleksei Tolpygo, *Ukraina bez Kuchmy: God oranzhevoi vlasti* (Kyiv: Optima, 2007), 37.

²⁹ Nevertheless President Yushchenko called for official recognition of the UPA and conferred the posthumous title of hero of Ukraine upon its commander in chief, Roman Shukhevych. See *UNIAN*, 10 November 2007.

Yanukovych's own contribution to this perception of an east-west divide was significant, and it was exacerbated in 2004 by his belated change of policies, his ill-advised visit to Russia in early October, and the visits by Putin and Zhirinovskiy to Ukraine later in the same month. As a candidate and public speaker he was also distinctly awkward, and not surprisingly he became the subject of a number of jokes and anecdotes. Yushchenko's own flaws were hardly negligible, but they would become more apparent only once he took office as Ukraine's third president. The PR was able to recover some lost ground in the parliamentary election of 2006, which resulted in Yanukovych returning to his former post as prime minister. Even in the less successful parliamentary election campaign of 2007 the PR remained the leading force in Ukrainian political life. However, the mistakes the PR made in 2004 were never repeated, and more attention was paid to Yanukovych's image. In the 2006 parliamentary election he resorted to the more moderate approach that had characterized some of Kuchma's election campaigns: more emphasis was placed on economic successes, real and alleged, and on raising fears that a new Orange coalition would take the country back to the days of hyper-inflation and economic hardship. Another significant factor in Yanukovych's re-emergence as a key political factor was that the PR sheltered its leader from direct public debate with rival leaders. Though the new version of Yanukovych maintained a respectful distance from Russia, he did maintain that only through a PR-led parliament could Ukraine guarantee supplies of oil and gas from Russia at acceptable prices. In short, the party was geared more to the daily lives and concerns of voters.

Above all, Ukraine's political parties in 2006, as in the Western tradition, sought the middle ground, offering reassuring economic pictures of what the country will be like under their tutelage. Neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovych were particularly charismatic, and perhaps the images of them derived from the 2004 campaign were far from the reality. Ukraine's electorate was thus doomed to some disappointment, but the country as a whole gained some political maturity and the recognition—perhaps—that it should avoid extreme or very radical future paths and seek compromises to satisfy its various regions. That is how politics works after all. Ukraine had to adopt policies that befitted its geographical and geostrategic position in Europe. It had to deal with both Russia and the European Union on its borders; and it must take a firm policy on the NATO alliance and whether joining such an organization would bring direct benefits to the country. The Orange Revolution will always be remembered for Yanukovych's failure and tragicomic indiscretions, but not for the demise of the PR he led or of those who continued to support his candidacy.

In retrospect, Ukraine gradually determined its future with the recognition that depending too much to the wishes of the pro-Western or pro-Russian parts of the electorate was neither feasible nor practical. Since 2010 Yanukovych has been the country's president and the PR has acquired control over the parliament by taking advantage of a dual system of proportional representation and single-mandate constituencies. In the process Ukraine has become more authoritarian and even more corrupt than it was during Kuchma's presidency. None of the flaws identified with Yanukovych in this paper have disappeared. On the contrary, he has failed manifestly to deal with many pressing problems, particularly the economy, the language question, and, indeed, the divisions in the country. Nonetheless Yanukovych's victory

in 2010 is further evidence that the lessons of 2004 were not forgotten. Despite his manifestly modest ability, Yanukovich has reached the pinnacle of power in Ukraine, which represents his crowning achievement.

Who are these People? 2.0

Roman Solchanyk

In the fall of 2004 I wrote an article for *The Ukrainian Weekly* titled “Who Are These People?”¹ The piece (and its title) was meant to be provocative, calling readers’ attention to a problem that I thought needed to be more widely recognized, critically examined, and somehow addressed—namely, the cumulative evidence, after more than a dozen years of Ukraine’s independence, of less than enthusiastic support on the part of the country’s citizenry for what is perhaps best described as the “national (or Ukrainian) idea.” The article cited various public opinion surveys from 2002–2004 that, among other things, indicated that Ukrainians² were not particularly supportive of their country’s status as an independent state.

Thus a poll taken in August 2003 and reported by the daily *Den* concluded that, based on responses to a question about attitudes toward the Independence Day holiday (August 24), over 70 per cent of the population took either a negative stand or were indifferent. Clearly, how one feels about a state holiday that celebrates independence and whether or not one supports state independence are two rather different things. However, other data cited in the article pointed in the same general direction. Polling conducted by the Razumkov Centre, in the course of which respondents were specifically asked how they would vote in a hypothetical referendum on independence, revealed that in 2003 only 46.5 per cent of respondents answered in the affirmative and 29.8 per cent were opposed. Moreover, the level of support was on the decline. In 2002, 48.8 per cent favoured independence, and in 2001 the figure had been 51.3 per cent. These numbers contrasted strikingly with the results of the December 1991 referendum, when just over 90 per cent of voters supported Ukraine’s declaration of independence. Further, a nationwide survey of young people (ages 16–34) conducted in the fall of 2002 by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) found that slightly more than 59 per cent of that age group were convinced that ethnic Ukrainians and Russians are “one people” [*odyn narod*]; in Russia the corresponding figure for the same age group was only somewhat higher—61.2 per cent. Another survey, organized by the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) and made public in mid-2004, compared Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus and revealed that—with one exception where the results for Ukraine and Russia were identical—larger proportions of respondents in Ukraine than in either of the two neighbouring Slav states wanted to live in (1) a union consisting of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, (2) a commonwealth of independent states, and (3) a restored Soviet Union. More surprising was the finding that nearly double the proportion of

¹ Roman Solchanyk, “Who Are these People?” *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 17 October 2004.

² Unless otherwise stated, here and throughout the term “Ukrainians” is used to denote all citizens of Ukraine regardless of ethnic affiliation.

Belarusians (28 per cent) as compared to Ukrainians (15 per cent) would choose to live in a united Europe.

Space did not allow for bringing the regional dimension into the picture. Had that been done, it would have shown stark disparities between the western part of the country, on the one hand, and the eastern and southern parts, on the other, with regard to such issues as the intrinsic value of independence, the role and status of the Russian language in Ukraine, the nature of relations with Russia, geopolitical orientation, and the like—a phenomenon central to the ongoing debate about “two Ukraines.”³

As far as I am aware, no one was sufficiently exercised to comment on or otherwise react to my provocation—with one exception. In a posting on the Web site of the American Association for Ukrainian Studies (AAUS), John-Paul Himka contrasted the general thrust of my piece with an open letter from a well-known writer in Ukraine that was published on the AAUS site at about the same time. Among other things, the writer insisted that the notion of an east-west split in Ukraine with “pro-Russian” and “pro-Western” and Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking parts fell into the category of “made in Russia political myths” that are eagerly consumed by naive Western journalists, leaving Himka wondering what to make of this seemingly conflicting information.⁴

Some years have passed since that episode, and it may be worthwhile and, indeed, instructive to offer an updated version of “Who Are These People?” Specifically, I propose to look at the issue of support or lack thereof for state independence, which, of course, is central to the larger question of how the “national (or Ukrainian) idea” or the “Ukrainian project” has fared after nearly two decades of independent statehood.⁵ Two caveats are in order. First, I am not entirely comfortable with either of these two concepts, both of which analysts have widely used in the discourse about nation building in Ukraine. They are, however, useful shorthand for complex and nuanced processes that reflect the degree to which Ukrainians can or cannot be judged as constituting a “modern nation.”⁶ Second, although I make wide use of survey research,

³ The origins of the debate can be traced to Mykola Ryabchuk's article “Two Ukraines?” in *East European Reporter* 5, no. 4 (July-August 1992): 18–22, the theme of which he subsequently developed in various articles and essays that evoked a wide-ranging discussion about national identity and regionalism in Ukraine. For an overview of the polemics, see Ola Hnatiuk, *Pożegnanie z imperium: Ukraińskie dyskusje o tożsamości* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2003), 245–51. A more recent installment is by the well-known historian Yaroslav Hrytsak: “Oдна, дві, двадцять дві ...” <http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?odna_dvi_dvadsyat_dvi&objectId=1061835> (29 September 2008).

⁴ John-Paul Himka, “Apocalypse Tomorrow: Some Remarks on Two Texts on the Ukrainian Elections” <www.ukrainianstudies.org/aaus-list/0410/msg00027.html>.

⁵ For earlier analyses of Ukrainian public opinion on independence, see Valerii Khmelko, “Referendum: Khto buv ‘za’ i khto ‘proty,’” *Politolohichni chytannia*, 1992, no. 1: 40–52; Jaroslav Martyniuk, “Ukrainian Independence and Territorial Integrity,” *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 17 (27 March 1992): 64–68; and my book *Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 135–57.

⁶ In this connection, I should add that I have no desire nor do I see any particular need to contribute to the long list of definitions as to what constitutes a nation, modern or otherwise. Not unlike Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Potter Stewart's take on hard-core pornography, I know it when I see it.

I am fully aware of its limitations. Nevertheless, public opinion studies, while hardly an exact science, do reflect a certain reality in time and space.

And a final observation by way of introduction. Doubts about the state of the nation in Ukraine are hardly new and have been raised in one form or another by individuals as disparate in their views and prejudices as the former president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma; the prominent and highly respected foreign- and security-policy scholar Zbigniew Brzezinski; and Russia's leading proponent of "neo-Eurasianism," Aleksandr Dugin. Kuchma was widely criticized by the patriotic Ukrainian intelligentsia after he asserted in early 1995 that "the national idea has not worked out" [*ne spratsiuvala*].⁷ Brzezinski, who has been consistently optimistic but also realistic when it comes to Ukraine, told an interviewer in the autumn of 2003 that

the main problem that confronts Ukraine is the absence of a deeply rooted national consciousness of civic responsibility. This is the core dilemma that the country faces. Most of Ukraine's leaders not only sacrificed nothing for national independence, they did not even strive for it. Many see it as an opportunity for self-enrichment.⁸

Dugin is an influential member of an assorted group of Russian academics, analysts, journalists, and politicians who believes that Ukraine as such and Ukrainians, with the possible exception of the residents of the western part of the country, simply do not exist.⁹ There is a substantial body of Western scholarly literature that is devoted to various aspects of regionalism in the context of nation building in Ukraine. More directly relevant for our purposes is a broader study by Stephen Shulman that focuses specifically on the achievements and failures of the nation-building process in Ukraine. Writing in 2005, Shulman noted "that one would be hard-pressed to find more than a handful of countries in the world where fewer than three-quarters of the population would favour the retention of their statehood."¹⁰ Ukraine was one of them. Finally, in Ukraine there are a large (and growing) number of publications on the subject that reflect—as the "two Ukraines" controversy suggests—sharply differing views.

At the end of 2002 KMIS president Valerii Khmelko announced that a November poll conducted by his firm gauged national support for independence at 77 per cent, which for the first time exceeded the level of support registered by the December 1991 referendum.¹¹ In 1991, 90.3 per cent of those who voted (84.3 per cent) said yes to

⁷ See Mykhailo Vivcharyk and Robert Kartashov, "Po shliakhu do konsolidatsii natsii," *Rozbudova natsii*, 1996, no. 2 (February): 15. Kuchma's comment was made during the first meeting of the organizational committee to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the victory in the Second World War. His verbatim remarks at that meeting, which he chaired, do not appear to have been published in the press at the time.

⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Na svitovii shakhivnytsi Ukraina nahaduie slona," *Yevroatlantyka*, 2003, no. 1: 16.

⁹ See, for example, his interview "Dugin: Abkhaziiu—brat, Ukrainu—rvat po shvam," *Rosbalt*, 5 June 2008 <www.rosbalt.ru/2008/06/05/491309.html>. The Russian notion that Ukrainians are a fiction is by no means new and was shared by 49 per cent of respondents in Russia who, in the fall of 2007, felt that Ukrainians and Russians are the same *narod*; 46 per cent said that they are separate peoples. See *Obshchestvennoe mnenie – 2007* (Moscow: Levada-Tsentr, 2007), 215.

¹⁰ Stephen Shulman, "Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma," *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 5 (September–October 2005): 34.

¹¹ UNIAN, 18 December 2002.

independence, which then represented 76.1 per cent of Ukraine's total adult population. Readers have every right to be puzzled. While for some the figure of 77 per cent may still leave a great deal to be desired, it nevertheless contrasts sharply with the Razumkov Centre's number of 48.8 per cent, also in 2002, cited above. Why the glaring difference?

The explanation lies in the different methodologies employed by the two polling organizations, both of which are highly respected at home and abroad. The KMIS questionnaire has a standard entry that asks respondents to choose a preferred variant of relations between Ukraine and Russia from among three options: (1) relations that are the same as with other countries—i.e., with closed borders, visas, and customs control; (2) Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states, with open borders and without visas or customs control; and (3) Ukraine and Russia should unite in a single state. For KMIS the combined response to the first two options represents the degree of overall support for independence. Table 1 below illustrates the level of support for independence recorded in December 1991 and from KMIS surveys in 1992–2008. There was a sharp drop in support during the first two years following the independence referendum, reaching an all time low of 56 per cent at the end of 1993. This period coincided with a catastrophic economic crisis, which has led many observers to link economic performance to support for independence.¹² A second significant drop occurred in 1997–98, falling to 60 per cent at the end of 1998.¹³ Since the end of 2002, support for independence has hovered around the 75 per cent level, with a noticeable drop in mid-2006 and an equally noticeable rise in early 2008. KMIS data from surveys conducted at the end of 2008 and in early 2009 yield an average of 75 per cent supporting independence (see table 2). In sum, the proportion of the population that supports independence has remained moderately stable in recent years, averaging about three-quarters of the population.


I will leave it up to readers to judge the extent to which the KMIS approach accurately reflects popular support for independence. It must be stressed, however, that its choice of methodology should not be construed as a mechanism for skewing the results in favour of independence. On various occasions KMIS pollsters have also asked respondents how they would vote in a hypothetical referendum on independence. The KMIS survey that posed that question in August 2008 revealed that only 50.1 per cent would vote in favour, which is in line with the data reported by the Razumkov Centre.¹⁴ Rather more problematical is the question of how many Ukrainians genuinely oppose independence. According to KMIS, by default that would be those who would like to see Ukraine unite with Russia in a single state—namely, an average of 22.3 per cent of the population in 2008–2009. The problem is that this third option, like the first two, does not *directly* address the question of independence, for or against. Presumably

¹² Some have argued that there is little correlation between economic performance and support for independence. See Grigorii Naumovets, "Zapad i vostok Ukrainy: 'Dve bolshie raznitsy'? Na samom dele – odna bolshaiia, vtoraiia – ne ochen,'" *Zerkalo nedeli*, 10–16 June 1995; and Stephen Shulman, "The Role of Economic Performance in Ukrainian Nationalism," *Europe-Asia Studies* 55, no. 2 (March 2003): 217–39.

¹³ V. Khmelko, "Makrosotsialni zminy v ukrainskomu suspilstvi za roky nezalezhnosti," 23 March 2004 <www.kiis.com.ua/materials/articles/macrosocial%20changes.pdf>.

¹⁴ "Stavlennia naselennia Ukrainy do yii derzhavnoi nezalezhnosti" <old.kiis.com.ua/txt/doc/27082008/pr.doc> (27 August 2008).

Table 1. Support for Independent Ukraine, 1991–2008



Source: "Stavlennia naselennia Ukrainy do yii derzhavnoi nezalezhnosti," 3 <old.kiis.com.ua/txt/doc/27082008/pr.doc> (24 August 2008). The respondents were eighteen or older.

Table 2. How Would You Like to See Relations between Ukraine and Russia? August and September 2008, February and March 2009 (in %)

| | <i>Aug 08</i> | <i>Sept 08</i> | <i>Feb 09</i> | <i>March 09</i> |
|---|---------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| The same as with other countries— with closed borders, visas, and customs | 12.9 | 16.8 | 7.8 | 7.7 |
| Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly countries— with open borders and without visas and customs | 58.5 | 65.8 | 67.6 | 62.9 |
| Total for independence | (71.4) | (82.6) | (75.4) | (70.6) |
| Ukraine and Russia should unite in a single state | 24.8 | 15.5 | 23.1 | 25.7 |
| Hard to say | 3.9 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 3.7 |

Source: <www.kiis.com.ua>

Table 3. If a Referendum on State Independence Were to Be Held Today, How Would You Vote? (in %)

| | <i>2001</i> | <i>2002</i> | <i>2003</i> | <i>2004</i> | <i>2005</i> | <i>2006</i> | <i>2007</i> | <i>2008</i> |
|---------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| For | 51.3 | 48.8 | 46.5 | 53.1 | 59.5 | 58.8 | - | 52.1 |
| Against | 29.2 | 33.9 | 29.8 | 27.6 | 19.6 | 20.1 | - | 22.2 |

Source: Razumkov Centre database, unpublished. The question was not asked in 2007.

there are those who are opposed to independence but do not necessarily want unification with Russia in a single state. Conversely, Ukrainians have been known to support independence within the framework of a “union of Soviet sovereign states” based on Ukraine’s 1990 declaration of sovereignty, a formulation identical to the one placed on the ballot in Ukraine in the March 1991 referendum in order to offset the so-called Gorbachev question on preserving a “renewed” Soviet Union. In a survey conducted by SOCIS-Gallup in the spring of 1997, 52 per cent of Ukrainians opted for this variant.¹⁵

As can be seen from table 3, the data from polls taken by the Razumkov Centre, which posed the question of independence directly, reveal a very different picture from that suggested by the KMIS surveys. For nearly the last decade, an average of only 53 per cent of the population affirmed their support for independence when asked specifically how they would vote in a hypothetical referendum; 26 per cent were opposed; and the remainder, about 21 per cent, were either undecided or would not take part in the voting. Here too the figures are fairly stable, with the highest level of support recorded during the first two years of the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko.

How do Ukrainians in different parts of the country feel about independence? As was to be expected, support declines as one moves from west to east and south, and, conversely, opposition to independence increases. Results from KMIS surveys taken in December 2001, October 2006, and August 2008 show that, with some variation, particularly in 2006, the trends have remained fairly consistent. Particularly interesting is the shift in the central part of the country, where support for independence

¹⁵ Den, 26 June 1997.

Table 4. If a Referendum on State Independence Were to Be Held Today, How Would You Vote? Regional Distribution in 2001, 2006, and 2008 (in %)

| | <i>West</i> | <i>Centre</i> | <i>South</i> | <i>East</i> |
|-----------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| <i>For</i> | | | | |
| 2001 | 72.0 | 46.6 | 38.9 | 27.4 |
| 2006 | 82.0 | 57.5 | 31.6 | 27.8 |
| <i>Against</i> | | | | |
| 2001 | 7.0 | 22.8 | 37.9 | 38.2 |
| 2006 | 5.2 | 16.1 | 31.0 | 38.6 |
| 2008 | 4.9 | 13.6 | 33.3 | 39.6 |
| <i>Would not vote</i> | | | | |
| 2001 | 8.1 | 17.9 | 14.0 | 20.8 |
| 2006 | 8.5 | 9.6 | 13.6 | 10.5 |
| 2008 | 7.5 | 11.9 | 17.9 | 18.2 |
| <i>No answer</i> | | | | |
| 2001 | 11.9 | 12.7 | 9.2 | 13.6 |
| 2006 | 13.0 | 12.6 | 14.2 | 14.1 |
| 2008 | 5.6 | 17.0 | 17.2 | 14.4 |

Source: KMIS database, unpublished.

Table 5. If a Referendum on State Independence Were to Be Held Today, How Would You Vote? Respondents by Region in %, August 2008

| | <i>West</i> | <i>Centre</i> | <i>South</i> | <i>East</i> |
|----------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| For | 87.7 | 55.7 | 29.6 | 38.6 |
| Against | 3.7 | 21.0 | 39.1 | 26.3 |
| Would not vote | 3.9 | 12.1 | 17.1 | 14.1 |
| No answer | 4.7 | 11.2 | 14.1 | 21.0 |

Source: < http://www.razumkov.org.ua/rus/poll.php?poll_id=326 >.

West = Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Rivne, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi oblasts; Centre = City of Kyiv and Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Poltava oblasts; South = the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts; East = Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.

has grown markedly, and the uniformity of opposition to independence in the eastern region and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in the south (see table 4). With some exceptions, the regional breakdown in a Razumkov Centre poll taken in August 2008 yielded results that were largely similar to those from the comparable KMIS survey. In the eastern part of the country, the number of independence supporters was higher and the number of opponents was lower than in the KMIS survey, and the proportion of those opposed to independence in the central oblasts was higher in the Razumkov Centre poll (21.0 per cent) than in the KMIS survey (13.6 per cent; see table 5).

We also have KMIS data from 2006 and 2008 that breaks down the responses by ethnicity and language. Again, it comes as no surprise that a significantly larger proportion of ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers support independence as compared to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. Nonetheless, the degree of support among ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian speakers is by no means overwhelming. As for ethnic Russians, in 2008 it dropped to below 25 per cent, while the proportion of

opponents increased to nearly 44 per cent. Also, fewer Russian speakers supported independence in 2008 as compared with 2006 (see tables 6 and 7).

Table 6. If a Referendum on State Independence Were Held Today, How Would You Vote? Distribution by Ethnicity, 2006 and 2009, in %

| | <i>Ukrainian</i> | <i>Russian</i> | <i>Both Ukrainian & Russian</i> | <i>Other</i> |
|-------------------------|------------------|----------------|---|--------------|
| <i>For</i> | | | | |
| 2006 | 58.5 | 34.9 | — | 31.3 |
| 2008 | 55.7 | 23.9 | 32.7 | 46.7 |
| <i>Against</i> | | | | |
| 2006 | 18.1 | 38.8 | — | 41.7 |
| 2008 | 17.6 | 43.6 | 44.9 | 16.7 |
| <i>Would not vote</i> | | | | |
| 2006 | 10.1 | 13.0 | — | 12.5 |
| 2008 | 13.1 | 16.1 | 14.3 | 21.7 |
| <i>Difficult to say</i> | | | | |
| 2006 | 13.4 | 13.3 | — | 14.6 |
| 2008 | 13.6 | 16.4 | 8.2 | 15.0 |

Source: KMIS database, unpublished. In the 2006 survey, those who considered themselves both Ukrainian and Russian were not identified as a separate cohort.

Table 7. If a Referendum on State Independence Were to Be Held Today, How Would You Vote? Distribution by Language Spoken, 2006 and 2008, in %

| | <i>Ukrainian</i> | <i>Russian</i> |
|-------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| <i>For</i> | | |
| 2006 | 65.3 | 41.9 |
| 2008 | 64.3 | 36.4 |
| <i>Against</i> | | |
| 2006 | 14.1 | 30.6 |
| 2008 | 10.7 | 33.3 |
| <i>Would not vote</i> | | |
| 2006 | 8.3 | 12.9 |
| 2008 | 11.6 | 16.0 |
| <i>Difficult to say</i> | | |
| 2006 | 12.3 | 14.6 |
| 2008 | 13.3 | 14.3 |

Source: KMIS database, unpublished

Polls organized by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine do not, as a matter of course, pose the question of independence either directly or indirectly. However, two of its standard questions—one on the preferred path of development for Ukraine, and the other on attitudes regarding Ukraine joining an unspecified union with Russia and Belarus—do provide additional insight into the state of the nation. In 2008 the proportion of Ukrainians who primarily favoured some form of co-operation or strengthening of ties within the framework of the post-Soviet space totalled 52.8 per cent; 29.8 per cent of that number supported strengthening the

"east Slavic bloc" of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus first and foremost. Those who preferred relations with the West totalled 17.7 per cent, and those who opted for relying first of all on one's own resources and thereby strengthening independence was 19.3 per cent. At the same time 60.2 per cent were more inclined to choose a union with Russia and Belarus; 24.2 per cent were more inclined to oppose such a union; and 15.4 per cent were undecided.¹⁶

There are, of course, other indicators that would leave one with a rather different impression than the one that might be expected from the data reproduced above. In the spring of 2008, for example, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (87.5 per cent) viewed Ukraine as their fatherland, and a large majority was proud of their Ukrainian citizenship (68.5 per cent). Moreover, according to the Kyiv Institute of Problems of Management (Gorshenin Institute), these figures have been on the rise in recent years.¹⁷ Similarly, 74.9 per cent of respondents asserted at the end of 2005 that they are patriots of Ukraine.¹⁸ Interestingly, according to a Razumkov Centre poll conducted in the summer of 2007, 86 per cent of Russian speakers considered Ukraine to be their fatherland and 72 per cent said that they are Ukrainian patriots.¹⁹ These and similar data have led some to play down what is most certainly a serious problem. President Yushchenko, among others, was a forceful and consistent cheerleader in this respect. In May 2007, for example, he told a group of Ukrainian war veterans:

We are country with a great deal of diversity, but we are [also] a country without opposing sides. As a wise nation, as a great people, we cannot be divided either by problems of language policy, or problems of religious politics, or problems of history. We are a single nation, irrespective of history, although we remember it well.²⁰

On an earlier occasion, Yushchenko insisted to a Moscow newspaper that "for years [they] attempted to divide Ukraine into west and east.... They buttressed the feeling that eastern and western Ukraine are different. In essence, there is no difference."²¹ However, those who, like Yushchenko, argue that the mix of Ukraine's overlapping regional, ethnic, and language problems are primarily the work of political elites vying for votes forget that these elites would not be able to exploit issues if they did not exist.

Optimists would be better served and should be able to take greater comfort in the knowledge that a June 2007 Razumkov Centre survey showed that 99.5 per cent of Ukrainians saw the future of their region as remaining a part of Ukraine—either under existing conditions or with expanded local prerogatives, but without autonomy. Those opposed to their oblast seceding from Ukraine and forming an independent state constituted 88.2 per cent of the respondents; those against uniting with another

¹⁶ Yevhen Holovakha and Nataliia Panina, *Ukrainske suspilstvo, 1992–2008: Sotsiologichnyi monitoring* (Kyiv: Instytut sotsiologii, Natsionalna akademiia nauk Ukrainy, 2008), 14.

¹⁷ *Ukrainska pravda*, 1 April 2009.

¹⁸ Yurii Yakymenko and Oleksandr Lytvynenko, "Rehionalni osoblyvosti ideino-politychnykh oriantatsii hromadian Ukrainy v konteksti vyborchoi kampanii – 2006," *Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona*, 2006, no. 1: 12.

¹⁹ *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 17–23 May 2008.

²⁰ *Ukrainska pravda*, 9 May 2007.

²¹ *Novaia gazeta*, 6 March 2006.

country constituted 85 per cent; and those who rejected autonomous status within Ukraine constituted 74.1 per cent. In the south of the country secession followed by independence was supported by 8.1 per cent, and union with another country was supported by 11.6 per cent. The corresponding figures for eastern Ukraine were 4.8 per cent and 10.4 per cent. Russian speakers—who accounted for 37 per cent of Ukraine's total population—were solidly against regional independence (79 per cent), joining another country (77 per cent), and federalization of the country (60 per cent).²²

Today's Ukraine, it seems, is a state in search of a consolidated, modern nation; a society that is obviously and seriously divided but not split along overlapping regional, ethnic, and linguistic lines; and a country that would prefer to work out its identity issues within its constituted borders.

²² "Formuvannia spilnoi identychnosti hromadian Ukrainy: Perspektyvy i vyklyky." *Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona*, 2007, no. 9: 20; and *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 17–23 May 2008.

Review Article

Russian-Oriented Cities and the Russification of Urban Memory in Late Soviet and Post-Soviet Ukraine

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Karl D. Qualls. *From Ruin to Reconstruction: Urban Identity in Soviet Sevastopol after World War II*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. ix, 214 pp. U.S.\$49.95 cloth.

Tanya Richardson. *Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008. xiv, 280 pp. \$30.95 paper, \$72 cloth.

Sergei I. Zhuk, *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dnipropetrovsk, 1960–1985*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. xx, 440 pp. U.S.\$65 cloth.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cities in Central and East Central Europe represented the most visible flashpoints of the national tensions and conflicts between the urban and rural areas. As the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian Empires slowly industrialized and urbanized prior to the First World War, the majority of the new urban residents often developed national identities different from those living in the countryside. As a result, social, economic, and political hierarchies became intertwined with a national pecking order. In some areas Russians, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, and, to a lesser extent, Jews occupied the more influential urban positions, while the populations living in the rural areas possessed the less prestigious ones. As the overwhelming majority of nationally conscious Europeans in this region defined their identities through the prism of primary language usage, they believed that the language of the cities should reflect the language of the surrounding countryside for their national movements to triumph. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the president of the Ukrainian Central Rada, best expressed this claim in 1917: "The cit-

ies must follow the majority of the surrounding population.”¹ Nearly one hundred years later this is still not the case in Ukraine, especially not in cities that developed outside the historic Ukrainian core within the Russian Empire.

Historical developments militated against language congruence between the Ukrainian urban areas, especially those established in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and their surrounding countryside. The authorities created each of these cities, Ekaterinoslav (Ukrainian: Katerynoslav, now Dnipropetrovsk, est. 1776), Sevastopol (1784), and Odesa (1792–94), in the context of the Russian Empire and in the empire’s interests. As Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions experienced rapid economic growth in the nineteenth century, these new cities attracted literate males from Russia’s central provinces, not from the closest rural areas. Simultaneously, as Roman Szporluk pointed out, “the traditional center of Ukraine, Kiev, and such smaller cities as Poltava and Chernihiv found themselves sidetracked in the process. One of the consequences of this dichotomy was the pressure for Russification of Ukrainians moving to, or living in, the rapidly growing urban centers.”² At the end of the nineteenth century the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians lived in the countryside and identified themselves primarily as peasants, a powerless group.

During the twentieth century Ukraine and the Ukrainians experienced a demographic and urban revolution. If less than 20 per cent of the people of Ukraine resided in cities in 1926, more than 67 per cent lived in them in 2001, the date of the last census. Not only did Ukraine become more urban, but Ukrainians also became more urbanized. The people of Ukraine experienced this urban revolution within the context of two total wars, revolutionary chaos, the violent consolidation of Communist rule, mass industrialization and collectivization, the Holodomor of 1932–33, the purges, a brutal Nazi occupation, the Holocaust, mass involuntary evacuations and ethnic cleansings, border changes, and a post-war famine. In the long peaceful post-1945 world, millions migrated from the Ukrainian countryside to the cities. Although most cities acquired a majority ethnic Ukrainian population in this period, many urban residents still claim Russian as their native language and possess a Russian orientation, not a Ukrainian one. Most importantly, many Russian-speaking cities in Ukraine identify themselves as part of Russia, not Ukraine.

These twentieth-century developments built on the long-term trends of the nineteenth century. The rapid industrialization and collectivization drives of the late 1920s and early 1930s took place as Stalin and his colleagues dismantled the Ukrainization program and “reduced Ukrainian culture to the status of folklore, to the *hopak*, and *varenyky*.”³ In addition to this political reversal, the Second World War (or the “Great Patriotic War,” as it is known in this part of the world) profoundly changed Ukraine’s demographic landscape, setting the stage for the outcomes that

¹ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, “Iakoi my khochemo avtonomii i federatsii?,” in his *Vybrani pratsi* (New York: Holovna uprava OURDP v SShA, 1960), 148.

² Roman Szporluk, “Kiev as the Ukraine’s Primate City,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3–4 (1979–80), part 2: 846.

³ George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 181.

Karl Qualls, Sergei Zhuk, and Tanya Richardson traced and assessed in Sevastopol, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa.

With the conclusion of the Second World War, Stalin and his colleagues united the majority of Ukrainians living in East Central Europe within a single Soviet republic. But despite the slight rise in the overall percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians between 1939 and 1959 (due primarily to the war's brutality), these border changes did not transform the Ukrainian SSR into a nationally homogeneous entity, such as post-war Poland.⁴

Instead the number and percentage of Russians grew dramatically. In 1939 this group's 4,175,300 members constituted 13 per cent of Ukraine's population. In 1959, as the first post-war census recorded, they comprised 7,090,810, that is, 17 per cent.⁵ Sadly, Ukraine's Jews suffered genocidal losses during the war and some migration to Poland after the war. All in all, they experienced a sharp decline in their total number and percentage of the Soviet Ukrainian population between the two censuses.

After 1945 Ukraine remained nationally diverse but regionally homogeneous, containing three different sets of territories. The Western Ukrainian territories, those areas that the Soviet Union acquired from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in 1939–45, became more Ukrainian demographically.⁶ Lviv, Galicia's historic capital, became a Ukrainian-majority and Ukrainian-speaking city. In the agricultural regions under Soviet control since 1920, the percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians increased in the 1939–59 period.⁷ Kyiv also became a Ukrainian-majority city, but it remained predominantly Russian-speaking. Nevertheless it played a critical role in defining and creating the foundations of an independent Ukrainian state in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The industrial eastern and southern regions under Soviet control since 1920 became more Russian (except in Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv

⁴ According to the 1939 census (taken before the annexation of Ukrainian territories from Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia), 23,667,509 individuals (or 76 per cent of the total population of the Ukrainian SSR) identified themselves as Ukrainians. According to the 1959 census, the first after the end of the Second World War, 32,158,493 people—77 per cent of the total population—identified themselves as Ukrainians. See, for 1939, Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv narodnogo khoziaistva (TsGANKh, Moscow), f. 1562, op. 529, d. 4535, p. 72; and for 1959, USSR, Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainianskaia SSR* (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1963), 168.

⁵ Ibid. The Russian population in interwar Western Ukraine was negligible.

⁶ In the 1930s in the territories annexed by the Soviet Union during the Second World War, 63.4 per cent of the population in Poland, 61.6 per cent in Czechoslovakia, and 43.4 per cent in Romania identified themselves as Ukrainians. See Piotr Eberhardt, *Ethnic Groups and Population Changes in Twentieth-Century Central-Eastern Europe: History, Data, Analysis* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 212–14. According to the Soviet census of 1959, Ukrainians comprised 91 per cent of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil oblasts, i.e., of what was Eastern Galicia in interwar Poland; 94 per cent of Volyn and Rivne oblasts, i.e., of what was Volhynia in interwar Poland; 75 per cent of Transcarpathia oblast (interwar Czechoslovakia's former Subcarpathian Ruthenia); and 67 per cent of Chernivtsi oblast (Northern Bukovyna in interwar Romania). See *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi nadeleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainianskaia SSR*, 176–78.

⁷ See, for 1939, TsGANKh, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 4535, pp. 72–74; and, for 1959, *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainianskaia SSR*, 174–79.

oblasts) and more Russified.⁸ As the authorities reconstructed one of the major industrial heartlands of the USSR after the war, they transferred many Russian and Russified cadres to this region, primarily because the war had devastated the labour force in the German-occupied areas.

All three sets of territories established different sets of “tipping points”—that critical mass needed to maintain the Ukrainian language and culture or to abandon it. These demographic changes and the introduction of new institutional arrangements provided a limited social and political menu of options. The masses could make choices after 1945, but only from a list the Soviet authorities provided. With Stalin’s death and de-Stalinization, this list of options grew larger, as Karl Qualls, Sergei Zhuk, and Tanya Richardson skillfully record and evaluate.

Sevastopol

Built in 1784 as a fortress and port, Sevastopol became the home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet twenty years later. During the Crimean War (1853–56) the city experienced a 349-day siege by the combined forces of France, Great Britain, and Ottoman Turkey. Rebuilt in the 1870s, it gained 53,000 residents, mostly naval personnel, by 1897. During the First World War or subsequent Russian Civil War, the German Army (May–November 1918), the Allied Powers (November 1918–April 1919), and General Anton Denikin’s White Army (June 1919–November 1920) occupied the city. In late 1920 the Red Army took the city and incorporated it into the Russian SFSR. During the Second World War Sevastopol resisted the German advance for eight months before surrendering in July 1942. Of the city’s 110,000 residents at the outbreak of the war, only 3,000 survived by the time of its liberation in May 1944 (Qualls, 87). The Germans and the Soviets leveled almost every building in the city.

Qualls’s rich, archive-based monograph deals with the complexity of the reconstruction of the city in the first decade after the war and how its rebuilding influenced its residents’ perceptions after the Crimea became part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. In this early post-war period, local officials challenged Moscow’s “triumphalist” socialist designs for the city. Whereas Moscow’s central planners generally favoured architectural styles and Soviet memorials common throughout the USSR, Sevastopol’s administrators sought to emphasize the city’s unique history. Instead of following a pre-war urban model emphasizing Soviet homogeneity, they engaged in countless subtle and overt bureaucratic battles to preserve pre-revolutionary Sevastopol’s street grid, architecture, monuments, and toponyms. By the end of the first post-war decade, they succeeded in restoring a city that celebrated Russian valour during the Crimean War over its role in World War Two or in the revolutionary period.

Local officials created a vast memorial complex within the city based on local heroes who had also served a larger community through their defense of the Russian/Soviet homeland. Sevastopol’s unique local identity reinforced its identification with the larger Russian polity. The city’s new residents learned that they constituted “part of a long lineage of heroic sacrifice in defense of the Motherland, whether it be Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union” (Qualls, 155, 166–67). Its reconstruction at the

⁸ See *ibid.*

height of post-war Soviet Russocentrism created a Ukrainian city that still views itself as primarily Russian. If given a choice, many, if not most, of the city's residents would likely choose the leadership of Moscow over that of Kyiv (Qualls, 10, 157).

This is not surprising. Unlike the experience of Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa, Sevastopol has always served as the headquarters of Russia's and the Soviet Union's Black Sea Fleet. Most of its ranking officers come from Russia and have viewed the city as an extension of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, not Ukraine. The city's population has always been predominantly Russian. As a long-term military outpost and major naval port, its new residents quickly absorbed its reputation as a city of two defenses, the Crimean War and World War Two. Building on the Soviet political culture's siege mentality (born during the hostilities of the revolutionary period and civil war) and xenophobia, this localized vision embodies, at least in Sevastopol, the Russian perception of a permanent threat from the West. The memorialization of this "we-they" paradigm served to unite a multinational state for the Great Patriotic War and prepared the city's residents for the Cold War, which permanently divided the world into two antagonistic and irreconcilable political and socio-economic camps (Qualls, 186, 44).

President Yanukovich's recent extension of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's leasing agreement in Sevastopol until 2042 guarantees that the city's primary employer will promote this localized, binary vision hostile to Europe. As long as the Russian Federation continues to see itself as separate from Europe, as Qualls claims, most of Sevastopol's residents will likely do the same (Qualls, 194). In doing so, the city's relationship with Kyiv and the Ukrainian state will remain tenuous well into the foreseeable future.

Dnipropetrovsk

Founded in 1776 by Prince Grigorii Potemkin, Dnipropetrovsk was originally named Ekaterinoslav in honour of Catherine II. In the early nineteenth century the city (Ukrainian: Katerynoslav) became the capital of a province. After the tsarist authorities built a railway line linking it with Sevastopol and Kharkiv in the 1870s, the city became a major transportation hub, linking the Dnipro River route, which carried grain and lumber, and the railroad line, which hauled iron ore and coal. With the Soviet industrialization drive of the 1920s and 1930s, the city (renamed Dnipropetrovsk in 1926) became one of the largest metallurgical and machine-building centres in Ukraine.

In *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City*, Sergei Zhuk, who lived in Dnipropetrovsk in his youth and early career, analyzes the four waves (1960–70, 1971–75, 1976–81, and 1982–85) of Western cultural influence among Soviet youth in the city, Ukraine's third-largest urban centre. Shortly after the authorities built an enormous secret enterprise (the so-called Southern Machine-Building Factory, or Pivdenmash/Yuzhmash), which designed and produced powerful rockets and military space equipment for the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the KGB closed the city to all foreigners (including those from socialist countries) from 1959 to 1996.

Despite its experience as a closed city, Dnipropetrovsk played a significant role in Soviet politics during the tenure of CPSU Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev, who

started his political career in nearby Dniprodzerzhynsk and then in Dnipropetrovsk itself. Brezhnev's close friend and ally, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, also promoted the careers of other people in Dnipropetrovsk. If before the start of Gorbachev's reforms in 1985 more than 53 per cent of all political leaders in Kyiv had come from this rocket city, by 1996 approximately 80 per cent of the major post-Soviet Ukrainian political leaders had begun their careers there (Zhuk, 5).

Many of these political leaders possessed a connection to the "discotheque mafia," a network of rock-music enthusiasts, black marketeers, Komsomol ideologists, entertainers, and representatives of the Soviet tourist agencies, who emerged in the 1970s and 1980s and made enormous profits from Western music. According to Zhuk, this group organized the overwhelming majority (90 percent!) of the successful post-Soviet businesses. By providing biographical information on Yuliia Tymoshenko, Serhii Tihipko, Leonid Kuchma, and his son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk, Zhuk claims that the consumption of Western cultural products played "an important role in the identity formation for [the] men and women" who later established Ukraine's post-Soviet political and entrepreneurial order (Zhuk, 4).

As a closed city, Dnipropetrovsk became a unique Soviet social, cultural, and political laboratory, where new Western cultural influences collided with the ideological orthodoxy of the late Brezhnev period. With a high concentration of educated professionals and students, the "rocket city" nurtured a dynamic youth subculture of its own. Part one of Zhuk's monograph deals with the first wave of cultural influence, when Ukrainian nationalist literature originating from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Lviv appeared for the first time. At the same time, Beatlemania, the so-called "beat music" (rock and roll), and hippie fashions spread among high-school and college students. Part two emphasizes the 1970s and the city's consumption of Western books and films, many of which became blockbuster hits in Soviet Ukraine during the Brezhnev era, as well as "hard-rock music" and popular religiosity. Part three focuses on the popularity of disco and punk music in the 1970s and 1980s, on tourism, and on the Komsomol roots of the post-Soviet "capitalist" order.

Zhuk analyzes how young people adapted Western cultural products (such as popular music—jazz, rock, hard rock, and disco—literature, and movies) and how these products directly transformed them, promoting Russification in their wake. Zhuk's rich description and analysis of the spread of Western jazz and rock and roll among Dnipropetrovsk's young people, based on over a hundred interviews, on archival materials from the local KGB, and on several school-children's diaries from that time, is his book's major achievement. If the Moscow International Youth Festival in 1957 ignited mass interest in Western popular culture with its positive evaluation of jazz, rock and roll encountered a different official reception. As late as 1973 Ukrainian Komsomol leaders considered rock "the negative commercial by-product of the progressive jazz music culture" and the Beatles, the group that attracted many young people to Western rock, "a fashionable illness" (Zhuk, 76, 82).

In order to compete with the popularity of Western rock bands, the Komsomol leadership promoted local Ukrainian vocal-instrumental ensembles, such as Smerichka (which possessed a very talented lyricist, Volodymyr Ivasiuk). These officially sponsored groups sang "pop" songs in Ukrainian and at first attracted large audiences. But the Party's embrace of this group produced unintended consequences. Because Smerichka's songs became "the official Soviet music," local rock bands and

fans soon lost interest. Even Ukrainian-speaking rock fans favoured the “real rock” coming from the West than an officially approved Soviet Ukrainian version of it. With the exception of “The Cossacks,” a Ukrainian-language cover of Shocking Blue’s song “Venus,” most rock buffs considered these songs to be inferior, peasant songs.

In response to this stereotype, as hard rock and disco music attracted more young people, women, and members of the working class during the 1970s, the Russian language became the major language of local rock bands. In turn a majority of young Ukrainian men reformulated their own identities by rejecting elements of Ukrainian popular culture. They tried to look and behave in a “cool” manner, like their Western idols of hard rock and glam rock, but within a framework in which the Russian language and culture mediated and connected Ukraine with the creators of this music.

In the closed city of Dnipropetrovsk, rock music fans tried to identify themselves only with the West or its legitimate substitutes, which by the end of the 1970s lost any ties to the Soviet Ukrainian culture. Ukrainian rock and rollers concluded that the official Soviet Ukrainian culture represented all the most conservative, backward, and anti-Western elements in their lives. By adopting the imaginary West (which bore very little semblance to reality) as part of their identities, those young rock aficionados and disco activists made the only real choices available to them in a closed city and a closed society. These options, according to Zhuk, “would affect their identity formation” (Zhuk, 94, 263).

By the end of the 1970s Dnipropetrovsk’s mass consumption of Western cultural products (including books written by Western authors, Western movies, fashions, and especially hard rock) contributed to the homogenization of the local youth culture and to the mass Russification of its adherents. If at first primary- and secondary-school students read Western classics in Ukrainian, by 1976 an “overwhelming majority of students preferred reading [them] in Russian.” Foreign literature in Russian replaced foreign literature in Ukrainian, although Zhuk does not explain precisely why this happened. (Perhaps the official publishing houses produced a very small number of Ukrainian-language books?). The majority of private book collectors ignored books in Ukrainian and only sought out books in Russian. Ukrainian books in private collections became “unfashionable.” The overwhelming majority of local readers lost interest in Ukrainian history and Ukrainian-language books (Zhuk, 107, 119, 120, 122).

The same happened with film viewing. In the 1960s and 1970s the cultural commissars allowed Soviet film audiences to see more movies from abroad. By 1975 almost 80 per cent of all films shown in Dnipropetrovsk came from the West. In light of their superior production values and pacing, young people now preferred them to slower and more didactic Soviet (Ukrainian and other) films. Needing to make a profit, local theatre administrators showed more foreign films, which attracted larger and younger audiences. The mass consumption of foreign films with soundtracks dubbed in Russian “also contributed to the mass Russification of the young generation of Eastern Ukraine” (Zhuk, 166, 124).

Western rock and roll, adventure books written by Western authors, and Western movies and fashions promoted Russification, especially among the city’s newcomers. When these young Ukrainian men and women left their villages to attend vocational schools and colleges in Dnipropetrovsk, they tried to adjust to a new urban, Russian-

language environment. In order to overcome their alienation, they started speaking Russian instead of Ukrainian; they wore new, stylish Western fashions; they listened and danced to the new “hip” music; and they stopped reading Ukrainian literature. Urban Soviet mass culture—heavily influenced by Western pop culture—filled a vacuum (Zhuk, 176, 178). The Russian language mediated this process of adaptation and accommodation after the migrants experienced the trauma of moving to Dnipropetrovsk and trying to fit in. But for the young people growing up in the rocket city, Russification did not completely erode their allegiance to their region or to Ukraine.

Despite the steady growth of the Russian language and culture in Dnipropetrovsk during the 1970s, the local population (including the young, enthusiastic consumers of Western cultural products) gradually distanced itself from Moscow, which they associated with unfair “privileges for Muscovites” and with various restrictions and limitations arbitrarily imposed on them. During the Gorbachev era Ukrainian nationalist politicians used these feelings of “provincial envy” of Moscow to mobilize local young activists in their anti-Russian (and anti-Moscow) independence movement (Zhuk, 211).

Many of the non-Ukrainian members of the “disco mafia” became active participants in the Ukrainian independence movement in 1988–91, primarily to protect their regional business interests rather than national cultural interests. According to Zhuk’s persuasive argument, Dnipropetrovsk’s mass consumption of Western cultural products by means of the Russian language and culture led to a loosening of the Soviet ideological grip on the city and to Russification. But it also inadvertently helped to create a regional identity opposed to Moscow.

Odesa

Built in the late eighteenth century, Odesa served as an imperial fortress, a naval port, and a trading centre. By 1874 the city became Europe’s largest wheat exporter, most populous city in the Ukrainian provinces, and ethnically diverse. Although it became the fourth-largest city in the Russian Empire, its Ukrainian residents constituted a very small percentage of its population. During the Soviet period Odesa also became a major industrial city.

Tanya Richardson’s rich and highly nuanced ethnographic assessment of the post-Soviet Odesa shows how difficult it is for the independent Ukrainian state to create a common political community and historical memory for all of its citizens. Richardson not only attended eleventh-grade history classes at a mixed Russian-Ukrainian language of instruction school in the Soviet-built suburb of Tairova and at an elite gymnasium in the city centre during the 2001–2002 academic year; she also visited classes at six other schools, attended special ministry-sponsored events, such as the Little Academy of Sciences competition, and interviewed and spoke informally with teachers and students. By focusing on the twentieth century, especially on those events in which elderly generations had participated, she sought to trace the influence of different modes of transmitting the past and young people’s understanding of history and sense of nationhood (Richardson, 34).

Despite assertions by theorists of nationalism, schooling does not always generate a universal and coherent historical memory. Although schools (following Ukraine’s

Ministry of Education guidelines) may provide an overall framework of a common history, parents and grandparents also share their memories and impressions of the past with younger family members. According to Richardson, “students encounter not only elderly relatives’ recollections of particular events, but also their parents’ interpretation based on the Soviet-era history education and on Soviet and Ukrainian public representations of history, both of which are often colored by their responses to the collapse of socialism” (Richardson, 53). Of all of the twentieth century’s events, the Second World War still provokes the most conflicting interpretations. Sadly, except within Jewish families, the Holocaust “remained suspended” outside circulating historical narratives (Richardson, 66). Students learn firsthand that the past has not even passed.

In addition to the official school histories and their reception based on stories parents and grandparents told, Richardson also investigated Odesans’ sense of place in terms of three city walking tours sponsored by a local Jewish history group, a Ukrainian collector, and the My Odesa Club. Each of these tours present Odesa and its relationship to Ukraine differently. With the exception of the Ukrainian collector’s tour, they highlight Odesa as a “Russian, cosmopolitan, cultured [city], distinct from Ukraine, and more connected with Russia and the outside world” rather than to the steppe hinterland (Richardson, 139, 171). According to Richardson, “these walks can be read in part as a response to disenchantment with the present (the policies and ideologies of the Ukrainian state) and as a momentary escape to the times and places of a past idealized as more meaningful and authentic.” In short, these school truths, home truths, and walking tour truths produce contradictory understandings of Ukraine as nation and state (Richardson, 165, 77, 41).

Different pasts remain an integral part of the present. This complicates the formation of a common political community in Ukraine, but also “individuals’ sense of personal and collective continuity” (Richardson, 103). According to Richardson, the “straightforward, linear progression toward consolidating a commonsense understanding of Ukraine as a state” does not exist among young Odesans, who define themselves within the context of an overall Russian cultural geography, not a Ukrainian one (Richardson, 43, 184).

In her conclusion Richardson raises an important issue, which most historians would agree with but find it difficult to implement in their accounts of the past. History, she claims, should not just be considered in terms of narratives abstracted from texts and political platforms, but rather in relation to the social contexts in which history is narrated and the geographies it invokes (Richardson, 215). In other words, she advocates that any analysis of the past retain an awareness of the fog of history, its contingency, its hesitancy, its internal conflicts and contradictions. The past did not move in a unilinear fashion. Historical waves also possess their own countervailing undercurrents.

Conclusion

These three monographs analyze the post-war political and cultural landscapes in three cities and grapple with one of the most fundamental issues in modern Ukrainian history—the relationship between Ukraine’s cities and the Ukrainian state. Most residents of each city imagine themselves as a bastion of high culture and “civiliza-

tion” in contrast with the backward, peasant Ukrainian countryside. Although self-identified Ukrainians make up the majority of the residents of Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk (but not Sevastopol), they “are often perceived as being foreign to the city” (Richardson, 112, 198).

Each of these monographs discusses the interplay of Ukrainian state formation, the urban environment, and its memorial practices, Richardson’s and Qualls’s more so than Zhuk’s. Each shows how contingent and how fragile the Ukrainian identity remains in each city, and how urban residents find it difficult to identify with the post-1991 Ukrainian state. Long-term Russification and the attraction to or revulsion against the imaginary West constitute the primary reason for this uneasy accord.

Although none of the three authors defines Russification, the process of moving from the Ukrainian language and culture of one’s youth to Russian, it has evolved in various forms in different cities in Ukraine. Odesa’s Russian orientation provides it with a window to the West, and Dnipropetrovsk’s slightly less so. But Sevastopol’s does not. People’s political and cultural attitudes develop locally, as they seek to harmonize themselves with their friends, peers, and neighbours. Adjusting themselves to local identities inspired many to compare themselves with the global one. Zhuk and Richardson imaginatively reconstruct how Soviet youth in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa accessed non-Soviet and non-Russian role models of the West by means of the Russian language and culture. In doing so, young people draw closer to the West, or—more accurately—become absorbed by their perceptions of the West. In these two cities, Russification provided a limited opening to the West. In contrast, Sevastopol’s Russification, especially its memorialization of the Russian defenders of the city, represents, according to Qualls, a conscious effort to resist Western integration.

These popular positive and/or negative impressions of the West, including the concomitant ideas of economic prosperity, scientific progress, the market, and democracy, have helped to define the post-Soviet status quo in Sevastopol, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa. Filtered by each city’s political and cultural past, the perceptions of the West vary and are at best incomplete in Ukraine (as they are in most other post-Soviet states). Moreover, those urban residents who have embraced aspects of Western culture have not necessarily assimilated all of its values (such as democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of minority rights) institutionalized in the post-1945 period in North America, Australasia, and the European Union.


In light of the long-term urban allegiances to Moscow, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and Russian culture, different forms of Russification have evolved in Ukraine in different cities at different times. Russification has not been primarily an act of repression. The Russian language and culture has also attracted those who aspire to change their socio-economic and cultural status, those in search of the modern, and those who hope to fit in by “being cool.” This process has appealed to those who recognize the inferiority of their own social status and aspire to overcome it by proactively blending in.⁹

⁹ On the role of status inconsistency and *resentment* in national movements, see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and idem, *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).


In their search for dignity in a brutal and incomprehensible world, many urban residents have embraced the certainties of the past, the confusion of the near-undecipherable present, and the possibilities of the future. They have done so often at the same time. Many Western analysts, as Richardson points out, have assessed these divergent views and incompatible perspectives as the product of “ambivalence,” a key phrase in describing Ukraine. This vacillation, according to her, implies indecisiveness, confusion, and being “in between,” the result of some sort of long-term psychological and political damage, a consequence perhaps of living in a post-genocidal society.¹⁰ But the citizens of Ukraine, as Richards asserts, are not necessarily disoriented straddlers. They have acquired the ability to interpret their environment through different perspectives, oftentimes simultaneously. They “acknowledge and live with conflicting, contradictory, and incommensurable histories” (Richardson, 218–19), as these three sobering monographs vividly demonstrate. Most importantly, they can only make choices from a limited menu of options that the past and the present have provided them.

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¹⁰ See Catherine Merridale, *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth-Century Russia* (New York: Viking, 2000). James E. Mace coined the term, “post-genocidal society.” See Andrea Graziosi, “James Mace’s Concept of a Post-Genocidal Society Set the Agenda for the Future,” *The Day Weekly Digest in English* (Kyiv), 2005, no. 35.



Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Publications



Poltava 1709: The Battle and the Myth

Edited by Serhii Plokhy


ISBN-13: 978-1932650-09-9 \$29.95 US

In 2009, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute gathered scholars from around the globe and from many fields of study—history, military affairs, philology, linguistics, literature, art history, music—to mark the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava. This book is a collection of their papers on such topics as the international, Russian, and Ukrainian contexts of the battle; Mazepa in European culture; the language and literature of the period; art and architecture; history and memory; and fact, fiction, and the literary imagination. Mazepa himself is the focus of many of the articles—a hero to Ukrainians, but a treacherous figure to Russians. This book provides a fresh look at this watershed event and casts new light on the legacies of the battle and its major players.

Harvard Ukrainian Studies Volume 29, no. 1–4 *Ukrainian Philology and Linguistics in the*

Twenty-First Century
Edited by Michael S. Flier

This volume draws connections between language and other humanistic and social scientific disciplines, including sacred philology, history, government, literature, religion, art history, communications, and sociolinguistics. Studies span the period from the eleventh century to the present day, and examine both Ukrainian and Belarusian topics.



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Book Reviews

Orest Subtelny. *Ukraine: A History*. Fourth edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009. xviii, 784 pp. \$59.95 paper, \$125 cloth.

Paul Robert Magocsi. *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*. Second, revised edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010. xxvii, 894 pp. \$54.95 paper, \$120 cloth.

Both of these histories of Ukraine have been the standard works on the subject since they were first published, in 1988 (Subtelny) and 1996 (Magocsi) respectively. In his account Subtelny takes a national approach to Ukrainian history. He stresses the role of the Ukrainian ethnic element throughout the history of this land and the modern Ukrainian national movement and its aspirations to statehood. By contrast, Magocsi treats Ukrainian history territorially and tries to deal with all the various peoples and states that have inhabited and ruled this land throughout the centuries. The two books are complementary, and reading them side by side is of great benefit.

Both books treat politics, social and economic developments, and cultural affairs. Subtelny's emphasis is on politics, whereas Magocsi is more even in his treatment of these subjects. Both books are very easy to read, but Subtelny's approach makes for a more unified story and therefore a livelier narrative. By contrast, Magocsi's approach tends to be more encyclopedic and therefore much drier. However, he is also much more inclusive, and his book thus is of special interest in a very different way from Subtelny's.

The illustrations and maps are also worthy of comment. Both books contain several interesting maps, but the maps in Magocsi's history are much more numerous and more detailed than those in Subtelny's. Magocsi's maps are one of the strongest features of his book. It contains no illustrations, however, whereas Subtelny's book does, and some of these are very good at giving the reader a feel for the various eras of Ukrainian history.

In these editions, the authors have added some new materials, but Magocsi's book is by far the more thoroughly revised. He has added several new chapters, revised and expanded the text, added new sidebars, and inserted new maps while revising and adding new details to some of his older ones. By contrast, Subtelny has only added a few new pages to the end of his book to bring the reader up to date on recent developments in Ukrainian politics and life. He has not revised or updated his original bibliography; and certain titles that were listed as "forthcoming" in 1988 have still not received full bibliographic treatment, even though they were printed some twenty years ago.

Magocsi's volume is conceptually the more innovative of the two. In this new edition he introduces a new concept—the "Polish-Lithuanian-Crimean" period of Ukrainian history. In his first edition, he had followed the traditional designation of a "Polish-Lithuanian" period (first formulated by the great Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky at the beginning of the twentieth century and accepted without question by most Ukrainian historians, including Subtelny, since that time). Magocsi's introduction of the "Crimean" element follows the logic of his thinking quite well, for the Crimean Khanate occupied about one third of what is today Ukraine for about three hundred years. Moreover, the introduction of this new conceptualiz-

ation allows him to place more attention upon Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar relations and the great Black Sea slave trade that carried off many of thousands of Ukrainian men, women, and children into Turkish captivity. This is a major fact of Ukrainian history, which earlier Ukrainian historians like Hrushevsky and Doroshenko largely ignored in their history textbooks.

The treatment of recent developments and what has happened in Ukraine since 1991 and the declaration of independence also differs considerably in the two books. Subtelny's account is definitely the more detailed of the two, and he devotes a great deal of attention to recent Ukrainian politics. By contrast, Magocsi contents himself with giving a more general outline of this period and certain basic statistics. However, his presentation is the more readable of the two, for Subtelny's description of Ukrainian politics prior to the 2004 Orange Revolution is mired down in minor details and already seems dated.

In general, both books are a welcome addition to the growing literature in English on Ukrainian history. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses, but each is attractive in its own way. One might add that the cover designs of both books are also quite attractive. As with the first editions of these books, Subtelny's cover design is the more "artsy" of the two, but Magocsi's design is more iconic. I am happy to have copies of both of these beautiful books in my home library.

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Mykhailo Hrushevsky. *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Volume Nine, Book Two, Part One. *The Cossack Age, 1654–1657*. Translated by Marta Daria Olynyk. Edited by Serhii Plokhly and Frank E. Sysyn with the assistance of Myroslav Yurkevich. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2008. lxvi, 566 pp. \$119.95 cloth.

One of the greatest achievements of Ukrainian historiography—indeed, of modern Ukrainian culture—was Mykhailo Hrushevsky's magisterial ten-volume history of Ukraine from the tenth century down to Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky's Hadiach Treaty (1658). These volumes were published in Ukrainian between 1898 and 1936 (the last appearing two years after the author's death in Caucasian exile). An eleventh volume taking the narrative to 1665 was rumoured to have been prepared but has not been found.

In terms of sweep, detail, and use of primary sources the four last volumes of Hrushevsky's *History*—the volumes dealing with sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Cossack Ukraine and the Hetmanate—remain the capital work on this period of Ukrainian history. Hrushevsky was very much a Rankean dedicated to thorough quarrying of the archives and close critical interrogation of the sources, which he often excerpted at length or reproduced in full. These included Polish as well as Ukrainian and Russian sources. Hrushevsky was therefore able to reconstruct high politics, warfare, and diplomacy in great detail. His attention to the unfolding of diplomatic missions and diplomatic correspondence allowed him to show how factional rivalries and sudden new exigencies pressed the great powers to alter their terms and even revise their strategic interests. The reader also learns much about the conduct of war because Hrushevsky quotes at length from commanders' reports, military memoirs, and prisoners' interrogations. And because hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky pursued such an imaginative and wide-ranging grand strategy, Hrushevsky's sources provide rich information

about Ukrainian relations not only with Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also with most of the other powers of eastern Europe (Transylvania and the Danubian hospodarates, the Crimean Khanate, the Porte, Sweden). Those of us specializing in Muscovite or Ottoman history but not adept at reading Ukrainian have long been frustrated that Hrushevsky's *History* was of such obviously enormous value but remained largely inaccessible to us.

It is now becoming accessible. Since 1997 the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies has been publishing Hrushevsky's *History* in excellent English translation, with very useful introductory essays by Frank Sysyn and Serhii Plokhyy, and good maps, and complete scholarly apparatus. So far have appeared volume One, dealing with the prehistory and early history of Kyivan Rus'; volume seven, examining the development of Ukrainian Cossackdom in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; volume eight, on the Cossack Revolution and the formation of the Hetmanate; and the first two of the three parts of volume nine. The first part of volume nine, book one, covered the years 1650–53: the 1651 war with the Commonwealth; the battle of Berestechko and the Bila Tserkva Treaty; Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Moldavian project; and the death of Tymish Khmelnytsky.

Volume nine, book two, part one, covers the period from the autumn of 1653 to the summer of 1655. This is one of the most important junctures in Ukrainian history, marked by the negotiation of the Pereiaslav Agreement placing the Hetmanate under the tsar's protection, the collapse of the Hetmanate's military alliance with the Crimean Khanate, and the Hetmanate's involvement in Muscovy's new war with Poland-Lithuania.

In 1653 the collapse of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's project to install his son Tymish as *hospodar* of Moldavia undermined his alliance with Sultan Mehmet IV and Khan Ismail III Girei. The Crimean Tatars shifted their slave-raiding operations to the territory of the Hetmanate. King Jan Kazimierz refused to renegotiate peace with Khmelnytsky on the terms of the Zboriv Treaty, citing these Tatar attacks on Ukrainian villages and towns as proof that Khmelnytsky's alliance with the Tatars had been the act of a perjurer and renegade who had betrayed his own Christian faith (pp. 34–35). Although the king's army was not yet ready to attack Halych during its campaign against the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky could no longer count on the Crimean Tatars as allies against the Poles, for the Tatars now placed greater value on raiding opportunities in Ukraine than booty opportunities in Moldavia or against the Polish army (p. 59). At Zhvanets in December 1653, the khan's grand vizier, Sefer Ghazi Aga, negotiated an armistice with King Jan Kazimierz. The terms of armistice called upon the king to restore to the Zaporozhian Host the rights guaranteed it in the Zboriv Treaty, to resume tribute to the khan, and to permit the Tatars to take captives in Ukraine. It left unclear whether the khan would actively ally with the Poles against Khmelnytsky. But it made obvious that the Hetmanate's military alliance with the Crimean Tatars was over.

Khmelnytsky was therefore forced to step up his diplomacy with Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and negotiate some kind of Muscovite protectorate over the Zaporozhian Host. For Khmelnytsky such an agreement of protectorate would compensate for the loss of his alliance with the khan; for the tsar it offered the prospect of military alliance with the Hetmanate to counter a Polish-Tatar alliance against Muscovy (p. 117). The trick for Khmelnytsky was how to negotiate a Muscovite protectorate without completely breaking off with the khan. Hrushevsky sees Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky clinging to the hope that "the khan should not enter into an alliance with the Polish king so as not to incur the tsar's wrath. In the event that the tsar ordered the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host to proceed against the Polish king, the

khan should proceed through the steppes against the Polish king, without touching the Cossack towns.... The alliance (friendship) of the khan and the hetman would thus remain strong” (p. 119). For the time being the negotiations with the Muscovites at Pereiaslav should be kept secret from the khan, as his *chambuly* were still roaming Ukraine.

Hrushevsky's discussion of the Pereiaslav negotiations occupies 139 pages. It is closely detailed, citing not only the surviving protocols (the “articles” redacted at Moscow) but also Khmelnytsky's and Vyhovsky's letters, the petitions of municipal delegations and monasteries, and even the alarmed reports of Polish and pro-Polish officials learning of the Pereiaslav Agreement. Hrushevsky examines in detail the terms of the protectorate agreement that would soon become problematic (the issue of Muscovite *voevody* and garrisons in the towns of the Hetmanate, which authority had the right to collect taxes, the hetman's rights to conduct his own diplomacy, etc.) and shows how understandings of these terms could be subject to change under later circumstances.

Hrushevsky emphasizes strategic concerns rather than any religious-ideological program of “reunification” as the main motive for the Pereiaslav negotiations: Khmelnytsky and Tsar Aleksei were both in immediate need of each other as military allies against the Commonwealth. He observes that Vyhovsky in particular encouraged the tsar to proceed with his war against the Commonwealth by suggesting that Lithuanian control over western Rus' was weakening and Muscovite recovery of Smolensk and Seversk was a quick and easy task, particularly with Khmelnytsky's Cossacks providing military assistance. Although Hrushevsky does not state it explicitly, the material he presents suggests the possibility that Aleksei was less interested in early 1654 in turning Ukraine into a Muscovite province than in recovering Smolensk and annexing Lithuanian-ruled Rus' with Khmelnytsky's support. The Muscovite invasion of Lithuania launched in May 1654 comprised three army groups totaling 71,000 troops and 4,000 guns, as well as 20,000 Ukrainian Cossacks under Colonel Ivan Zolotarenko. By contrast, just 4,000 Muscovite troops were sent into Ukraine to supplement the two thousand already garrisoned at Kyiv. The tsar's military commitment to the defense of the Hetmanate would of course subsequently expand after the Crimean Tatars entered hostilities in alliance with the Poles (see my book *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe* [London and New York: Routledge, 2007], 115, 117–119).

Hrushevsky believes that Khmelnytsky sought Muscovite military alliance and protection of the Orthodox faith in Ukraine but did not envision “protectorate” as limiting his sovereignty as hetman or circumscribing the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host. The words of Vasili Buturlin, the Muscovite envoy at Pereiaslav, showed that the tsar accepted this image of protectorate but reserved for himself “a free hand in the further ordering of Ukrainian affairs” (p. 154). Hence Buturlin refused to give the tsar's self-binding oath but probably did give Khmelnytsky “a very decisive assurance of the tsar's word” (p. 161). Hrushevsky does consider Khmelnytsky guilty of “carelessness in his conversations with Buturlin and his associates in Pereiaslav concerning further relations ... thereby giving the Muscovite government advantages in those relations that he could easily have avoided if he had reckoned more with the use that Muscovy could make of them” (p. 162).

Khmelnytsky's carelessness was in regard to two crucial matters. The first of these was military: he (and the Muscovites as well) had not given sufficient thought to how Moscow's role in protecting Ukraine might change in the event the Crimean Khanate allied with the Poles against them and the tsar got bogged down in his campaigns in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. (The expansion of the war on Ukrainian territory would inevitably give Moscow more reason to enlarge and multiply its garrisons and intervene more directly in the collection

of taxes). The second matter initially had to do with political ritual, and its significance would become apparent only over time: Khmelnytsky had not foreseen that the tsar's envoys would fan out across Ukraine collecting oaths of allegiance to the tsar and receiving petitions of submission from various towns (e.g., Pereiaslav, Kyiv, Nizhen, Chernihiv), and there was nothing he could do about it. Hrushevsky explains: "Everything in Ukraine had been conquered by the Cossack sword. And when the time was at hand, Muscovy accepted Cossack Ukraine, which the Cossack Host was submitting to it, without asking anyone else. Even when they arrived in Ukraine to establish new relations, the Muscovite envoys did not think it necessary, even for the sake of appearances, to convene any assembly of representatives of the Ukrainian estates.... The hetman and the Cossack officers had sworn an oath, which meant that everyone else had to swear; otherwise it would be a revolt against Cossack authority and Cossack law. But the Cossack leaders, not having taken care to develop a theoretical system of Cossack law, also neglected to bind that system to another political principle that they themselves had advanced and championed from time to time with the Polish government: the principle of the inviolability of the rights of the Rus' nation and all its estates and institutions, both clerical and secular.... At the midnight hour of this critical era, during the Pereiaslav negotiations, the Cossack elite took no care whatever to establish in law its Cossack hegemony—the patronage and authority of the Cossack Host over the other strata of Ukraine and their institutions!" (p. 241)

The rest of this volume describes how news of the Pereiaslav Agreement pushed the Polish king and the new Crimean khan, Mehmet IV Girei, to form a new military alliance for war against both Muscovy and the Hetmanate. The Ottoman sultan was not prepared to restrain the khan from this, as he feared Don Cossack and Zaporozhian Cossack naval raids on his coastal towns at this critical juncture in his war with Venice. There were even reports from Moldavia that crossing points on the Danube were being established for the Ottoman army. Much of the Cossack army was off in Seversk with Zolotarenko, and there were already sharp disagreements between Zolotarenko and the Muscovite commanders as to where the Cossacks were to campaign and whether they would be permitted to take the surrender of towns in the Lithuanian duchy. The final chapter makes a digression to summarize the state of economic and cultural life in Ukraine as described by Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo, who accompanied his father, Patriarch Makarios III of Antioch, in a journey across Ukraine in 1654. It then shifts to the enormous destruction in the spring of 1655 wrought by the Polish invasion of Ukraine, led by Stefan Czarniecki, Stanisław Potocki, and Stanisław Lanckoroński, and describes Khmelnytsky's pleas for reinforcement with Muscovite troops under V. B. Sheremetev.

Given the continuing controversy over the meaning of the Pereiaslav Agreement, this is one of the most important volumes in Hrushevsky's magnum opus. This English-language edition includes a very useful introductory essay by Serhii Plokyh describing the development of Hrushevsky's political and historical views and assessing the place of his work in Ukrainian and Russian historiography.

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Mykhailo Hrushevsky. *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Volume 9, Book 2, Part 2. *The Cossack Age, 1654–1657*. Translated by Marta Daria Olynyk. Edited by Yaroslav Fedoruk and Frank E. Sysyn with the assistance of Myroslav Yurkevich. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2010. lxxxvii, 480 pp. \$119.95 cloth.

Another volume of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's magisterial *History of Ukraine-Rus'* has become available thanks to the continuing efforts of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. The previous installment in the series, volume nine, book 2, part 1 (2008) dealt with the crucial period 1654–55, when the collapse of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's project to install his son Tymish as hospodar of Moldavia, the breakdown of his military alliance with the Crimean Tatars, and the new Tatar alliance with King Jan Kazimierz forced Khmelnytsky to negotiate with Moscow to place Ukraine under Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich's protection. The resulting Pereiaslav Agreement was of enormous consequence for the future of Ukraine because its terms and intent were left partly undefined and therefore subject to subsequent reinterpretation by both the hetman's ruling circle and the tsar's government. Hrushevsky thought that Aleksei was initially less interested in using the agreement to turn Ukraine into a Muscovite province than in using it to secure the Ukrainian Cossack army as allies in the war to recover Smolensk and annex Lithuanian Rus'. For his part Khmelnytsky initially believed that the agreement would compensate for his abandonment by the Crimean Tatars by establishing alliance with Muscovy, which he expected would help to secure the Orthodox faith in Ukraine without Ukraine's new "protectorate" status limiting his sovereignty or endangering the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host.

Volume nine, book 2, part 2 begins in June 1655 with the Swedish invasion of the Commonwealth and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's negotiation of a tentative alliance with Sweden at Kamianets. It concludes with his death in July 1657 and the political divisions within the Hetmanate that would soon elevate Ivan Vyhovsky. The focus throughout this volume is on the reasons for the growing estrangement of Ukraine from Muscovy and the preconditions for Hetman Vyhovsky's eventual repudiation of Muscovite protectorate and the Ukrainian Cossacks' re-alliance with Poland (the 1658 Treaty of Hadiach).

Although Moscow was intent on limiting his authority to conduct an independent foreign policy, Khmelnytsky initially believed his rapprochement with Karl X Gustav could provide a further guarantee to the Hetmanate's sovereignty without provoking a complete break with the tsar. Now that Jan Kazimierz had been driven from Warsaw and the Radziwiłłs had placed Lithuania under Swedish protection, Khmelnytsky thought that the Hetmanate could not only secure its independence from the Commonwealth once and for all, but also extend its territory to the north and west. Hence some Ukrainian Cossack forces in the west joined the Swedes and another new ally, the Transylvanian prince György II Rákóczi, for a final victory against the Polish king, while other Ukrainian forces joined the Muscovites in a drive upon Lviv.

Unfortunately for Khmelnytsky, Karl X and Rákóczi were never able to offer him guarantees on the Hetmanate's sovereignty and frontiers that was clear and firm enough to serve as a counterweight to the relationship the tsar expected from the Pereiaslav Agreement (p. 80). Meanwhile the conduct of the tsar's campaigns in Belarus' had taken a new turn: Moscow now gave greater urgency to asserting the tsar's sovereignty over the captured towns of Lithuania, including those taken by Ukrainian Cossack forces, lest these towns come under the formal sovereignty of the hetman. The Swedish king having now "revealed his intention of

taking power in Poland and Lithuania, the Muscovite government countered with its own claims to Lithuania, Belarus' and western Ukraine ... a manifestation of Muscovite plans to turn them into Muscovite provinces" (pp. 25–26). It was also clear that Moscow's preoccupation with territorial expansion in Belarus' left it unready to provide Ukraine with much military deterrent against the Crimean Tatars.

By October 1655 Khmelnytsky was forced to withdraw many of his troops from joint operations with the Muscovites and the Swedes and Hungarians in order to protect Ukraine from attack by the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean khan in turn used threats of Tatar invasion to try to turn Khmelnytsky back towards peace with Jan Kazimierz. Khmelnytsky was able to obtain a truce with the Tatars without having to make peace with the king or break with the tsar, but the disgrace and suicide of Vasili Buturlin at year's end, for offenses that seemed "to amount to nothing terrible or substantial," made Ukrainian ruling circles more nervous about the political costs of the tsar's "protection": there was dismay that "such a great man, so recently lauded by the tsar himself for his merits in bringing Ukraine under Muscovite rule ... lost everything so easily and ended his life in vain as a suicide, without earning even a kind word from the tsar.... If such an end could befall one's own in that Muscovy, what could its newly arrived wards expect?" (p. 76).

Hrushevsky thinks pressure from the Crimean Tatars did play a role in convincing Polish and Lithuanian magnates and army hetmans to abandon the Swedes and assist Jan Kazimierz in recovering the throne. Karl X expected the Ukrainian Cossacks to continue in joint operations against the Poles, but it was more important to him at this time to tighten his alliance with Rákóczi. To this end he promised Lviv, Galicia, Pokuttia, and Podillia would be stripped from the defeated Commonwealth and awarded to Rákóczi rather than to the Hetmanate. These developments provided Jan Kazimierz the opening to send Jan Szumowski to the Crimean khan to urge a Tatar-Ukrainian rapprochement and bring Khmelnytsky to make peace with the king. Although Khmelnytsky was not yet prepared to accept, there was a party of Cossack colonels ready to throw off the tsar's "protection" and determine Ukraine's fate in league with Poland; but it was unable to prevail at the Rosava Council in May 1656 (136–37). For the time being Khmelnytsky's policy remained one of walking the tightrope, maintaining alliance with Muscovy while simultaneously maintaining "friendly expectation" towards Sweden and Rákóczi.

An important stage in the worsening of the Hetmanate's relations with Muscovy came in the summer of 1656. Although the Hetmanate had rejected at the Rosava Council negotiating peace with Jan Kazimierz, the Muscovites broke off relations with Sweden (May 1656), redeployed their armies to Livonia, and began peace talks with the Polish king (1 August 1656). This *volte-face* was encouraged by the Habsburg emperor and motivated partly by Tsar Aleksei's anxiety about Swedish encroachment on his conquests in Lithuania and by his belief the Poles would be willing to purchase peace at the price of agreeing to designate him heir to the Polish throne. Cossack representatives of the Hetmanate were not allowed to participate in the talks at Vilnius that produced an armistice settlement with the Commonwealth and initiated the tsar's war against Sweden. Khmelnytsky protested that past events—especially Polish persecution of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine—made it impossible for him to make peace with the Poles. It was also a shock that the terms Aleksei had set for peace with the Commonwealth reportedly included the cession to Muscovy of "White Rus', Volhynia, and Podillia ... as far as the Buh River, for all time," (p. 163) and required the Zaporozhian Cossacks "to unite into one state with the Commonwealth and ... forever belong to the Commonwealth" once the tsar was elected king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania (p. 164).

The Muscovites were ultimately unable to obtain all these terms—the Poles were willing to agree only to an armistice and to the election of the tsar upon the death of Jan Kazimierz, and they still demanded the eventual return to the Commonwealth of Ukraine and Belarus'. Both sides accepted this compromise in order to concentrate their energies on the struggle against Sweden. But much of the Cossack *starshyna* was nonetheless outraged by the Vilnius talks: "Not only did the tsar's envoys not consult with us about anything or admit us to the Polish tent, but they did not even allow us near the tent—just like dogs at God's church. But the Liakhs, probably out of a guilty conscience, said that the tsar's envoys concluded a settlement with the Liakh commissioners ... according to the Treaty of Polianovka, and we, the Zaporozhian Host with all of Little Rus', are again to be on the king's side, with the Liakhs, the enemies of the Holy Cross" (p. 170).

The conviction that the tsar had betrayed Ukraine at Vilnius spread among the *starshyna*, marginalizing the pro-Muscovite faction. It complicated Ukrainian-Muscovite joint operations to partition Poland, and it led Khmelnytsky to seek a closer if still informal military alliance with Rákóczi and Karl X. For the time being the Swedish king was content to ask Khmelnytsky to send letters of admonishment to the tsar while dispatching 20,000 Cossacks to assist the Swedish army; he had not yet addressed the issues of the ultimate disposition of the Polish domains and the status of Ukraine. Khmelnytsky, for his part, wanted to avoid a complete break with Muscovy until the time the tsar tried to hand Ukraine over to the Commonwealth; he tried to convince Moscow his joint operations with Rákóczi were not in support of the prince's ambitions but merely necessary retaliation for Polish attacks on Ukraine. In response to the Ukrainian-Swedish rapprochement, Polish diplomats stepped up their own efforts to negotiate a truce and restore Ukraine to the Commonwealth as an independent principality comprising the former palatinates of Kyiv and Chernihiv.

By 1657 Bohdan Khmelnytsky was deathly ill and preoccupied with getting his son Yurii recognized as his successor. Hrushevsky sees the Host as formally agreeing to this, proclaiming Yurii as hetman, and Bohdan as beginning to transfer powers to him: it was only after Bohdan's death that Vyhovsky cast doubt on Yurii's election and moved to get himself elected. In the late spring Ukrainian operations in support of Rákóczi at Sambir began falling apart, pushing Karl X to demand Khmelnytsky make a total break with Muscovy and join the Crimean Tatars against the Muscovites. But by July Karl X was forced to withdraw most of his own troops from Poland to respond to Denmark's entry into the war; the disintegration of Rákóczi's army in Poland had encouraged the Crimean Tatars to mass for attacks on Transylvania, the hospodarates, and Ukraine; and soon after this Karl X's ally, the Prussian elector Friedrich Wilhelm, abandoned him and signed an alliance with Poland. This left Rákóczi isolated at Brest and the Ukrainian Cossacks now in open revolt against him.

In the summer the Muscovite envoy Fedor Buturlin arrived at Chyhyryn and sharply rebuked Bohdan Khmelnytsky for having broken his oath of "full obedience to His Tsarist Majesty" by rendering aid to his enemies, the king of Sweden and the prince of Transylvania (p. 343). Khmelnytsky responded that he done so "out of fear—because the Liakhs, offering great fantasies, actually told us under oath that His Tsarist Majesty had returned us to the Liakhs.... But we never wished and do not wish that they [Karl X and Rákóczi] take over the Kingdom of Poland—only that his Tsarist Majesty establish peace and concord with the Swede" (p. 347). Buturlin then demanded that Yurii Khmelnytsky affirm a new oath of loyalty to the tsar.

At this point Stanisław Bieniewski brought Bohdan Khmelnytsky a proposal for reconciliation with the Commonwealth, pointing out that this would be of great advantage to him

now that he faced renewed war with the Crimean Tatars and “no longer enjoys any trust with Muscovy” (371). This offer would serve as the foundation for Hetman Vyhovsky’s agreement to the Hadiach Treaty the following year. For the time being Bieniewski expected “the greatest care that Muscovy not be informed until all that has been concluded” (p. 371). Khmelnytsky did not commit to this, but his choices were narrowing. Rákóczi surrendered to the Poles in July, and the Cossack mutiny that had begun in Rákóczi’s army now spread to Yurii Khmelnytsky’s army, stationed at Korsun to defend against the Tatars. Bohdan Khmelnytsky died on 27 July 1657.

In his final chapter Hrushevsky offers an appraisal of Khmelnytsky’s character and political career and his significance for Ukraine’s history. He recognizes Khmelnytsky’s achievement as founder of the Hetmanate but does not view him as the ideal embodiment of Cossackdom or the Ukrainian national idea. He thinks that Khmelnytsky did not follow a logically unfolding general plan to build an independent Ukrainian nation, but remained committed to the idea of Cossack autonomy within the Commonwealth at least until 1649; that he did not anticipate the ultimate consequences of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654; that his *de facto* alliance with Sweden in 1655 represented yet another great shift in objectives and strategy; and that it was likely Vyhovsky, not Khmelnytsky, who planned and directed diplomacy from 1651 on, scrambling in 1657–58 to find a new strategy to replace the one that had collapsed.

This volume includes two very useful essays by Yaroslav Fedoruk and Frank Sysyn placing Hrushevsky’s concluding assessment in updated historiographic context. They and the volume’s high-quality maps, glossary, and notes further enhance the value of Hrushevsky’s richly detailed account. Like the previous volumes in the series, this one is also an essential acquisition for every university library and every reader interested in early modern Ukrainian and Eastern European history.

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Paul Kubicek. *The History of Ukraine*. Westport, CT, and London: Greenwood Press, 2009. ix, 199 pp. U.S.\$45 cloth.

This short history by Paul Kubicek was written for the Greenwood Histories of Modern Nations series. As stated in the foreword, the series “is intended to provide students and interested laypeople with up-to-date, concise, and analytical histories of many of the nations of the contemporary world.” Each volume in the series also contains an introductory chapter that is meant to provide “an overview of the country’s geography, political institutions, economic structure, and cultural attributes” (p. vii). Series editors also write that “a significant portion” of each history is devoted to events of the last forty years (p. vii). In his preface Kubicek notes that the book’s focus is on the Soviet and post-Soviet periods (p. xii). Roughly two thirds of his narrative covers events of the twentieth century and the first seven years of this century. Kubicek’s treatment of earlier periods of Ukraine’s history, from the foundation of the Kyivan Rus’ state to central and eastern Ukraine’s subjugation and incorporation into the Soviet Union is for the most part quite brief.

Paul Kubicek is a political scientist from Oakland University who has written on post-Soviet politics and society, including in Ukraine, where he spent one year conducting research soon after it became an independent country. The author’s strengths are rooted in his study of the pre-independence and post-independence periods of Ukraine’s history. Yet, a requirement

of the series is that authors also provide a historical narrative that could reach back to ancient times, as well as additional information, such as on a country's culture. It is in these areas that the author sometimes makes mistakes and faulty generalizations.

For example, writing on language, Kubicek asserts that the main distinctions between Ukraine's regional dialects are between Left- and Right-Bank Ukrainian and the Ukrainian spoken by diaspora Ukrainians who emigrated to the United States, Canada, and Australia in the early decades of the last century (pp. 4–5). Right- and Left bank Ukrainian dialects do not exist, while the reference to the Ukrainian spoken by the diaspora is really superfluous to an understanding of dialects in Ukraine. Although it may seem old-fashioned, it would have been more useful for readers to have learned about the development of the Ukrainian literary language during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the language was more or less standardized. On another page Kubicek writes that services in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) are conducted in Russian. They are, in fact, conducted in Old Church Slavonic.

Any author of a short history faces the difficult task of selecting what should be examined, at least briefly, and what could be ignored or merely mentioned. For the intelligent reader and particularly for university students, it would be useful to learn something about pivotal periods in a country's history and events that have caused controversies among historians.

Kubicek devotes several paragraphs to discussing the claims of Ukrainian and Russian historians to the heritage of the Kyivan Rus' state. In discussing the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky's arguments, he emphasizes Hrushevsky's focus on ethnic continuity as a basis for Ukrainian claims to the heritage of Kyivan Rus' (p. 28). While in his seminal essay "The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the History of the East Slavs" Hrushevsky did stress ethnic continuity, he also presented an outline of stages in Ukraine's early history—from Kyivan Rus' to the Galician-Volhynian state and the establishment of Lithuanian rule. Hrushevsky's ideas, the evolution of his views, and his contributions to the construction of a national historiography are discussed at length in Serhii Plokhyy's *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (2005). Kubicek does note that some Ukrainian historians see the period of Lithuanian rule as a reconstituted Rus' state, but this comes in the chapter following his discussion of the heritage of Kyivan Rus' (p. 32).

A pivotal point in Ukraine during the early modern period is the Khmelnytsky Uprising and its legacy. Kubicek devotes several pages (3943) to the revolt and its legacy. He concludes that the uprising failed in the end and that it is unclear what Khmelnytsky was ultimately fighting for. Kubicek notes that the 1654 Pereiaslav Agreement led to "a new, mostly repressive period in Ukrainian history." While this is a generally accepted view, these negative consequences should have been tempered by pointing out that the Khmelnytsky revolt also led to the establishment of a Cossack state, which maintained a quasi-autonomous status in the Russian Empire into the late eighteenth century. It thus was a contribution in the legacy of state building in Ukraine. Worth mentioning but missing in Kubicek's account are the long-term consequences of the Khmelnytsky period for Poland and on the balance of power in eastern Europe.

Kubicek treats the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20 and the establishment of Soviet rule in some detail and reasonably well, considering the confusing number of regime changes, wars, invasions, and much chaos amid the breakdown of authority in this short period. In the end, the Ukrainians failed to establish an independent state at the time. Kubicek points to some of the shortcomings of the Ukrainian Central Rada, such as its failure to create a

functional army or bureaucracy, two critical attributes of statehood. He also addresses the important issue of the anti-Jewish pogroms, a large number of which were committed by forces of the Directory of the UNR, the Ukrainian government headed by Symon Petliura. Petliura does deserve blame for not taking resolute measures to stop the pogroms earlier. However, his leadership, as well as of the Central Rada's attempts to satisfy the national and cultural aspirations of Jews and other minorities in Ukraine, deserve more attention. In his book's bibliographic essay, Kubicek does not mention Henry Abramson's solid study of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during this brief period, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (1999). Kubicek devotes five pages (101–105) to the Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932–33 in Soviet Ukraine. His narrative largely follows Robert Conquest's major study about that famine, and he concurs with Conquest's and James Mace's arguments that the death by starvation of several million Ukrainians during the Holodomor constitutes genocide. However, because there is much literature in English on the famine, including debates—some of a highly political nature—about its character, it would have been useful if Kubicek had provided his student readers with more information about this literature and the debates.

In his account of Ukraine during the Second World War, Kubicek treats this complicated history fairly well. However, some important episodes are missing from his narrative, including the Polish-Ukrainian guerrilla war that resulted in the mass slaughter of civilians on both sides. Kubicek does not cite or mention in the bibliographic essay Karel Berkhoff's *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (2004). Also missing in his account is mention of the Waffen-SS Division Galizien and a discussion of the virtual collapse of Soviet forces at the beginning of the German-Soviet War.

Paul Kubicek has written a history of Ukraine that is readable, organized well, and fairly balanced. Unfortunately, he did not integrate into his narrative some important recent studies, some of which are mentioned above. Judging from the notes in the book, it appears, to this reviewer at least, that in writing his book he relied very heavily on the already published general histories of Ukraine by Orest Subtelny, Serhiy Yekelchuk, and Andrew Wilson.

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Yaroslav Fedoruk. *Vilenskyi dohovir 1656 roku: Skhidnoievropeiska kryza i Ukraina u seredyni XVII stolittia*. Kyiv: Vydavnychy dim “Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia,” 2011. 622 pp. UAH80 cloth.

Vilenskyi dohovir is the latest and, arguably, the most important work written thus far by Yaroslav Fedoruk, a leading Ukrainian authority on early modern European diplomatic history. His new monograph represents a detailed and thorough reconstruction of European foreign politics in the 1650s leading to the Treaty of Vilnius. It far surpasses anything ever written before on the subject by a Ukrainian scholar. What is more, this work identifies the place of the Cossack Hetmanate on the contemporaneous political map of Europe and places the foreign policy of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's state within the broader context of “big European powers.”

Fedoruk describes the purpose of this study as continuing the search for primary sources and further developing the Treaty of Vilnius topic. His book begins with an historiographic survey, in which Fedoruk first reviews Ukrainian writings and points to a lack of significant

specialized studies on the topic in Ukrainian scholarship. He draws attention to the tendency by scholars to mention the treaty primarily within the context of Hetman Khmelnytsky's foreign policy rather than making it a subject of research in its own right (p. 23). Fedoruk then provides an extensive overview of Russian, Polish, west European, and North American historiography on the treaty, followed by a thorough analysis of the primary sources. He ends his introduction ends by pointing out the considerable interest in this subject in European historiography throughout the past two hundred years. Indeed, the earlier contributions of various historical schools and individual scholars have been invaluable sources for Fedoruk and will remain so for future scholars.

Fedoruk's work has three major components, which he associates with a "three-level pyramid." Chapters 1–3 discuss the politics in east central Europe from late 1654 to mid-1656, when, according to Fedoruk, the tendency toward rapprochement between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy became evident. Chapter 4 focuses upon their negotiations before and up to the signing of the Treaty of Vilnius. The "Ukrainian question," which constituted one of the most important (and stickiest) issues, and the Cossack administration's attitude to it are reviewed in Chapter 5. The narrative is enhanced by over sixty rare portraits of the main historical figures of that time and other reproductions of important documents and old maps.

In the first three chapters no stone has been left unturned. There Fedoruk investigates the political architecture of contemporaneous Europe and its dynamics—numerous diplomatic missions, alliances, counter-alliances, and military campaigns. He analyzes them within the wider context of the European political crisis of the mid-seventeenth century and takes a warranted much broader look at all the major political players involved and their agendas. The players included Sweden, the Holy Roman Empire, France, the United Provinces, Denmark, England, and other powers. Fedoruk persuasively answers the hypothetical objection to devoting more than a half of his book to a detailed reconstruction of diplomatic manoeuvring leading to the Treaty of Vilnius by showing that the rapprochement between Warsaw and Moscow represented just one of the likely political configurations at that time and that it had both powerful allies and powerful opponents in various European capitals. Hetman Khmelnytsky was one of the treaty's staunchest opponents.

The treaty was signed in November 1656, but the road to it proved difficult, and most of the acute problems between the Commonwealth and Muscovy were not resolved. In fact while the treaty was concluded in part as an anti-Swedish alliance, both parties to it soon entered into secret negotiations with Sweden. The project, which envisaged the election of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich as a successor to the Polish king—perhaps the most intriguing twist during the treaty's negotiations—proved futile. In the end hostilities between Warsaw and Moscow resumed in October 1658, less than two years after the treaty was signed.

According to Fedoruk, the treaty was concluded much to Hetman Khmelnytsky's chagrin. The Cossack administration tried to participate in negotiations preceding the treaty's conclusion in order to secure its own territorial and political interests. But the tsar's administration kept the Cossack side out of actual decision making; this severely aggravated relations between the Hetmanate and Muscovy during the last years of the hetman's life.

The political situation in eastern Europe during the second half of the seventeenth century dictated further rapprochement between the Commonwealth and Muscovy. After the Treaty of Vilnius this process continued with the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667 and culminated with the "Eternal Peace" of 1686. It took thirty years to bring peace between the two states, and Ukraine paid a hefty price in territory and freedoms to make it happen. From this perspective

the Treaty of Vilnius was a premonition of the future decline of the Cossack state, which became caught up in the complex relations between its two powerful neighbours.

Yaroslav Fedoruk's *Vilenskyi dohovir* significantly advances our knowledge about its subject. The principal beneficiaries will be specialists in European diplomatic and military history. The book shows the impact of the Commonwealth and Muscovy upon the Hetmanate from every possible angle. However, the roles of the Crimean Khanate and its overlord, the Ottoman Empire, are not as developed in the book. Perhaps this has to do with the lesser significance of the latter two states in the events under investigation, or perhaps Fedoruk has addressed their role in more detail in other studies. A clear statement in this regard would have been welcome, primarily because the Khanate and the Porte were active political players in the region during that time. This minor criticism notwithstanding, Yaroslav Fedoruk's superbly researched and well-documented monograph represents a considerable step forward in European and particularly Ukrainian historiography. It advances our knowledge of seventeenth-century European politics and the Cossack Hetmanate's place in them.

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Hadiatska uniia 1658 roku. Ed. Pavlo Sokhan et al. Kyiv: Instytut ukrainskoi arkheohrafiï ta dzhereloznavstva imeni M. S. Hrushevskoho NAN Ukrainy, Natsionalnyi universitet "Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia," and Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2008. 452 pp.

The articles of the Union of Hadiach, signed on 16 September 1658, after hard negotiations by representatives of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and those parleying on behalf of the Cossack state, formally a Muscovite protectorate, at the Cossack military camp near Hadiach were amended at Chyhyryn on 30 April 1659 and finally ratified by the Diet at Warsaw on 22 May 1659. The most significant provision of the union treaty related to the creation, out of Kyiv, Bratslav and Chernihiv palatinates (at the time collectively known as Ukraine), of the Grand Duchy of Rus'. This new grand duchy was to become, alongside the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the third autonomous member of a federal state known as the Commonwealth. This event seemed to have signalled the beginning of a turning point in the history of Europe. However, for a number of reasons, the union's articles failed to become fully operative. Therefore, remarked one historian, "the Union of Hadiach remained a *matrimonium ratum sed non consummatum* (a legally contracted but not consummated marriage), one of those historical turning points at which history refused to turn." This negative development must be regarded as an unfortunate occurrence, because the emergence of the triune Polish-Lithuanian-Rus' Commonwealth had been a far greater historical accomplishment, and one of much more significance, than the rise of the next union in Europe—that of England and Scotland in 1707.

Hadiatska uniia 1658 roku comprises chiefly papers presented by talented historians at a scholarly conference at Poltava Pedagogical University to mark the 350th anniversary of the union treaty. The book, a collection of Ukrainian-language articles, is divided into four parts, each one represented by a specific theme. The first part (pp. 11–46) stresses documents: in it the editors provide the original Polish text of the ratified Hadiach treaty of union and its Ukrainian translation, while Tetiana Tairova-Yakovleva (St. Petersburg, Russia) concentrates on the analysis of its texts.

The second part (pp. 49–105), entitled “On the Way to Hadiach,” consists of three articles: Viktor Brekhunenko (Kyiv) traces Cossack-Polish relations up to the middle of the seventeenth century; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (Warsaw) examines the Turkish option (as opposed to the Muscovite and Polish alternatives) in the policy of the Cossack hetmans in the period after the Union of Hadiach failed to become fully operative; and Viktor Horobets (Kyiv) examines the significance of the Hadiach Union in the light of international relations in East-Central Europe.

The largest part of the book, the third (pp. 109–266), contains six articles, chiefly pertaining to the attitudes of the Cossack, Polish, and Lithuanian elites to the Union of Hadiach. Petro Kulakovsky (Ostrih) examines the composition of the diplomatic mission representing the Zaporozhian Host and the Grand Duchy of Rus' that was sent to the Warsaw Diet of 1659 to ratify the union treaty. Tomasz Kempa (Toruń) analyzes the religious issues and problems raised in the articles of the ratified treaty. Piotr Kroll (Warsaw) examines the attitudes of the Polish nobility to the union, while the views of the Lithuanian nobility towards the third member of the Commonwealth are shown by Krzysztof Kossarzecki (Warsaw). Zenon Kohut (Edmonton) concentrates on the meaning of the term “fatherland” among the Cossack-Rus' contemporaries of the treaty, chiefly during the 1650s and 1660s. Taras Chukhlib (Kyiv) examines the political aims and ideas of Hetman Petro Doroshenko, who had a great interest in and attempted to restore the articles of the Hadiach Union during the 1660s and 1670s.

The last part (pp. 269–349) consists of three articles dealing with the Union of Hadiach in Ukrainian and Polish intellectual traditions. Yurii Mytsyk (Kyiv) examines the treatment of the union in early modern Ukrainian chronicles. Serhii Plokhii (Harvard) shows the union's role in the creation of myths in Ukrainian historiography and political thought. The book's last contributor, Konrad Bobiatyński (Warsaw), examines the varied assessments of the union by Polish historiography from the 1850s to the present.

Thus *Hadiatska unii 1658 roku* provides the most comprehensive picture of this extremely significant event in the history of, not only Ukraine, but also of Poland-Lithuania and East-Central Europe. Readers will learn about many issues, among others, reasons for the conclusion of the treaty, its significance in relation to the social strata of the society, and its role as an obstacle to Muscovite expansion. Because heretofore, for various reasons, practically nothing of significance had been published on this topic, this collection must be regarded as a milestone in Ukrainian historiography. I recommend it highly to anyone interested in learning more about this pivotal event.

The 350th anniversary of the Union of Hadiach was commemorated chiefly by the scholarly international conferences held in Poltava on 4–5 September and in Warsaw on 13 October 2008 and by the publication of books comprising scholarly articles relating to this topic. Apart from *Hadiatska unii 1658 roku*, I also recommend *350-lecie Unii Hadziackiej (1658–2008)*, edited by Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, Piotr Kroll, and Mirosław Nagielski (Warsaw, 2008), with articles in several languages; and *W kręgu Hadziacza A.D. 1658: Od historii do literatury*, edited by Piotr Borek (Cracow, 2008), a collection of articles in Polish.

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Barbara Skinner. *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in Eighteenth-Century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009. xvi, 295 pp. U.S.\$42 cloth.

Mara Kozelsky. *Christianizing Crimea: Shaping Sacred Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010. xi, 270 pp. U.S.\$42 cloth.

These two fascinating new books explore religion and politics in what were both the borderlands of the Russian Empire and Ukrainian borderlands in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They invite renewed reflection on the challenges of writing the religious history of the territories that make up modern Ukraine, as well as on the relationship between the Russian state and its church in the imperial period.

In *Christianizing Crimea*, Mara Kozelsky tells the story of the transformation of Tatar Crimea, annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783, into Russian Athos, an Orthodox holy peninsula modeled on the community of monasteries on Mount Athos in Greece. By the mid-nineteenth century the population of Taurida province (of which Crimea was a part) was both multi-confessional and multinational. The Muslim Tatars made up the largest single group; alone, and especially together with Catholics, Lutherans, Armenian Gregorians, Armenian Catholics, Mennonites, Jews, Karaites, and Pietists, they significantly outnumbered the Orthodox. Moreover, many of those Orthodox believers, particularly along the Crimean coast, were neither Russian nor Ukrainian but of Balkan extraction. In this complex setting the Russian state continued to emphasize the religious toleration policies of Catherine the Great and, indeed, to actively resist any missionary campaigns on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church. Interestingly, Kozelsky argues that when proposals emerged in the mid-nineteenth century for the Christianization of Crimea, they aimed not so much at ethnic Russification of the region as on building on the peninsula's pan-Orthodox composition; furthermore, the aim was less conversion of the many non-Orthodox groups than marking Crimea physically as an Orthodox space.

The crucial protagonist of Kozelsky's account is the intriguing figure of Archbishop Innokentii (Borisov), who from 1848 to his death in 1857 headed Kherson-Taurida Eparchy, which included the Crimean Peninsula. One of the great preachers of his age, Innokentii was also an influential author who passionately argued for the importance of religion to national identity and the need for pan-Orthodox unity. He made the idea of building "Russia's Athos" in Crimea into the central theme of his career as archbishop. By 1850 he had persuaded the Holy Synod to endorse an extensive program of archeological research and restoration of Christian antiquities, and the establishment of a multinational monastic community on the peninsula. Later that year, an elaborate religious procession wended its way through the centre of the Tatar capital of Bakhchisarai to the Dormition Monastery, a complex then believed to have been built into the nearby cliffs by Christian Greeks between the eighth and tenth centuries, for the formal launching of the Russian Athos community. Priests across the eparchy and throughout the empire began raising money for new building and restoration projects in Crimea, while local monks got to work setting up their retreats. Across the peninsula ancient Christian sites were identified for development. Their age was often exaggerated in the quest to demonstrate Crimea's essential and ancient Christian character: modern scholarship dates the Dormition Monastery, for instance, to the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. Another priority was to build a church and monastic community at Khersones, near Sevastopol, amidst

the ancient ruins on the site identified in the Primary Chronicle as that of Prince Volodymyr the Great's baptism in the late tenth century. Underlining the connection to Mount Athos and Innokentii's pan-Orthodox vision, monks and hierarchs in the community were expected to have journeyed themselves to the original Greek Athos and to be able to communicate in Greek.

The best chapter of the book deals with the Crimean War, which Kozelsky argues was the crucial turning point in the Christianization of Crimea. Indeed, as she felicitously puts it, "the church won the war that Russia lost in Crimea" (p. 5). Archbishop Innokentii, a longtime lobbyist on behalf of the Ottoman Christians, emerged as an early and ardent supporter of the war against Turkey. For him the war became a crusade on behalf of all Orthodox Christians, under Russian leadership. After the allied invasion of Crimea in September 1854, Innokentii rushed to the peninsula to preach and ritually bless the cities most in danger. His many sermons reiterated the idea that Crimea was a holy land where messianic Russia was fighting a holy war. They were then reprinted in the major newspapers and periodicals of Russia's leading cities and read aloud during church services across the empire, thus bringing even the illiterate under the influence of Innokentii's views. Kozelsky ably demonstrates the critical role of the Orthodox clergy as a group in framing the Crimean conflict, in interpreting it for the local and all-Russian audiences, and in infusing patriotism with Orthodox themes. Moreover, she shows how sermons inspired local Crimeans to build new monasteries and churches even as war raged around them. War transformed the peninsula ideologically, bringing it into the national imagination and enhancing the church's local prominence. It also quite literally cleared the way for overt Christianizing: the reconstruction of the devastated region was accomplished with a vision of its alleged ancient Christian past in mind; moreover, the decade following the conflict saw a huge population transfer between the Russian and Ottoman empires, as nearly 200,000 Crimean Tatars emigrated, often quite literally switching homes with Bulgarians fleeing persecution in the Ottoman Empire.

The history of the Crimean Peninsula in the early nineteenth century, in an empire where each social and ethnic and religious group had its own separate dealings with the government, is a complex one to research. Kozelsky has delved deeply into local and central archives as well as printed sources to draw out this complexity and the challenges faced by both church and state in the management of this region over a long period. The book is not without its faults: the writing and organization could be clearer in places, translations are often awkward, and chronology is sometimes confusing. Kozelsky seems to belabour the idea of co-operation between religion and science in the archeological research that anchored the project of Russian Athos without really analyzing it. It would also have been helpful if she had better outlined the basis for Orthodox assertions of the Tatars' alleged Christian past, and done so earlier in the narrative. The book concludes with a lengthy epilogue dealing with the complicated post-Soviet history of Crimea in independent Ukraine and with battles over its identity.

There is much of interest here, and it is true that many of the issues about religious marking of the Crimean territory have returned since the collapse of Communism. But overall this chapter seems somewhat too detailed to be an epilogue and thus out of place in the book. Moreover, because Kozelsky skips over the Soviet period, the reader often finds herself wondering how the Soviet authorities coped with the legacy of Russian Athos, how they re-envisioned the peninsula, and the legacy of their interpretation in post-Soviet Crimea. What did the anti-religious Soviets make of the Church of St. Vladimir at Khersones before it was conveniently destroyed during World War Two? Was not Bakhchisarai restored and a tourist site during the Soviet period, before the return in the last twenty years of the Crimean Tatars

expelled by Stalin? It might have been better to provide a more detailed analysis of developments in the peninsula up until the end of the imperial period and a stronger conclusion, rather than to devote so much attention to the post-Soviet context.

That said, this book will be of great interest to scholars interested in Russia as empire, in the development and dissemination of Russian Orthodox nationalism in the nineteenth century, and in the relationship between religion and empire in imperial Russia. I read this book during a recent trip to Sevastopol. Since it deals to such an extent with the building of many of the sightseeing destinations of present-day Crimea, I would also recommend it to visitors to Crimea who seek a deeper understanding of the peninsula and its history more generally.

The Western Front of the Eastern Church similarly provides readers with insight into the development and evolution of policies of religious toleration in the Russian Empire and argues for the centrality of religious motives and practices in shaping the great events of the early modern period. In this deeply researched and well-written study, Barbara Skinner wades into the choppy waters of religious conflict in the Polish-Russian borderlands and emerges with a fascinating and even-handed analysis of a very complex story. Tracing the history of the Ruthenians in present-day Ukraine and Belarus from the emergence of their division into Greek Catholic and Orthodox religious camps following the Union of Brest in 1596 through the forced conversion of the Uniates of the Russian Empire to Orthodoxy beginning in 1794 after the Second Partition of Poland, Skinner offers many new insights into the social, religious, political, and foreign policy context of the disintegration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the foundation of Russian imperial policy in the western borderlands, and the emergence of modern Ukrainian and Belarusian identities. She draws on a remarkable range of sources, including documents from eight different archives in Russia, Poland, and Ukraine, as well as a large number of published primary sources and secondary sources in several languages. Her central argument is that, particularly during the eighteenth century, confessional and political identities became increasingly interdependent in the eastern regions of the Commonwealth, with crucial implications for the fate of that state.

Skinner eschews the national narratives that have animated modern Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian interpretations of this conflict, as well as the long-lived and competing nineteenth-century myths of Orthodox backwardness and barbaric Russian persecution on the one hand, or of Polish and Roman Catholic maltreatment and a joyful “return” of the Uniates to Orthodoxy on the other. Instead she adopts the lens of the Reformation and the ensuing process of confessionalization in order to analyze and explain the deepening of religious division among the Ruthenians across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. She contends that when the Eastern Church in “Ruthenia” divided over the creation of the Uniate Church, which accepted Catholic doctrine but retained the Eastern rite, both sides drew on the tools created by the newly divided Western Church to develop and reinforce separate religious identities. These included, for instance, written confessions of faith, catechisms, and church councils, but also increased education and professionalization of the clergy. The Orthodox pioneered the process with Metropolitan Petro Mohyla’s campaign to revitalize the Orthodox community through reforms such as strengthening church administration, founding the Kyiv Academy, and especially by publishing his *Orthodox Confession of Faith* in 1640 and his revision of the service book, the *Trebnik*, in 1646.

Skinner focuses on how the process of confessionalization played out at the parish level, providing a fascinating analysis of the emergence of a distinct Uniate culture. She shows that in practice it was difficult to separate doctrine from its cultural expression in liturgy. Thus, although the realistic character of icons displayed in Greek Catholic parish churches did not

distinguish them from those in Orthodox ones in this region, the actual subject of the images came to include prominent Roman Catholic saints, such as Ignatius Loyola or Poland's St. Casimir, as well as St. Josaphat the Martyr—the Uniate archbishop of Polatsk killed by an enraged Orthodox mob in 1623. New churches were increasingly built without the traditional iconostasis and with the altar against the wall, which made certain aspects of the Eastern rite that required movement around the altar and the opening and closing of the royal doors impossible; by the late eighteenth century virtually every Uniate church had altar bells for use during the Eucharist, a practice unknown in Orthodoxy, and ciboria containing the reserved sacrament were displayed in full view on the altar. These changes reflected the post-Tridentine Catholic emphasis on the reality rather than the mystery of the sacrament. The Greek Catholic Basilian Brotherhood, which provided the intellectual leadership and hierarchy of the Uniate Church, also served as a conduit for Roman Catholic moral theology and Western ideas about law and legal constructs of society, which contrasted with competing Orthodox literature that focused on timeless, universal concepts and patristic sources. Over time these views were conveyed to the parish clergy through their training and through instructional literature.

Throughout Skinner portrays the “Ruthenians” as a people torn between two cultural orientations, but also as agents and shapers of their confessional history. The emergence of two distinct religious cultures was a fraught process, one that was still ripening in the mid and late eighteenth centuries as the borderlands descended into civil and religious strife. Across this period parish churches passed back and forth between Orthodox and Uniate authority. In a region made poor by strife, local priests often continued to use uncorrected prayer books from the other side of the religious divide. Nevertheless, Skinner argues, both Uniate and Orthodox identities hardened in these years and were not as easily sloughed off as these rapid “conversions” might suggest.

Skinner's analysis of confessionalization processes on the ground provides the crucial backdrop to the second part of her book, where she turns to the politicization of the Uniate-Orthodox conflict in the eighteenth century and argues for the importance of religious factors in explaining the disintegration of Poland-Lithuania. Muscovy took little interest in the Ruthenians until the mid- to late seventeenth century, when Bohdan Khmelnytsky made protection of Orthodoxy part of the justification for his 1654 alliance with the Russians, leading to the Truce of Andrusovo that redrew the border between Russia and Poland along the Dnipro River, placing Kyiv, Left-Bank Ukraine, Smolensk, and the Zaporizhzhia under Muscovite control. Where previously the Russians had shown little interest in their Ruthenian neighbours, the incorporation of Kyiv brought Ruthenian clergymen to prominence in Muscovy. Moreover, the 1686 treaty that incorporated these regions stipulated that the Orthodox in Poland-Lithuania be free, giving Russia a basis for meddling in Commonwealth affairs in defence of Orthodoxy that it would exploit for the next century.

By the early eighteenth century political and religious identities were becoming increasingly aligned on both sides of the new border. In the 1760s the region exploded in religious violence that became a key source of instability for the Commonwealth. The catalyst was Catherine II's insistent interference in Polish affairs, on the pretext of protection of Orthodox and other dissidents. Roman Catholicism had become increasingly central to the political identity of the ruling elite in the Commonwealth since the early eighteenth century, and Catherine's policy of tolerance produced instead, as Skinner puts it, “a wave of intolerance” (p. 129). First, the Commonwealth imploded with the massive Confederation of Bar rebellion against Catherine's protégé Stanisław August Poniatowski and in defence of the Catholic

faith; that rebellion in turn triggered a vast uprising in defence of Orthodoxy in the eastern regions of the realm, the so-called Koliivshchyna. Without dwelling on the details, Skinner sketches the gruesome brutality of civil strife on all sides and demonstrates the intertwined nature of these two great rebellions, which were quelled only with Russian occupation of the region in the early 1770s. Following the first partition of Poland in 1772, Catherine found herself having to balance the policy of toleration that she had made a trademark of her rule with the fact of the sudden presence within her empire's borders of 800,000 members of the Uniate Church that the Russian state and church had put so much effort into combating. In the end she would abandon the toleration policy in favour of upholding the state's traditional promotion of Orthodoxy. Violence broke out again in the Commonwealth in 1789, leading to fear of a new Koliivshchyna and violent reprisals against the Orthodox, a circumstance that Skinner argues was a neglected cause of the Four-Year Sejm's last-ditch effort to save Poland-Lithuania through reform in the early 1790s. Skinner concludes with a nuanced discussion of the massive conversion campaign of 1.5 million Uniates to Orthodoxy within the Russian partitions between 1794 and 1796.

This book is simply essential reading for all scholars of early modern Ukraine and Belarus, as well as for historians of eighteenth-century Russia, its church, and its imperial policies. A brief review can hardly do justice to its richness. Covering such a large territory over such a long period of time, Skinner in many places acknowledges but leaves some interesting questions unresolved. For example, she contrasts the Belarusian and Ukrainian experiences without fully explaining why they differed: she mulls over whether the size of the parish mattered—speculating, for instance, that the smaller size of Ukrainian parishes assisted their resistance to outside forces in the late eighteenth century, while at the same time pointing out that the sprawling nature of Belarusian parishes could also explain their more successful struggle against Catherine II's anti-Uniate campaigns there. Skinner reveals the fertile ground for future researchers in various sources such as visitation records or the declarations required of parishioners during the conversion of their parishes to or from the Uniate faith in the 1770s. Her discussion of the latter, in particular, suggests that these seemingly formulaic documents can help us sense ordinary lives disrupted by crisis.

For scholars of Ukraine, these works provide useful insight into the workings of the Russian Empire on the territory of present-day Ukraine. They also offer important background to the political and religious battles that have raged since independence over the identity of eastern and western Ukrainians and the place of Crimea and Crimeans in Ukraine. Finally, they reinvigorate the ongoing debate about whether Ukraine should be studied as a territory or as the expression of an ethnic nation. Liliya Berezhnaya recently asked "Does Ukraine Have a Church History?" (*Kritika* 10, no. 4 [fall 2009]: 897–916). These books, one by exploring a region of Ukraine with a very multiethnic past and present, and the other by demonstrating that its story cannot be told within the confines of a single national paradigm—be it Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, or Russian—suggest that ideas about nationality and identity best serve as a tool rather than as a framework for analysis. They reveal the significance of multiple religious influences in the elaboration and transformation of identities in the Ukrainian space over time, and they challenge us to reflect on the significance of this historical experience in the evolution of the church history—or is it histories?—of Ukraine.

Leonard Friesen. *Rural Revolutions in Southern Ukraine: Peasants, Nobles, and Colonists, 1774–1905*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2008. xii, 325 pp. U.S.\$39.95 cloth. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

In *Rural Revolutions* Leonard Friesen examines agricultural revolution in New Russia, as he refers to Southern Ukraine in his book, from its annexation by the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century to the revolutionary year of 1905. In so doing, he takes the idea of agricultural revolution seriously, as something that transforms not only agricultural technology and practice but rural society, as well, and goes so far as to make a bold and intriguing claim early in the book: “Peasants,” Friesen writes, “became truly revolutionary not only when they burned down manor houses in 1905, but also when they responded to growing land shortages in the 1870s with the aggressive acquisition of recently manufactured steel-based agricultural implements” (p. 4).

Friesen begins with a description of New Russia before Russian annexation, its geographic features, the ethnic diversity of its inhabitants, and the trade routes that were already well embedded in their lives. Then, in a series of chapters arranged chronologically and thematically, he describes the ways that those elements changed. The late eighteenth century brought many new inhabitants, encouraged or forced by the imperial state or its nobles, in the form of private serfs, state peasants, and foreign colonists, all of whom increased both the ethnic and social diversity of the population. Emancipation not only changed the relationship between these various people, particularly as nobles began first leasing their lands to their former peasants and later selling it to colonists, but also introduced new actors in the form of migrant workers. While the contours of New Russia’s geography remained the same, over the next century these new inhabitants altered their surrounding environment through successive new agricultural approaches. Field agriculture was a near constant in some form, but its centrality to peasant and estate livelihoods changed as labour shortages came and went, as new market opportunities created an impulse to plant new crops (wheat, or market gardening), and, eventually, as technological change altered certain aspects of agricultural practice. Large-scale sheep farming, particularly of imported fine-fleece breeds, also came and went, usually in response to price fluctuations and hampered by periodic crises. Central to both the population and environmental shifts were changes in trade routes as the Black Sea ports gained and faded somewhat in importance, and then as the growth of railways (and the development of industry) more fundamentally altered lives.

Although the major theme of the book is revolution, another word is perhaps even more prevalent: adaptation. Moments of agricultural revolution, like the introduction of new stock or new agricultural implements, were in many ways doubly cases of adaptation. For one, Friesen presents them as moments when peasants and estate owners adapted to changes in their circumstances or to actual crisis. But those newly revolutionary tools were also themselves adapted to pre-existing practices and techniques. Friesen points out that new breeds of fine-fleeced sheep were introduced, but haphazardly and with little attention to the modern breeding or rearing techniques that would truly transform agricultural society. Similarly, even as peasants bought new plows in a way Friesen describes as revolutionary, those peasants used their new tools while farming in much the same old way. As a result, the short-term improvements that the new technologies or new breeds brought about were likely to end in a return to the status quo at best and in real crisis at worst.

So, then, if the agricultural revolution Friesen describes was only a partial one, what becomes of his opening claim that that revolution was just as revolutionary as the events of 1905? In Friesen's telling, New Russia was certainly not exempt from social unrest even well before 1905. The Emancipation, in particular, brought with it rumours and uncertainty, which led to significant resistance. But overall Friesen emphasizes the ways that New Russia's society remained remarkably stable despite the differences between and within its various ethnic and social groups. In 1905 it was those peasants living in regions that had only recently undergone significant change in their economic structures—the development of capitalist agriculture on large estates, which resulted in less land for peasants and more competition from migrant workers—that were most likely to revolt. Those who lived in regions with a longer history of such developments had learned to adapt. In other words, the “revolution” in 1905 was in a way just as much a response to recent crisis as some of the agricultural revolutions described elsewhere in the text. In that the two sorts of revolutionary moments were indeed similar.

It is, of course, difficult to write about 1905 without addressing the greater revolution that followed twelve years later, but if one does, perhaps the two sorts of revolution are similar in another way. The acquisition of new farming implements was, in essence, an example of peasants gaining revolutionary new tools that they used in unrevolutionary ways. Can the same be said of 1905? Were the new tools of violence that peasants used simply revolutionary methods used to pursue the same old system? Given that the most “revolutionary” peasants were reacting to recent change, it seems so. Thus perhaps the equivalence of the revolutionary aspects of both agricultural and socio-political revolution in New Russia is apt, but in a topsy-turvy way. Both used revolutionary methods but toward unrevolutionary goals, and in so doing they failed to solve the increasingly uncertain situation facing New Russia's land and its people.

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D. D. Bilyi. *Ukraintsi Kubani v 1792–1921 rokakh: Evoliutsiia sotsialnykh identychnosti*. Lviv and Donetsk: Skhidnyi vydavnychy dim, 2009. 544 pp. Cloth.

Ukraintsi Kubani by Dmytro Dmytrovych Bilyi, a Donetsk-based historian of the Kuban and Ukraine and a Ukrainian novelist, is an ambitious and sweeping study of the formation of social and regional identity among the Ukrainian settlers of the Kuban region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Extensively researched, carefully argued, and gracefully written, it represents a significant contribution to modern Ukrainian historiography. At a minimum this monograph fills a crucial gap, illuminating the history of a usually neglected region. It demonstrates how, beginning in the late eighteenth century, the remnants of the Zaporozhian Cossack Army colonized the frontier territory of the North Caucasus, ultimately transforming it into a Ukrainian cultural space. More broadly, *Ukraintsi Kubani* restores the Kuban to its rightful place in the Ukrainian narrative, successfully challenges the Kyiv- and Galicia-centric approaches that have so long dominated the study of modern Ukraine, and suggests an alternative way of thinking about identity formation in the nineteenth century.

Perhaps the most original and exciting aspect of the author's monograph is his argument that, throughout much of the nineteenth century, the formation of a regional, social, and

ethnic/national identity were parallel and often mutually reinforcing processes. The core of this thesis can be found in part five, “*Chornomoriia – kavkazka Ukraina: The Mechanisms of Preserving and Functioning of the Black Sea Cossacks’ Ethnic and Social Identity.*” There Bilyi shows how the cultivation of Zaporozhian history and traditions became an active and ongoing project among the Kuban Cossacks in the nineteenth century—directly linked to the continued preservation of the privileges and social status of the Cossacks as a group. For the better part of the nineteenth century, invoking Zaporozhian tradition became a way for the Black Sea Cossacks to maintain a remarkable degree of autonomy. The head (*otaman*) of the Black Sea Cossack Army and his staff, for example, were drawn for many drawn from the ranks of local officers. Likewise, in accordance with Cossack custom, Orthodox priests were recruited from among the local population rather than appointed by the Russian Orthodox Church. In this respect, the “period of scholarly interest” (Phase A in Miroslav Hroch’s notable scheme) in this region was, from the very start, never simply academic. It was always connected to real issues of self-preservation, power, and control.

Moreover, as *Ukrainci Kubani* demonstrates, the links between the Black Sea Cossacks and Dnieper Ukraine were constantly renewed. They were revitalized by successive waves of immigration from Poltava and Chernihiv gubernias (and, later, Slobidska Ukraine). The Cossacks perpetuated—first through place names and oral tradition and later in literature—the memory of an original Ukrainian homeland. Indeed, as Bilyi argues, the conscious cultivation of “Little Russian” culture and language made it possible to attract and integrate new settlers and thus replenish the frontier population more easily. In fact, as Bilyi illustrates, this process worked both ways. Throughout the nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries, from Yakiv Kukharenskyi’s friendship with Taras Shevchenko to the circle of Cossacks that formed around Panteleimon Kulish and later to the alliance between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Kuban Council in 1918, the Cossack intelligentsia always maintained close links with Ukraine and the Ukrainian national movement.

The tsarist administration, as Bilyi shows, tolerated and at first even exploited these links between the Cossacks and “Little Russia.” Resettlement, for example, was initially encouraged and organized by the governors of Poltava and Chernihiv gubernias. The Caucasus region was, of course, the main theatre of war and rivalry between the Ottoman and Russian empires in the nineteenth century, and building up military colonies on the frontier was part of the Russian imperial project. By the 1860s, however, as the imperial authorities became increasingly suspicious of the Ukrainian movement, this attitude began to change. In the Kuban the new restrictions against the use of the Ukrainian language—the Valuev circular and the Ems Ukase—ran parallel with an overall reorganization of the Cossack Army and efforts to curb the “separatism” of the Black Sea Cossacks. (Interestingly, as Bilyi shows, the prohibitions against the Ukrainian language provoked protests on the part of the rank-and-file Cossacks.) The successful conclusion of the Russo-Turkish wars and the flood of new, land-hungry non-Cossack settlers from other parts of the Russian Empire fundamentally changed the political dynamic in the region. Ultimately, as Bilyi and other authors have noted, it set the stage for a conflict between the Cossacks and the non-Cossacks (“*inorodnye*”), which assumed a violent form after the February Revolution.

Bilyi concludes by posing a question that two émigré historians, Luka Bych and Pavlo Suliatsky, debated in the 1920s: did the Ukrainian national idea work in the Kuban during the years 1917–21? (“Чи спрацювала українська національна ідея на Кубані в 1917–1921 роках?”). Both Bych and Suliatsky viewed the problem in rather narrow political terms, conflating the “Ukrainian national idea” with the survival/failure of Ukrainian state structures.

Any analysis that ends in 1921 and does not take into account the decade of the 1920s—or the unprecedented political violence of the 1930s—is, to my mind, incomplete. This is not a criticism of Bilyi's magnificent volume as much as it is an encouragement to the author to continue his research and writing.

Bilyi has successfully demonstrated the central role that the "Ukraine myth" played in the formation of the social identity of the Kuban Cossacks. His work highlights—implicitly if not explicitly—an enormous vacuum in Ukrainian historiography—the lack of a serious study of the "Cossack myth" in nineteenth-century Ukraine. This is the other part of the story that must be told if we are to understand modern Ukrainian history. In this respect Dmytro Bilyi's monograph has not only added a new regional history, but also set a new agenda for Ukrainian historiography.

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John-Paul Himka. *Last Judgment Iconography in the Carpathians*.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009. xxii, 301 pp. \$75 cloth.

In this well-researched and eminently readable monograph, John-Paul Himka takes us on a journey through the Carpathian region in search of iconography depicting the Last Judgment. But he offers us considerably more than that. In fact, it may come as a surprise that although the title and the material analyzed in the book is Last Judgment iconography in the Carpathians—and the reader will learn a great deal about that subject—this is not, in a sense, primarily an art-history study, nor was Himka's motivation only to acquire a familiarity with this art form. In his book he explores the way we study history itself and takes a courageous stand in proposing a fresh approach.

Himka's work is based on nine years of research and countless miles of travel during summers and winters, aided by old and new friends who were inspired by his efforts to survey and analyze Last Judgment iconography, much of it fragile and located in environments less than ideal for survival. The geographical area of his study is the Carpathian region, which he defines clearly, aided by a physical-geography map, a historical map, a map with current administrative boundaries, yet another pointing out the location of monasteries, and a two-page spread indicating locations where one can find icons on wood of the fifteenth to eighteenth century—the time period that is the focus of his study—as well as later icons on canvas and in the form of murals and frescoes. The maps provide the reader with a clear visual sense of the territory under scrutiny, which covers parts of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Transcarpathian Ukraine defined largely by the sometimes rolling, sometimes jagged, and always impressive Carpathian Mountain chain running through them.

Himka also provides useful appendices that summarize his material: a list of relevant towns and villages in the Carpathian region, with their names rendered in all the forms and languages historically connected with them—German, Polish, Slovak, Hungarian, Romanian, Rusyn, and Ukrainian; summaries of sermons on the Last Judgment responsible for some of the theological context on which the iconography was in part based; and a catalog of Last Judgment images identified by location, date, material/type of image, inventory number, plus any available bibliographical or other information. The book has at least 125 icon illustrations with accompanying text descriptions and commentary. These are drawn from personal and

published collections, as well as photos of icons taken directly in their churches. Useful notes, a bibliography, and a helpful index round out the volume.

The book consists of five major chapters. The first provides helpful explanations, guidelines for the writer's study, and his working definitions, as well as a thumbnail sketch of the Carpathian region's history and a summary of Last Judgment theology and historiography of the iconography. The second chapter describes the fifteenth-century origin of Carpathian Last Judgment icons, and the third chapter covers the subsequent evolution of the icons during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The fourth chapter traces the disintegration of the tradition, and the fifth offers general conclusions. A summary at the end of each chapter allows even the reader with little time to quickly acquire some familiarity with the author's material and arguments before then dwelling more deliberately on the rich details.

Himka concludes that Last Judgment iconography in the Carpathian region is unique, whether found on the Carpathian soil of today's Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, or Ukraine. The prototype came from northern Rus', most likely Novgorod, and was, Himka conjectures, brought to the region in the fifteenth century by monks making their way south to Constantinople, Mount Athos, or the Holy Land. In time the tradition of icons on large vertical linden boards, complex and theologically sophisticated in their depictions, began to decline, and they were painted or written increasingly from the middle of the seventeenth century largely on canvas or directly onto the walls of wooden churches, and even painted on glass, by small-town artisans, priests' sons who chose not to follow in their fathers' footsteps, and perhaps peasants or shepherds.

This iconography portrayed heaven, hell, saints and sinners, a series of toll booths leading to heaven along which the deceased moved as they attempted to make their way upwards, and a series of what might be called stock characters and images recognizable from the Scriptures, the Book of Daniel, Old and New Testament Apocrypha, liturgical texts for Meatfare Sunday, and the teachings of the Church Fathers, with some of the relevant material that was conveyed to the faithful in sermons. Himka traces the evolution of these elements, identifying the Byzantine influences and demonstrating how northern Rus' iconographers worked them over and added to them, creating a model that was then emulated and subsequently evolved further in the region with the addition of certain Gothic features.

Utterly fascinating is Himka's discussion about this evolution, which represents, he says, a flowering and then a degeneration of the tradition, as non-monastic iconographers pushed the limits in depicting "tillating and grotesque" imagery focused primarily in the "hell" or lower sections of the icons. This imagery included depictions that communicated strong social commentary (evil landlords and crowned heads going into hell) and blatant sexual depictions, such as women with full, round breasts emerging from tombs, a seemingly gratuitous painting of a sexy smiling mermaid off to one side of an icon, the explicit portrayal of punishments for particular sexual sins (the devil punishing a woman for having had oral sex by stuffing something into her mouth or sawing the groin of a man who desired another's wife) and for cheating (a blacksmith punished by the devil who has inserted a bellows into his anus). The list goes on.

Most popular and abundant by the eighteenth century, such images alarmed Uniate Synod bishops, who, responding to reverberations of the Counter-Reformation, strove to raise the cultural level of their clergy and reform the spiritual life of the faithful in the Uniate (formerly Orthodox) churches throughout the region. This ecclesiastical vigilance, Himka discovered, led to an obvious tampering with numerous Last Judgment icons from this period. The lowest sections, depicting hell, were often actually torn away, or images were whitewashed or

effaced in order to remove what clerics considered “inappropriate.” Roman Catholic influence expressed in the form of such elements as the seven deadly sins, not part of the Orthodox canon, also began appearing in the art. And thus, Himka says, the uniformity of the Carpathian region’s traditional Orthodox iconography of the Last Judgment dissipated. The growing diversity in content from the eighteenth century on leads him to categorize that iconography into type clusters within micro-regions rather than the Carpathian region as a whole.

Himka’s monograph provides us with much more than an analysis of iconography. This is a treatise about how we approach the study of history itself and especially Ukrainian history. Himka states that the normal paradigm for his work as a historian of Ukraine—as it is for many Ukrainian historians, he says—is ordinarily the national paradigm—that is, working backwards from modern history’s national idea of Ukraine to identify what is/was Ukrainian and what is/was not Ukrainian. Dissatisfied with “the way the Ukrainian historical paradigm dealt with the pre-national cultural past,” he challenged himself to find a fresh approach. Seeking for his test case a “large complex of the past culture” not connected to the nation and its objectives or “assimilated into the national narrative,” he chose Last Judgment iconography. Himka described his work process as that of an evolutionary biologist and as “mental archaeology.” He seems to be guided by the theory proposed by the new cultural sociology, which permits deep scrutiny of “observable cultural materials” as bearing symbolism that can be investigated in a systematic way for meaning.

Working with hard raw evidence, Himka discovered that there is, in fact, no connection between Ukrainian Last Judgment iconography and the tradition that was carried to and developed further in the Carpathian Region. The Ukrainian iconography exhibits features of standard Byzantine Last Judgment iconography and “nothing more.” By contrast, the Carpathian tradition incorporates Byzantine features but offers elements clearly from northern Rus’ and develops local elements known only in the Carpathian Region. There is evidence neither of the Kyiv-Halych tradition nor of the Moldavian tradition, which has been investigated by certain Polish scholars. In this regard Himka’s research and conclusions suggest that we think about considering the Carpathian Region as a geographic and cultural area unto itself, a crossroads of culture and identity, an entity not identified exclusively with any one of its participating nations or peoples.

One senses that Himka must be a fine teacher, as well as scholar, by how patiently and in what a lucid manner he guides his reader through his investigation. Most refreshing is his willingness to speak in the first person, disclosing just enough personal information about his research journey to make the reader feel welcome in sharing in his adventure. There is nothing dry or abstruse in this book, and it should be welcomed by Slavists, art historians, and religious scholars, who will find much of value in it. Himka’s descriptions of the icons themselves are lively, wonderfully detailed, and are crucial, actually, because the reproductions are only in varying shades of gray and often hazy. This is not his fault. Many of the originals are not in good condition, and providing sharp illustrations in colour would no doubt have raised the price of the book substantially. At least the dust jacket shows a typical image from a Last Judgment icon in vivid colour—a devil driving a lord and lady into hell in a handcart!

Larry Wolff. *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010. xi, 486 pp. U.S.\$27.95 paper, U.S.\$62.50 cloth.

This study is not a political, cultural, or intellectual history of Galicia. Rather, it is the history of an idea. The idea of Galicia is traced from the “invention” of the province by Austria at the First Partition of Poland in 1772 through the dissolution of Galicia in 1918 and up to the early twenty-first century. While “political culture” is the central theme, the roles of “history and fantasy” in culture in the broader sense receive considerable attention. Indeed, Professor Wolff’s interdisciplinary study delves into German, Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish literature, as well as art and music. The author draws on a rich variety of sources, from prose, poetry, and drama to correspondence, newspaper articles, and even dancing regulations for a ball. His roughly chronological account of the evolution of “Galicia” touches on the roles not only of well-known Galicians such as Aleksander Fredro, Ivan Franko, and Bruno Schulz, but also of a number of renowned modern intellectual and cultural figures whom one does not immediately associate with that province, including Martin Buber, Sigmund Freud, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Gustav Mahler, and Billy Wilder.

The nature of the topic requires frequent quotation and paraphrase. The book’s varied and extensive literary and epistolary excerpts contribute its value and provide some of its most delightful reading. The paraphrasing is occasionally tedious but necessary to reinforce the author’s argument. Wolff pays close attention to grammar in interpreting quoted material. The connections he draws among ideas, words, and images in various sources are often brilliant and only rarely strained. As is inevitable in intellectual history, speculation about the thought processes of individuals is not always convincing, and there is a certain amount of “might have,” “perhaps,” and “probably.”

Wolff’s account is readable and coherent, with frequent summations and recapitulations, as well as reminders about the identities of the people, places, and events to which he refers. His writing is graceful and imaginative, with many artful turns of phrase (e.g., “the oasis was a mirage,” p. 95; “to polish the Polish pearl,” p. 174; “the now fading pigment, but the still abiding figment,” p. 419) and inventive comparisons (e.g., Mickiewicz’s 1833 “epistle to the Galicians” and St. Paul’s epistle to the Galatians, p. 105). The author’s sensitivity to language is contagious: when he translates Fredro’s “les coups de fléaux et de faux” in an 1846 letter to Count Alfred Potocki as “the blows of the whips and the lies,” the reader is prompted to additionally read “faux” as “scythes”—an apt allusion to the peasant insurrection of the previous February (p. 167).

Throughout his text, Wolff generously acknowledges the contributions of contemporary scholars. It is unfortunate, however, that there is no bibliography. Thus the reader seeking full bibliographic data on the book by Hans-Christian Maner referred to on page 224, and finding only an abbreviated reference in endnote 84 (on p. 443), must first find Maner in the index (on p. 477), then turn to the first mention of Maner in the text (on p. 10), and from there look up endnote 13 on page 422 for the full citation. On the other hand, the extensive endnotes do provide ample sources for further reading. The text is complemented by well-chosen black and white illustrations, photographs, and maps.

The author and the publisher appear to have eliminated all but a few minor errors. The mention of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky’s reaction to the 1908 assassination of Viceroy Andrzej Potocki (p. 342) is incomplete and thus misleading; a fuller account can be found in Andrii Krawchuk’s 1997 monograph *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*. One may receive the

impression that the “Galician idea” only caught on with Western Ukrainians long after the demise of Galicia—in fact not until the end of the Soviet Union. Evidently most Galician Ruthenian leaders found the Ukrainian project or (in the case of the Russophiles) the Great Russian project more appealing than a purely provincial identity. In this they differed from many of their German, Polish, and Jewish neighbours.

Although *The Idea of Galicia* is not a complete cultural or intellectual history of the Habsburg province, it does provide an intriguing introduction. For those accustomed to a single ethnic or national perspective on Galicia, it provides an opportunity to broaden one’s knowledge and seek points of comparison. Specialists and graduate students in Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, or Austrian history will profit from this study. Cultural and intellectual historians will find it a deliciously erudite exploration of a rich and rewarding subject.

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Markian Prokopovych. *Habsburg Lemberg: Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772–1914*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009. xvi, 357 pp. U.S.\$49.95 paper.

Markian Prokopovych has written a much needed book on nineteenth-century Lviv. It links architectural developments and, to a lesser extent, urban planning with social, political, and ideological developments. Similarly to other books on Habsburg cities and architecture, in this work the author focuses on the usual suspects—the empire, as represented by the state bureaucracy and experts in the capital; in the province, Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish nationalisms, as represented by the intellectuals and the movements they led; and, finally, the city itself, as represented by the municipal authorities.

With the exception of several studies by Jacek Purchla, *Habsburg Lemberg* is the first book to go beyond merely discussing architectural styles in nineteenth-century Lviv and to integrate architectural developments with both the city’s rich political and social history and current theoretical frameworks in urban studies and urban history.

The book is divided into four chapters. The first outlines the connection between architecture, public space, and politics throughout the nineteenth century, establishing major turning points transforming all three and their relationships. The turning points are familiar from the traditional political history of Galicia—Poland’s partitions, the Napoleonic wars, 1848, the 1860s, and, finally the *fin de siècle*. But the focus on architecture and public space is refreshingly original.

The second chapter examines “writing the city” by bureaucrats, historians, technicians, and others. It follows discussions about Lviv’s changing architecture from neoclassicism to historicism in the context of local debates about identity, history, nations, the empire, and the world. The third chapter, on “making the city,” looks at a few representative city institutions (the Ossolineum, the Skarbek Theatre, the Ruthenian National Institute, the Town Hall), the buildings that were to house them, and parks and monuments, including projects that were completed.

The final chapter, “Using the City: Commemorations, Restorations, Exhibitions,” discusses imperial visits to Lviv, the transformation of the Polish Riflemen Confraternity’s public ceremonies, and the appearance of national public ceremonies, the Lublin Union Mound in particular. The restoration is discussed in the context of the “invented” city’s past

and present identity and focuses on the emergence of the preservation movement and on the “restorations” of city’s medieval churches that projected architects’ identities and ideas about history onto its ancient buildings while simultaneously claiming them for the respective national communities.

Habsburg Lemberg sums up more than a century of developments with the conclusion that despite the fact that even though the material fabric of Lviv changed dramatically and incorporated numerous “invented traditions,” these were readily accepted by the city’s inhabitants and are now an integral part of its imagery. The changes, including alleged “traditions,” were not dominated by a single ideology and remained open to multiple interpretations. The process of architectural change itself was never usurped by a single national or political group or authority. The multiplicity of major players, with their own specific interests, were present in Lviv throughout the Habsburg period. Therefore the cityscape’s mosaic emerged as a consequence of complex negotiation, testifying to the failure of attempts to create the only comprehensive representation of Lviv’s past and its identity.

Despite being an indisputable achievement, the book is not without flaws. Even though it is common for historians to select concepts eclectically, ripping them off the theoretical debates in which they emerged, Prokopovych’s analytical framework is questionable for those acquainted with the discussions involving the “public sphere,” “social space,” and their usage. He uses the concept of public space, so central to the book, sometimes as a heuristic tool and sometimes as a notion that allegedly was in the mind of Lviv’s nineteenth-century agents. A subchapter is dedicated to the “Official conceptualizations of public space” during the *Vormärz*, but in fact the bureaucrats and intellectuals during the period cited in the book did not mention public space at all. Discussing attempts to nationalize public space at the end of the nineteenth century, Prokopovych observes that “the only true loser in the long run was the culture that failed to incorporate nationalism: the *Vormärz* culture of enjoyable privacy, where public space was restricted to imperial representation and German was the *lingua franca*” (p. 51). However, imperial representations and the German language even in *Vormärz* Lviv were just one part of street life. One can also argue that the culture of privacy, connected to the clear delineation between public and private, was strengthened throughout the nineteenth century.

Similar theoretical reservations can be raised about the last chapter, “Using the City: Commemorations, Restorations, Exhibitions.” The “usage” discussed in this chapter is not about the use of already existing “architectonic” space by various agents. Most of it fits into the “writing” and “making” of the city discussed in other chapters. In this chapter the city is being marked and claimed by means other than textual: either through performances and staging, or through the modification of already existing structures—the “restoration.” In any case, it is definitely not about using urban space in the sense of practice, as conceptualized in the theories of everydayness and social space.

Some subchapters that attempt to deal with complex issues are simply too short to address in any depth. For example, “Public Representation and Segregated Socializing: *Vormärz* to Constitutionalism” is discussed in four only pages. There are abrupt and confusing leaps between events and periods in the book. The use of some epithets and phrasing in general are questionable. Why is Jaworski’s logic “wretched” when he laments the destruction of medieval Lviv by the Austrians (p. 90)?

Readers of this journal would be especially interested in the discussion of the role Ruthenian/Ukrainian projects played in the shaping of Habsburg Lemberg. Prokopovych tries to draw some conclusions from the scarce comments on Lviv gleaned from Ruthenian publications. But in doing so he often over-reads them while, at the same time, simplifying the

political and intellectual developments of nineteenth century Galicia. For example, in his discussion of Teodor Bilous's 1856 brochure on architecture, Prokopovych claims that Bilous's "complete omission of Lemberg also reflects the difficulty that the older generation of Greek Catholic clergy had in seeing Lemberg as a Ruthenian town because of their understanding of Ruthenian identity as both "peasant" and "Eastern" (p. 94). It is not clear why Prokopovych sees Bilous, who was then only twenty-nine and not a priest, as representing views of some "older generation of Greek Catholic clergy." Secondly, the Ruthenian patriots definitely claimed Lviv as the Ruthenian capital as early as in 1848. Thirdly, in the 1840s and 1850s the Ruthenian patriots did not emphasize either the "peasant" or the "Eastern" character of the Ruthenian nation, but stressed its belonging to the family of "normal" European nations. In another fragment, despite failing to find a single Ruthenian comment on the Jewish quarter in Lviv, Prokopovych claims that "the presence of the Jewish quarter was for Ruthenian intellectuals a sink of filth, immorality, and criminality" (p. 109).

Prokopovych also believes that the Ruthenians "continued to socialize indoors until the late 1900s" (p. 49). Since in this case "socializing" refers to public celebrations, he is mistaken. Somehow he has managed to ignore the first anniversary of the abolition of serfdom in 1849, perhaps the best-attended Ruthenian public celebration of the nineteenth century, as well as the "national assemblies" of the 1880s and the reburial of Markiiian Shashkevych in 1893, all extremely rich in symbolism and with explicit claims to the city space. Similarly, Ukrainian participation in the exhibition of 1894, with separate pavilions and emphasis on the distinct aspects of the Ruthenian ethnographic tradition, and the work of Ukrainian voluntary associations hardly fit Prokopovych's belief that the Ruthenian population figured only as an integral part of "the multiethnic, yet nominally Polish nation" (p. 259).

These criticisms notwithstanding, the book is a valuable contribution to the history of the city, especially if we take into account the scarcity of serious historical literature on Lviv. It is recommended to everyone interested in Habsburg or modern Ukrainian history and can be used in specialized graduate courses.

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John Czaplicka, ed. *Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2005. 365 pp. U.S.\$39.95 cloth. Distributed by Harvard University Press. Also published as *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 24.

The cover of *Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture* has a photo of a bas-relief of two lions facing each other. Even native Lvivites could have trouble identifying this detail: it is above the triple portal of 6 Kniaza Romana Street, a nineteenth century-building flanked by pairs of elevated, large statues of knights on pedestals glancing glumly down to the sidewalk below, their arms resting at shoulder level on their swords. The building was designed in 1912–14 by Adolf Piller and Roman Völpel, and its details were carved by Stanisław Ryszard Plichal. The photo on the cover was taken by Michael Flier, the current director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI). This fact and this particular image suggest that the aim of this volume is to offer academic perspectives on objects and subjects in Lviv that are not immediately noticeable or familiar to the city's denizens.

The twelve articles in this volume examine various aspects of Lviv, including its architecture, literature, history, and ethnic inter-relations. Several of the articles originated as papers presented at a 1999 conference cosponsored by Harvard University's Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute; others were later added to round out the volume. Several were also published in Ukrainian translation in the Kyiv-based journal *Krytyka* (2002, nos. 7–8).

In his introduction, John Czaplicka previews the volume's contents. He points out that Lviv's multicultural past is preserved in its material heritage, and he calls for the need to focus on cultural interaction in order to provide a balanced view of the city, whose past was filled with inter-ethnic strife. Czaplicka points out that when young Ukrainians tended Polish graves in Lviv in the late 1980s, it was a step towards the reconciliation of a common past. It should also be pointed out, however, that this gesture was also an expression of a common Polish and Ukrainian rejection of the city's Soviet and a search—actively pursued today—for Lviv as it was before 1944.

In his contribution to the volume, Yaroslav Hrytsak points out that Lviv's various ethnic groups historically did not actively interact but, instead, kept to themselves; nonetheless, a mix of their various cultures did arise—for example, in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. In his contribution, Alois Woldan provides a very useful survey of literature about Lviv, demonstrating how one particular event or issue is approached differently by various authors, usually along ethnic-loyal perspectives. There is, however, one important omission in his essay: Woldan does not mention Denys Zubrytsky's *Kronika Miasta Lwowa* (1844), a detail-laden text that was encouraged by, and dedicated to, Leopold von Sacher, Lviv's chief of police, head of the Galician Musical Society, and father of the famous writer Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (whose works Woldan does mention). Zubrytsky's *Kronika*, with its often anti-Polish tenor, had a very large impact on Lviv's Ukrainian community at the time.

Of particular merit in the volume is Ihor Zhuk's elegant article on Lviv's architecture. His flowing narrative provides the reader with the major names and structures in Lviv's rich architectural heritage, singling out the turn of the twentieth century, when Lviv's own distinctive school of architecture developed, as a particularly fruitful era.

Another article on Lviv's architecture, by Jacek Purchla, focuses on the transition from Viennese domination of the city's architectural development, the growth of a local architectural school, and its decline in the interwar era. Purchla neatly divides this period of time into four phases and singles out some of the city's greatest architectural achievements of the mid-nineteenth century, such as Theopil Hansen's marvelous House of Invalids. Whereas Zhuk discusses the contributions of Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish architects, Purchla focuses mostly on Polish achievements, including the emergence of the Zakopane style; consequently he fails to mention the Ukrainian folk elements in several of Ivan Levynsky's unique buildings in Lviv.

The volume's third article on architecture, by Bohdan Tscherkes, is a fascinating account of initial plans to transform the city during the Soviet occupations of 1939–41 and 1944–91. Thankfully, these destructive plans were never realized and few buildings were destroyed, but, as the author points out, with the onset of the Soviet era the entire Lviv school of architecture was eliminated.

Hugo Lane's insightful article on the efforts of Lviv's Polish and Ukrainian elites to construct theatres for their respective communities provides an excellent comparative analysis of the activity of the two groups at the turn of the twentieth century. Lane demonstrates how

goals, and means to realize those goals, differentiated the Poles and the Ukrainians co-inhabiting the city at the time.

Philipp Ther's contribution to the volume presents a new approach to studying Lviv's twentieth-century history, echoing Hrytsak's call to avoid presenting history from strictly nationalist perspectives. Ther argues that during periods of peace—before the First World War and in the interwar period—the city's various ethnic groups were given an opportunity to coexist peacefully. According to him there was no gradual linear growth in inter-ethnic strife in the city; it was the particular effect that the two world wars had in the region that led to tragic conflicts.

In her article, Liliana Hentosh provides a survey of the Polish, Ukrainian, and Armenian Churches in Lviv and shows how ecumenical theories played out in the city.

In his contribution, Waław Wierzbieniec offers an analysis of the Jewish communities in Lviv and describes how parts of them shifted to Polonization and what mechanisms caused these shifts. Wierzbieniec's article is very informative, providing details about how Jews became established in Lviv, how they gradually obtained certain rights there, and about the nature of their relations with their ethnic Polish and Ukrainian neighbours. It would have been interesting if he had also discussed Jewish-Armenian relations in Lviv, especially an account of how command of trade in the city shifted from Armenians to Jews in the fourteenth century.

Soviet-era Lviv is analyzed by Martin Åberg and Padraic Kenney. Åberg argues that the Soviet failed attempts at modernizing and industrializing the city created the homogenous community that led to Ukraine's striving for independence in the late Soviet years. Kenney provides an account of the ways that members of the Lev (Lion) Society were successful with their moderate nationalist initiatives because they focused on culture instead of conflict. His article mentions some of the key individuals involved in the continually growing and active society. (The surname of one such individual, Ihor Kopestynsky, is misspelled Tsopestns'ky.) Particularly perceptive in Kenney's article is the symbolism of the human chain that linked Lviv and Kyiv in January 1990. As the 1990s progressed, Lviv's importance in Ukraine gradually waned, and the city became increasingly marginalized as power became increasingly centralized in Kyiv.

The volume concludes with an engaging article by George Grabowicz. He provides an insightful investigation of the ways in which Lviv figures as the object of narratives of self-assertion for both Poles and Ukrainians. Grabowicz provides analyses of key texts forming the Ukrainian myth in Polish literature and shows how Józef Wittlin successfully captured Lviv's eccentricities in *Moj Lwów* and how that work combines what seemingly cannot be combined. Grabowicz shares Wittlin's take on Lviv as a city of paradoxes—a prevailing myth and yet part of Lviv's reality.

Grabowicz then searches for mythologizations of Lviv in Ukrainian literature. Finding very few examples, he looks at the figure of Hrytsko Chubai as an object of mythmaking in Lviv. It is not Chubai's poetry but his embodiment as an underground Lviv poet that engages this mythmaking. Grabowicz criticizes a former member of Chubai's circle, Yurii Vynnychuk, for his use of kitsch and for his exploitation of nostalgia in building a myth of Lviv. Absent in the article, however, is any mention of Kostiantyn Moskalets's "Zyma u Lvovi," a short story in which the author actively mythologizes Lviv while simultaneously forging an intertextual bond with the above mentioned Chubai circle. This major post-Soviet text on Lviv would have fit particularly well with Grabowicz's discussion on mythmaking in independent Ukraine and on his linking of the late Soviet and post-Soviet eras. Also, Grabowicz mentions the design of Vynnychuk's *Lehendy Lvova* but fails to point out that the design of its first edition was rendered by contemporary Lviv artists Yurii Kokh and Olha Pohribna-Kokh. In what is a

useful example of the mythologization of a Ukrainian Lviv, these artists interlace Vynnychuk's "legends" with caricatures of post-Soviet Lviv's bohemian scene in various period garb. In this manner (absent in subsequent editions of the popular book, with different covers) *Lehendy Lvova* proclaims contemporary Ukraine's right to contribute to Lviv's myth. In it the city's current writers, musicians, actors, and visual artists are presented as "living legends" for today's readers to admire and for future readers to explore.

Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture offers many perspectives on this enigmatic city. Several metaphors for Lviv are presented by its authors: a secret capital (Åberg), a window to the West (Woldan), a testing ground (Hentosh), a peculiar laboratory (Purchla), a grand ocean liner that would shortly suffer shipwreck (Zhuk), a trade haven (Hrytsak), an island (Czaplicka, and Grabowicz via Viktor Neborak.) One volume certainly cannot capture all aspects of the city, and this explains the book's absence of discussions of visual art and music in the city. Nonetheless *Lviv* is of great value. It provides a number of excellent articles focusing on key facets of the city. Lviv is a wealthy subject of analysis that has been largely ignored in English-language publications. This collection makes a major step in filling this gap. Its articles focus mostly on the city's past, a bit on its present, and offer a few glimpses of its potential future. And that future, with the changes that the city is experiencing, is dependent on the city's past.

In the years since these articles were written, Lviv has changed somewhat by slowly accepting and adjusting to its twenty-first-century face as a tourist destination. A walk through the city's centre today reveals several tourist-friendly commercial enterprises utilizing many of the themes the contributors to this volume have focussed on (i.e., Lviv's multi-ethnic character and its legends). Lviv's central Market Square has, in fact, acquired a fairy-talelike character replete with chocolate shops, salon dancing recitals, "olde" beer halls, and girls in period costumes hawking flowers on the square. The square is now presented in a manner which is a conglomeration of the various myths and nostalgic tales describing past life in the city. But the Market Square never actually looked the ways it has been stylized to look today—it was, instead, a central marketplace where daily necessities were sold and the city's administrative centre. Cash-strapped and in search of an identity in today's world, Lviv's (more so than most other Ukrainian cities') immediate future lies in its ability to present itself as a city made up of its past. The various approaches provided in this book attest to that.

Lviv's back cover features a photo—also taken by HURI's director—of streetcar tracks crossing in an unusual matter. They are now gone, having been replaced by straight tracks along which the city's numerous tourist groups can travel more efficiently around town. Today's Lviv is still a peculiar Ukrainian city somewhat detached from the cross-currents of culture, but striving to remain so by finding its current identity in its multicultural past.

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Alexander V. Prusin, *The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870–1992*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. xii, 324 pp. U.S.\$65 cloth.

The dust jacket of Alexander Prusin's book states that "*The Lands Between* investigates the causes and dynamics of conflict in the 'borderlands' of Eastern Europe: the modern Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the western provinces of Byelorussia and Ukraine,

and the republic of Moldova—areas that have changed hands in the course of the twentieth century on several occasions.” It also states that the author “looks at these ‘borderlands’ as a whole.” This last claim is unsustainable.

This is especially clear when one looks at Prusin’s treatment of Ukraine. He discusses Western Ukraine only in the last part of the book. Mostly he is concerned only with the so-called *Kresy*, that is, Galicia, Volhynia, and Transcarpathia, and he studiously avoids mentioning “Ukraine.” There is some discussion of the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) and its conflict with Poland. But there is no explanation that with the fall of the Russian Empire the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) came into being. Prusin merely mentions the Ukrainian Central Rada, the UNR Directory, and “the puppet government,” by which he likely means the Ukrainian State of 1918 headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, and that these polities played an important role in Ukrainian relations with Russia, both revolutionary and Bolshevik, and with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and newly re-established Poland. There is no evidence in the book that Ukraine participated in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; the Treaty of Warsaw (April 1920) between Poland and the UNR is not even mentioned, and the Treaty of Riga (March 1921) is mentioned only briefly. Yet all three had a direct impact on Volhynia and Galicia, and less directly on Bukovyna, Bessarabia, and Transcarpathia. The Piłsudski-Petliura alliance is omitted completely, and there is no mention that Ukrainian troops helped the Poles to defeat the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw.

Not one word is said about the Holodomor or “Great Famine” of 1932–33 in Soviet Ukraine, although it also had a tremendous impact on the Ukrainian communities in Galicia and Volhynia and generally outside the USSR. Had Prusin included Ukraine in his analysis at least to the extent that he did the Baltic republics (Ukraine was, after all, one of the largest of “the lands between”), many things in his story would have become much clearer. Even the map on p. 25 incorrectly shows that the Soviet Union already existed in 1920, when in fact it was created only at the end of 1922. The population statistics provided in the book clearly show that the Ukrainian element was always large and important: in fact, it was almost equal to all of the other nationalities of Prusin’s “borderlands” combined.

Prusin is also quite imprecise when it comes to some widely accepted terms in the social sciences, such as, for example, “nationalization.” At times, he uses it to mean nationalization of property. But he also uses the word as a substitute for Polonization or Russification, and his usage in this sense is left quite obscure and unexplained. Prusin’s use of the “civil war” as a description of the conflicts that erupted between the Poles and the Lithuanians and between the Poles and the Ukrainians is also quite unusual. It becomes particularly confusing when applied to descriptions of conflict between those who served in the police formations under German command and the Soviet partisans during the Second World War. The Polish historian Grzegorz Motyka, a widely recognized authority on Polish-Ukrainian relations, simply called it “a Polish-Ukrainian war” in which both sides committed numerous crimes. Prusin himself appears uncomfortable with this formulation of the “civil war” when he states that these conflicts “transcend the conventional definition of civil war” (p.177), but nevertheless he continues using it.

On the whole, Prusin presents the wartime Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Volhynia in a rather one-sided manner. He does not mention the Polish repressions of the Ukrainians of the Kholm region at the end of 1942 or the plan, confirmed in September 1942 by Gen. Grot-Rowecki, commander of the Polish underground, labeling Ukrainian insurgents as Poland’s foes.

The discussions at the OUN's First Military Conference in October 1942 and recently discovered archival documents indicate that approval of the decision to launch anti-Polish actions was not unanimous among the members of the Ukrainian resistance movement. This is clearly shown by the September 1943 appeal entitled "To the Ukrainian Citizenry" as well as by other documents that have become available recently (see Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy, Kyiv, fond 13, file 372, vol.5, fol. 26; fond 13, file 376, vol. 8, fol. 98; vol. 34, fol. 268; fond 71, list 9, file 22, vol. 3, fol. 341; and others). The creation of the Polish "*placówki*" with German help and their anti-Ukrainian activities also contributed to the hostilities (see *ibid.*, Lutsk, file 2147, fol. 11v).

Contrary to the fact that Ukrainian underground documents never used the hyphenated name OUN-UPA, Prusin feels comfortable with this Soviet invented nomenclature when describing the activities of the OUN and the UPA. He is not alone—there are a large number of individuals who do the same.

"Ukraine" finally appears on a map as part of the name Reichskommissariat Ukraine, but it is still not labeled a "borderland" (p. 163). The Lemko, Sian (Polish: San), Yaroslav (Jarosláv), and Kholm regions, as well as Podlachia and the Kholm region, with approximately 800,000 Ukrainians, which were part of the Nazi Generalgouvernement of Poland (1939–41), are also completely overlooked. These lands remained part post-war Poland, and most of the Ukrainian population there was deported to the USSR. In 1947, during the post-war Polish state's Operation Vistula (Akcja "Wisła"), those regions' remaining Ukrainians were forcibly resettled in the Polish "recovered lands" that were formerly part of Germany. This is especially strange as even on the map of 1992 the former "borderlands" in Ukraine are clearly demarcated (p.245).

The Holocaust receives perhaps the most even-handed treatment in Prusin's book, but he goes a bit too far when he writes "that all the [local] assailants [against the Jews] were volunteers, whose conduct was generated by a range of motives." As Rev. Patrick Desbois (author of *The Holocaust by Bullets*) has clearly shown, there were many who were forced to participate in anti-Jewish actions.

Prusin's book is based almost exclusively on secondary sources, and the material he cites on the Ukrainian question lacks many authoritative publications. In this respect it does not compare favourably with of Timothy Snyder's recent publications on the same regions of Eastern Europe. My critical comments do not mean that Alexander Prusin should have written a different book. But if a monograph's structure and contents are limited or very selective, it should not be surprising that the end result may not be fully satisfactory.

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Mark L. von Hagen. *War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918*. Seattle: Herbert J. Ellison Center for Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies, 2007. xi, 122 pp. U.S.\$24.95 paper. Distributed by University of Washington Press.

This book offers, in its author's own words, a "stereoscopic view" of four occupations that occurred in the Ukrainian lands during the First World War. During that war the Russian

imperial army twice invaded Austria-Hungary, in 1914 and again in 1916, and to various extents occupied the provinces of Galicia and Bukovyna. In response the Central Powers invaded the Russia Empire in 1915 and again in 1917–18), retaking the lost regions and in 1918 eventually occupying most of what had been Russian-ruled Ukraine in agreement with a its “ally,” the government of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Although the occupations of Ukrainian territories (by the Entente Powers, the Russian Volunteer Army, the Red Army, and Polish forces) did not end in 1918, von Hagen decided to limit himself to the time frame of the Great War. He also chose to focus only on the Russian occupations of Galicia, thus leaving out Bukovyna and Russian plans for occupying Hungarian Rus' (Transcarpathia).

Of the four wartime occupations, the first and the fourth—the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1914–15 and, in 1918, the joint German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of what had been tsarist-ruled Ukraine, were the most important. Von Hagen's book is primarily devoted to them. The first occupation challenged the very existence of the Ukrainian national movement and the Uniate Church in Galicia, both of which the Russian authorities considered deviations and artificial creations of Russia's enemies. The primary goal of the Russian occupation of Galicia was to incorporate it into Romanov Empire. Russian nationalists viewed so-called *Prikarpat'skaia Rus'* (Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia) as a part of Russian national territory and part of the “Rurik's legacy,” which had to be reunited with the Russian motherland. On the other hand, the fourth occupation promoted the idea of Ukrainian statehood, albeit in the form of the puppet Ukrainian State governed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. This, however, occurred at a great cost: Austro-German exploitation of Ukraine's natural resources and termination of the creation of a Ukrainian army. The nature of each occupation defined the extent of its intrusion into local affairs.

The history of the occupations is presented here from the perspective of “high political history,” dealing mostly with imperial bureaucrats, central and local political elites, and military establishments. As far as political elites are concerned, von Hagen is at his best in his treatment of Polish elites in Galicia and of Russian elites in the rest of Ukraine (for example, the latter's role in Skoropadsky's coup d'état in 1918). However, von Hagen should have described the Skoropadsky episode more extensively. His book does not revolutionize our knowledge of the occupations in terms of factual material, especially for readers familiar with recent historical studies (e.g., by Aleksandra Bakhturina and Aleksei Miller). Its merit is mostly not because von Hagen presents new facts, but because of his conceptualization. Drawing on several national historiographies (Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, and others), but not following any of them blindly, von Hagen creates a complex and multi-layered picture of events. His study clearly demonstrates that in reality the dividing lines lay not only between the occupiers and the occupied, but also within each of the various sides themselves. Competing agencies, a lack of unity, and personal ambitions plagued the first Russian occupation of Galicia; hidden German-Austrian rivalry was the backstage of the Central Powers' occupation of Ukraine.

Von Hagen's main conclusion is that during the course of the war and through the experience of occupation (frustrating to a degree for both sides, occupiers and occupied alike) all three imperial actors (Petrograd, Berlin, and Vienna), “whether reluctantly or not,” shifted to acknowledging the principle of national self-determination. The occupiers' rhetoric of “national liberation” backfired, argues von Hagen, as it “carried a grave risk of encouraging the disgruntled peoples of one's own multinational empire as well.”

I have two corrections. (1) *Prologue to Revolution* (1967) appears twice in the bibliography, first under its editor, M. Cherniavsky, and again under its author, A. N. Yakhontov;

and (2) the 1916 Brusilov (Lutsk) Offensive did not result in the capture of Lviv by the Russian army, as von Hagen states on p.72. Notwithstanding, Mark von Hagen has produced a very condensed but solid work on one of the most complex yet insufficiently studied topics of the Great War. I highly recommend his book to anyone with an interest in the field and especially to those seeking a quick but thorough introduction to the subject. I hope von Hagen will expand his treatment in further studies of the wartime occupations of Ukraine.

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Vasyl Kuchabsky. *Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923*. Translated by Gus Fagan. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2009. xxix, 361 pp. \$34.95 paper, \$59.95 cloth.

Most English-language monographs and essay collections chronicling the Ukrainian Revolution have drawn their borders in accord with the Treaty of Riga of 1921 that divided the Ukrainian lands between Poland and Bolshevik Russia. That is, they have left out events in Western Ukraine, which was then also known as Eastern Galicia. In fact Eastern Galicia and its Ukrainian neighbour, Bukovyna, were subjects of serial Russian, Austrian, and German occupations during World War I and witnessed the rise and fall of a Ukrainian national movement with significantly different dynamics from those to their east. As we learn more about the revolution and subsequent wars in Central and Eastern Ukraine from new archival sources, we might also compare their experiences in nation building with Western Ukraine's for what they can tell us about broader East European trends of national movements and the impact of the war on the geopolitical transformation of the "borderlands" between Germany and Russia.

Vasyl Kuchabsky's book is a good introduction to the complex military and diplomatic history of the period. It comes to us via strange paths. The English text was fluently translated from the original German of the long rare 1934 edition. Kuchabsky, a Ukrainian historian and eyewitness-participant in the events he describes, died in 1971 in the German Democratic Republic. He was among the first Galician Ukrainians to heed the call to join the Sich Riflemen. He fought in that legion, then part of the Austrian army, on various fronts during World War I, was captured by the Russians, and was held in prison until December 1917. He helped defend Kyiv from the Bolsheviks in early 1918 and later entered Kyiv following the uprising against and overthrow of Pavlo Skoropadsky's conservative would-be Ukrainian monarchy. Following the defeat of the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR), Kuchabsky returned to Lviv, where he was an organizer of the clandestine Ukrainian Military Organization, which led to his spending ten months in a Polish jail. After his release he moved to Germany, where he earned a doctorate in history and Slavic philology at the University of Berlin in 1930. We know these biographical facts about the author thanks to the fascinatingly reconstructed life in the introduction by Oleksandr Pavlyuk, a Ukrainian scholar of the international relations of the period.

And so we might view this book as a scholarly history of the period framed by a memoir of a Ukrainian patriot who participated in some of the key events. (It has very helpful maps to guide readers through the battles.) Kuchabsky did not have access to archives at the time, save for a few valuable published collections of mostly diplomatic documents; he read widely the

available memoir literature in Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian, as well as the publications of Polish, German, and Ukrainian scholars. Kuchabsky reveals much of his scholarly passion in his sarcastic and ironic attacks on Polish historians, who, in his view, persist in perpetuating Polish nationalist myths about Galician Ukrainians as nationally immature and thereby in need of Polish rule. The book is overwhelmingly about the rise and fall of the Western Ukrainian nation-building project in 1918 and 1919 and Western Ukraine's conflict with Poland. It says much less about the conflict with Bolshevism and still less about Romania, which also occupied territory claimed by the Ukrainian movement. The years 1920–23 are treated very briefly in a final chapter.

Kuchabsky provides a detailed military history of the period, including frank assessments of the strength of the ZUNR's Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) at various points and of the enemy Polish and Red armies. Not surprisingly, he highlights the contributions of the UHA to the Ukrainian National Republic's (UNR) struggle for independence. He has also reconstructed the history of UNR and ZUNR political activists and military men in their negotiations with the victorious powers at the Versailles peace negotiations. But his account is frequently interrupted by his own personal opinions about the leading players of the day. He has precious few heroes in his story, among them Symon Petliura (with qualifications) and an ethnic Russian general, Aleksandr Grekov, who ably led the UHA until he was sacked by incompetent and petty superiors.

Kuchabsky has many more villains in his stories, from the "pediocrats" of the Ukrainian Central Rada-UNR Directory socialists to the limited minds of the ZUNR dictator Yevhen Petrushevych and the "Ukrainian State's" would-be monarch, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. The most lengthy "opinions" concern the new leaders of the resurrected Polish state in 1918 who waged a "colonial war" against Ukraine and were consistently intent on eliminating their "Ukrainian problem" through political and eventually cultural Polonization. Still, Kuchabsky acknowledges in several passages that the Poles had many historical advantages over their Ukrainian rivals and demonstrated more will than their eastern neighbors. Behind the Poles, of course, stood France's political leaders and diplomats, who were ready to sell Woodrow Wilson's principles of national self-determination down the river. The only counterweight to the French-Polish "settlement," though even they were ineffective, were British leaders and their diplomatic representatives.

Kuchabsky brings to life the day-to-day existence of Ukrainian revolutionaries and soldiers during 1918 and 1919, especially the chaos and confusion that seemed to reign most of the time. He provides critical perspectives on the activities of several Ukrainian governments, east and west, as they tried to build and hold onto the nation they felt they represented. It is a story of the many opportunities lost by those proto-governments, mostly led by incompetent and limited men. In sum, this volume will be of interest to historians of the revolutionary period, national movements, and eastern Europe more broadly. The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies is to be commended for bringing this volume to an English-speaking audience.

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Myroslav Shkandrij. *Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. xiv, 265 pp. U.S.\$55 paper.

Jewish-Ukrainian relations are generally assumed to be antagonistic, inimical, and combative. All the same, Jews and Ukrainians have lived side by side on the same territory in eastern Europe for hundreds of years. Naturally this means that their respective cultural products, particularly their literature, reflect the presence of their estranged neighbour. Myroslav Shkandrij has set himself the task of describing the Ukrainian half of this cultural reflection, the depiction of Jews in works of Ukrainian literature. But because the relationship is governed by hostility and by what Shkandrij calls the “two solitudes,” the parameters of the description begin with two basic categories, hostile or friendly, hateful or understanding, anti-Semitic or philo-Semitic. It is to Shkandrij’s enormous credit that he tries to give both of these categories serious attention.

Shkandrij’s monograph is constructed chronologically. He begins with the literature of the nineteenth century and surveys a very broad range of works, from Taras Shevchenko’s “Haidamaky” to Mariia Matios’s *Solodka Darusia* (2004). He breaks down the centuries into seven periods: the nineteenth century up to 1880; modernism up to World War I; the early Soviet period, that is, the “*rozstriliane vidrodzhennia*”; interwar Stalinism; World War II and the post-war Stalinist period; the post-Stalin Soviet thaw; and independence. In each of these periods he recounts the most significant social and political developments that impacted relations between Ukrainians and Jews and describes a broad selection of literary works, which he considers as specimens of a general pattern or stereotype that serves as a paradigm for the representation of Jews in Ukrainian literature in the given period.

In the first of these periods, the key paradigm is the “keys to the church” theme, an anti-Semitic myth whose possible causes and origins Shkandrij explores in connection with its sudden reappearance in the early nineteenth century. Shkandrij finds that the folkloric evidence for such anti-Jewish attitudes is likely fabricated, but he also claims that the theme “has some basis in reality” since the commercial relations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries allowed for the closing of a church pending repayment of debts. Of course, regardless of any historical basis, the re-emergence of this theme in the midst of the Ukrainian cultural revival of the nineteenth century is not a matter of recovered memories of historical events, but a reflection of growing national animosity. Shkandrij traces this animosity in a number of works by various writers, particularly Mykola Kostomarov and Panteleimon Kulish, who are “largely responsible for introducing into literature the stereotype of the exploitative, pro-Polish, and anti-Orthodox Jewish *orendar*.”

In the next period, 1881–1914, Shkandrij sees a different dynamic, with Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the political and cultural worlds gravitating toward greater co-operation and mutual respect. Shkandrij finds evidence of this growing rapport in the relatively sympathetic treatment of Jewish characters in the ethnographic theatre of this time, the frequent allusions to biblical themes in the works of Ivan Franko and Lesia Ukrainka, the depiction of Jews as victims of anti-Semitic feelings in the works of such modernists as Ahatanhel Krymsky and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and the appearance of Jewish authors who write in Ukrainian without abandoning their Jewish cultural roots, such as Hryts Kernerenko. But there are also counter-examples, which Shkandrij does not ignore, including Franko’s hostile presentations of Jews as exploiters and the nasty anti-Semitic stories of Olena Pchilka.

According to Shkandrij, the light of Ukrainian-Jewish interaction shines even brighter in the next period, which includes the harmonious co-operation between Ukrainian and Jewish political parties in the short-lived Ukrainian Central Rada. But the weak UNR government witnessed anti-Jewish pogroms, and the early Soviet period bore witness to the creation of the second major theme of perceived Jewish hostility to Ukrainians—the participation of Jews in Soviet oppression of Ukrainians. Like the other major theme, the Jewish *orendar*, this second theme finds expression in a particular character stereotype that will later appear in literary representations, the Jewish Chekist.

Shkandrij devotes a special chapter of his book to Leonid Pervomaisky (1908–1973), a Soviet Jewish-Ukrainian writer whose career as a writer crosses a number of different periods. His early work in the 1920s reflects the general exhilaration of those times, including the depiction of harmonious relations between Ukrainians and Jews. But in the succeeding period Pervomaisky becomes an apologist for Stalinism and writes works that Shkandrij depicts as hostile to the Ukrainian forces fighting for independence after the Revolution of 1917 and insensitive to the massive suffering during the Holodomor. After Stalin's death, and after enduring public ideological attacks both for his Jewish and for his Ukrainian identity, Pervomaisky abandons Stalinism and turns (or perhaps returns) to a "humane, generous, and optimistic spirit" that has since come to characterize his reputation as a writer.

World War II and the Holocaust brought both increased animosity and opportunities for co-operation between Ukrainians and Jews. But neither position is much reflected in literary works. Anti-Semites such as Rostyslav Yendyk and Arkadii Liubchenko were in some measure balanced by the more humane and friendly, though perhaps not philo-Semitic, voices of Yurii Kosach and Yurii Klen.

In the years since Stalin's death, Jewish themes in Ukrainian literature have not generally reflected the spirit of co-operation that developed in the late Soviet period between Jewish and Ukrainian dissidents. Some historical works did arise from the celebration of the 350th anniversary of Khmelnytsky's revolt; there was Dokiia Humenna's portrait of Nazi-occupied Kyiv; and there were, most of all, the voices of the Jewish-Ukrainian writers Moisei Fishbein and Naum Tykhy. But it was not until independence that Jewish themes, for better and for worse, reappeared with regularity in Ukrainian writing. Anti-Semitic propaganda from organizations like the Kyiv-based Inter-regional Academy of Personnel Management (MAUP) have fixated on resurrecting perceived grievances from the past, while serious writers like Yurii Andrukhovych and, particularly, Mariia Matios, have focused on the shared sufferings of Ukrainians and Jews in the twentieth century.

On the whole, Shkandrij's monograph is a valiant and somewhat earnest attempt to lay the groundwork for a verdict on the question of whether Ukrainian literature is basically anti-Semitic or, on the contrary, deeply concerned with representing the various interactions that result from the historical presence of Jews on Ukrainian territory. Whether or not the question, thus put, deserves a serious answer, Shkandrij deserves praise for an impressive, though not exhaustive, catalogue of the various literary appearances of Jewish characters and themes in Ukrainian literature. Moreover, he spends almost as much energy describing the historical events and circumstances of Ukrainian-Jewish interactions in history, without which the literary works would lose their context and thus their significance. In this sense Shkandrij has produced something of a cultural introduction to Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Specialists in Ukrainian literature who are familiar with this subject will still find interesting revelations in this book, but they might experience some disappointment in the simplicity of the literary analyses here. Shkandrij's rather brief study only skims the surface of the various colonial,

deconstructive, semiotic, philosophical, and ethical interpretive approaches that the literature of Ukrainian-Jewish relations begs for. His is largely a straightforward historical approach that examines the issues from the perspective of self-evident virtue. There is little here about the literary modes of “othering,” the various principles of cultural identity, the history of anti-Semitic imagery, trauma narratives, or any of the wide range of sophisticated topics that Shkandrij’s book will hopefully inspire others to explore. There is very much room here to say more, much more.

One class of readers is certain to be disappointed. Extremists on both sides of Ukrainian-Jewish animosities will, no doubt, find Shkandrij’s even-tempered and tolerant approach unacceptable. That is all for the good. It is not that Shkandrij’s judgments are the model of dispassionate wisdom, but they are open, honest, and grounded in the facts he presents. If at times he seems more interested in finding the passages in Ukrainian literature that depict Jews in a positive light than he is in finding another passage of anti-Semitic invective, I am inclined to attribute this to his humanity rather than prejudice. He does not cover up the truth, but he writes in a spirit that reminds us that it is always nobler to find love and humanity in the human heart than it is to catalogue its sins.

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Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern. *The Anti-Imperial Choice: The Making of the Ukrainian Jew*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. xvi, 344 pp. U.S.\$65 cloth.

In this book Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern examines the life stories and works of five Jewish-Ukrainian writers. Although they are not part of the Ukrainian literary canon, their complex hybrid identities serve as a strong testimony to the feasibility of rapprochement between Jews and Ukrainians through literature. Five of the book’s chapters, dealing respectively with Hrysko Kernerenko, Ivan Kulyk, Raisa Troianker, Leonid Pervosmaisky, and Moisei Fishbein, were previously published as articles (mostly in Ukrainian). Petrovsky-Shtern’s contribution lies not only in his comprehensive approach and insights regarding the connections and continuities between these writers, but also in his underlying methodological premise, according to which all five protagonists “broke the established pattern of modernization and refused to acculturate into the imperial societies” (p. 1). The counterintuitive, selfless choice by these writers (especially by Pervomaisky and Fishbein) of anti-imperial Jewish-Ukrainian identities was inevitably fraught with moral and physical suffering. At the same time, however, their choice allowed for the production of unique literary works reflecting a dedication to Ukrainian national aspirations and “their attempts to reconcile Jewish and Ukrainian historical narratives traditionally regarded as incompatible” (p. 23).

In addition to Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation, a motif that figures prominently in the identity formation of Petrovsky-Shtern’s protagonists is that of translation. Throughout their lives they inevitably operated at linguistic and cultural crossroads, oscillating between Yiddish/Hebrew, Ukrainian, Russian, and often other languages. Even more importantly, translation was not just an effective mode of amalgamating the multiple and often disparate facets of identity, but also (most notably, in case of Kulyk and Pervomaisky) an essential means of creative self-expression. Kulyk compiled and edited an anthology of American poetry in Ukrainian translation (1928), while Pervomaisky produced excellent Ukrainian translations of

poems by Heinrich Heine, François Villon, Sándor Petőfi, and Nezāmi-ye Ganjavi, to mention but a few.

Although biographical information about Hrytsko Kernerenko (Grigorii Kerner) is scant, the book's first chapter unveils a story of a Jewish man born in Huliai-Pole in southeastern Ukraine and educated in Munich, who eventually—against all social and personal odds—ended up writing poetry based on three important themes, “love, Ukraine, and Shevchenko” (p. 41). Of particular interest is the book's account of Kernerenko's correspondence with Ivan Franko, whom Kernerenko might have introduced to the works of Sholem Aleichem and Semen Frug. In turn Franko facilitated the publication of Kernerenko's poems and translations in *Literaturno-naukovyj vistykyk*. As Petrovsky-Shtern concludes, Kernerenko, who advocated the use of Ukrainian as a free language, “was not only among the first to start constructing Ukrainian-Jewish identity as a literary narrative and a lifestyle, but also among the first obliquely to underscore its profoundly imaginary nature” (p. 59).

The stories of Ivan Kulyk (the pen name of Izrail Yudovych Kulyk) and Raisa Troianker are no less intricate than Kernerenko's. Troianker's purported relationships with Valeriiian Polishchuk and Volodymyr Sosiura, her poetic celebration of erotic passion and sensuous portrayal of the body, and her allegedly pioneering multi-faceted depiction of the Jewish *shtetl* (p. 131) are just a few important milestones from this extraordinary woman's personal quest for Jewish-Ukrainian synthesis. Eventually, however, Troianker turned to writing Russian poetry and allowed the imperial discourse to silence her Jewish-Ukrainian voice. Kulyk's fate was even more tragic: notwithstanding his “genuine and sincere [belief] in the harmonious fusion of communism and Ukrainian revivalism” (p. 78) and his unyielding commitment to Marxism and proletarian internationalism, in 1937 he was accused of anti-Soviet activities and executed.

Petrovsky-Shtern's comparison of Troianker to Oksana Zabuzhko (p. 162) on the basis of “sex” and “fieldwork” is, however, slightly far-fetched; and his portrayal of Kulyk as a victim and an excellent poet is not without some blind spots. In a recently published article, historian Oleksandr Rublov presents Kulyk in a somewhat different light. Although both Petrovsky-Shtern and Rublov refer to the memoirs of Nadia Surovtsova, a poet and Gulag prisoner, who knew Kulyk personally and whom he blatantly refused to help after she was arrested, Rublov offers a more revealing quote from Surovtsova, casting doubt on Kulyk's erudition and education.

The last two chapters of the book are dedicated respectively to Leonid Pervomaisky (the pen name of Illia Hurevych) and Moisei Fishbein. Pervomaisky's story is metaphorically presented through the prism of one of his “key ideas: the voice of a speechless victim is the voice of the ultimate truth” (p. 201). Petrovsky-Shtern's analysis of Pervomaisky's prose, poetry, and plays, as well as the depiction of the hardships he endured (most notably, a slanderous campaign against him led by Mykola Sheremet, to whom he responded with a biting satirical verse) all testify to the fact that in almost everything Pervomaisky accomplished as a writer and translator he spoke for those whose voices were silenced by violence, famines, and the Holocaust. Finally, Fishbein, whom Petrovsky-Shtern's author knows personally, is portrayed—through predominantly religious imagery—as a self-proclaimed Ukrainian messiah from the western Ukrainian city of Chernivtsi, a redeemer of the Ukrainian language, and a prophet-follower of Lesia Ukrainka. Supported early in his career by Mykola Bazhan and Dmytro Pavlychko, today Fishbein has received wide critical acclaim as he continues writing philosophical and lyrical verse, investing himself “in the

Ukrainian linguistic revival” and rigorously pursuing “the purity of the Ukrainian language” (p. 274).

The typos and stylistic infelicities in the book—e.g., choose instead of chose (p. 11), loose instead of lose (pp. 76 and 113), Knut Gamsun instead of Hamsun (p. 52), “rustic peasants” (p. 67), “technical flows” instead of flaws (p. 130), and the overuse of “to pen”—are few and far between and by no means mar its first-rate quality. What is somewhat alarming, however, is Petrovsky-Shtern’s deliberate decision to transliterate proper names on the basis of “shifting angles” (p. xiii), which, despite the intention of giving a fair perspective, leads to confusion. For anyone who may not be familiar with different Ukrainian, Russian, or other spellings, this approach creates a hodge-podge of indecipherable names—e.g., Dnipro vs Dnieper vs Dnepr, Kyiv but Kievan Rus', Halychyna vs Galicia, Lviv vs Lvov vs Lwów vs Lemberg, Kharkiv vs Kharkov, Irpin vs Irpen. A scholar so highly attuned and sensitive to linguistic and cultural nuances as Petrovsky-Shtern should not hesitate to become a trend-setter in jettisoning deeply entrenched and anachronistic Russian imperialist spellings in favor of the Ukrainian transliteration system. Another related concern is that while Petrovsky-Shtern offers his own excellent translations of excerpts from the discussed literary works, including the Ukrainian originals would have allowed for greater appreciation of their quality.

The publication of *The Anti-Imperial Choice* is an outstanding event not only for those who specialize or are interested in Ukrainian literature, but for the entire field of Slavic and East European studies as well. It is symbolic that the year 2009 also saw the appearance of Myroslav Shkandrij’s *Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity*. Both studies challenge from a literary perspective the idea of Jewish-Ukrainian antagonism. In addition, by outlining the emergence of the Jewish-Ukrainian tradition, Petrovsky-Shtern contributes further to the efforts begun by Taras Hunczak, Howard Aster, and Peter Potichnyj to promote “a cross-fertilizing dialogue” (p. 9) between Jews and Ukrainians.

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Peter Galadza, ed. *Unité en division: Les lettres de Lev Gillet, «Un moine de l'église d'orient,» à Andrei Sheptytsky, 1921–1929*. Paris: Parole et silence, 2009. 328 pp. €25 paper.

Rev. Peter Galadza provides us with a compilation of the letters of Lev Gillet (1893–1980) as a monk of the Eastern Church. Preserved in the Sheptytsky archives and encompassing the years 1921–29, the letters offer significant insights into a number of issues relating to the religious and political affairs of the day. They clearly place in relief the spiritual journey of Fr. Gillet and, perhaps more importantly for Ukrainian specialists, demonstrate the pan-European significance of Andrei Sheptytsky (1865–1944) as metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

The two introductory essays, by Rev. Galadza and Antoine Arjakovsky respectively, provide valuable contexts for the letters. Galadza’s is a translation of an article first published in *Logos* 43–45 (2002–2004) and provides the historical background for the letters themselves. Arjakovsky’s provides a slightly broader perspective, placing Gillet and Sheptytsky’s relationship in the context of the nascent Catholic ecumenical movement, with particular attention to one of the Catholic Church’s leading figures of the day, the Benedictine Dom Lambert Beauduin (1873–1960). Both pieces are invaluable for helping the reader to

comprehend the significance of the epistolary compilation, especially given that the letters only provide us with half of the ongoing dialogue.

Gillet's turn from Roman Catholicism, first to the Greek Catholic Church and then to Russian Orthodoxy (1928), is chronicled in the compilation. Gillet is moved by compassion for Russian émigrés struggling in Western Europe and fascinated by oriental monasticism, which he regards as flourishing in both Ukraine and Russia. In a number of letters from 1925 he extolls the eastern monastic experience over Western monasticism as truly evangelical (p. 78). However, Gillet's attempts to develop a fledgling eastern-style monastic community are stymied for a number of reasons: by financial challenges, by a lack of understanding by local Roman Catholics, and most significantly by the Vatican's agenda for Eastern Europe. The Vatican regarded the Slavic Orthodox world as the object of missionary activity for the Jesuits (p. 227); this was a plan entrusted to the secretly ordained Bishop Michel d'Herbigny, SJ (1880–1957). Implicitly the letters present two different perspectives on working towards the reunion of the Churches of the East and the West. D'Herbigny and the Vatican's approach, even including the later *Ostpolitik*, represents a unity built "from above," so to speak, both structurally and hierarchically. Gillet's route, which Sheptytsky supported, was one of fundamental Christian unity: a unity of prayer and human reconciliation, reminiscent of Cardinal John Henry Newman's *cor ad cor loquitur*. Gillet's inroads into building a renewed union were, like Sheptytsky's, rooted in sincere human relationships, actual expressions of generosity towards "the other," and a profound Christian humility.

Gillet's circles in France also provide for insights into attempts at deepening Russian-Ukrainian relations. In 1927 Russian monarchists use him as an intermediary to approach Sheptytsky to commence ongoing meetings with Western representatives to deepen mutual understanding and possible co-operation (p. 144). The degree to which Sheptytsky was regarded as open to co-operation with the Russian émigré community is further indicated by the high esteem he enjoyed within the Parisian Russian Orthodox circle headed by Bishop Evlogii Georgievsky (1868–1946), formerly the bishop of Kholm eparchy. Even though the community of St. Serge in Paris was rather closed to Catholics, it welcomed a visit from Sheptytsky in 1925 (p. 190). Gillet straddles the divide between Orthodox and Catholics and between Russia and Western Europe, but he does so because he consciously follows the example provided by Metropolitan Sheptytsky bishop."

In the end Gillet chose to enter the Russian Orthodox community centred on the Parisian Institute of St. Serge. He did so because he attested that he found Jesus Christ more in Orthodoxy than in Roman Catholicism (p. 271). Nonetheless he maintained his devotion to "my bishop" (p. 284), and all indications are that the great metropolitan continued to view Gillet as his spiritual child.

The value of this volume not only lies in the text of the letters. Galadza has provided a great service to all students of Catholic-Orthodox relations during this period by extensively footnoting the letters and providing valuable information about all the figures mentioned in the letters. The text therefore serves as a virtual encyclopedia of background information. It will be a helpful tool for many and serve as a wonderful complement to Elisabeth Behr-Sigel's exhaustive and authoritative biography of Gillet.

Timothy Snyder. *Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. xxvi, 347 pp. U.S.\$20 paper, U.S.\$38 cloth.

Timothy Snyder has produced another brilliant book. It is very well written, original, exciting, full of fascinating details, and reads like a spy story. Yet *Sketches from a Secret War* constitutes a piece of solid and erudite scholarship, supported by meticulous research in many archives and libraries. Snyder, a professor of history at Yale University, had previously published several important works on the borderlands of East Central Europe, and this book is based on true scholarly experience and penetrating knowledge of the field.

The main motif is a life story of Henryk Józewski (1892–1981), a scion of a Polish family from Ukraine, a painter, an intellectual, a politician, and a close assistant to his great mentor, Józef Piłsudski. Raised in three languages and cultures, Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian, Józewski was an uncompromising enemy of Communism and an indefatigable promoter of the non-Russian East European nations' political collaboration. According to Piłsudski, Józewski, and their milieu, only by working together would these nations be able to stop tsarist and Bolshevik imperialism and save their freedom.

After a short prologue, devoted to the book's structure, primary sources, and goals, Snyder describes Józewski's early years, his involvement in the secret Third (Eastern or Ukrainian) Command of the Polish Military Organization (POW) from 1914, his participation in the government of Symon Petliura's Ukrainian National Republic as a vice-minister of internal affairs, his contribution to the Polish-Ukrainian march on Kyiv in 1920 and to the 1921 Ukrainian operation against Soviet Ukraine, and his retreat to private and artistic life in the early 1920s.

The next part of the book, "An Artful Ascent," describes Józewski's return to politics after Piłsudski's coup d'état in 1926. In 1928 Józewski became the governor (*wojewoda*) of Volhynia, a province ethnically dominated by the Ukrainians, and tried to build Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation there based on toleration of Ukrainian culture and language. Attempting to convince the Ukrainians that Poland would be a better option for them than the Bolsheviks, Józewski became one of the directors of Poland's little cold war against the Communist power in Ukraine and one of the organizers of the Promethean Project, which encouraged nationalist movements inside the Soviet Union. In the book's next part, "A Political Descent," Snyder depicts the failure of the Polish anti-Soviet spying and propaganda operations in Soviet Ukraine and of the "Volhynian Experiment." After Piłsudski's death in 1935, Józewski lost support for his unconventional, in the Polish context, national-minority policies. In 1938 he was moved as a governor to the central Polish Łódź province, a region completely foreign to his interests and experience. The final part of the book, "The Local World War," is devoted to Józewski's last year before World War II, his activities in Polish resistance against the Germans, and, after 1945, against the Soviets. Arrested in 1953, he spent several years in jail. He returned to his artistic career in the mid-1950s.

For Snyder, Józewski's life story is a pretext to show numerous phenomena linked to the history of Poland, Ukraine, and Poland's eastern borderlands in general, as well as to Soviet Communism and both World Wars. Following the vicissitudes of Józewski's *vita*, we read about the Polish Socialist Party, Piłsudski's activities and milieu, the Polish Communists, the eastern borderland intelligentsia, Polish and Soviet intelligence operations, Sovietization, collectivization, and famine in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Polish nation-building projects, modernism, nationalism, and anti-Semitism, Stalin's revolution of the 1930s, the objectives of Poland's foreign and national minority policies, the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches, Soviet and German

policies regarding Poland during World War II, Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Volhynia, the Polish underground during and after the war, women's special role in the resistance, the Sovietization of Poland after 1945, and the general turning points in East European history. Frequently Józewski's life almost disappears into the background and the context becomes the main story. The text is dense but full of interesting details, a mixture of micro and macro views based on primary sources that have become available only recently. It offers insights into topics completely unknown to most readers and helps us to understand the Gordian knot of the East European borderlands.

Like most superb books, *Sketches from a Secret War* is stimulating and provoking. It encourages asking questions and may lead to interesting discussions. Most likely, to some readers, Snyder's interpretation of Józewski's *vita* and Polish-Ukrainian relations look romanticized. One may even suspect that Snyder subconsciously avoided topics that are not compatible with his romantic vision. He meticulously analyzes dozens of phenomena related to Polish-Ukrainian relations. Yet, in the entire book there are only several scattered sentences devoted to the 1918–19 war between Poland and Western Ukrainian National Republic. Some historians believe that this was Europe's last romantic war. They write about Polish and Ukrainian officers, former colleagues from the Austrian Army, socializing between battles. Others, however, claim that the war was particularly cruel and vicious, became a model of a bloody ethnic conflict between neighbors, and poisoned Polish-Ukrainian relations in such a way that no experiment in Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation could repair the damage. The Western Ukrainian government-in-exile formed a strong anti-Polish lobby, and its activities led to the anti-Polish involvement of many Ukrainians during World War II. Does Snyder avoid this topic just like the entire Eastern Galician issue for some particular reason? Perhaps this is why the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) pops up a bit surprisingly in the middle of the book, after all the chapters devoted to harmonious Polish-Ukrainian anti-Soviet activities.

Snyder writes, of course, that many criticized Józewski's "Volhynian Experiment," but it would be interesting to read more about the critical arguments of the Polish National Democrats, Communists, conservatives, and various Ukrainian political groups. Maybe this would help to explain better why the anti-Polish Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA) genocidal operations took place mostly in Volhynia and not in Galicia or in any other regions, where nobody experimented with Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. Some may think that Snyder got fascinated with Józewski or with the Piłsudski camp in general and this is why *Sketches from a Secret War* may resemble works by Piłsudskiite historians, such as Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski. It is true that Józewski was a captivating figure, but did he really fit in his era? Maybe, like Piłsudski and the disappearing Polish gentry of the eastern borderlands, he was intellectually and mentally rooted in the nineteenth century and did not manage to adjust to the twentieth century, the era of totalitarianisms and wars of annihilation. Is this why Snyder's picture of World War II is sketchy, compared to his treatment of the 1920s?

Similar questions could be multiplied, for *Sketches from a Secret War* is saturated with controversial issues. But this does not change the fact that Snyder's book is an instant classic and no one interested in the history of Polish-Ukrainian-Soviet relations can ignore it. The book should also be an encouragement to many historians, not only from Eastern Europe, who specialize in local problems but believe that they are too complicated and too hermetic to introduce them to Western readers. Snyder has proven that even the most difficult and unknown issues can be clearly explained and presented in a fascinating way.

Lynne Viola. *The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin's Special Settlements*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. xxvi, 278 pp. U.S.\$19.95 paper.

Most works on the Stalinist terror's penal mechanisms focus on the executions and the extensive network of labour camps known as the Gulag. Professor Viola has written the first book (originally published in cloth in 2007) in English on an often-neglected component of this system—the “forgotten archipelago” of special settlements for those sentenced to internal exile. Ukrainian specialists will find Viola's book particularly important, because the Stalinist state first developed the web of special settlements to accommodate mass deportations of “kulaks” during collectivization. Ukrainian peasants constituted a large share of the original “special settlers.”

Like the transition to wholesale collectivization, the policy of “liquidating the kulaks as a class” was an ad hoc decision. Stalin and his lieutenants decided the fate of the deported peasant families as an afterthought, when the first trains loaded with the exiles were already in transit. The deputy head of the secret police, Genrikh Yagoda, came up with the concept of “colonization villages,” which would be a self-sufficient form of penal servitude and at the same time assist with the economic development of the remote regions. The first on the list of such regions was the Russian republic's Northern Territory, with its centre in Arkhangelsk and its northern reaches extending into the Arctic Circle. Within the first wave of kulak deportees, Ukrainians “accounted for the lion's share of the Northern exiles” (p. 71). Because of the harsh conditions in this forbidding region and total neglect on the part of the local authorities, even official estimates put the 1930 mortality rate among the special settlers in the North at “no less than 15 percent” (p. 115).

Moreover, in the spring of 1930, when Stalin hypocritically called for the correction of mistakes that were made during all-out collectivization, the first secretary of the Northern Region, S. A. Bergavinov, argued against releasing Ukrainians. Influenced by his civil-war experiences in Ukraine, Bergavinov insisted that there could be few mistakes with classifying Ukrainian peasants as kulaks. Even if their socio-economic status had been determined incorrectly, “those who came from ‘bandit’ stock, especially from border areas, represented a danger” (p. 71). Yet Bergavinov's idea to turn his region into a “wooden Donbass” (p. 65) by developing the forestry industry with the help of slave labour did not quite work, because the undeveloped infrastructure could not accommodate larger numbers of exiles. (Bergavinov was executed as an “enemy of the people” in 1937.)

Subsequent convoys of deportees from Soviet Ukraine and elsewhere were therefore channeled to Siberia, the Urals, and Kazakhstan. These peasant exiles were used as slave labour on a large scale during the construction of the world's largest steel mill in Magnitogorsk. Available official data from 1930 and 1931 put the total number of deportees from Ukraine at 63,817 families (p. 195). Back in the Ukrainian republic, the secret police reported a “movement” developing in thirty-two rural districts for the return of mistakenly dispossessed fellow villagers. Family members and friends of the exiled sent petitions, dispatched delegations, and even involved some rural soviets in their efforts to help the deportees (p. 121). Eventually the authorities allowed the release of children under fourteen to the care of their relatives. In spite of the system of collective responsibility instituted in the special settlements, peasants also fled en masse; as many as 215,856 had gone missing by 1933 (p. 151). The special settlements' porous borders fueled Stalin's paranoia about escaped kulak saboteurs being everywhere, and this led directly to the “anti-kulak operation” of 1937, when

46,215 people in the special settlements and escapees were arrested. Most of them were executed (p. 165).

The artificial famine of 1932–33 also took a terrible toll on the peasant exiles in all corners of the Soviet Union. The statistics are incomplete, with the number of deaths in the Northern Territory in 1933 fixed at 14,896, and in all the special settlements in 1932 and 1933 at 241,355 (pp. 140–41). Viola also shows that the famine became a turning point in the history of Stalinist penal institutions: henceforth the state saw the special settlements as a drain on resources. Consequently the Soviet authorities switched their focus to developing prison camps managed directly by that the secret police managed directly, and they soon overtook the special settlements as the principal penal institutions.

At the start of the Soviet-German War in 1941, the special settlements contained some 930,000 exiles, with one-half of them toiling in industry and the other half split between forestry and agriculture. In April 1942, however, the state began conscripting men from the special settlements into the army while simultaneously emancipating their families. In 1945 all of the remaining exiled kulaks were granted full citizen's rights, but they were not allowed to leave their places of exile without official permission until 1954. The stigma of being an exiled kulak or a kulak child remained with them until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

One of the very few drawbacks of this excellent book is that it focuses almost exclusively on exiled peasants or the original special settlers. However, beginning in the mid-1930s the settlements also included significant numbers of exiled urban "undesirables" (both political prisoners and criminal) and of victims of the so-called ethnic deportations. Viola mentions briefly that during 1939 and 1940 forced deportations from "Poland" "restocked the special settlements with a new generation of exiles" (p. 168), but she does not elaborate on what happened to these newcomers or how the changing population of exiles changed the workings of the system.

Lynn Viola has done the profession a great service by writing the first study in English on this important and little-known aspect of the Stalinist Terror. It is remarkably well written and will win favour with the general reader as well.

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Halyna Hryn, ed. *Hunger by Design: The Great Ukrainian Famine and Its Soviet Context*. Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2008. xii, 150 pp. U.S.\$24.95 paper. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

The Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University (hereafter HURI) published this book to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33. The content is based partly on a symposium held in October 2003. It is sorely needed: there has been very little published of monograph length in English since the appearance of Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow*, in 1986, itself a result of a scholarly project initiated by HURI.

For over fifty years the Soviet authorities concealed the famine from the public, but still it is difficult to distance oneself from the enormity of the crime that Stalin and his subordinates carried out. That fact also makes it difficult to produce objective and detached books and articles. This volume is a fine beginning. All of the authors herein have produced original research and offer balanced conclusions. Moreover their work covers not only Ukraine, but

also Kazakhstan and the Urals, and thus this book offers a comparative perspective that allows the reader to draw some conclusions about which events were common to all and which were unique to Ukraine.

As Lubomyr Hajda notes in his introduction, much has happened since 1986, including the opening of former Soviet archives and the decision by the Ukrainian and some international governments to recognize the Famine—now known officially as the Holodomor—as an act of genocide based on the UN definition of 1948.

Terry Martin's paper at the symposium could not be published here for contractual reasons. Two others, by Nicolo Panciola and Gijs Kessler, were published in an earlier volume of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* and are reproduced without changes. Another, by Sergei Maksudov, continues a study that originated in the 1980s. Thus the volume does not contain a great deal that is new. Nevertheless it contains some fascinating insights and valuable information.

There are a number of problematic areas in Famine/Holodomor research, of which two need to be highlighted here. The first is the question of numbers. In his article on the collectivization-famine in Kazakhstan, Nicolo Picolo wisely comments that the number of victims will never be known precisely. No one counted victims. The Kazakhs, as herders with a sizeable contingent of nomads, might represent a special case. But the numbers issue would cause confusion for an uninformed reader.

Thus Andrea Graziosi, in a well-argued and authoritative paper, accepts the use of the tag of genocide but cites a death toll in Ukraine in 1932–33 of 3.5–3.8 million and several hundred thousand in the North Caucasus, which contained a majority population of ethnic Ukrainians. In the following article, Hennadii Boriak of the Institute of Ukraine's History of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and formerly Ukraine's chief archivist, maintains that available documents encompass three million deaths, which is only about *one-third* of the total. Next, Maksudov, in his lengthy chronological account that takes up a large portion of the book, states that the losses of ethnic Ukrainians were 4.1 million—a figure close to that of Graziosi.

These discrepancies lead into the second issue, namely the politicization of the Famine/Holodomor. In his eloquent essay George G. Grabowicz deals with the question in part. He notes the absence of a monument similar to the one for Vietnam casualties in Washington, and the impossibility of conveying the mass scale of Ukraine's tragedy. He takes issue justifiably with "famine deniers," particularly journalists and scholars writing even as late as 2003, many of which attacked Conquest's book, and concludes that today the case for genocide is "incontrovertible." Boriak is in agreement but bemoans the unfortunate practice—it occurred in Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow* and in the 1985 Canadian film about the Famine, *Harvest of Despair* directed by Slawko Nowytski—of substituting photographs of the famine of 1921–22 because of the dearth of available photographs from 1932–33.

Indeed, the case for genocide, especially given the broad UN definition, is very strong, and Boriak does a service to research with the disclosure of the document found in the Odesa State Archive (reprinted in this book) showing how the authorities removed death registration books from the village councils, after which they became classified material of district executive committees. Several authors also show convincingly that although there was widespread hunger and starvation—Kessler offers the example of the three mainly ethnic Russian oblasts of Cheliabinsk, Ob-Irtysh, and Sverdlovsk in the Urals—only in Ukraine was there a mass famine that had an anti-national component.

Nevertheless, the politicization of the Famine is not unique to the Soviet side. It would have been useful for Grabowicz in particular to round out his article by applying the same investigative approach to the actions of the Yushchenko government and the Ukrainian

diaspora, both of which may have hindered rather than aided research by inflating the number of victims (it has risen as high as 10 million in recent reports and documentaries, including several YouTube clips) and trying to direct the course of research.

During his time as president, Yushchenko attempted to make genocide denial a criminal offense. The lamentable practice of competitive victimization, postcard petitions, as well as inflation of the number of victims may help to explain why, as Grabowicz notes, large numbers of Ukraine's inhabitants still deny that genocide took place. Many regard the discussion as a political campaign.

Overall, however, this book is a valuable companion to Conquest's book and to the volumes of eyewitness testimony issued by the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine in the late 1980s, under the direction of the late James E. Mace. Boriak reveals that the entire archives of materials on the Famine in Ukraine contain 70,000–80,000 documents in some 2,000 collections and fonds. Many were destroyed, but there are certainly enough for researchers to produce a series of books. This HURI volume should serve as a suitable clarion call to Western researchers.

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Serhii Kokin and Marc Junge, editors. *Velykyi teror v Ukraini: "Kurkulska operatsiia" 1937–1938 rr.* Parts 1–2 (2 vols.). Kyiv: Vydavnychiy dim "Kyievo-mohylianska akademiia," 2010. 614 and 598 pp. UAH100 cloth.

These two volumes stem from the Russian-Ukrainian-German joint research project on "Stalinism in the Soviet Provinces, 1937–1938: Mass Operation No. 00447," which has already resulted in a number of collections of documents and research monographs. *Velykyi teror v Ukraini* is of considerable importance, and its publication is to be welcomed. It contains some 450 archival documents (mainly from the archive of the Security Service of Ukraine [SBU, the Ukrainian successor to the KGB and NKVD]) and dozens of statistical diagrams and analytical essays. True to the mission of this project, these volumes provide not only documents from the central archives in Kyiv and Moscow but also from oblast archives in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, and other parts of Ukraine. Attention to the oblasts is based on the premise that a full account of Stalin's mass terror is only possible through a detailed analysis of how it was actually implemented on the ground. This is, as the editors admit, a "roundabout way" (*obkhidnym shliakhom*, 1: 6) of explicating the historical event, but it does have the merit of complementing Moscow-based views with provincial perspectives.

The documents herein shed much light on the concrete process of mass terror in Ukraine. Kokin and Junge concentrated on the so-called "kulak operation" (based on NKVD Order 00447 of July 1937), a part of Stalin's repressive campaign known as the "Great Terror." Through this operation, 121,994 people were arrested, and of them 70,868 were executed in Ukraine. Far from all of the repressed were kulaks. Many common criminals and "other counter-revolutionary elements" were terrorized en masse in this operation. In 1938 in particular, the ratio of those repressed as "other counter-revolutionaries" rose sharply. There is no evidence that Ukraine as a Soviet republic suffered disproportionately. If anything, proportionately speaking Ukraine as a whole suffered somewhat less: 121,994 people repressed in Soviet Ukraine account for about 18 per cent of the total repressed in the USSR, whereas the republic accounted for almost 20 per cent of the all-Union population in 1937.

This is the reason why, in their analytical essay, Junge and Bonwetsch state that although they have not found reliable statistical data showing national characteristics of the kulak in Ukraine (and the USSR), Ukraine was not terrorized disproportionately (2: 424). They might also have noted, however, that a very large number of people were repressed as members of Ukrainian “nationalist counter-revolutionary organizations.” To be sure, numerous Russians were repressed as “monarchists” and “White Guards.” Yet were there any cases in which Russians were arrested as “Russian nationalists” at the time? It is unlikely. In this sense, Junge and Bonwetsch’s assertion that Ukraine was “a microcosm of the Soviet Union” (2: 420) is difficult to accept.

The most significant challenge presented by these volumes is that the editors separate the “kulak operation” completely from the “national operations.” For reasons of analysis, the disaggregation may be understandable, but more effort to integrate the “kulak operation” into the Great Terror is necessary. The result is that the analysis is self-contradictory. Junge states that the “kulak operation” reflected the Soviet government’s desire to cleanse the country of individuals whom the state considered potentially hostile and disloyal (1: 425). Yet in an analytical essay written with Bonwetsch, he goes out of his way to try to show that the “kulak operation” was meant to be a tool of “social engineering,” a “turn from the protection of cities especially important to the regime to the social and economic stabilization of the countryside by way of penal measures” (2: 424). They emphasize that the threat of war was not an important factor at least until early 1938, and that in any case it was not a decisive factor. Unfortunately they do not ask why Stalin wanted to “stabilize the countryside” by such extreme measures as mass killings. Moreover, when one examines individual case files, one sees very little practical difference between the “kulak operation” and the “national operations.” Did it make any difference, for instance, whether a Polish peasant in Ukraine was executed as a kulak or a Pole? Hardly.

Oddly, for this reviewer, Ukrainian historiography is not integrated into the two volumes: some important works on terror in Ukraine are missing. Even though *Velykyi teror v Ukraini* was published by the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy publishing house, its two *retsenty* are Russian historians from Novosibirsk, one of whom is also a contributor to an essay in volume two. No specialist of Ukraine seems to have reviewed the manuscript. That being said, both volumes’ strength is clear: they have made important documents readily available. They should be read widely by the community of scholars in the field.

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John Czaplicka, Nida Gelazis, and Blair Ruble, eds. *Cities after the Fall of Communism: Reshaping Cultural Landscapes and European Identity*. Washington, DC, and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. x, 368 pp. U.S.\$65 cloth.

The Second World War brought about the deaths of tens of millions, the devastation of the world economy, the forcible movement of millions of people across continents, and the reconfiguration of Europe’s borders and national homelands, especially in East Central Europe. Mass deportations, mass expulsions, and genocide changed the rural and urban landscapes of this region. (For an excellent overview of these forced migrations, see Phillip Ther and Ana Siljak, eds., *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–*

1948 [Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2001]). Polish Wilno, for example, became Vilnius, Lithuania's new capital. Breslau and Stettin, which were German cities, became Wrocław and Szczecin, cities in Poland's mythologized "Recovered Lands." Poland's Lwów, a city contested by Ukrainians in the interwar period, became Lviv, the unofficial capital of Western Ukraine. Prussia's Königsberg became the Russian Federation's Kaliningrad.

Not only did the international borders encompassing these cities change, new national groups supplanted the old ones and the populations of East Central Europe fell under the post-war Soviet sphere of influence for nearly all of the next five decades. In this Cold War period the Soviet Union created a new world order based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and Russian national interests. Further, the Communist authorities established a single interpretation of the pre-Communist past. They ignored the complex prewar urban, multiethnic, and multicultural legacies in their official histories and soon excluded them from public memory. Only individual memories and the unique architectures of Lviv, Tallinn, Vilnius, Wrocław, Szczecin, and Kaliningrad silently challenged this cleansed past.

John Czaplicka, Nida Gelazis, and Blair Ruble produced this superb multi-authored collection of essays examining the post-Communist response to these post-war changes in eleven cities in five countries—Russia (Novgorod, Kaliningrad), Poland (Wrocław, Łódź, and Szczecin), Ukraine (Lviv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sevastopol), Estonia (Tallinn), and Lithuania (Vilnius). With the collapse of the Communist order, the residents of these cities encountered long-term economic declines and radical political transformations. In light of these traumatic experiences, how did these cities' leaders and populations interpret (or reinterpret) the symbolic and material influences of the past in order to orient themselves to the present or to their anticipated future? How did these predominantly mono-ethnic cities now deal with the multinational diversities of their pasts? More importantly, how would they now deal with their relationship to "Europe"?

Influenced by Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost, perestroika, and democratization in the late 1980s, many cities began celebrating different anniversaries than those memorialized in the Communist past. Many changed the language of various public signs, renamed Soviet-era street names, and restored architectural monuments, including churches and the housing quarters of the vanquished peoples that existed before the Soviet era. They also purged Communist symbols, statues, and plaques honouring Lenin and other prominent Soviet leaders, and erected new monuments. But the commemorations did not just bring back the old traditions of the new majority populations. Tallinn's embrace of postmodernist architecture and urban design, for example, also represented a sharp break with the Soviet past (see Jorg Hackmann's article, pp. 10–36).

Of the above-mentioned cities in this collection, Novgorod, Lviv, Tallinn, Vilnius, Wrocław, Łódź, and Szczecin led this anti-Communist schism. In some cities, such as Vilnius, a new local master narrative emerged within the framework of an open discourse, where all citizens participated and where all reached a consensus. In other cities, such as Wrocław, each resident "carries his or her own version ... in his or her mind. Everyone can pick from a diverse local history—whatever suits. Today, all of the city's monuments, both old and new, do not collectively convey a single simple message." Thus Wrocław, according to Gregor Thum, "has become a postmodern place" (p. 99).

Yet in other cities, such as Sevastopol, the post-Communist elites and local populations retained the old local, pro-Russian master narratives with a few, minor modifications. Most importantly, not all cities (as exemplified by Kharkiv) have ruptured their ties with the

Communist era. Each of these eleven cities possessed, and still retains, different urban political cultures and sets of self-perceptions.

Building on this heterogeneity, the post-Communist period accentuated these differences. In addition to the length of time under Russian or Soviet rule, these eleven cities provided a diverse set of responses to the existential questions posed above. Generally most of these cities chose either a “European turn” or a “local turn” (p. 10).

Collective memory incorporates both the diverse social memories of a people’s lived experiences and the historical memory of the past. Social memories are not uniform or static. Most importantly, they do not endure. With each successive decade, social memories erode and then disappear. A learned historical memory shaped by the writing of history and by images from the past then replaces social memories. (See Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992].) In free societies, the historical memory incorporates a diversity of views. In unfree societies governments attempt to sculpt the body of historical memory on a procrustean bed in order to make it conform to the ruling party’s interpretation of the world.

The greater the length of time within the Soviet sphere, the greater the sculpting; or so it appears. Novgorod, Odesa, Sevastopol, and Kharkiv belonged to the Soviet sphere from 1920; Vilnius, Wrocław, Tallinn, Kaliningrad, Lviv, Łódź, and Szczecin, from 1944, if not also in 1939–41. At first glance, the longer a city was a part of the Soviet sphere, the less reform-minded it became. But Novgorod does not meet this expectation, as Nicolai N. Petro points out. Building on its heritage as a medieval city with extensive cultural and political pluralism and strong commercial ties with the West, Novgorod sought “to anchor it(self) firmly in Europe” after Communism’s collapse (p. 67). Between 1994 and 2004, according to Petro, “the Novgorod region obtained more foreign direct investment per capita than any region of Russia, but Moscow” (p. 71). Predominantly Russian cities are not necessarily bastions of conservatism and provincialism. One can act locally as well as globally at the same time.

How do recently mono-ethnic cities, such as Lviv, Vilnius, Łódź, and Wrocław, celebrate their multinational pasts? Despite recent efforts to come to terms with the diversity of the post-war and post-Communist periods, the Jews disappeared from the East European landscape. In Vilnius, Lviv, and Wrocław the new majority populations have come to terms with the Poles and the Germans, but less so with Jews and others. This does not necessarily imply that the Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian residents retain or possess an antipathy toward the Jews. The Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Germans still interact within the same European neighborhood, but within secure post-war borders. Owing to the Nazi decimation of the once populous and vibrant Jewish community, Jewry in East Central Europe ceased to exist. Many Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians feel uneasy about commemorating the Jewish past because they, as groups, have not completely confronted their participation in Hitler’s Final Solution, as have the Germans. But the Holocaust’s complexity and horrible choices in East Central Europe demand a thorough historical investigation without preconditions. Failure to commemorate the Jewish past in these areas means to acquiesce—if only indirectly—in the Final Solution.

At the core of the essays on these cities is the question of their “return to Europe.” But not all authors (or residents of these cities!) agree on a common definition for “return,” much less what “Europe” represents. Some cities that orient themselves towards Europe seek to honour and revitalize the multiethnic heritage of the past in order to raise themselves to a more cosmopolitan, European level. As Joanna Michlic points out, the “endorsement of Łódź’s pre-1918 heritage as part of the local identity is symptomatic of a more general national re-orientation that has been taking place in Poland since the fall of Communism: a turn to the

culture of civic nationalism. This orientation has been gaining strength in Poland, particularly since the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s" (p. 288). In Kharkiv, however, as Volodymyr Kravchenko emphasizes, the symbolism of "Europe" is "generally confined to the sphere of business and policy: "Primarily, it refers to the European standards of life, lifestyles, and fashion, and only secondarily does it signify standards of democracy, civil society, or professional culture" (p. 244).

As the essays demonstrate, civic nationalism has not permeated most of Ukraine's largest cities. The essays on Odesa (co-authored by Oleg Gubar and Patricia Herlihy), Sevastopol (Karl D. Qualls), Kharkiv (Volodymyr Kravchenko), and Lviv (Liliana Hentosh and Bohdan Tscheres) describe and analyze the great urban heterogeneity in present-day Ukraine and the challenges of the "quadruple" post-Communist transition (democratization, marketization, state building, and nation building).

Since the fall of Communism and the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Sevastopol renewed their emphasis on local identities, but each manifests a unique twist. These cities, like much of eastern and southern Ukraine, identify themselves (especially Sevastopol) more with Moscow than with Kyiv, and more with Russia than with Europe.

The people of Odesa differentiate themselves from all other cities, celebrating their uniqueness and wit. In the light of Odesa's founding in 1794, the city's inhabitants imagine themselves as Europeans and believe they live in a multinational city by catering to the descendants of foreigners (pp. 151–52). Sevastopol, the primary port for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, is a predominantly Russian city within the boundaries of Ukraine. According to Qualls, since the end of the Second World War "residents and non-residents alike have been bombarded with a set of images that help to define the city's identity and role in Russian and Soviet history, often in conflict with Europe" (p.170). Sevastopol's identification with Russia strengthened its turn away from Europe and its resistance to integration into independent Ukraine. Both are closely intertwined. In line with this attitude, many of Sevastopol's citizens believe that Ukraine should return Crimea to the Russian Federation. In embracing the Russian identity, the city's post-war planners have ignored the pre-war contributions of the Crimean Tatars (deported by the Soviets in 1944) and the Crimean Karaite Jews (exterminated by the Nazis during the war).

If Odesa defines itself as a European city, and Sevastopol as a Russian city somehow misplaced in Ukraine, Kharkiv emphasizes its Soviet traditions, its Russian Orthodox and Russian imperial traditions, and its Ukrainian identity. In everyday life, the city's residents do not want to choose from among the competing identities. They desire to have it several ways at once, not unlike those with pre-modern identities and multiple sets of loyalties. Kharkiv still memorializes Soviet Communist leaders not only from the Brezhnev and Khrushchev eras, but also from the age of Stalin and Lenin (p. 243).

In light of the high percentage of those inhabitants who identify themselves as Russians in these cities, many have acquired a vested interest in preserving the status quo in the Russian or Soviet past. Unlike the residents of Novgorod, many Russian urban residents remain uneasy about Ukraine's "quadruple" transition, especially its state-building and nation-building projects. Lviv is a relatively recent (post-1945) addition to the Ukrainian urban environment. Its population, now overwhelmingly Ukrainian and Ukrainian-speaking, embraces both a pan-Ukrainian identity and one focused on Western Ukrainian history and traditions. Most of Lviv's population identifies with Kyiv, not Moscow. This city also defines itself as a European city, but its sense of Europe is very different from Odesa's.

The demographic and political aftermath of the Second World War strengthened the cultural ambiguity among cities in Ukraine's different regions. Although the war, according to Timothy Snyder (in his book *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003], 5), completed the process of dividing the Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians into modern national communities that possessed their own states, these communities did not emerge as homogenous political entities.

With the Soviet victory in the Second World War, the Ukrainian SSR acquired eastern Galicia and eastern Volhynia from Poland, northern Bukovyna from Romania, and Transcarpathia from Czechoslovakia. At the end of the Second World War, Stalin and his colleagues, in effect, incorporated the majority of Ukrainians living in East Central Europe into a single Soviet republic. However, despite the slight rise in the overall percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR between 1939 and 1959, the post-war border changes and population exchanges did not transform it into a nationally pure state. Unlike the Polish People's Republic, which became nationally homogeneous after the devastation of the war and the exchanges of populations in the late 1940s, post-war Soviet Ukraine remained "nationally diverse" but "regionally homogeneous." (According to the 1959 Soviet census, the first one after the war, 77 percent of the republic's population identified themselves as Ukrainians.)

The Western Ukrainian territories that the USSR incorporated after the war became more Ukrainian demographically. Whereas in the 1930s those who identified themselves as Ukrainians in those regions comprised 63.4 per cent of the population in Poland, 61.6 per cent in Czechoslovakia, and 43.4 per cent in Rumania (see Piotr Eberhardt, *Ethnic Groups and Population Changes in Twentieth-Century Central-Eastern Europe: History, Data, Analysis* [Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003], 212, 213, 214), according to the Soviet census of 1959 Ukrainians comprised 91 per cent of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil oblasts, 94 percent of Volyn and Rivne oblasts, 75 percent of Transcarpathia oblast, and 67 percent of Chernivtsi oblast. Between 1939 and 1959 the percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians also increased in the agricultural regions under Soviet control since 1920. But with the post-war transfer of many Russian and Russified cadres to Ukraine's central, southern, and eastern industrial regions, those regions (with the exception of Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv oblasts and the city of Kyiv) became more Russian. (See *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Ukrainskaia SS* [Moscow: Gosstatizdat], 168, 174–79.) All of Ukraine's territories established various sets of "tipping points"—the critical mass needed to maintain the Ukrainian language and culture or to abandon it.

Highly nuanced and intellectually stimulating, *Cities after the Fall of Communism* investigates the formation of multiple historical perspectives and how (and why) urban residents reformulated their self-perceptions and social memories after the trauma of Communism's collapse. The pictures of monuments and architectural designs in the book are well integrated into the text. Unfortunately the volume does not contain any maps illustrating the post-war border changes and the location of the cities profiled. If such maps are included in a second edition of this book, it would be an excellent text on the evolution of collective memories and urban identities in post-Communist Europe and suitable for upper-level undergraduate and for graduate courses. In the meantime, all specialists on the history and politics of cities in East Central Europe should read this book.

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Andrej N. Lushnycky and Mykola Riabchuk, eds. *Ukraine on Its Meandering Path between East and West*. Interdisciplinary Studies on Central and Eastern Europe 4. Bern: Peter Lang, 2009. 210 pp. U.S.\$73.95 paper.

Larissa M. L. Zaleska Onyshkevych and Maria G. Rewakowicz, eds. *Contemporary Ukraine on the Cultural Map of Europe*. Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe in co-operation with the Shevchenko Scientific Society, 2009. xxxii, 471 pp. U.S.\$89.95 cloth.

Ukraine has been described as a “borderland.” The most pessimistic observers, like Andrew Wilson, say it is an “unexpected nation,” neither “east” nor “west,” a land caught between two great civilizations that have fought their philosophical, ideological, religious, and economic battles on Ukraine’s territory. Most propagandistic observers claim that Ukraine is either entirely European, as a matter of fact the heart or centre of Europe, or that Ukraine is a Slavic or even historically a Russian nation. These two volumes, although attempting in some sense to elucidate these myths, fall into the trap (bar a few choice chapters) of the dichotomous conception of the identity of Ukraine, its society, politics, and culture.

The editors of both volumes have chosen book titles that may or may not adequately frame the discussion in their respective compilations. *Ukraine on Its Meandering Path between East and West*, while eye-catching, tends to reproduce the myth of a bipolar dichotomy used by academics to frame all analyses of Ukrainian politics and society. Either Ukraine is “Western,” “modernizing,” “Orange” and European, or it is an “Eastern,” “backsliding,” and “blackmail state” within Russia’s sphere of influence. The authors (Mykola Riabchuk, Nicole Gallina, Marta Dyczok, Olexiy Haran and Petro Burkovsky, Mychailo Wynnnyckyj, Tammy Lynch, James Sherr, and Mark Andryczyk) focus on the failings of Ukrainian politics and politicians, specifically, in post-Orange Revolution Ukraine.

While Onyshkevych and Rewakowicz’s volume uses a less controversial title, it nonetheless sets itself up to prove that contemporary Ukraine is on the cultural map of Europe. The book’s contributors are Roman Szporluk, Mykola Riabchuk, Giulia Lami, Oxana Pachlovska, Andrew Sorokowski, Catherine Wanner, Elehie Natalie Skoczylas, Myroslava Antonovych, Marian J. Rubchak, Maria Zubrytska, Larissa M. L. Zaleska Onyshkevych, Michael M. Naydan, Ola Hnatiuk, Lidia Stefanowska, Marko Robert Stech, Marko Pavlyshyn (two articles), Maxim Tarnawsky, Maria G. Rewakowicz, Serhii Vakulenko, Michael Moser, Laada Bilaniuk, Yuri Shevchuk, Marta Dyczok, Myroslav Shkandrij, and Virko Baley. In their introduction the editors feel it necessary to explicate and validate their choice of situating Ukraine in Europe, claiming that Ukraine, while initially a European nation, has now “returned to Europe” and reaffirmed its European choice in 2004. Unfortunately, not all of the contributions, divided into three sections that can be roughly described as discussing (1) political history, (2) literature, and (3) language and culture, adequately deal with the issue of Ukraine on the cultural map of Europe. The particular topics discussed, be it politics, literature, language, or art, are not explicitly framed in, by, or against the European context. Thus the text, while well written and highly informative, seems not to have a unifying theme.

In *Ukraine on Its Meandering Path*, the more political-science based volume, Mykola Riabchuk sets the pace by eloquently and painstakingly outlining the role of the “blackmail state” and the poor quality of Ukrainian democracy leading up to 2004. Gallina, Haran and

Burkovsky, Wynnyckyj, and Lynch cover post-Orange political and institutional failings; they outline Ukraine-EU relations, the difficulty of power sharing, and the post 2006 elite institutional conflict respectively. Meanwhile Sherr explores Ukraine's relations with Russia. The authors point out in detail the obvious shortcomings of institutional conflict based in constitutional ambiguities (brought on by the 8 December 2004 constitutional amendments) and Russia's post-Orange attempt to assert power and influence in Ukraine by way of its control over gas supply. Yet the authors fail to acknowledge that part of the conflict, specifically its visibility, is a symptom of the small success of the Orange Revolution, which we often seem to forget. The sheer fact that Ukraine is no longer a "blackmail state" and that "machine politics" is not an effective tool for those in power tells us that a great deal has indeed changed since Leonid Kuchma's presidency. There always have been multiple poles of politico-economic power in Ukraine, and they have indeed been regionally divided. Yet, central government power has been so forceful that it could control, quell, or at least make less visible the on-going conflicts between various politico-economic elites. This being said, the authors are correct in emphasizing the negative effects of institutional design, which facilitates or even provokes political conflict and stalemate. They repeatedly make the case for constitutional amendment, although, much like this reader, they are skeptical about where the political initiative will come from. The January 2010 presidential elections have made it highly unlikely that constitutional changes will be made any time soon.

Dyczok's chapter on the state of Ukrainian media between 2004 and 2006 is an insightful piece about the progress and divergence in the media sphere following the Orange Revolution. It adequately frames the above-described discussion by her colleagues. Dyczok demonstrates that the post-Orange media's benefits are hidden due to uncertainties about how the institutions are run and what the new "rules of the game" are. She makes clear that while there is some rupture followed by measured progress, there is also a level of continuity.

The book's last essay, Andryczyk's "New Images of the Intellectual in Post-Soviet Ukrainian Literature," seems somewhat out of place because it is less oriented on politics than the other essays. Andryczyk traces the intellectual and literary "people of the eighties" (the *Visimdesiatnyky*) and likens them to the famous "people of the sixties" (the *Shistdesiatnyky*) by contrasting and comparing their contribution to Ukrainian literature. While it is an interesting contribution, it is too bad that Andryczyk does not unpack newer developments of the late 1990s and early 2000s and fails to include the generation of writers under the age of thirty-five who have been pushing the landscape of contemporary literature forward in recent years.

Onyshkevych and Rewakowicz's volume is broader in scope than Riabchuk and Lushnycky's and should therefore appeal to a wider audience. While this reviewer is a political scientist, it is useful to make a few points on the two-thirds of *Contemporary Ukraine on the Cultural Map of Europe* dedicated to literature, language, art, and culture. Like Andryczyk, the authors therein who focus on literature and art have not truly encompassed all of the new literary voices. Zubrytska's, Stefanowska's, Stech's, Pavlyshyn's, and Shevchuk's essays are powerful, intelligent, and a pleasure to read. But, like most of the essays in the book's last two sections, they do not focus their attention on what can be loosely labeled the "new generation" of Ukrainian writers (e.g., Serhii Zhadan, Natalka Sniadanko, Tania Maliarchuk, Taras Prohasko, Sofiia Andrukhovych, Liubko Deresh). It would have been useful if the editors had included at least essay about these younger authors and their works.

Similarly, Shkandrij's short essay, whilst stating that it will address contemporary Ukrainian art, only addresses the post-1990 scene in one third of its text and fails to mention

influential art hubs of the past two decades, such as the Dzyga Centre in Lviv and the prominent (Soros) Contemporary Art Centre in Kyiv; nor does it mention more recent developments, such as the Pinchuk Art Centre and the Arsenal in Kyiv, both of which are hugely important on the cultural scene in Ukraine today (even if they do symbolize the oligarchization of contemporary art). Furthermore, there is no mention of the “new generation” of highly successful Ukrainian artists such as REP, Hrupa SOSka (Kharkiv), Alevtyna Kakhidze, and Ivan Bazak, or of some of the accomplished older guard like Tiberii Silvashi, Oleh Tistol, Andrii Sahaidakivsky, and many more. The essays also contains makes a factual error: the “Ukrainian Brand” exhibit, which in many ways was a milestone on the Ukrainian landscape of contemporary art, took place at the (Soros) Contemporary Art Centre and not at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy National University. Without any other essays on the “new generation” of writers and visual artists, *Contemporary Ukraine* is missing an important part of the landscape of contemporary art and literature in Ukraine.

Among the volume’s essays in the social sciences, Szporluk’s, Riabchuk’s, Lami’s and Dyczok’s stand out in terms of analysis and information. These authors attempt to take on the theme outlined by the editors, and they critically ask, as Szporluk writes, “Where is Ukraine?” He does this by analyzing institutions, ideas and actors, as well as historical and political geography. These four essays engage the reader in an exploration of Ukrainian identity formation coupled with today’s socio-political realities. Szporluk opens our eyes to the concepts of nation building by alluding to the building of a common German identity, reminding us that the Germans may have had as much a difficult time in answering “Where is Germany?” as Ukrainians have in describing whether or not Ukraine is in Europe. Riabchuk correctly points out that there has been a move to the east, that it is the centre of Ukraine that has been since 2004 a liberalizing zone, and that it is too simplistic to talk in terms of “west” versus “east.” He reiterates that identity in Ukraine is regional and not national. Although it is mentioned, it could be better stressed that Ukrainians have a strong, common, cross-regional *civic* identity and that linguistic, religious, and possibly ethnic diversities are not the most valuable explanatory factors and not as significant as they have been made out to be (a point that Skoczylas makes). Lami points to the issues of post-2004 continuity of elite-level conflict and how constitutional ambiguities have affected political outcomes specifically with respect to EU-Ukraine relations.

Dyczok’s powerful contribution seems out of place in the third section and fits well within the scope of the themes discussed by Riabchuk and Skoczylas in the first section, specifically regarding how identities and preferences are shaped. In her revealing and provocative essay Dyczok describes the pre- and post-Orange Revolution mass media and questions current social-science assumptions about how mass media influence the population. She states that perhaps mass media reflect more than they impose upon Ukrainian citizens. Although one could debate this, specifically how the centre of Ukraine, whilst more and more “liberal” and more and more “Western,” is still bombarded by Russian and Russian-oriented media, Dyczok correctly points out that our simplified dichotomous assumptions of Ukraine’s politico-economic and cultural spheres may in fact miss the mark.

Szporluk’s, Riabchuk’s, and Dyczok’s essays could easily be assigned as mandatory reading in university courses that discuss Ukraine’s political history or contemporary society.

While there are many differences in the subjects they cover, both volumes under review share preoccupation widespread in Ukrainian studies today—trying to answer the question “Where is Ukraine?” In some ways, both volumes reproduce the dichotomous choice of Ukrainian political, economic, and cultural modernization, and it seems most of the authors

see this as an “East” to “West” trajectory (whilst apparently not linear or unidirectional). After reading both volumes, this reviewer is not any closer to understanding where on the meandering path between East and West contemporary Ukraine is or what the post-Orange Revolution political conflict and economic crisis meant for the country. Nor am I any closer to believing or understanding whether, how, and where Ukraine is on the cultural map of Europe. This does not mean that both volumes’ contributions are not well researched, analytically balanced, and, for the most part, highly informative. But it is simply not clear why Ukraine’s *place*, be it physical, political, or intellectual continues to be part of the framing discussion if that place is not effectively interwoven into all of the essays.

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Peter W. Rodgers. *Nation, Region, and History in Post-Communist Transitions: Identity Politics in Ukraine, 1991–2006*. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2008. 195 pp. €24.90 paper.

This is well-written book will be of interest to anyone who studies Ukraine’s identity politics. In this revised doctoral dissertation Peter Rodgers provides a nuanced yet easily accessible discussion of the complexities of hybrid, multi-faceted regional identities in contemporary Ukraine. He engages with familiar questions of national identity and identity change, and takes the discussion in new directions. Moving beyond the dominant binary “west-east” explanation of Ukrainian identity, he unpacks the meta-region commonly referred to as “Eastern Ukraine” by looking at regionalism in three oblasts adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border—Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Sumy. To get at the heart of the issue, he chose an innovative approach: to explore the education process in the years since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, focusing specifically on the teaching and studying of history. His analysis is based on empirical research conducted in the three selected oblasts, mainly by way of in-depth, qualitative interviews conducted with students, teachers, professors, and educational administrators. Such a comparative, multi-dimensional approach provides insight into the interaction between the “top down” and “bottom up” processes.

Rodgers poses three central questions to delve into individuals’ subjective, fluid sense of identity: “Where are we from?” “who are we?” and “who are we not?” Starting with a nuanced discussion of the complex issues surrounding identity politics, he incorporates the larger theoretical discussions and the specifics of the Ukrainian case. He then goes on to provide a useful, clear, and succinct summary of the very diverse and complex histories of the three oblasts he focusses on. In doing so he draws out the diversity *among* the three oblasts and also *within* each oblast, as well as some often forgotten ties. For example, in pointing to the differences between the northern and southern regions of Luhansk, he reminds the reader that the northern areas were part of historic Slobidska Ukraine, as was much of Kharkiv, and that the Democratic Movement of the Donbas was formed in Luhansk in 1990 rather than in Donetsk (pp. 68–73).

In laying the foundations for his own empirical data, Rodgers provides a chapter on the way history has been taught in Ukraine since 1991. His focus is on the topics where the new Ukrainian historical narrative has most hotly contested the old Soviet version of Ukraine’s history, namely the Kyivan Rus’ era, the Cossack period, the nineteenth century, and the most contentious issues of the twentieth century, such as Ukraine’s independence struggle after the First World War, the Holodomor, the Second World War, and the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

The most interesting parts of Rodgers's book are the chapters where he describes the interviews he conducted. Using many quotations effectively, he conveys the ideas and view of the teachers and students, as well as a few policy-makers, on how they view the history they are teaching and learning. Here he allows his respondents to use their own words to present the many different views and perspectives he encountered.

Rodgers comments on the regional and generational differences; he makes the very significant observation that all the actors are *engaged* in these discussions, not passively absorbing information but critically examining it and engaging with the various information sources they are receiving. Not surprisingly, many are finding this difficult. For example, Rodgers quotes a Luhansk schoolboy: "That is the most difficult thing about the present day history books, that earlier, about fifteen years ago, our parents were taught different things from what we learn now, and we have to make a big decision. Whether it is this way or that way, or maybe somewhere in the middle" (p. 131).

Also interesting and new is his discussion in chapter five of regional historical narratives and the way regional history is being taught in the three oblasts. What would have made the book even stronger is more analysis and synthesis of the results from the interviews. Despite their rich detail, the reader is left with a rather impressionistic view and does not learn how many students expressed which views and where. Were there majority opinions in the teachers' and students' debates about the Second World War And were there significant variations among the oblasts?

Overall, this study is an important and valuable contribution to discussions of identity and regionalism in Ukraine, and it will be very useful for teaching at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. I recommend it as required reading for journalists and policy-makers, who often continue to view Ukraine from a narrow and inaccurate, binary "east-west" perspective.

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Margrethe B. Søvik. *Support, Resistance and Pragmatism: An Examination of Motivation in Language Policy in Kharkiv, Ukraine*. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Stockholm Slavic Studies 34. Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2007. 351 pp. Paper. Free download at <su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:197056/FULLTEXT01>.

This doctoral dissertation is the remarkable result of an in-depth sociolinguistic analysis of the current Ukrainian-Russian language conflict in the city of Kharkiv. The study arose within a supportive network of Swedish scholars and Ukrainianists from Canada and Ukraine. Moreover, a team of students and scholars from Kharkiv helped Margrethe Søvik organize both individual and group interviews and undoubtedly contributed much to the successful circulation of the large-scale questionnaires, which found no fewer than 800 respondents.

In her cover text, the author defines the central topic of her study as "language policy (conceptualized as language practices, language beliefs, and language management)" in Kharkiv; she wants to demonstrate "how language conflict is not about language, but rather about social positions, interests and value systems." What she highlights as her most important result is the fact that "language practices and language beliefs are often at odds."

In her introductory chapters Søvik offers a general picture of the linguistic situation in Kharkiv and an outline of her theoretical foundations. Her meticulous approach to terminological questions often seems to betray the character of the study as a dissertation, yet even

if some readers might find this scrupulosity at times exaggerated, they will be rewarded with a number of useful references. Søvik tries to offer new insights by a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods (p. 23), although she consciously used “wordings, entire questions or adapted questions from surveys conducted both in Ukraine and elsewhere” (p. 32). The target group of her interviews and questionnaires consisted above all of “academics, cultural workers, journalists and students, and not on other groups such as assembly line workers, farmers or plumbers.” The alleged reason for this choice is that the former group of people “would be more concerned with the language issue” (p. 29), yet much more pragmatic reasons might have come into play too, inasmuch as people from the educational and cultural spheres can usually be accessed by scholars much more easily. It may be that a socially even more stratified sample would have been more interesting and relevant.

Although Søvik’s methods and interpretations are generally convincing, one might regret that some essential questions are not addressed: the reader learns that “all interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by persons fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian to minimize the risk of misunderstandings” (p. 31) and that the questionnaires were available both in Ukrainian and in Russian. However, she informs us that it unfortunately “took longer to finalize the Ukrainian version than expected,” and at the beginning only the Russian version was distributed (p. 33). One can also read that the author herself “conducted the interviews, and most interviews were conducted in Russian, a few in Ukrainian, and all group interviews in Russian” (p. 31). What is not explained, though, is the very reason for the choice of the language in the interviews. Moreover, as soon as both Ukrainian and Russian versions of the questionnaire became available, it might have been interesting to pay attention to the proportion of each version chosen by the respondents. To be sure, although Søvik emphasizes several times that the choice of the language was not necessarily linked with particular language attitudes, she takes into account the language that respondents spoke at home. In any case, deviations from the sample of Russian-speakers are remarkable.

It is highly probable that it would make a certain difference for the interviewees in Kharkiv whether they were asked questions about their language attitudes in Russian or in Ukrainian. I am inclined to believe that only few (if any) of the interviewees who chose to respond in Ukrainian would share negative attitudes toward a language they basically still use against the odds. This leads me to the very focus of my main criticism: perhaps language policy is linked with “languages themselves” to a much higher degree than Søvik’s study suggests, despite the fact that nobody would deny that the sociolinguistic context in the very broad sense of the term is of no less importance. And further, maybe even the interpretations of the interview and questionnaire data are in the end much more language-bound than they might seem at a first glance. Namely, what readers find throughout this book are solely English translations of the questions and responses, whereas the original versions, in particular those of the interview responses, would undoubtedly have offered a more precise picture. Discourses on attitudes and beliefs usually involve a considerable amount of language-specific connotative and associative meanings that no translation into another language can ever reflect. Hence, to put it briefly, languages as such do matter, and not only linguists should keep this in mind. And languages matter with regard to this particular book, since, as far as I (a non-native speaker of English) can judge, the English language found in it is certainly quite good but definitely not perfect (and by this I do not mean the rather large number of typos).

The chapters on theoretical issues comprise approximately a quarter of the book. Then, on p. 79, in the chapter titled “The Language Issue in Ukraine: A Background to the Current Discussion,” Søvik moves forward to questions of the history of Ukraine and of the Ukrainian

language and thereby never loses sight of the focus of her study. In this chapter, a certain influence of North American Ukrainianists, particularly historians, has left its strongest imprint. Altogether it seems that the closer Søvik's historical narrative approaches present times, the more familiar it is to the author herself. The same applies to chapter 4, "Introducing the Site: Kharkiv, the Border Area."

The remainder of the book evaluates the interviews and questionnaires. The author completed her work with the questionnaires in August 2004, that is, shortly before the so-called Orange Revolution. Whereas some readers might therefore regard the book to be outdated, one should not agree with them: what we are, of course, dealing with is certainly a historical contribution, no less than any other so-called "synchronic" study that, in the end, does not examine the present, but always the recent past. In this case the temporal frame of reference is marked by the years 2003 through 2005, with a focus on the months preceding the historical events of the autumn of 2004. This should be kept in mind while reading Søvik's study and using its data.

The subjects highlighted in the interviews and in the surveys are grouped in chapters 5 to 9, which are aptly titled "Attitudes to Regulations and Language Practices in Public Domains," "Language Management between Duty and Coercion," "Discussing Bilingualism and Equal Rights," "Language-Related Stereotypes, Norms and Accommodation," and "*Who is Ukrainian? Searching for Authenticity.*" What the reader finds there is generally the expected diverse picture, but also many good observations and Søvik's largely convincing discussion of the collected materials, which cover a range of interesting aspects on how the respondents assess the language situation and the languages themselves. A broad spectrum of opinions is represented, from the all too well known arrogant attitudes toward the Ukrainian language by certain Russian speakers to attitudes based on Ukrainian national and linguistic patriotism. Particularly interesting are the responses that reflect the dilemma of those citizens of Kharkiv who would in fact favour the ongoing spread of the Ukrainian language but for various reasons still lack the courage to switch to Ukrainian themselves. Especially in these cases it would have been useful if these respondents could have been asked follow-up questions of an even greater depth.

Some readers will find useful the conclusions at the end of each chapter, especially if they want to quickly reread the book or use parts of it. The book contains two appendices, where Søvik describes the sample of her respondents and then presents "the items of the questionnaire that were referred to in the analysis and the full coding, as well as the recoding of certain items" (p. 340).

Margrethe Søvik's "Concluding Remarks" confirm that this book should not remain unnoticed in Ukrainian linguistics and philology. She presents a largely convincing, well-balanced picture of the language situation and language attitudes in Kharkiv. Apart from the fact that since the "Orange Revolution" much has been both gained and lost with regard to the standing of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine, this picture, which is primarily based on the opinions of younger persons with an academic background (only 6.9% of the respondents were more than 45 years old), might add some fuel to the arguments of those who believe that after two decades of Ukrainian independence some changes benefitting the Ukrainian language are occurring even in the cities of the country's east and southeast. However, others might emphasize the fact that the book also confirms the persistence of those strong advocates of "bilingualism" who still tend to reject the Ukrainian language as such and to Russify their surroundings as actively as they and their ancestors have been doing for centuries.

Paul D'Anieri, editor. *Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization Apathy and the State*. Washington, DC, and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. viii, 316 pp. U.S.\$60 cloth.

Orange Revolution and Aftermath is an admirable addition to the small number of book-length studies about Ukraine's Orange Revolution (hereafter OR). Like all collections of articles by various authors, the eleven contributions therein vary in their originality, value, and relevance. Paul D'Anieri opens the proceedings with an excellent introduction. Joshua A. Tucker's essay draws on his earlier article in *Perspectives on Politics*, while the other contributions, particularly in part I, provide original contributions to the study of the OR. Ioulia Shukan's, Anna Fournier's, Serhiy Kudelia's, and Marc P. Berenson's stand out as the most interesting new contributions to the study of this important event in contemporary Ukrainian history.

In "National Identity and Authoritarianism: Belarus and Ukraine Compared" Lucan A. Way presents one of two theoretical frameworks for explaining the factors leading to democratic revolutions. In it he stresses the importance of Ukrainian nationalism as supportive of democratic revolution in Ukraine and of Soviet nationalism as supportive of authoritarianism in Belarus. However, Way's article "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions" in the *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (2008): 55–69, which he wrote subsequently, does not include nationalism as an additional factor explaining democratic revolutions, despite its overconfident title. Four responses to that article in *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 1 (2009) by Mark R. Beissinger (pp. 74–77), Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (69–73), Charles H. Fairbanks (82–85), and Vitaliy Silitski (86–89) debate his criticism of frameworks to discuss democratic revolutions; but they also ignore nationalism's role. In his "Reply to My Critics" therein, Way does not discuss nationalism as supportive of or opposed to democratic revolutions, but credits mobilization in the OR as having "tapped into widely shared anti-Russian nationalist sentiments dominant in the west of the country." (90–97).

To me it is unclear where Way stands on the role of nationalism in democratic change, especially as he argues forcefully in "National Identity and Authoritarianism" that national identity is a better indicator of why Ukrainians joined the OR than protests against election fraud are. He differentiates between Ukraine, where nationalism has consolidated and united diverse groups against an authoritarian incumbent, and Belarus, where such nationalism is weak and a competing Soviet "nationalism" is stronger and underpins Alyaksandr Lukashenka's authoritarian rule. Way misses this opportunity to describe similar competing nationalisms, unlike Stephen Shulman who differentiated between "ethnic Ukrainian" and "eastern Slavic" nationalisms in his article "National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine" in *Slavic Review* 64, no.1 (2005): 59–87. If we substitute Yushchenko for "ethnic Ukrainian" and Yanukovich for "eastern Slavic," we have a good framework for understanding the 2004 elections in Ukraine. Shulman points to "ethnic Ukrainian" identity as being the more supportive of democracy, which was the case during Yushchenko's presidency, and provides a good framework for discussing divisions in Ukrainian politics and national identity. However, Way is unwilling to draw upon it and, instead, disputes Shulman's survey results and disagrees that "eastern Slavic" identity is less supportive of democracy. Way's argument is undermined by the anti-democratic policies introduced during both Kuchma's and Yanukovich's presidencies. It is not a coincidence that

the only period of democratization in Ukraine occurred when “ethnic Ukrainian” identity controlled the presidency—under Yushchenko.

Way also fails to see the interconnection between Soviet identity in Belarus and Shulman’s “eastern Slavic” identity even though both of them draw on the same Eurasian and Soviet political culture. This has been most vividly seen during Lukashenka’s and Yanukovich’s presidencies. According to a survey that Kyiv’s Razumkov Centre conducted in 2009, most residents of Donetsk and Crimea, two Party of Regions strongholds, have a greater affinity for Soviet (than Russian or Ukrainian) culture. Way is right to criticize Western analysts of Ukraine, such as David Marples, who assume that the majority national identity in Belarus is ethnic Belarusian while ignoring Soviet identity. Way draws on Keith Darden’s writings in explaining that urbanization and the growth of literacy grew in eastern Ukraine and Belarus during the Soviet Union and therefore both regions arrived at modernity through Soviet education, which has led to a strong base for Soviet values to persist.

In her essay, Fournier argues it is wrong to have seen the OR as a radical break with the Soviet past: she argues that Ukrainians have maintained many of the cultural norms of the Soviet era and that the OR should be seen as a restoration of Soviet and Western “order.” Fournier’s originality is in correctly pointing to protestors having both political and economic reasons for being on Kyiv’s Independence Square. This is an explanation—like that of nationalism—that has been ignored by American political scientists who have debated democratic revolutions (e.g., the *Journal of Democracy* debate included no reference to social or economic factors). The political and economic reasons influencing OR protestors, Fournier argues, are “linked partially with economic expectations developed under Soviet rule (p. 111).” These included factors such as demands for social justice, anger at economic inequality, and demands for “order,” understood as a return to normality in the form of honest government, stability, salaries paid on time, respect for the constitution and rule of law, accountability of elites, and non-interference in business affairs. As I pointed out in my article “Populism in Ukraine in Comparative European Context” in *Problems of Post-Communism* 57, no.6 (November–December 2010: 3–18, such demands have traditionally led all Ukrainian political forces to be populist during election campaigns (and not just Julia Timoshenko, the Ukrainian politician usually singled out as “populist”).

Prime Minister Timoshenko’s 2005 government sought to implement the anti-oligarch” policies Yushchenko espoused in the previous year’s election campaign and in his election programme, which Fournier points to, but which he forgot about him after he was elected. “The opposition discourse relied mainly upon the denunciation of injustice and of immorality of the government and its representatives (p.97),” Shukan argues in her essay, quoting Yushchenko’s first campaign speech (July 2004) that attacked oligarchs. She states that the Yushchenko campaign deliberately portrayed him as a “people-s candidate” counterposed against the *bandytska vlada* (p. 97). Fournier points out that OR protestors supported privatization and steps to be taken against oligarchs and that therefore it was little wonder that Tymoshenko replaced Yushchenko as the main standard-bearer of “Orange” values by the 2010 elections. Yushchenko did not understand the reasons why Ukrainians protested, and during his presidency he got into bed with oligarchs. Fournier describes this integration of values as a “double becoming of Western and Soviet modernities” (p.115). OR protestors wanted to be treated as citizens, not slaves (subjects), and the authorities were repeatedly referred to as “bandits” and *bandytska vlada*. None of the authors in *Orange Revolution and Aftermath* grapple with the perplexing question why 44 per cent of Ukraine’s voters chose the *bandytska vlada* (see below). Using Fournier’s framework, was it because Soviet values

remain stronger in eastern Ukraine than in western Ukraine? Surveys of national identity and culture and, even more clearly, the actions, methods, and policies of President Yanukovich's administration indicate that this could be the reason. "What emerged from the double becoming of Soviet and Western European modernities was the articulation of 'the state' through the idioms of morality, responsibility, and care" (p. 126), Fournier writes. She discusses the feelings of OR protestors who demanded a European democratic contract between rulers and citizens, which would narrow the gap that Berenson points to as a major factor undermining trust in state institutions, and a halt to the "bandits'" theft from the people. Fournier also found there was widespread anger about the elites' illegal, unrestrained, and unaccountable plundering.

Berenson explains the origin of the Ukrainian state as a weak democracy and points to how easily Yanukovich was able to roll back democratic gains during his first year in power. He argues that the remaking of citizen-state relations will remain Ukraine's greatest challenge, and that the overhaul of the state's relationship with its citizens is an urgent requirement for democratization—something that was not achieved by Yushchenko and will be not achieved under Yanukovich. Berenson found that Ukraine's citizens have a high rate of distrust of state institutions and that fewer than ten per cent of them feel that the state fulfills its obligations to its citizens. The result is low tax compliance. Trust in Ukrainian state institutions "to do what is right as well as to fulfill its obligations to citizens was so low that it was almost non-existent" (p. 214), Berenson states. It is little wonder that the shadow economy has remained consistently high, accounting for 40–50 per cent of GDP and low levels of trust in the state.

In her contribution, Tammy Lynch analyzes the origins of the 2004 slogan "Bandits to Prison!" in opposition rhetoric during the years 2000–2003, particularly in the Ukraine without Kuchma/Arise Ukraine! movements that were dominated by the Yuliia Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialist Party of Ukraine. Her discussion of the OR is enlightening; at the same time it is disappointing because it fails to analyze sufficiently Yushchenko's multi-vector personality and politics, which became all too apparent during his presidency. However, both she and Shukan do masterful jobs in analyzing the opposition's successful tactics and strategies that led to Yushchenko's electoral success. These included opposition unity, media outreach, massive election monitoring, mobilization, articulation of concrete and achievable goals, divisions of responsibility between youth and political leaders, developing ties to the security forces, and ensuring the *Maidan* was operational 24/7 with speeches, news, and music. Lynch also provides an illuminating analysis of the origins of the anti-Kuchma opposition in 2000–2001 and its evolution into the Ukraine without Kuchma/Arise Ukraine! Movement and the For Truth NGO that became respectively associated with the Tymoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine; of the arrest of Tymoshenko, which transformed her into a radical opposition leader; and, on the same day she was arrested, of the open letter attacking the protestors signed by Yushchenko, Kuchma, and Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Plushch.

Lynch states that Yushchenko's transformation into an opposition leader "was long in coming and largely the result of the actions of others. Any decision to fight simply went against his nature" (p. 55). She should have analyzed this important point further, for it explains his subsequent failure as president and inability to use the opportunities afforded to him by the OR to become "Ukraine's George Washington." Throughout the period that Lynch reviews (2000–2004), Yushchenko, as later during his presidency, was unable to decide if he should be allied with Tymoshenko or with the Kuchma authorities and (after 2005) with Yanukovich and the Party of Regions. Yushchenko's alliance with Yanukovich was clearly seen in 2010, when he undermined Tymoshenko's presidential election campaign; in return,

he was not arrested and been criminally charged, unlike Tymoshenko. Lynch states that the opposition learned three lessons from the pre-OR protests: the need for a united opposition, for clear and achievable goals, and for the widest circulation of information. But she misses the most important lesson from the March 2001 riots: the need for non-violence (which Kudelia discusses in his essay) because the March 2001 riots discredited the opposition.

Kudelia discusses a little researched part of the OR: the round-table negotiations that arose because neither side had the knock-out capability to win an outright victory. (The other such study is Steven Pifer's "European Mediators and Ukraine's Orange Revolution," in *Problems of Post-Communism* 54, no. 6 [2007]: 28–42.) In November 2004 Ukraine resembled Libya in March 2011 more than it did Tunisia two months earlier, which was more like Georgia's Rose Revolution. (The civil war that nearly erupted in Ukraine did so in Libya.) Kudelia argues that soft-liners in the opposition (Yushchenko, Petro Poroshenko) and the authorities (Kuchma, Parliamentary Chairman Volodymyr Lytvyn, Plushch) negotiated a pact that sidelined the hard-line opposition (Tymoshenko) and authorities (Presidential Administration head Viktor Medvedchuk, Yanukovich). The authorities were stunned by both the size of the protests, something that continues to haunt Yanukovich, and the defection of the security forces to the opposition or their neutral stance (e.g., the army intervening to halt the Interior Ministry special forces' offensive against the *Maidan* on 28 November 2004). Yushchenko opposed the calls of Tymoshenko and the civic youth organization Pora (It's Time) to storm the building of the Presidential Administration and opted instead for negotiations.

Kudelia's well-researched chapter has two pitfalls. The first is his inclination to favour Yushchenko over Tymoshenko, which has led him to believe that the only option was for a negotiated pact to overcome the crisis. Even if Yushchenko had no choice but to negotiate, Kudelia never asks why he give away so much and why he failed to recognize the reality on the ground, which could have permitted him to dictate terms to the authorities. During the round-table meetings the Yushchenko campaign controlled Kyiv, where millions of Ukrainians were protesting, and he had the loyalty of all the security forces (with the exception of Interior Ministry special units from the Crimea, such as those guarding the Presidential Administration). With such power Yushchenko could have rejected the introduction of constitutional reforms into the negotiations and limited the granting of immunity to Kuchma alone. Kudelia also ignores the likelihood that the November 2004 separatist congress in Severodonetsk was organized with the blessing of Kuchma to put pressure on Yushchenko to capitulate at the round-table meetings.

The second factor flows from the first and is Kudelia's lack of any mention of immunity granted by Yushchenko at those meetings. Sviatoslav Piskun was reappointed prosecutor-general a day after the parliamentary vote on the compromise package as the "guarantor" of the immunity deal. Perhaps granting immunity to Kuchma was the only bloodless way out of the crisis, but was there also a need to provide blanket immunity to all of the Kuchma elites, including Yanukovich, whose election campaign was condemned and whose victory was overturned by the Supreme Court? If Yanukovich had been charged with abuse of office and election fraud in 2005, he would have been barred from standing for office, and the Party of Regions would have chosen a new leader. Without criminal charges, Yanukovich continues to believe that there was no election fraud, that the OR was an "American putsch," and that he was fairly elected in 2004.

Orange Revolution and Aftermath only paints half of the canvas: none of the authors deal with "anti-Orange Ukraine," that is, the 44 per cent of electors who voted for Yanukovich in 2004 or the 48 per cent who won him the 2010 elections. Why so many citizens of Ukraine

are anti-Orange is an area of research that has yet to be undertaken by any Western scholar. That D'Anieri and company missed the opportunity to do so is surprising also because Ukraine's strongest political party, the Party of Regions, won pluralities in the 2006 and 2007 elections. The national minorities in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Serbia supported their countries' democratic breakthroughs, revolutions, and integration with the rest of Europe. But Ukraine's national minorities have supported the anti-Orange camp and voted for the Party of Regions and, until the 2002 elections, the Communist Party. Georgia's national minorities also did not support the 2003 Rose Revolution, but they live outside central-government control in the frozen conflict enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Another research area that has yet to attract the attention of Western scholars is why eastern Ukraine did not support the protests against President Kuchma from November 2000, when the Kuchmagate crisis began, to the 2004 elections. Why did the July 2001 brutal murder of journalist Igor Aleksandrov in Sloviansk, Donetsk oblast, not spark the same protests as the murder of Heorhii Gongadze in the autumn of 2000 (or the likely murder of Kharkiv editor Vasilii Klimentev in the autumn of 2010)? The Gongadze case is important, because as long as it remains unresolved the Yanukovich administration will use it to black-mail Kuchma and Lytvyn, believed to have been the "organizers" of Gongadze's abduction, to support Yanukovich's regime.

A third area of research also awaiting scholarly interest is the inability of Ukraine's legal system, particularly the prosecutor's office, to complete investigations of high-profile crimes, such as the Gongadze murder and the poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko. Indeed, why was Peru, which had a similar scandal in 2000 surrounding its leaders caught on video giving bribes, able to prosecute and imprison senior officials, including the head of the security service and Alberto Fujimoro, the first ex-president in Latin America to be sentenced and imprisoned? No members of Ukraine's elites have been jailed, except in the United States and Germany, and those criminally charged and imprisoned since 2010 are the victims of Yanukovich's score-settling against the former "Orange" administration.

I recommend that the Woodrow Wilson Center consider sponsoring a "companion" volume about "anti-Orange" Ukraine.

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Sarah D. Phillips. *Women's Social Activism in the New Ukraine: Development of the Politics of Differentiation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. xxii, 206 pp. U.S.\$24.95 paper, U.S.\$65 cloth.

Sarah D. Phillips provides a vivid picture of NGOs in post-Soviet Ukraine. She analyzes "women's social activism in the new Ukraine and the processes of differentiation that have both motivated and resulted from women's NGO activities" (p. 8). Her book is structured around the observation and interviews of four NGO activists—Svetlana, Ivana, Sofia, and Maryna. Phillips examines why women in post-Soviet Ukraine flock to the non-profit sector and why some of them "were able to rise through the ranks of the state education system and international development foundations finally to launch a career in business" (p. 7), while others remained marginalized. Phillips states that the activists' life stories reflect a process of differentiation in Ukraine. Differentiation is the book's main topic. Phillips points out that "it is mostly women who have been left to pick up the pieces of the disheveled social welfare

system” (p. 9). While some women in Ukraine may have sought refuge in their NGO activities from the process of marketization, others have taken their NGO work as an opportunity to further their careers in business or government.

In chapter 1, Phillips provides an outline of Ukraine’s history and the current political economy of the country. In chapter 2, with the guidance of one of the women, she explores in detail the post-Soviet “NGO boom” in Ukraine. In chapter 3, Phillips examines the stories of Maryna, Vira, and Sofiia as an indication of new forms of class differentiation in the country. In the last chapter, she focuses on Ivana’s life story and the upward mobility that NGO leadership offers.

Phillips mentions the enormous financial help provided by the West to build a civic society in the region, but she also remarks that “the Western civil society models that have been uncritically transplanted to Eastern Europe by political actors and donors do not leave much room for different ways of thinking about civil society, or for recognizing and valuing the pertinent expertise that former Komsomol and Party activists might possess” (p. 69). In Ukraine, Phillips notices, many NGOs, which are led by women, have focused on the needs of mothers, children, and youth. Western donors, who have tended to provide more funding to NGOs that support feminist ideas, often ignore this characteristic of Ukrainian women. Phillips mentions that in Ukraine many “associate feminism with a rejection of the family, and may correlate contemporary feminism with the failed state feminism of the Soviet Union” (p. 78).

Phillips maintains that even though “many NGOs in Ukraine are highly regarded for the important advocacy and consciousness-raising work they do, average citizens in Ukraine tend to be somewhat suspicious of civic organizations. NGOs are often perceived as fictitious fronts for money laundering ...” (p. 70). She shows that “the interventions of foreign donor organizations into the sphere of women’s NGOs have produced a kind of double differentiation. First, certain types of organizations have been promoted over others: NGOs whose mandates have been line with donors’ neo-liberal and feminist-oriented philosophies have been privileged, whereas others—for example, those that have made “socialist-era” claims for more support from the state or have had a maternalist orientation—have been devalued. Furthermore, select NGO activists have been equipped with criteria and language that they have used to differentiate themselves from other activists; this has lent them the social and cultural capital to move on from NGO work to other careers. This, Phillips argues, has further marginalized already vulnerable women.

Phillips concludes that “the NGO boom of the 1990s in Ukraine has not resulted in the widespread empowerment of vulnerable categories of citizens such as large families, the elderly, the sick, and the disabled ...” (p. 161). She suggests that coalitions of NGOs would result in a more successful political voice and that Western feminist-oriented NGOs need to be more understanding of the maternal character of many women’s NGOs in Ukraine.

The book includes explanatory notes, an extensive bibliography, an index, and letters and photographs that present a clearer picture of the issues. This monograph will be of interest to scholars, students, and researchers in sociology, anthropology, gender studies, and other areas.

Nadia Zavorotna
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Ksenya Kiebusinski, editor and curator. *Through Foreign Latitudes and Unknown Tomorrows: Three Hundred Years of Ukrainian Emigré Political Culture. Exhibition and Catalogue: Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto, 12 October 2010–13 January 2011*. 102 pp. \$20 paper.

This fine catalogue of rare and antique books from the University of Toronto Library describes the publishing and other activities of Ukrainian émigrés over the last three hundred years. The history of the political emigration from Ukraine went through several stages, and they are revealed in the organization of the catalogue and the character of the émigrés.

The earliest of them were the so-called Mazepists, followers of the Ukrainian Cossack hetman Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709), who joined the invading Swedish army of King Charles XII to fight the Imperial Russian forces of Tsar Peter I at the Battle of Poltava (1709) but were defeated and had to flee into exile. These Ukrainian refugees first fled to Bender in Moldavia, then under Ottoman rule, but afterwards spread out more widely. Some of them eventually found refuge in France.

Among these political refugees, perhaps the most important were the father-and-son team of Pylyp and Hryhor Orlyk. After Mazepa's death Pylyp was elected hetman-in-exile and agreed to the famous Bender Constitution (1710), which was geared to regulate relations between the Cossack army and its hetman. Hryhor was later active in France, and in the 1730s he aided the Polish king Stanisław Leszczyński in his unsuccessful attempt to regain the Polish throne. The Bender Constitution was impressively democratic for its time, and Hryhor's activities in France and Poland show the extent to which the question of Ukrainian independence (as early as the eighteenth century) could be bound up with European inter-state relations.

The second half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century form a hiatus in Ukrainian émigré activity, but after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 a new period of vigorous émigré activity began. Some of the participants in this unsuccessful insurrection were from Ukraine and included Ukrainian planks in their political and social platforms. A Ukrainian School of Polish Literature emerged from among the new refugees, and some of them were outright supporters of an independent Ukraine in alliance with a resurrected Poland. Perhaps the most important of these was the Cossack writer Michał Czajkowski, better known under the pen name Sadyk Pasha. Chaikovsky (Ukrainian orthography) was a descendent of one of the old Ukrainian Cossack hetmans; he was a Greek Catholic by religious background and thoroughly "Cossack" in his political sentiments. He developed his Cossack ideology in exile in France, where he published stories and tales about old Ukraine, and then he went to the Ottoman Empire, where he converted to Islam and led an Ottoman Cossack regiment against the Russians during the Crimean War. In later life the Russian ambassador convinced him to return to the Russian Empire and convert to Orthodoxy. In the 1880s Chaikovsky died in his beloved Ukraine, disappointed in love and scorned by many who considered him a turncoat.

The next stage in Ukrainian émigré activity occurred with the emigration of the Kyivan political thinker Mykhailo Drahomanov. This important Ukrainian figure was sent abroad in the 1870s by a group of Ukrainian cultural activists, the so-called Old Hromada, and was expected to publicize the plight of Ukrainian culture and language under repressive tsarist rule. Drahomanov settled first in Switzerland and then in Bulgaria. In Switzerland he published widely on the emerging Ukrainian question and let the Western world know of the

suppression of the Ukrainian language in the Russian Empire. He also pioneered Ukrainian democratic and federalist thought.

The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 inaugurated another phase in the history of Ukrainian émigré politics. Most active during this period was the Vienna-based Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, though an extensive printing program was also carried out through the Ukrainian publishing house in Geneva.

The failure of the Ukrainian national revolution of 1917–21, which was successful at establishing some short-lived national governments but was quickly superseded by Soviet rule, brought about the emigration of tens of thousands of new highly political émigrés. They, too, founded presses and publishing houses and newspapers and journals of various sorts. All shades of opinion were represented in this great emigration from the democratic Left to the extreme Right.

During the interwar period some of these émigrés even organized a number of relatively successful academic institutions in Warsaw, Prague, and Berlin. One of them, the Ukrainian Free University, was founded in Vienna but soon after was transferred to Prague, where it was active throughout the interwar period. Upon the approach of the Red Army in 1945 it was transferred to Munich, where it exists to the present day.

The defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 led to the exodus of another great wave of émigrés, who similarly established various printing houses and publications, most of them of clearly anti-Communist character. The hottest years of the Cold War, that is, the 1950s, saw the most intense period of their activity, but this activity continued without break right through to the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of independent Ukraine in 1991. From the 1970s onward, the post-war émigrés were joined by a small band of expelled Soviet political prisoners, whose activities were also rather substantial.

Dr Kiebusinski's catalogue contains examples of publications from all of these eras. Notable are an edition of Orlyk's constitution (Lausanne, 1916), Chaikovsky's *Contes cosaques* (Paris, 1857), Drahomanov's journal *Hromada* (Geneva, 1878–79), Dmytro Dontsov's *Die Ukrainische Staatsidee* (Berlin, 1915), and various publications from the interwar Ukrainian academic institutions in Czechoslovakia. Also notable are certain Ukrainian-language publications from Canada in the 1930s, including a description of the highly successful visit of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky's son, Danylo, in 1938.

From the Cold war era two publications are worthy of special note. These are the striking, indeed perhaps even shrill, *Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book* (Toronto, 1953), a book chronicling the Stalinist Terror and the Holodomor of the 1930s; and Semen Pidhainy's *Ukrainska intelihentsiia na Solovkakh: Spohady 1933–1941* (Germany, 1947), a memoir about an important part of the enormous Soviet Gulag of the 1930s and its many Ukrainian inmates.

The collection ends with the writings of Soviet dissidents, General Petro Hryhorenko and polemicist Valentyn Moroz, in the 1980s. The former was noted for his defense of the Crimean Tatars, and the latter, for his sharp defense of Ukrainian nationalism. The Gorbachev reforms of the later 1980s rendered émigré publishing much less significant, and the catalogue contains no examples from that era or afterward.

However, Dr Kiebusinski's collection is not strictly confined to émigré political literature as her title suggests. Examples of other treatments of Ukrainian subjects by European authors were included in the exhibition. Thus sixteenth-, seventeenth-, or eighteenth-century histories and descriptions of Poland or Russia containing Ukrainian material, such as Marcin Bielski's (1597) and Andreas Cellarius's (1659), are included, as are the famous works of Beauplan

(1660), Chevalier (1672), Voltaire (1732 and 1759–65), and von Engel (1796). Illustrations from most of these are printed in the volume, and they add a beautiful esthetic side to it. The attractiveness of the volume is also enhanced by the inclusion of several antique Ukrainian religious books printed in various forms of Slavonic, though what these books have to do with émigré political literature is highly questionable. In general, however, Dr Kiebusinski has given us a striking exhibition catalogue. It is much appreciated.

Thomas M. Prymak
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Symon Narizhny. *Ukrainska emihratsiia: Kulturna pratsia ukrainskoi emihratsii mizh dvoma svitovymi viinamy*. Part one. Second edition. Lviv, Kent, OH, and Ostroh: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 2008. 372 (text) + ccxxxii (photos) pp. Cloth.

Since it was first published in Prague in 1942, *Ukrainska emihratsiia* has been the most important and detailed work on the cultural activities of the Ukrainian émigré diaspora of the interwar period. Its author, Symon Narizhny (1898–1983), was a talented historian, a professor of the Ukrainian Free University in interwar Prague, and the director there of the Museum of Ukraine's Liberation Struggle. The initiator of the first edition was Yevhen Vyrovny, an important Ukrainian public figure in interwar Prague.

The publication of the second edition was a joint undertaking of the Lviv-based Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh), the Ukrainian Historical Association (UHA), and the Ostroh Academy National University (NUOA), with financial support from the Ukrainian American Association of University Professors. It begins with a very informative and heavily footnoted introduction by Lubomyr Wynar, president of the UHA, and Alla Atamanenko, head of the Dept. of Ukrainian Diaspora Studies at the NUOA, containing biographical information about Narizhny, a short history of the writing of this impressive work, and an analysis of Narizhny's other scholarly writings.

Narizhny's monograph has thirty chapters. He begins with a detailed account of the history of the Ukrainian political diaspora up to the end of the First World War (pp. 9–17). The next chapter is devoted to the tours of the popular Ukrainian Republican Choir directed by Oleksander Koshyts (pp. 18–32), and the two subsequent chapters describe the Ukrainian cultural and educational activities in refugee camps in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s (pp. 33–70). Narizhny then provides a very interesting account about Ukrainian students in Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, France, and other countries of Europe (pp. 71–118). However, his most striking accounts are about the Ukrainian postsecondary institutions in Czechoslovakia (pp. 119–92) and the Ukrainian Academic Committee and its members there (pp. 193–267). There Narizhny provides a detailed account of the activities of the professors and students of the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Poděbrady, the Ukrainian Pedagogical Institute in Prague, and the Studio of Arts in Prague. He also devotes chapters to Ukrainian gatherings, congresses, and the cultural and academic collaboration of Ukrainian academics with their colleagues at universities in Central and Western Europe. There is also an account of the activities of the Sokil sports and fitness organization and the Plast Ukrainian scouting organization (pp. 268–89) and a chapter on the cultural work of Ukrainian women in

the interwar diaspora (pp. 290–302). The last parts of the book are about cultural activities in Galicia, Bukovyna, Volhynia, and Transcarpathia.

All of the chapters are based on archival documents, most of which were preserved at the time of writing at the Museum of Ukraine's Liberation Struggle. The names of hundreds of individuals and many institutions and organizations in every chapter make this book indispensable for the study of the Ukrainian interwar diaspora.

An invaluable part of this impressive work is the 232-page appendix with 834 photographs, many of them group and individual portraits. Their quality in the reprint edition is considerably better owing to modern technology. The book also contains an extensive index of names and photographs.

This was the first, and unfortunately the last, monograph of a series that the Museum of Ukraine's Liberation Struggle had planned to publish. Narizhny prepared a second volume, but its manuscript was confiscated during the Soviet occupation of Prague in 1945 and long locked up in what is now the Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO) in Kyiv. It only became declassified after 1991 and was finally edited by Oleksandr K. Fedoruk et al and published in Kyiv in 1999.

For many years the first volume was considered a "black book" of the interwar Ukrainian émigré diaspora. Narizhny himself opposed this notion, but many members of the Ukrainian community believed otherwise. His book was so well researched and provided such detailed information, including the names and photographs of the active members of the Ukrainian émigré community, that the Soviet secret police (SMERSh) most likely used it to locate and arrest people in Prague in 1945.

The republication of this important work is of great importance for the study of the history of the Ukrainian diaspora and of Ukraine's intellectual and cultural history in general. This high-quality second edition will remain extremely beneficial not only to scholars, but also to anyone interested in the cultural and intellectual history of the Ukrainian diaspora in Europe between the World Wars.

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Frances Swyripa. *Storied Landscapes, Ethno-Religious Identity and the Canadian Prairies*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010, xiv, 296 pp. \$29.95 paper, \$55 cloth.

Frances Swyripa has written a multidisciplinary study on a complex subject: the establishment, development and maintenance of a distinct Prairie and Canadian identity. In her historical research she also includes information relating to architecture, politics, folklore, human geography, and related fields of study.

To some extent, the idea for this book began in Swyripa's childhood, when she traveled with her father on Sunday drives in east-central Alberta to visit country churches, cemeteries, and pioneer settlements. Her interest in this region grew, and more recently she conducted research in the company of friends, acquaintances, and students.

In the introduction Swyripa provides an outline of her study and mentions that she is concerned primarily with European immigrants who arrived in the region between the 1870s and the 1920s, and much less with the "two charter peoples," the French and English. The

main immigrant groups in question are the Ukrainians, Mennonites, Icelanders, and Doukhobors, with references to other immigrant groups in the three Prairie Provinces.

Throughout this study the recurring question is the role of ethnicity and religion in forming and preserving identity at the local, regional, and national levels. In chapter 1, Swyripa begins examining how personal and group identity evolved through a series of complex relationships that include religion, land, and history and had their roots both here and in their countries of origin. She illustrates the importance of ethnicity and religion to Prairie identity and, to a larger extent, Canadian identity. There are, of course, variations in these relationships and resulting identities depending on the specific group immigration and settlement experiences. Other factors include the presence or absence of a unifying collective consciousness, religious and national ideology, and strong local leadership.

During the settlement period there were attempts to “domesticate” the Prairies with familiar place names both from the country of origin or from Canada and the United States. Christianizing the local landscape with saintly place names, building churches and shrines, and establishing cemeteries were all part of this process. In some cases the new immigrants outnumbered the “host society,” and the absence of a “critical mass” to assimilate them rapidly enabled the immigrants to take the lead in domesticating the land. The establishment of a local identity parallel to mainstream society is the main theme of chapter 2, while chapter 3 traces the evolution of this collective identity along successive generations through founding stories and historical anniversaries. Chapter 4 continues the theme of the spread of a Prairie-based identity within Canada. Chapter 5 examines the development of the international dimension of this ethno-religious identity in relation to the country of origin and related groups in other countries, including the United States. This chapter includes references to the traditions of political and religious persecution and other forms of adversity in the countries of origin that contributed to the formation of the ethno-religious groups’ identities in Canada.

The final three chapters (6–8) examine the assimilation of the western Prairie experience by the pioneers’ descendants and by other group members who did not trace their origins to the pioneers.. Swyripa investigates the modern phenomenon of popular symbols of Prairie ethnicity, the use of homeland images, and the renovation of surviving landmarks, cemeteries, cairns, and monuments. Chapter 8 concludes the study with a discussion of the transformation of these sites into “sacred ground” and centres of pilgrimage and commemoration.

In her conclusion, Swyripa mentions that this book is still an unfinished product. The recognition by the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada that historical events specific to ethno-religious groups in western Canada are now of “national historical significance” suggests that Canadian national identity is still in the process of development. This view of Canadian society is a central component of the Canadian official policy of multiculturalism. According to this policy, both pioneers’ descendants and new immigrants can still contribute to building this inclusive Canadian identity.

Swyripa suggests that a tentative and basic definition of Canadian identity has evolved over the years. The degree of an ethno-religious group’s “Canadianness” may be determined by their ancestry in Canada. Anniversaries and monuments commemorating the arrival of the first settlers tend to confirm the Canadian pedigree of certain groups and their descendants that is often assumed by later arrivals. Therefore some groups perceive themselves as more Canadian than later groups of arrivals, but all of them are superseded by Canada’s First Nations and Inuit. Settlement of the land and the hardships of the pioneer experience are important in the founding stories, and they are also strong tests of a historic Canadian identity. The so-called “blood sacrifice” of members of specific groups in Canada’s wars is also an

important measure of their Canadianness. Monuments with the names of those who made the supreme sacrifice in Canada's wars are permanent reminders of this claim. These indicators parallel, to a large extent, the popular and informal definition of Canadian identity by the two charter peoples, the French and the English, and facilitate to some extent the merging of the various regional identities in Canada.

The evolution of a larger identity among ethno-religious groups, especially from eastern Europe, includes a legacy of persecution, martyrdom, and exile. Their sense of a people as "victims" has been an integral part of their religious and national identity. These experiences are not absent from the founding stories of the French and English settlement of eastern Canada, with the Conquest story of the Québécois and the Loyalist refugees fleeing the American Revolution. All share stories as victims, and it may be suggested that this theme forms one of the basic but unstated components of Canadian identity in contrast to the American tradition of "triumphalism." For some ethno-religious groups, it may be said that their claim to status as victims is a central component of their identity. As these groups have evolved in Canada, there has been a tendency to maintain their identity as victims with references through anniversaries and monuments to their history of political and religious persecution in their countries of origin and, in some instances, in Canada. This process is well documented in Swyrypa's study.

Of the four main groups studied in this book, the Mennonites and Doukhobors are primarily religious groups that tend to downplay worldly demonstrations and displays of their history and activities in Canada. Another group, the Icelanders, settled mainly in Manitoba, and they are not as numerous as the Ukrainians. As a result, it may be suggested that the Ukrainians tend to dominate the ethno-religious landscape of the Prairie Provinces by default.

Storied Landscapes will be of particular interest to students of elusive and perennial questions regarding the formation of a distinct Prairie and, at the national level, a Canadian identity. This is an interesting and worthwhile contribution that will be of benefit to students, scholars and the general public.

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Rhonda L. Hinthier and Jim Mochoruk, editors. *Re-Imagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011. x, 482 pp. \$35 paper, \$80 cloth.

For many years the general history of Canadians of Ukrainian background had been dominated by the chilly facts of the long Cold War between the democratic West, led by the United States, and the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, dominated by the USSR. In the classic studies of the Ukrainian Canadians by Paul Yuzyk, Olha Woycenko, Michael Marunchak, and others, there was an emphasis upon the struggle for economic survival and progress and a certain acceptance and social respectability within the wider Canadian polity. All of these authors emphasized the opportunities in the New Country and the problems of the Old Country, and they breathed a fairly conservative spirit. For them it was a given that the USSR did not end but, rather, only continued the oppression of their compatriots in the Old Country. Moreover, the above-named historians did not consider the so-called "progressive" apologists for the USSR in Canada to be worthy of serious consideration.

Of course, this did not mean that such “progressives” lacked a history in this land. The Ukrainian-Canadian pro-Communist organizations sponsored a number of historical publications, many of which contained important historical data. By far the most prolific of the pro-Communist writers of such works was the late Peter Krawchuk, who throughout most of his long career adhered very closely to the official party line in all relevant questions but, towards the end of his life, at the time that the Communist dictatorships were collapsing all across Eastern Europe, made a sincere, if not always successful, attempt to revise his earlier positions and write a more open and balanced kind of history. The book under review here follows in Krawchuk’s steps in that it clearly takes the “progressive” organizations as its major point of departure and strives to explore their history and nature further. Indeed, even in those articles in the book that do not directly address the history of these organizations, there is a definite bias in favour of social history of a leftish slant. Perhaps it is this slant that is referred to in the title of the collection, which states that the volume actually undertakes to, as it were, “re-imagine Ukrainian Canadians.”

I found three essays to be most conducive to this “re-imagining” project. The first is Orest T. Martynowych’s “Sympathy for the Devil: The Attitude of Ukrainian War Veterans in Canada to Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1933–1939.” He deals with the extreme Right rather than the extreme Left, but takes up some subjects that the Left has long pointed to and have been downplayed by conservative authors like Yuzyk and Marunchak: namely, just how strongly fascist and pro-fascist authoritarianism, militarism, and anti-Semitism influenced the extreme Right of the Ukrainian Canadian political spectrum. Admittedly, Martynowych seems to be hammering away quite ferociously at only one rather restricted aspect of these organizations, but he does make a clear and necessary point: extremism was present within both the Ukrainian Canadian Right and Left in of the 1930s.

The second essay that caught my attention was Jim Mochoruk’s “‘Pop and Co.’ versus Buck and the ‘Lenin School Boys’: Ukrainian Canadians and the Communist Party of Canada, 1921–1931.” He explores how the highly centralized and blatantly authoritarian leadership of “the Party” repeatedly tried to dominate and control the Ukrainian pro-Communist organizations and how the bulk of the leaders of these organizations, especially the very charismatic leader Matthew Popovich (1890–1943), resisted this attempt with some success while formally remaining ideologically loyal to the party. The third such essay is Andriy Makuch’s “Fighting for the Soul of the Ukrainian Progressive Movement in Canada: The Lobayites and the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association.” He takes the theme Mochoruk began considerably further, tracing the struggle against the official party line through the terrible events of the mid to late 1930s, when western Canada sank into the depths of the Great Depression and the dust bowl while Soviet Ukraine suffered a great famine-genocide and Stalinist terror. Unlike Popovich and company, however, Danylo Lobay and his supporters, in the end, would not cave in to the party’s authority and eventually were forced out. This group soon joined the democratic Left in Canada and became supporters of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (the CCF, forerunner of the NDP), which its Communist opponents sometimes labeled “social fascist.”

The general bias of the volume is quite obvious to the independent observer. In spite of an attempt to view the Ukrainian-Canadian Left with new and unblinkered eyes, much of the same old conceptualization and vocabulary is used: the organizations involved, the Labour Temples and others, are “progressive,” not “pro-Communist,” and their leaders are mostly sincere and not hypocritical. They, seemingly, and not the democratic socialists of the CCF, represent the true Left. This is a conceptualization and vocabulary that is clearly dated now

that the Cold War is long gone and the USSR no longer exists. It should be discarded, and a new conceptualization and vocabulary should be taken up. Unfortunately *Re-Imagining Ukrainian Canadians* does not even approach doing this, but, rather, retains the same old ideas about the Right and the Left and about what is “progressive” and, presumably, what is “reactionary.”

Finally, in particular, the points Martynowych makes in his paper about the Ukrainian-Canadian Right also need to be looked at in context. While it may be true that the organizations he names as having some “sympathy for the devil” (the Veterans’ Organization and the Ukrainian National Federation or UNF, among others) may indeed have contained many members that were in part under fascist influence and sometimes made anti-Semitic statements (for example in *Novyi shliakh*, the UNF’s official organ), the Nazis and the Italian Fascists were not the only devils around at that time—there were also many Stalinists and other Communist extremists—and, with regard to Ukrainian-Jewish conflict, many of the leading foes of an independent democratic Ukraine besides Leon Trotsky and Lazar Kaganovich had Jewish roots. This does not, of course, excuse militarism or anti-Semitism, and the authoritarianism and racism periodically expressed by the Ukrainian Canadian extreme Right can be correctly condemned. It does, however, go some way to explaining how in a free and democratic Canada, where despite the Great Depression very few people were actually starving, such extreme sentiments, frankly repulsive today, could be openly expressed. Moreover, the somewhat flamboyant nationalism of organizations like the UNF must also be seen as, at least in part, a reaction against the overt chauvinism of British North America in those days. Even in the Dominion of Canada of the 1930s there continued to be much Anglo-Saxon prejudice against minority groups such as the Ukrainian Canadians, and this, in particular, was responsible for much of the inferiority complex of so many members of this minority group at that time. The UNF’s extreme nationalism may have been partly a reaction against this inferiority complex, an attempt to heal it and inculcate a healthy national pride, and if so, the guilt for the alleged excesses of such organizations can be spread around quite widely. The same explanation, by the way, may be offered for the success of the militantly pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadian Left of those days. Anglo-Saxon prejudice and Ukrainian Canadians’ consequent inferiority complex may also have influenced the flourishing of the extremism of that Left, which as much as its rightist foes put much stock in positive cultural activities. The fact that the Labour Temples could not escape excessive adulation of the great leader and guide to all progressive humanity, Joseph Stalin, and eventually caved in to the party, should not go unmentioned, though this too needs to be put within a wider context.

Re-Imagining Ukrainian Canadians makes some small and very hesitant but also very necessary steps toward rewriting for our times the history of this interesting and diverse ethnic group whose history is so bound up with the class and national conflicts and the political polarization of the long Cold War. We may modestly conclude by saying that the road toward the integration of Left and Right into a new and more inclusive Ukrainian-Canadian narrative is a long one and most of this fascinating journey still lies before us.

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Artur Bracki. *Surżyk: Historia i terażniejszość*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2010. 272 pp. 31.50 zł.

During the past decade Surzhyk, or, in other words, the various results of mixing the Ukrainian and Russian languages, has become one of the favourite topics in Slavic linguistics. Whereas normativists have singled out real or alleged Russian elements in the Ukrainian language in order to pave way for a broader use of “purer” versions of the Ukrainian standard language, non-normative sociolinguists have often been fascinated by the phenomenon of Ukrainian-Russian code-mixing, and some of them have even begun propagating that Surzhyk should be regarded as a language of its own. Artur Bracki of Gdańsk University has collected and convincingly analyzed a representative sample of various materials ranging from transcripts of oral speech to quotations from the mass media. He has pondered a number of important theoretical approaches to the topic and found his way to a largely convincing, sober description of Surzhyk. In his preface, Bracki pays tribute to those Ukrainian and Belarusian scholars who generously supported him during his work. Apparently most credit goes to Larysa Masenko from Kyiv. At the very beginning of his introduction, Bracki aptly defines Surzhyk as “a type of speech manifesting itself in a sample of idiolects that are based on the Ukrainian language and exhibit strong Russian interferemes [Polish: *naleciałości*] resulting from the long-lasting coexistence of both languages in terms of asymmetrical bilingualism in its diglossic form” (p. 14). Whereas some might disagree with that definition, it seems to be broad enough to be able to match at least prototypical Surzhyk as a mass phenomenon in Ukraine. Most importantly, Bracki rightly argues that Surzhyk should not be understood as one consistent idiom, but as a plethora of linguistic varieties. Moreover, he emphasizes that mixed codes such as Surzhyk and Russian-Belarusian Trasianka are not unique at all, not even in the Slavic-speaking world (pp. 16–18). In an informative survey of the history of both Polish and Ukrainian sociolinguistics, Bracki focuses on the study of bilingualism. He concisely discusses various approaches toward Surzhyk from different angles and omits none of the major publications on the topic. Some readers might be surprised to find Ivan Dziuba’s *Internationalism or Russification?* among them. But because Bracki, like Larysa Masenko and others, tends to view Surzhyk as a result of Russian colonialism in Ukraine, this does make sense.

In his historical description of the Russification of Ukraine in chapter 2, Bracki correctly emphasizes the significant role of the eighteenth century, when Russian was developed step by step into a modern standard language and Ukrainian was increasingly confined to “the vivid speech of the commoners and oral literature” (“żywy język ludu i ustn[a] twórczość ludow[a],” p. 47). Bracki largely adopts the prevalent Ukrainian narrative, which also holds for his view of the Russian approach toward the heritage of Kyivan Rus’ (pp. 47–48). These historical parts are primarily based on Orest Subtelný’s *History of Ukraine*, and they end with the language bans of 1863 (the Valuev Circular) and 1876 (the Ems Ukase). Patriarch Nikon’s quasi-standard Ukrainian saying “Коли буде багато мов, підє розбрат (сму́та) на землі” (p. 45), as quoted from a Ukrainian source of the Ukrainization period, should have been replaced with a version closer to the (Russian) Church Slavonic original.

In his chapter on the etymology and history of the word *surzhyk*, Bracki does not only take into account Ukrainian sources, but also Russian, Polish (*sqrzyca, sqzyca*), and Czech (*souřež*) cognates (p. 55). Apparently Ukrainian *surzhyk* began to be used only in reference to people of mixed origin and subsequently to more kinds of mixtures, including mixed languages. Following Lesia Stavyska and Trub, Bracki identifies Oleksander Dovzhenko’s diary entry

from late May or early June 1942 as the first evidence of the use of “*surzhyk*” in the linguistic meaning of a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian. One might recall at this point Yuri (George Y.) Shevelov’s autobiography, where he writes that he heard the expression “*surzhyk*” for the first time in Kharkiv in the 1930s. Since Shevelov had already become a junior Ukrainian language specialist by that time, it is likely that the new meaning of the word began spreading only during that period as a result of the years of the most intense but still half-hearted measures of so-called Ukrainization—1926–33. While pondering the essence and the dimension of Surzhyk, Bracki also mentions a number of alleged synonymic expressions for the term, including “царський/панський діалект,” “мовний покруч,” “макароничне [correctly: макаронічне] мовлення,” or “кровозмісне дитя двомовності” (p. 57). It is not clear, however, in what sense such more or less accurate labels can be regarded as true synonyms of *surzhyk*.

Bracki aptly discusses various definitions of Surzhyk and highlights some of their shortcomings. In terms of theoretical questions, one might sometimes miss the broader picture pointing beyond Ukraine and Poland. Regarding the definition of code-switching and code-mixing, however, Taras Koznarsky, though he who did make an intriguing contribution to the study of Surzhyk, should not be the first authority to be cited (p. 68). And the high quality of Laada Bilaniuk’s study of Surzhyk notwithstanding, it comes as a surprise that Bracki, like some other young linguists in their recent works, tends to take her rather tentative ad hoc typology of Surzhyk for granted (pp. 69–70). As for the term “synonymous quasi-extension” (p. 68), i.e., the replacement of Ukrainian terms with synonymous Russian ones, it is not entirely clear from where Bracki took it. In his view, Surzhyk is above all a result of “synonymous quasi-extension.” However, if Surzhyk could be reduced to mere substitutions of isolated forms, the quite complex character of the phenomenon would be hard to understand. Bracki takes no position regarding the discussion about whether Surzhyk is an urban or a rural phenomenon. He assumes that Surzhyk is not used by “educated persons who know at least one of the languages well (perhaps a territorial or regional variant) from which Surzhyk is formed, or by true bilinguals” (p. 72). Perhaps, however, this depends on the situational setting in which a certain act of communication takes place?

Chapter 3, on “The Present Shape of Surzhyk from a Sociolinguistic Perspective,” is of central significance for the book’s theoretical foundation. In it Bracki views Surzhyk against the background of some linguistic varieties, such as colloquial language, slang, and *prostorichchia*. It is interesting to see how he faces the problem of translating the latter term into Polish categories and willy-nilly confirms the difficulties of working with that extremely fuzzy term (which has been adopted from Russian “*prostorechie*”). “*Język pospólny*” (common language) is barely the best Polish translation for the word, because its (contemporary) negative aspects as a degraded and vulgarized manifestation of a concrete language are much less present (if at all) in the genuinely neutral Polish term. One of the strongest statements of this chapter is that Surzhyk allegedly lacks any norm or the possibility of the creation of a tradition (p. 81). Bracki views Surzhyk as a variety close to pidgins but not to creole languages, yet he rightly does not identify it as a pidgin. He not only emphasizes the differences between Surzhyk and Yiddish, but also tends to undermine the similarities between Surzhyk and Belarusian Trasianka. His stance on the latter comparison seems to be based on different scholarly approaches in Ukraine and Belarus than on the linguistic entities themselves (p. 104).

More than once Bracki emphasizes his critical attitude toward the “Novye yazyki novykh gosudarstv” project in St. Petersburg. What he disagrees with the most is his Russian

colleagues' thesis that Surzhyk and Trasianka are basically new languages in formation (e.g., pp. 101–102, 126–28). Most interestingly, Bracki raises the question whether Surzhyk can be regarded as an interlanguage or as a product of semilingualism (p. 103). It would have been interesting if he had elaborated a bit more on that. On several occasions Bracki emphasizes that the various hybridizations of Surzhyk are always bound to concrete speech acts and are of an individual or, in other words, idiolectal character (e.g., p. 105). In his discussion of Surzhyk's phonetic features one might have wished to see more accurate phonetic transcriptions, particularly with regard to the Russian examples, which more often than not do not exhibit *akan'e* and so on (e.g., p. 109).

What Bracki clearly underestimates are dialectal differences, particularly those of Ukrainian but also those of Russian. For example, Russian [vs'ehda] need not be regarded as a Surzhyk form in a Russian-based text, because the fricativization of *g* occurs not only in Ukrainian, but also in the South Russian dialects. Apart from that, it is not easy to understand Bracki's considerations about the graphemization of Surzhyk (p. 112) if one acknowledges the fact that any graphemic system is necessarily a result of compromises. Finally, one might also note some inconsistencies in the rendering of certain forms (e.g., on p. 115, *питаються* along with *питаються*).

Bracki argues that the largest group of Russianisms consists of "special terms, technical expressions, or definitions of abstract concepts" (p. 119); the second-largest group (a quite fuzzy one), of "expressions in the central position of the utterance" (ibid.); and the third-largest group, of "words denoting items and concepts of everyday life and names of most general activities" (p. 120). It turns out that it remains hard to establish any rules that would really deserve such a name, i.e., explain something in a way that would make various phenomena of Surzhyk predictable at least to a certain degree. This is not astounding if Surzhyk is really primarily as idiomatic as Bracki suggests. Altogether his linguistic observations are interesting and largely convincing, but his remarks on syntax definitely remain too unclear. In particular, it is not easy to understand what syntactic "simplification" means in his description (pp. 123–26). The last passage in chapter 3 is devoted to one of the burning questions regarding Surzhyk, namely, whether its codification is possible. Given his outlined key theses, Bracki denies that it is (pp. 126–28).

The last and longest chapter, on the functioning of Surzhyk, is probably the book's most intriguing part. Bracki collected materials on Surzhyk in "everyday communication," "the mass media," "mass culture," and "belles-lettres and their translations into Polish." He puts the strongest emphasis by far on "everyday communication." Bracki conducted his fieldwork during the years 2006–2008 on "the entire [?] territory of Ukraine" and recorded thirty-one transcripts of longer Surzhyk utterances and ten transcripts of spontaneous utterances in Kyiv, supplementing them with nine photographs of announcements in Kyiv allegedly demonstrating their authors' "inability to distinguish between the Ukrainian and the Russian code" (p. 131). Bracki conducted his interviews in Ukrainian because, as he states, otherwise the respondents would have probably switched to Russian (ibid.). If, however, Surzhyk speakers are truly unable to distinguish between the two codes, would not the result necessarily have been just another kind of Surzhyk? Since I believe that Bracki's latter assumption is correct, something else seems to be at stake. After all, because of the traditional privileged position of Russian in Ukraine, Surzhyk speakers tend to know Russian better than Ukrainian. Although conversations in Russian would probably not have yielded the "purest" varieties of Russian in the respondents' utterances, they might have provided less mixed, less Surzhyk results with at least some of the interviewees.

Bracki transcribed all of the examples of Surzhyk in his book using the Cyrillic Ukrainian alphabet. He also provided their “phonetic transcription,” which, however, is not really based on phonetic principles but rather on phonemic ones. He also translated all of the fragments into Standard Ukrainian, Standard Russian, and (for the Polish reader) Standard Polish (cf. pp. 132–33). It would have been worthwhile to provide true phonetic transcriptions, and at very best a CD containing all of the recorded fragments could have greatly enhanced his study. (Such a CD is part of Salvatore Del Gaudio’s *On the Nature of Surzhyk: A Double Perspective* [Munich: Otto Sagner, 2010]; cf. my highly critical review in *Wiener Slavistisches Jahrbuch* 57 [2011]: 245–55). Bracki differentiates various fragments according to their small, middle, or high degree of deviation from Standard Ukrainian. His categorizations are largely convincing, but sometimes, quite naturally, also questionable. His analysis of Surzhyk in the mass media suffers a bit because he did not differentiate clearly enough the materials he recorded from common speakers, advertisers, journalists, anchormen, and other mass-media professionals. In the book’s passage on Surzhyk materials taken from mass culture, Vierka Serdiuchka’s shows occupy a central part, whereas in the passage on Surzhyk in belles-lettres the analysis of its translation into Polish receives particular attention.

Bracki prepared his book carefully. Misprints or formal mistakes occur very rarely; e.g., “репресіонованих” (p. 26) instead of “репресованих”, “інтерферени” (p. 21) instead of “інтерфереми,” and *Eneida* dated 1897 (p. 113) instead of 1798. Bracki has tried to give a thorough description of a linguistic phenomenon, and he views it from a much more distanced and sober angle than many other Slavists outside Ukraine have. No one interested in Surzhyk or, in the broader context, the coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian should miss getting acquainted with this solid work. It is the best study of Surzhyk published thus far.

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Jacob P. Hursky. *Selected Works*. Volume 21/Numbers 49–50 (2000–2008) of *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 220 pp.

Many Ukrainian émigrés who settled in the United States after the Second World War were budding scholars whose formal induction into the world of academe was disrupted by the turmoil of war and displacement. For some, like Jacob (Yakiv) P. Hursky (1923–95), the relative stability of a new environment offered an opportunity to persevere and continue their scholarly interests. Moreover, during the Cold War of the mid-1940s to 1991 a premium was placed on those whose specialties were valued for their possible contribution to the West’s drive to match and surpass the Soviet Union’s threatening hegemony. These decades were the golden age of Slavic and East European studies in America, an age that provided an appreciative context within which Jacob Hursky, like many of his compatriots, pursued his scholarly interests, often with the support of government grants and university scholarships. For Hursky these interests were rooted in Ukrainian philology and culminated with his doctoral dissertation, “Patronymic Surnames in Ukrainian,” which he defended at the University of Pennsylvania in 1957, only seven years after immigrating to the United States in 1950. This work, published here for the first time, constitutes this volume’s cornerstone (pp. 19–118) and is accompanied by four shorter studies by Hursky. Three of them (two in Ukrainian) were published earlier, and the fourth is “a revised version of part of his dissertation” (p. 9).

In general, Hursky's approach is historical-geographic, as favoured by somewhat dated, classical European philology, rooted in a diachronic mindset driven by nation-building concerns. And so, for example, we learn that Ukrainian "surnames in *-enok* are met for the first time in the mid fifteenth century" (p.107); that etymological clues suggest Ukrainian surnames are derived from Christian names, occupations, social status, ethnic origin, and so on (pp. 47–94); and that certain areas of Ukraine show a preference for certain patronymics over others (see page 112 for a geographic–distribution map). Other, more fashionable methodologies are bypassed; in particular, those that surfaced with the explosion of synchronic and contrastive linguistics in the 1960s at places like MIT and Harvard have no place in Hursky's work. One wonders how these other perspectives on patterning and structure in language could have worked to reshape Hursky's investigations. (An example of such an approach is reflected in Jaromira's Rakusan's "Slavic Immigrants, Situation, and the Process of Naming," in *Living Record: Essays in Memory of Constantine Bida [1916–1979]*, ed. Irena R. Makaryk [University of Ottawa Press, 1991], 371–87.)

Somewhat baffling, if not surprising, is the seemingly padded bibliography at the end of Hursky's dissertation, where a subsection on "Works Consulted" (pp. 116–18) includes a plethora of dictionaries and grammars (there are questionable entries for Julius W. Stechishin's *Ukrainian Grammar* [Winnipeg, 1951]) and American knock-off reprints [Mykhailo L. Podvezko's *Ukrainian-English Dictionary* and Hryhorii Holoskevych's *Pravopysnyi slovnyk*]) mixed in with a variety of directly relevant titles. Was there a lack of discrimination here? Of course, Hursky is unable to defend these quirks, and, besides, given his methodology's exclusive reliance on historicity it is the printed word (and not the living, spoken word) that constitutes his primary and possibly only source of documentation, guidance, and information.

With his focus on Ukrainian surnames, Hursky's commitment to historical phonology quite naturally caused him to look at comparative links between Ukrainian on the one hand, and Romanian, the South Slavic languages, and Old Church Slavonic on the other. This bent is reflected, for example, in a separate, admirable foray (pp. 153–68) into the language of chants from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as found in a "*bolgarski*" *heirmologia* housed by a monastery in Galicia. In a way, Hursky's disinterest in pursuing Ukrainian-Russian connections can be viewed as a tacit refusal to associate with politically tinged practices promoted by official Soviet scholarship.

A family photo and the many glowing tributes reproduced in this work suggest that this publication (funded by Hursky's widow, Valentina and edited by Assya Humesky) is meant to serve as a posthumous, commemorative volume saluting Hursky's academic and scholarly achievements. Unfortunately, although scholarly output (listed on pp. 14–16) points to a wide spectrum of interests (including music), these other aspects of Hursky's productivity are given little attention.

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Alla Nedashkivska. *Ukrainian through Its Living Culture: Advanced Level Language Textbook*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2010. xxii, 342 pp. \$60 cloth.

An advanced-level textbook of the Ukrainian language in English has long been overdue. Indeed, for over two decades no such book was published in North America. *Ukrainian*

through Its Living Culture is an imposing eight-by-ten-inch edition that is convenient to use. (Once it is opened, it stays open.) It is the most visually attractive of all the textbooks of Ukrainian published in English thus far. The text is liberally spaced, and the pages have wide left-page margins. It offers what none of its forerunners did—a wealth of pictures in colour, and well-spaced, easy-to-read print in black and occasionally in red.

In this textbook Alla Nedashkivska strives to follow the language-teaching guidelines of the American Council for the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL), which emphasize the need to teach in real-life situations. Thematically it is organized into nine units, each focusing in turn on such topics as student life, personal life, housing and employment, leisure, restaurants, a healthy lifestyle, travel, music, and sports. Each unit consists of two parts. The first part is geared to developing an advanced command of the language; the second part allows the learner to acquire some superior-level skills, such as hypothesizing. The textbook offers the instructor flexibility by portioning out its material in such a manner as to accommodate course programs varying in length from thirteen to forty weeks. The five appendices include key expressions used in general discussions and in discussions of books, articles, films, and so on; speech etiquette formulas; grammar notes; and a note on the two competing Ukrainian orthographies—the Russified one introduced in 1933, and the one that predated it and is now quickly gaining ground despite the fact that it has not been officially reinstated.

The textbook is focussed on developing conversation skills. Brief texts from the contemporary Ukrainian mass media and dialogues are used as the points of departure. The vocabulary, with some important exceptions, is useful and limited to words frequently used in the most common everyday informal situations. The content is presented in easily manageable portions with a great deal of authentic material—advertisements, restaurant menus that the learner is most likely to see in Ukraine today, posters, flyers, artistic programs, schedules, and other information. The topics are aptly illustrated. All of this creates a context of cultural authenticity. Instructors and students alike are bound to be attracted by the textbook's active use expressions and phrases that are popular in Ukraine today. Alla Nedashkivska's enthusiasm for teaching students the colloquialisms, jargon, and slang that young people in Ukraine use is apparent. An undeniable merit of her textbook is its general orientation toward modern Ukrainian youth culture and the language of the information revolution, including SMS vocabulary, Internet jargon, and expressions for "cool" things.

Any path-blazing work, and this surely is one, is bound to leave some bases uncovered. Nedashkivska's immediately obvious and puzzling oversight is the absence of word stresses in her textbook. One of the main challenges of learning Ukrainian is its highly mobile stress. That authentic Ukrainian texts do not mark it is hardly license for language instructors or students to ignore it. The absence of word stresses has been a systematic drawback of most language teaching materials published in Ukraine over the last two decades and detracts significantly from their usability. In contradistinction to that indefensible practice, there has been a consensus among most authors of Ukrainian language teaching aids published in North America regarding the need to mark word stresses, for in many cases words cannot be pronounced correctly without them. This unfortunate oversight makes effective use of the textbook by both instructors and students highly and needlessly challenging, if not impossible.

Instructors of a language that has been an object of imperial assimilation inevitably face the problem of finding a balance between the descriptive and prescriptive approaches to their material. In other words, should texts be taken as they are, regardless of whether or not they conform to the literary norm, or should they be carefully monitored in order to isolate and

discard elements artificially introduced into the target language as a result of its forced assimilation? Nedashkivska has clearly chosen to use a descriptive approach. As a result she includes phonetic (*нульовка* instead of *нулівка*, *студік* instead of *студик*, *Макдональдс* instead of *Макдональдз*, *Рівер* instead of *Ривер*), grammatical (*на вищому рівні* instead of *на найвищому рівні*), lexical (*ессе* instead of *есей*, *роботодавець* instead of *працедавець*), syntactic (*приходить в Макдональдс* instead of *приходить до "Макдональдзу"*), and stylistic (*інтернет використовуються студентами* instead of *інтернет використовують студенти*) elements whose Ukrainian provenance is questionable. If she had applied a more selective approach, she still could have made good use of the contemporary language of young people without violating the literary standard and granting macaronic elements the legitimacy they do not have. Ukrainian has been under relentless pressure from Russian in all spheres of communication. Consequently, if a textbook fails to help students to learn the literary norm of the target language, it fails to achieve its first and foremost purpose.

This textbook would have gained considerably by making a clear and systematic distinction between written (formal) and spoken (informal) speech. In Nedashkivska's book the separation between the two is absent or blurred. Stylistically coloured words and expressions are often not labeled as such—e.g., *нишпорка* (p. 201), *крик моди* (p. 212), *посидинок* (p. 229), *халена* (p. 331); or mislabeled—e.g., *скуйовджена шевелюра* (p. 52), *автозаправка* (p. 314), *багажник* (pp. 161 and 314), *річка* (p. 327), *шевелюра* on p. 332). In Appendix II, the two forms of speech are explicitly treated as being no different: "How to discuss books ... orally or in writing."

Some of the book's headings are misleading. It is unclear, for example, what the expressions of personal opinion and articles of clothing have to do with stylistics (p. 44); or why such terms as *нульовий*, *підісти на наркоти*, *двинуті стрілку*, *чайник*, *стрілянути*, and *стріла* are given under the rubric of sports slang (p. 226–27): they are hardly limited in semantics and usage to sports. Similar stylistic and functional misattributions are given to other items: *брехунець*, *здирати*, *інді*, *компакт*, *круто*, *парті*, *ніпл*, and *фан* (p. 200). At the same time Nedashkivska introduces stylistically marked colloquialisms, slang, and jargon under the heading of "Language and Culture" (p. 200). Sometimes she presents an expression in a truncated form or without sufficient explanation about how it is used. For example, *треба комфортно* (p. 49) should be *комфортно вдягатися*; *гріти руки* (p. 68) should be *гріти руки на чомусь*; and *переводити розмову* (p. 113) should be *переводити розмову на щось інше*.

The text has a number of erroneous forms. *Приймати участь* (pp. 88, 136) should be *брати участь*; *дієслівниковий* (p. 104) should be *дієслівний*; *і в хвіст, і в гриву* = *не дбаючи* (p. 113) should be *дуже сильно, нещадно*; *Для Козерогів* and *Для Раків* (p. 135) should be *Козерогами* and *Раками*; *проходьте* (p. 153) should be *заходьте*; and *перетворення в* (p. 154) should be *перетворення на*. Nedashkivska has left several foreign names untranslated: *Pepsi* (p. 98) and *New Form*, *Mixer*, *Medirun*, and *Medistep* (p. 146)—an inadmissible violation of specific rules regarding the rendition of foreign names into Ukrainian. Ukrainian, unlike Russian, has followed the principle of transcription in such cases. Yet Nedashkivska's textbook all too often departs from this principle and reproduces the writing rather than sounding of foreign words. On at least one occasion the prices for services in Ukraine are given in U.S. dollars instead of hryvnias (p. 156). There are also erroneous or disputable word descriptions: e.g., *у нього не всі вдома* (p. 36), which does not mean *нерозумна людина*, but *дивакувата або божевільна людина*; *постіль* (p. 229); *нам до снаги* (p. 230); *ударна та кидкова техніка* (p. 239); *дурниці* (p. 242); *адже* (p. 248); and *нишпорка* (p. 201). The textbook is not free from

other forms of Russian linguistic interference: e.g., *абсолютно вірно* (p. 246) should be *абсолютно правильно*; and *уікенд* (p. 260) should be *вікенд*.

It is a tested and accepted lexicographic practice to present items in explanations, notes, or glossaries in their dictionary forms instead of the ones that are used in a text. Nedashkivska often ignores this principle, however, and this is bound to create confusion and additional difficulties for the learner. For example, instead of their singular forms, we find only the plural forms of the nouns *брови*, *вії*, *губи* *зуби*, *очі*, *щок*, *босоніжки* (p. 40), *кросівки*, *сандали*, *туфлі*, *черевики*, *чоботи*, *шкарпетки* (p. 41), *аксесуари* (p. 51), *шафки* (p. 70), and *знайомства* (p. 77); and instead of *відігравати особливу роль* we find *особливої ролі це не відіграє* (p. 77). *Singularia* and *pluralia tantum* nouns are not labeled as such: e.g. only sg. *одяг* (37) and *волосся* (p. 40); and only pl. *джинси* (p. 40), *плавки*, *штани* (p. 41), *меблі* (p. 69), and *канікули* (p. 77).

For me the pedagogical value Nedashkivska's repeated use of general questions to lead the discussion of texts (pp. 31, 35, 55, 71, 81, 93, 118, 126–27, 157, 187) is questionable. It is a commonplace that yes/no questions are hardly the best pedagogical strategy to solicit an extended speech sample from the learner. Therefore, instead of "Do you often read it?" one should ask "How often do you read it?" to elicit more than a monosyllabic answer.

There seems to be no clear division between the ACTFL's levels of proficiency in Nedashkivska's presentation of material. Her appendices offer topics regarding verb conjugation, basic etiquette formulas, and a rather inadequate explanation of the basic functions of cases and other topics that pertain to in lower levels of language proficiency. For instance, the brief explanation of the ways to form degrees of comparison of adjectives is more confusing than instructive. Synthetic and analytical forms thereof are mentioned in one sentence, and the important fact that Ukrainian gives a clear preference to the former is ignored. Semantic differences between such parallel forms as *молодший/молодіший* 'younger' and *старіший/старіший* 'older' are left unexplained. There Nedashkivska's unfortunately brief elucidation will leave the learner with the impression that adjectives that do not have comparative/superlative degrees are something of an oddity ("some adjectives and adverbs"). In fact, only qualitative adjectives (*білий*, *свіжий*, *твердий*) have such forms, while two other semantic classes of adjectives—the relative (*кам'яний*, *дерев'яний*, *водяний*) and possessive (*Іванів*, *приятельчин*, *риб'ячий*)—do not have them.

The book's serious drawback is its rather shorthand presentation of grammar. In my opinion, at the advanced level grammar should be treated in depth, with a focus on difficult cases that are left outside the program of elementary- and intermediate-level language courses. Such topics may include, for example, the genitive singular of inanimate masculine nouns of the second declension; the modality of verbal aspect; the historical past tense; the interaction between style and syntax; and patterns of building words. In Nedashkivska's textbook the user will find a minimum grammar, reduced to tables and superficial explanations that are not free of disappointing mistakes (e.g., the conditional conjunctions *якщо* and *якби* are repeatedly called particles on pp. 298–99). The grammar exercises therein are almost exclusively geared toward reviewing grammar on the elementary and intermediate levels. Learners would be well served if the book contained references to Ukrainian grammatical and lexicographical resources, such as Andriy Hornjatkevych's very helpful *530 Ukrainian Verbs*, the Web site *Sloynyky Ukrainy on-line* <corp.ulif.org.ua/dictua>, or even <sum.in.ua>, the electronic version of the 11-volume dictionary (1970–80) of the Ukrainian language published by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Such references are much called for in view of the extremely curtailed descriptions of entries in the Ukrainian-English glossary at the end of

the textbook and of the notable absence there of an English-Ukrainian glossary. Learners who wish to fill this void by turning to existing dictionaries are left to fend for themselves.

Finally, it is unclear what value the numerous Russian or English loanwords scattered throughout Nedashkivska's textbook can have for learners if they are presented as if they are Ukrainian: e.g., *відстежувати, впадо, влом, летюча миша, стрілка, кльовий, прикол, (по)тисуватися, прикид, прикидатися, лейбл, фітнес-зал, рекордінг, бодібілдинг, боулінг, тренінг, фітнес, дайвінг*. That such words are often encountered in contemporary Ukraine is evidence of a general degradation of language culture there, a fact that country's leading linguists have bemoaned. The popular use of such words is hardly a reason to include them in language-teaching materials. If anything, an unsuspecting learner should be clearly instructed that such linguistic anomalies are to be avoided, and they should not be encouraged to use them. Instead Nedashkivska has classified some of them (*лейбл, бодібілдинг, боулінг, тренінг*) as "new Ukrainian words," thus giving them an endorsement they do not merit.

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Adriana Helbig, Oksana Buranbaeva, and Vanja Mladineo. *Culture and Customs of Ukraine*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2009. xx, 195 pp. U.S.\$75 cloth.

This relatively slim volume presents the reader with a succinct examination of post-Soviet Ukrainian culture and society from a multi-faceted perspective grounded in cultural anthropology, ethnography, literary studies, gender studies, and history. Primarily focusing on expressive cultural practices of Ukrainian society—ranging from such institutionalized domains as religion and education to topics of pastime and everyday life—the authors also look into history, politics, and the social makeup of Ukrainian society to contextualize their discussion. The volume begins with an introduction of Ukraine as a geographic entity and a modern nation, followed by a highly compressed yet well-balanced excursus into last two millennia of Ukrainian history. As dense as it is, the presentation of historical context is well crafted and well referenced. Throughout the book's remaining chapters, the authors examine religion, language, gender, education, customs, holidays, cuisine, mass media, literature, music, theatre, and cinema.

Readers should not expect a sustained exploration of all of the topics included in the book: some received extended analytical and historical treatments while others did not. Thus the chapters on religion, language, literature, theatre, and music take the reader, somewhat predictably, as far back as the period of Kyivan Rus', while the chapters on gender, customs, holidays, and cuisine dwell mostly on recent developments. The critical perspective applied to the discussion of religion, music, literature, language, customs, holidays, and cuisine in Ukraine makes the chapters on those subjects more informative and more engaging. For example, despite the limitations imposed upon this volume by its format, the chapter on religion offers a thoughtful analysis, a good narrative, and an excellent focus. Underscoring the importance of ecumenism in Ukraine, it attempts "an historical overview of the role religious institutions and identities have played" in Ukraine at various times and contexts (p. 30). As such, it provides a good and balanced introduction to the multi-faceted and complex history of various faith communities in Ukraine and also to the relationship between religion, identity, and culture in Ukraine's various regions. Another example of a well-rounded presentation is the chapter on

music. The expertise of one of the book's coauthor is in the field of musicology, and it is therefore not surprising that this chapter provides a wealth of information, even if in a succinct way, both from a historical perspective and regarding recent developments in Ukrainian music.

There are, however, chapters in this volume that are less informative and have no particular analytical focus. The chapter on theatre and cinema, for example, only touches upon major and well-known facts from the twentieth century history of both artistic traditions, leaving the reader mostly uninformed about the recent and often exciting developments in Ukrainian cinema and especially theater since Ukraine's independence. Further on, the chapter on gender only touches upon developments in gender relations, rights, and equality as they have been experienced in Ukraine during the twentieth century. It only briefly discusses the gender situation in Ukraine, focusing on women in Ukraine, violence and trafficking, feminism (only as limited to the literature), abortion, and homosexuality. The chapter makes no reference to the pre-modern framework of gender relations in Ukraine before the twentieth century, despite the fact that such a discussion would certainly have enhanced the existing outline of gender-related issues in Ukraine today.

Despite its shortcomings, *Culture and Customs of Ukraine* is a welcome addition to the large collection of publications on Ukraine and has great value as a teaching tool, especially in the K–12 curriculum and possibly university introductory courses on contemporary Ukraine. All of the co-authors have great expertise about Eastern Europe and Ukraine specifically. Applying their own disciplinary lenses, rooted broadly in cultural anthropology, ethnomusicology, political studies, and international affairs, they have produced a readable, concise, and refreshing reference book about contemporary Ukraine and an excellent primer on Ukrainian culture. The co-authors' no-nonsense language and their unbiased presentation of often complicated aspects of Ukrainian history will be appreciated by a wide range of readers. The book's value also lies in its exploration of the most common elements of Ukrainian culture—day-to-day practices, social relations, the importance of friendship and family, gender relations, the perseverance of the collective, and so on. Given the focus on the contemporary and ordinary and that the volume is mostly oriented towards readers with little or no exposure to Ukraine, this book will provide them with an adequate understanding of the nuances and realities of life in Ukraine today.

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Yaroslav Rozumny. *Batktivshchyna v poezii Yara Slavutycha*. Kyiv: Vydavnychiy dim "Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia," 2009. 179 pp.

Liudmyla Skoryna. *Zvytiaha slova, rozdumiv i dila: Poeziia Yara Slavutycha*. Cherkasy: Brama-Ukraina, 2007. 312 pp.

Yaroslav (1918–2011) was a major figure in émigré Ukrainian culture. The author of popular language textbooks, a literary scholar, and an organizer of cultural life, today he is probably best remembered as a prodigious poet. Slavutych's poetry never suffered from lack of attention on the part of scholars. A number of works about him appeared in the diaspora beginning in the 1960s, and as soon as contacts with Ukraine became possible in the 1990s, writing about Slavutych became somewhat of an industry there. The two books under review are among the last such studies published during the poet's lifetime (both with funding from

the Slavutych Foundation). A fellow Canadian Slavist, Yaroslav Rozumny (Professor Emeritus Jaroslav Rozumnyj of the University of Manitoba) focuses in his small book on the central theme of Slavutych's poetry, that of the fatherland. Liudmyla Skoryna, a younger literary scholar in Ukraine, provides in her more substantial monograph a complete overview of Slavutych's poetical oeuvre.

Rozumny's work is informed by Western concepts of émigré writing, in particular the sense of loss and guilt present in so many diaspora literatures. He offers a subtle reading of Slavutych's often declarative poetry, finding behind it a disoriented émigré who idealizes his lost homeland. Rozumny shows the tension between the poet's constant longing for the native steppes of southern Ukraine and his attempts to imagine first northern California and later Alberta as a surrogate fatherland, while at the same time feeling guilty for the "sin" of accepting the new land (pp. 81 and 121). Rozumny rightly points out that, for all the superficial optimism Slavutych expressed about the Ukrainian-Canadian experience expressed in *Zavoivnyky prerii* (1968), the poet's predominant imagery there is that of a cold northern winter that suggests despair (p. 124).

However, directly connecting this despair to Slavutych's professional unhappiness at the University of Alberta for much of the 1960s and early 1970s (p. 125) is perhaps too simple an explanation. Likewise, identifying the "oasis" of the eponymous poetry collection with Monterey, California, where Slavutych taught from 1955 to 1960 (p. 88) does not flesh out fully the tensions Rozumny himself identifies in Slavutych's poetic world.

Skoryna is probably more on the mark when she notes that the "oasis" in question is (inaccessible) Ukraine, which is only confirmed by the absence of this place name in the collection, as if it were taboo (p. 79). Unlike Rozumny, who is concerned with the big picture of the poet searching for the lost fatherland, she also offers a close reading of many of Slavutych's poems.

Skoryna stresses the merging in Slavutych's oeuvre of neoclassical and neoromantic poetic language. He wrote practically about everything in his favourite form, the classical sonnet. But Slavutych went against his self-acknowledged teachers—the Neoclassicists—because, unlike him, they would not compose political or satirical sonnets (p. 183). Skoryna incorporates most if not all the findings in existing literature about Slavutych. Some of her more interesting observations about his poetry are original, such as her remarks about his alliteration and sound consonances (pp. 122 and 156) and the virtual lack of intimate motifs, except in Slavutych's imitations of Japanese and Central Asian poetry (p. 155). In agreement with Rozumny's reading, Skoryna notes astutely that Slavutych declared his love for the Canadian prairies immediately upon arriving there, in a poem he composed while he stopped at the first gas station upon entering Alberta by car (p. 129).

Much of what Slavutych says in his poetry about his family history is the stuff of legend, if not outright poetic hyperbole. His real family name, Zhuchenko, is widespread enough to find some Zhuchenkos involved in many great events of Ukrainian history, and all of them, of course, appear as the poet's ancestors, not to mention that Yar happens to be the name of a Slavic pagan deity, a point also not lost on Slavutych. Skoryna marshals theoretical approaches from Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault to separate Slavutych's poetic persona from the real Slavutych (pp. 242–44). This helps her to explain some inconsistencies in his autobiographical poem *Moia doba* (1957–78). But Skoryna presents other mythologies as if they are established facts, without critical comment (pp. 21, 106, and 113–14). It is also worth noting that she presents criticisms of Slavutych's poetry only as quotes from other scholars. Rozumny has more freedom in this respect. He even registers his uncertainty about some of the youthful poems Slavutych wrote

during the Great Terror's last years about the need to "cleanse this land with fire"—were they anti-Soviet or, on the contrary, very Soviet (pp. 45–46)?

Both Rozumny and Skoryna situate Slavutych's poetry not in the context dictated by its neoclassical form, but in the one determined by its explicit didactic function. His patriotic rhetoric and constant interest in Ukraine's history present Slavutych as carrying on the tradition of the poets of the Prague school and the *Vistnyk* circle, such as Yurii Klen, Oleh Olzhych, Olena Teliha, and Leonid Mosendz. Both books portray Slavutych as a prolific poet and patriot who insisted on the national literature's traditional forms and ideological function—components that were only reinforced by his long life in exile. His longest autobiographical work was entitled *Moia doba* (My Epoch), and, indeed, his passing marks the end of an era.

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Olha Luchuk, ed. *V inshomu svitli/In A Different Light: A Bilingual Anthology of Ukrainian Literature Translated into English by Virlana Tkacz and Wanda Phipps as Performed by Yara Arts Group*. Lviv: Sribne Slovo Press, 2008. 792 pp. Cloth.

V inshomu svitli /In a Different Light is an ambitious publication. It corrals over twenty years of Virlana Tkacz and Wanda Phipps's co-translations of Ukrainian poetry into English. The volume contains translations of verse by thirty-seven Ukrainian poets, beginning with Tkacz and Phipps's earliest collaborations in 1990. The majority of the poems in the volume are by contemporary authors. Notably, however, this anthology also includes translations of Pavlo Tychyna's *Zamist sonetiv i oktav* (Instead of Sonnets and Octaves, 1920) in its entirety and of Lesia Ukrainka's drama in verse *Lisova pisnia* (The Forest Song). Also included are incantations, legends, epics, and traditional songs. The anthology's three introductory essays, by Virlana Tkacz, Natalia Pylypiuk, and Olha Luchuk (the volume's compiler and editor), provide the story of how this volume came to be as well as insights about its contents.

In her essay Tkacz notes that her and Phipps's co-translations were created primarily for use in her theatrical productions performed by the Yara Arts Group in New York, i.e., that their focus was on the performance aspect of poetry. This impetus inspired not only the strategy they employed in rendering the selected texts into English (allowing them to stray often from the original form of the poem), but also the approach they adopted in organizing this publication. In the anthology the poems are grouped according to the particular productions in which they were featured. The theatrical performances that had taken place in the past are given prominence over poems that are to be read using this volume today. As a result, when read as a book of Ukrainian poetry, the publication suffers from the manner in which its contents are presented to the reader. Different poems by the same author are scattered throughout the book. As individual poems, the translations are easily accessible and consistently inspiring. When the poems are read consecutively, however, one's enjoyment of them becomes compromised. For a reader who has not experienced Yara's performances, it is often difficult to make the connection between the grouped poems. An earlier publication of some of the translations—the delightful *Ten Years of Poetry from the Yara Theater Workshop at Harvard* (1998)—is more successful in presenting such a conceptual approach (poems grouped according to their use in Yara's productions); its brevity (45 pages), and superior design are a better fit for such an effort. Perhaps a different organizational plan would have

better suited the presentation of the large number of quality translations contained in *In a Different Light*. Also, despite the anthology's handsome and title-appropriate cover, the design of its pages is surprisingly dull for a book of vibrant poetry and theater; it is saved only by the sixteen pages of colour photos of Yara's productions.

The anthology's organizational and design flaws notwithstanding, it constitutes a substantial collection of Ukrainian poetry for the English-language reader. This alone establishes this book as a major contribution to world literature, Ukrainian studies, and translation studies. The book's second half shows its unique significance. Featured therein is a collection of notes, interviews, and press items about Yara's productions, bringing together evidence of the committed work of this group over a twenty-year span. The documents offer an insider's view of a theatre director and actors working and surviving in their particular field.

The time period in which Yara emerged has undoubtedly steered the subject matter and contents of its productions: the launch of the group's activity coincides with glasnost and Ukraine's subsequent achievement of independence. The 1990s were a fervent cultural period that saw both the rehabilitation of cultural achievements and individuals who had been banned in the Soviet Union, as well as the emergence of the many new vibrant and diverse voices in post-Soviet Ukrainian literature. Thus, in Yara's productions, Antonych, Neborak, Svidzinsky, Lysheha, and many other representatives of Soviet and post-Soviet modernism are presented simultaneously. These productions reflect what was happening in Ukraine culturally in the initial years of its independence. This particular timing also corresponds with post-Soviet Ukraine's suddenly open access to the West. In many ways Yara's work became an attempt at culturally straddling Ukraine and the United States: actors, poets, designers, and musicians from both countries (as well as from other countries) are woven into Yara's productions. This is where *In a Different Light* reveals its exceptional value. Reading the various notes, project ideas, and press clippings reproduced in the volume, one is thrust into a world in which the key individuals of Ukrainian cultural life—Ukrainian intellectuals and artists—and their work become intertwined in Yara's projects. *In a Different Light* presents the story of the first two decades of Ukrainian independence, starring the key journals that wrote about Ukrainian theatre and literature at that time (many of which have ceased to exist but were so vital at the time) and the individuals who were most active then (sadly, some of them have since died). The volume's name index is a very useful tool for navigating the interconnected paths these men and women treaded.

All of the materials in this anthology are presented in both English and Ukrainian. This demonstrates the conscious intention of the co-translators, editor, and publisher to make the book be available to audiences and readers both in and outside Ukraine. This decision is praiseworthy, considering the book's archival value: Ukrainians will have access to the story of a formative period in the cultural life of their young state, as will scholars outside the country studying contemporary Ukrainian culture.

In the autobiographical section of her introductory essay, Virlana Tkacz discloses that her family instilled in her a love for poetry and that it is together with poetry that she delved into theatre arts. It was also with poetry that she embarked overseas to begin connecting all of the individuals and cultural institutions contained within this book. Combining all of the above-mentioned elements, *In a Different Light* encapsulates the scope of Yara's contribution to Ukrainian culture, offers a bilingual guide to Ukrainian cultural activity at the turn of the twenty-first century, and locates poetry at the center of this cultural effervescence.

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Vasyl Makhno. *Thread and Selected New York Poems*. Translated by Orest Popovych. New York: Meeting Eyes Bindery, 2009. 126 pp. U.S.\$15 paper.

The thematic scope of Vasyl Makhno's first book in English translation is announced right at the outset in its title: it is by and large about New York City in its multicultural, multiethnic vitality. To be even more precise, it is mainly about the poet's experience of this metropolis. Makhno observes, reflects, and converses with his predecessors and contemporaries alike in order to digest the new American reality in such a way that it becomes his own. His New York comes across as a site of archaeological importance in which he digs layer by layer into textual deposits left by other poets he admires, from Federico García Lorca and Walt Whitman to John Ashbery and members of the New York Group of Ukrainian émigré poets. Makhno, a Ukrainian poet who settled permanently in New York in 2000, celebrates his newly adopted city with all its ups and downs. At first he does so with a dose of considerable hesitation, if not outright reluctance.

However, *Thread and Selected New York Poems* presents a wider perspective. Even though the largest selection of the poems therein originally appeared in Ukrainian in Makhno's collections *Cornelia Street Café: Novi ta vybrani virshi, 1991–2006* (2007) and *38 virshiv pro Niu-York i deshcho inshe* (2004), *Thread* conveys considerably more than the poet's ruminations about New York or America at large. It also reveals his own philosophical reflections on existential matters, where time passing, love, home, and poetry are essential markers of his new life. But Makhno does not shy away from social issues. He can turn into a social critic in no time, wrenchingly describing the immigrant realities (e.g., in "The Weekend of an 'American Family,'" or the triptych "Chinatown"). More importantly, *Thread* can also be perceived as Makhno's inconspicuous autobiography, where fragments of his life's journey, poetically expressed throughout the book, can be put together to form a coherent story.

In the poem "SS Brandenburg 1913" we discover, for example, the poet's roots on his father's side. The story of two young emigrant girls from his father's village, Dubno, also gives Makhno a pretext to talk about the historical events his family lived through (forced repatriation from Poland to Ukraine after World War II), and, finally, about his own emigration almost a half-century later. We also learn that he has a wife and two daughters (e.g., in "Would You Stop Loving Her If You Knew She's a Lesbian?") and that he lives in Brooklyn, attends poetry festivals, and has become quite a local patriot of the Big Apple (e.g., in "An Aviation Response to Yuri Andrukhovych"). Fittingly, the book ends with the poem "A Farewell to Brooklyn," in which Makhno reflects on his creative work and years spent in that borough. By doing so he implicitly signals a new beginning in his life.

Overall, the thirty-one poems (thirty-three if one counts the poems of the "Chinatown" triptych separately) in *Thread* are those by a poet who embraces difference and locality with typical postmodernist acceptance. Makhno's New York is deeply rooted in the specific and reflects diversity, history, and allegiance. His community of others includes both poets and the ordinary men and women he observes while walking or while drinking coffee in a café.

Michael Naydan, in his brief introduction to the book, points to "the absence of conscious beginnings and endings" in Makhno's poems and suggests that it is "the middle where the poet gravitates" (p. 7). While "the middle" is indeed where the main thrust of Makhno's vision resides, I would argue that beginnings are quite well marked in his poetry, while endings are not. In the poem "Thread" for example, Makhno contemplates a man's life; it unfolds like a thread from the known beginning (birth), but where it leads to no one knows,

“and you are left at the bus stop / alone” (p. 13). That is, death is implied but presented as unknown, something one awaits, but “the next bus / as always is late” (p. 13). The poem “America” presents the same dilemma, but not on a personal level. For Makhno America is “a ship between two oceans” (p. 50), and while incredibly interesting things are going on there, where this “ship” is sailing to is unknown. He just gives us a snapshot, a slice of life at a time. There are no political connotations in the poem. It is a hymn to life, with all of its dynamism, interactions, creativity, and incongruities.

Makhno comes across in translation as a lively poet who aspires to be a citizen of the world. He is witty, observant, sophisticated, and simultaneously down to earth. He is not afraid to be politically incorrect (e.g., in the triptych “Chinatown”: “Chinese women are pregnant practically / all the time” [p. 53]) but is free of malice. If anything, Makhno displays a considerable dose of compassion, especially in his socially minded poems. The fact that he is so readable and engaging in English is in no small part thanks to an expert rendition by Orest Popovych. In his brief note “About the Translations,” Bohdan Rubchak (one of the poets of the New York Group about whom Makhno wrote a poem) introduces Popovych as a translator and provides his own evaluation of his translations. This is rather an unusual practice, but justified here: Popovych is not a seasoned translator, and therefore he deserves credit all the more for sustaining the poet’s atmosphere and tone throughout the book. Clearly Popovych’s translations are a labour of love. He managed not only to preserve the content but also to render all the nuances of Makhno’s poetic craft. For example, contrary to what Naydan says in his introduction, Makhno does have rhymed poems, and Popovych shows great courage by trying to convey them as rhymed in English. Because Makhno rarely uses exact rhymes, in many ways this made Popovych’s task somewhat easier. His English rendition of “Gertrude Stein” masterfully preserves not only the poem’s rhythm and rhyme, but also the wordplay so prevalent in the original text.

Nonetheless Popovych has had to make some compromises, arising mainly from his desire to reflect the Ukrainian text faithfully. For example, he translates “о 12-й вночі” (p. 60) “at 12 midnight” (p. 62) although “12” and “midnight” are redundant. Moreover, he translates “а хто там чекає удома тебе?” (p. 38) “there is no one waiting for you at the house” (p. 40); but here “at home” would be the more colloquial and natural term. Perhaps Popovych chose “house” so that it would rhyme somewhat with “response” in the previous line. Clearly, in cases like these it is a matter of choice as to what is best sacrificed, rhyme (however remote) or diction. I would also have rendered “додому буття” (p. 120) “to the house of being” rather than “to the home of existence” (p. 122), because this way we instantly receive an intertextual reference to Heidegger’s famous remark that language is the House of Being. Taking into account that Makhno delights in incorporating various inter-texts, nuances like these are indeed important. Popovych’s shortcomings of this kind are rare and isolated, however, and they do not mar his otherwise excellent rendition.

The book’s copy-editing is more problematic. In this bilingual, Ukrainian-English edition of the Meeting Eyes Bindery, an imprint of the small New York publishing house Spuyten Duyvil, typos abound; for example, “he” instead of “the” (pp. 8, 121), “tree” instead of “three” (p. 41), “know” instead of “knew” (pp. 35, 37). Even in the Ukrainian text there are errors: “гостий” instead of “гострий” (p. 15) and “сповнів” instead of “стовнів” (p. 75).

Also problematic is the fact that the poems’ original Ukrainian texts and their translations do not face each other on verso and recto pages. Only occasionally, in the case of one-page poems, do we see both variants on a single page. For readers who do not know Ukrainian this

is not an issue, but for bilingual readers this arrangement does not facilitate ready comparisons of the poems' original and translated texts.

Despite the above shortcomings, one can only rejoice that with this volume Vasyl Makhno has become a member of a distinct, though far too small, group of Ukrainian poets whose books of poetry are available in English and hence accessible by wider, international audience.

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Oleksander Dombrovsky, ed. *Visti UVAN*. Volume 4. New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 2007. 283 pp. Cloth.

Asia Humetska [Assya Humesky], ed. *Ukrainsko-amerykanska asotsiiatsiia universytetskykh profesoriv: Statti i materiialy*. Ostroh: Vydavnytstvo Natsionalnoho universytetu "Ostrozka akademiia," 2008. 371 pp. Cloth.

Liubomyr Vynar, ed. *Materiialy do istorii Ukrainskoho istorychnoho tovarystva*. New York and Ostroh: Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo, 2006. 383 pp. Paper.

These three volumes are devoted to three important Ukrainian post-war émigré academic institutions in Canada the United States: the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. (UAAS), the Ukrainian Historical Association (UHA), and the Ukrainian American Association of University Professors (UAAUP). All three carried on most of their work and publishing activities in the Ukrainian language and catered primarily to a clientele within the Ukrainian community in North America. Nevertheless, as the documents in these collections show, they did have some impact in the wider academic community on this continent.

The New York-based UAAS (Ukrainian: UVAN) was probably the most influential. Its English-language *Annals* revealed a fairly high level of academic discourse during the difficult early and middle years of the Cold War, which began in 1945 and only fully ended in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of an independent and more democratic Ukraine. The UHA was probably the second most important of the three. It published its journal *Ukrainskyi istoryk* continuously from the early 1960s throughout the latter half of the Cold War, through the period of the Gorbachev reforms, right into the early period of Ukrainian independence. It still appears today. The UAAUP was much less prominent, with no consistent publishing program and no high profile in the general academic community. But it did provide background and support for other Ukrainian institutions and academic, offering prizes or awards to certain outstanding works of Ukrainian scholarship.

The volume of *Visti UVAN* considered here contains a variety of materials on the history of the organization, but two pieces stand out: Oleksander Dombrovsky's general history of the organization and a detailed bibliography of the various works of the prominent Ukrainian historian, Dmytro Doroshenko (1882–1951), that were published since 1942, when the last bibliography of his works appeared. Together the two bibliographies provide a very full picture of the contribution of this important historian to Ukrainian historical scholarship and to the history of his times.

The second and third volumes considered here are basically reprints of the information bulletins of the organizations and provide materials for the history of the UHA and UAAUP. Both contain modest introductory remarks by the editors or others. The bulletins reprinted therein contain some information about major questions that faced the scholars who belonged to these institutions, such as, for example, in the case of the UHA, why publishing in Ukrainian was important for émigré scholars in the 1960s, 1970s, and later; the arguments in favour of and against the publication of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's great *History of Ukraine Rus'* in an English translation; and the controversy and politics surrounding the publication of Ivan Teslia and Evhen Tiutko's *Istorychnyi atlas Ukrainy* (1980). All three attractively produced and professionally edited volumes provide source materials for a major task awaiting future generations of scholars—producing a history of Ukrainian émigré scholarship.

Thomas M. Prymak
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Books Received

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
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In the footnotes, Ukrainian and Russian book and article titles should be transliterated according to the modified Library of Congress system below, i.e., without diacritics; without indicating the soft or hard sign (б,б) by a single or double prime (except in the word "Rus"); and with surnames ending in -sky instead of -s'kyi (Ukrainian) or -skii (Russian). Thus, the Ukrainian and Russian alphabets are as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| А | А | Н | Н |
| Б | В | О | О |
| В | В | П | Р |
| Г | Н (Ukrainian), G (Russian) | Р | Р |
| Г | Г | С | С |
| Д | Д | Т | Т |
| Е | Е | У | У |
| Є | Ye in initial position, otherwise ie | Ф | Ф |
| Ж | Zh | Х | Kh |
| З | З | Ц | Ts |
| И | Y (Ukrainian), I (Russian) | Ч | Ch |
| І | І | Ш | Sh |
| Ї | Yi in initial position, otherwise i | Щ | Shch |
| Й | Y in initial position, otherwise i | Ы | Y |
| К | К | Э | Е |
| Л | Л | Ю | Yu in initial position, otherwise iu |
| М | М | Я | Ya in initial position, otherwise ia |



